Grain trade in Early modern Mantua and Venice: The role of Ashkenazi and Italian Jews

Abstract

The economic role of Ashkenazi and Italian Jews in early modern Italy is traditionally associated with money-lending and second-hand goods retailing. Yet, fiscal and notarial sources show how beneath the surface of the charters signed between the minority and the local authorities, their business was far more diversified. In the northern and central Peninsula Jews had built a strong network based on endogenous and exogenous trust which permitted them to also engage in (inter)regional trade. From the early sixteenth century, when the establishment of the ghettos and changes in the economic system made banking far less lucrative, trading in commodities became a profitable alternative. The case studies of Mantua and the Venetian state show how this process was also strictly intertwined with the local political environment, as Jews had to resort to different sorts of informal and formal relationships with local power structures in order to take part in the grain trade.

Keywords:

• Jewish grain trade
• Early modern Duchy of Mantua
• Early modern Venetian State
• Ashkenazi Jewry
• Italian Jewry
• Vincenzo I Gonzaga
• Federico II Gonzaga
• Jewish Community of Mantua
• Jewish merchants
• Jewish bankers
• Condotte (charters of privileges)
• Early modern Venetian Jewry

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 See Caffiero (2012, Maifreda (2021, pp. 33–34) and Toaff (1989, pp. 214–219). On the other hand, being guaranteed the provisioning of kosher food was vital to the very existence of any Jewish community, as the orthodoxy of the Jewish faith is strictly merged with orthopraxis, through halakhic rules. This explains, for instance, why in 18^th-century Venice the Jews were still buying more than other groups the top quality wheat (fior di farina) (Vertecchi, 2009, p. 54): not just for status reasons, but also because it was needed to bake foods such as matzhah and unleavened bread.

2 For instance, this contradiction between formal institutional and religious rules based on theoretical positions and everyday life was experienced even in early modern Rome, where the popes continued to ban Jews from grain trading when proclaiming other mitigations. That was the case with Sixtus V and his constitution Christiana Pietas (22 October 1586) which opened occupational chinks for the Roman Jewry, but reiterated the prohibition against being directly involved in grain and wine traffic, and more in general with food commodities broadly (see also previous papal bulls of 20 August 1555 and 19 April 1566). This notwithstanding, Jews seemed quite accustomed to gift prelates with a variety of delicacies such as sugar, chocolate, and foie gras. See Groppi (2018, pp. 599–600, 606, 622–624).

3 The disparaging image of the minority as ‘infamous’ due to its association with the sin of usury was spread during the 15^th century by mendicant preachers, who stressed the impossibility of Jews belonging to a perfect and saintly Christian society; see Hanska (2014) and Muzzarelli (2005).

4 See the considerations in Israel (1998, pp. 37–41) on the Jewish role in the spread of a mercantile perspective and organisation in the central and northern states of the Peninsula between the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

5 Thanks to a close-knit set of family and business connections, they could make the most of a variety of strategic networks, which merged the homophilic component based on their shared Jewishness with the individual and community relations they could forge with the leading political and economic groups of the majority. On the network models, Currarini (2015).

6 The same was true even in the case of the relations among different regions and rulers, thanks to which the minority was able to take advantage of their political rivalry. An example was Lucca in the fifteenth century, where competitiveness between the two main Jewish families was used to force the decisions of the local government thanks to the backing of the Neapolitan court and the hostility to the Florentine power; see Cohen Skalli and Luzzati (2014, pp. 46–56).

7 Concerning the strength of such ties the reference (a contrario) is Granovetter (1983, pp. 201–233). See also Garruccio (2000). According to Granovetter, weak ties could offer people more economic opportunities than strong ties as they act as a bridge between different social environments. Compare to Armani and Schwarz (2003, pp. 221–251). See also Luzzati (1996) and Toaff (1996, pp. 268–287). As for the Jewish networks in the Age of Absolutism and in the modern age see Stern (1950, pp. 27–28), Bermant (1971), Chapman (1984, p. 18), and Ferguson (1999, pp. 278–286).

8 On the relations between the Jewish minority and Italian princes see Savy (2020, 129–141) and Haverkamp (2010).

9 On the need to avoid the distortions arising from an a priori classification according to any given time and place by analysing which contracts better suited a specific group of economic actors in a specific context, see the considerations advanced by Trivellato (2020, p. 251).

10 See the thoughts on the role of microhistory in a larger comparative context, as well as the role of the minorities in these theoretical attitude, as analysed in Trivellato (2011, pp. 13–17, esp. pp. 14–15).

11 The choice of Venice is significant, also due to the dearth of comparative studies between the Serenissima and other states, even within the Italian peninsula, due to its peculiar path of economic development which has often been read as unique by historiography (Fusaro, 2020, p. 185).

12 For instance, in Venice the role of the Sephardim in the new mercantilist attitude of the patriciate emerging during the sixteenth century has largely overshadowed the fact that the natione Todesca hold wider occupational interests than moneylending and petty second-hand retailing since the establishment of the Ghetto and through the later Middle Ages and during the ban from trading that lasted up to the seventeenth century both in the Mainland and the capital; an historiographical attitude that prevails even when considering mercantile routes and networks within the Peninsula. See Cooperman (1987) and Israel (1998, pp. VII–VIII, 39–40).

13 In 1612, when the ghetto of Mantua was built, the Community consisted of 2300 ‘mouths’, while in Venice the initial Jewish population was of circa 700 individuals, although seeing a rapid and consistent growth with the arrival of the Sephardim, from around 900 people in 1551 to 1400 in 1563. See respectively Simonsohn (1973, pp. 191–192) and Favero and Trivellato (2004, p. 45).

14 For a definition of ‘court Jew’ see Israel (1998, pp. 101–118).

15 For example, being involved in the provisioning of garrisons; Israel (1998, p. 115).

16 A slightly earlier starting point for our analysis of the Venice case is functional to understanding the mechanisms adopted to accumulate commodities via the credit market, and to explain the birth of that business practice, which would be perfected during the Ghetto period. The later Middle Ages also show how the Jewish interest in grain coming from the Mainland state partly anticipated the general Venetian trend of shifting its major victualling supply from the sea to its landed dominions, which would only be thoroughly pursued by the Serenissima after the 1550s.

17 The Magistrato Ducale was the authority that supervised the city’s supply of food, controlled the duchy’s cereal production, oversaw the upkeep of the river banks, and monitored the value of silver and golden coins circulating in the state.

18 In both cases, we try exploit the peculiarities of the sources more specific to business history, that is those records which give evidence of how a particular trade actually operated; on this theme see also the considerations in Fredona and Reinert (2020, pp. 16–17).

19 On the relation between the Jewish minority and Italian princes see Savy (2020, pp. 133–136).

20 See Mueller (2008, pp. 68–83), and for the main cities and districts of the Mainland state see local cases in Mueller and Varanini (2003).

21 Ravid (1987, p. 172, 180–184), and for a longer term picture of the Venetian Jewry after the establishment of the Ghetto see Pullan (1971, pp. 431–578). The moneylenders’ charters were renewed in 1513, whilst only in 1515 was the right to open 10 shops dealing in second-hand goods granted by the Republic (see Pullan, 1971, pp. 481–482).

22 Things changed with the arrival of the Sephardic minority from the Ottoman state – the Levantine nation – followed by fellow Jews coming from Western Europe – the Ponentines. Both settled in the Ghetto together with the original Italian-Ashkenazi community (the natione Todesca), but the Levantines were considered foreign traders, subjects of the Sublime Porte; Ravid (1993, pp. 280–285).

23 Jewish involvement in the agricultural and food commodities market was in fact quite common in other Italian states and cities like Ferrara (Traniello, 2012, p. 55), especially for those living in smaller contexts (Maifreda, 2021, p. 109). The peculiarity of the Venetian state was the fact that it should have not been possible in any case, and was even explicitly prohibited in some local charters. Nonetheless, it was customarily accepted in practice.

24 Clerici (2001), and for the Vicentine case in the grain market also Clerici (2021b, pp. 119–126).

25 ASVe, Senato, Misti, reg. 55, c. 77r (30 December 1424).

26 See Corazzol (1979) for the definition (pp. 15–17) and the diffusion of the livello francabile contracts in the early modern Venetian state.

27 On the solid and complex system of partnerships of the Jewry of Italy through the central and northern Peninsula, and the diversification of investments and exchanges in many areas characterized by different economic environment (both urban and not), and different regional states see the example of the Finzi family examined in Romani (2007).

28 On grain provisioning in Venice in the sixteenth century see the role of the magistrate of the Provveditori alle Biave described by Aymard (1966), Mattozzi et al. (1983), and Mattozzi (1983).

29 For instance, in 1435 Calimano, the Jewish moneylender of Bassano, was trading wine asked as a repayment for his loans, chosen as a money-equivalent good to be resold in a period characterized by a rapid increase of the population in the district, and thus a growth of the food demand. Being repaid in wine became so usual in Bassano that in 1489 the local Jewry was accused of evading taxes on wine, and they answered the community that their exemption from wine taxes had been customary for years for their business in that commodity; Scuro (2021, pp. 153–154). Besides, at the beginning of the sixteenth century at the moment of the establishment of the Ghetto, the Republic worried about finding proper accomodation to two Jews granted privileges (in 1511) as inventors of devices to build grain mills, and that had previously worked in several towns in the Brescia district; another indirect proof of the interest of the Mainland Jewry on the grain sector, and its secondary spheres (see Segre, 2021, pp. 545–546).

30 As stated, for instance, in the charters re-discussed in the Senate in 1566 (ASVe, CL, b. 188, cc. 416r–421v [19 February 1566]).

31 ASVe, CL, b. 188, cc. 378r–379v (26 August 1542). The Senate remarked that the Jews were banned from every kind of trading excepted second-hand goods dealing, and unredeemed pledges.

32 This network has been defined by Luzzati as the res publica iudeorum of Italy, marked not only by economic affairs, but also by cultural and social identity thanks to a set of kinship and partnership bonds grounding their F-connections (see Luzzati, 2004, p. 197); see also Maifreda (2021, pp. 158–159), and the considerations in Romani (2008). Once the alien Sephardi element had settled in Italy, and constrained life conditions in the ghettos spread, the Italian and Ashkenazi minorities who had previously lived in the same geographical areas, but divided in their ‘community’ spheres, found a new sense of collectivity, as epitomised in the two elements of the Venetian natione Todesca.

33 Large part of the Provveditori’s archive has been lost for the period previous to the later seventeenth century, and only a few capitolari books survive for the Cinquecento; on the source Vertecchi (2009, pp. 15–23).

34 At this stage of our research the relevant element is the participation of the Ashkenazim and Italian Jewry in such a trade, as in the absence of other typological sources for Renaissance Venice any consideration must necessarily remain pending on the qualitative side. What sources survive cannot fully answer quantitative issues, and also often lack more detailed elements regarding the commodity itself (generally cited as ‘grains’, exactly as in the case of similar contracts signed between Christian partners). Only after the conclusion of a progressive, yet unavoidably slow collation of all the surviving deeds through the several hundreds of coeval notarial registers, will it be partially possible to give quantitative trends too.

35 The involvement of Sephardim as direct public suppliers to the Venetian Provveditori alle Biave seems also to have been quite sporadic. For instance, between 1558 and 1574, only on one occasion were grains sold to the Republic by the Levantine Moyse Salit (a prominent member of that community); ASVe, PB, b. 4, reg. 7, c. 97r (28 February 1564). The same applies to his coreligionist from Italy Abraham de Osimo (Aymard, 1966, p. 88) which will be mentioned below. As a consequence, it can be inferred that where they took part in the trade it was mainly within the sphere of private mercantile partnerships.

36 Capitoli della ricondotta (1981, chapters 92–93). During the first half of the Cinquecento, broader opportunities were accorded to the Jews of the Mainland, since by that time it had become generally accepted that they would trade (mercandare), especially in the textile sector, despite the frequent attempts of the local communities (both in the cities and in smaller centres) to forbid it. However, in 1558 the Senate prohibited them any other commerce other than second-hand dealing, as in the case of their coreligionists in the capital (Pullan, 1971, p. 527).

37 Given a population of around 160 thousand inhabitants at the middle of the sixteenth century, and an average consumption of grain ranging between 3 and 4 staia (250–330 litres) per person per year, the annual Venetian demand at that time was of c. 560,000 staia each year; for these estimates see the values in Aymard (1966, pp. 15–17).

38 Other grains arrived from central Italy (the Marches and Abruzzo esp. [Aymard, 1966, 38–42]).

39 Grain from the Mainland could not usually be stored for more than a year, while crops from Romagna and central Italy could last two (Aymard, 1966, 77).

40 The Provveditori alle Biave used fiscal incentives to ease the provisioning of Venice and encourage merchants to increase supplies, for instance permitting the re-export of a quota of the grain to other subject territories or with discounts on custom duties. Commodities from like central Italy and Romagna, favoured by the Jewish traders, are often listed among the markets which benefitted of those import advantages, as in ASVe, PB, b. 3B, reg. 6, c. 1r (10 March 1550), c. 62r (14 October 1553), c. 83v (18 June 1555); Ivi, b. 4, reg. 7, c. 27v (14 October 1558), c. 36v (4 February 1559); or b. 4, reg. 9, sub data (13 February 1595). Lombardy and Mantua were counted among source areas too; ASVe, PB, reg. 6, c. 23r-v (23 February 1551); b. 4, reg. 7, c. 161r (21 July 1570); and b. 4, reg. 9, sub data (24 July 1596). Besides, in the Mainland state also, cities like Vicenza and Verona used to resort to Central Italian grains, with the consent of the central power.

41 On credit sales in Renaissance Veneto, see Grubb (1996, pp. 133–155).

42 ASVe, NotA, b. 8249, VII, cc. 30v–31v and 31v–32v (17 December 1562).

43 ASVe, NotA, b. 8250, I, cc. 35v–36v (4 February 1563) and 36v–37v (5 February 1563).

44 The Vicentine case is significant, as in the city there were no Jews after the expulsion of 1486. However, the local elite, who had decided to banish the Jews perceived as rivals in the economic (and mainly financial) sphere, did not altogether renounce their services, and used the banks of the Venetian Ghetto directly or through Jewish intermediaries from the countryside, especially for the trade of money-equivalent goods; see Scuro (2017, pp. 254–260).

45 ASVe, NotA, b. 3266, cc. 465v–466r (6 September 1560).

46 ASVe, NotA, b. 8252, V, cc. 21v–22r (10–18 July 1567).

47 Something not very different, for instance, from the trading of woad between Venice and Urbino as practiced by the Finzi brothers in the same period (as in ASVe, NotA, b. 3259, cc. 338v–339r [24 December 1555]).

48 ASVe, NotA, b. 8244, IV, cc. 10v–11v (28 April 1557).

49 On the interrelation existing among the size of a community, the complexity of its society, the diversification of its production activities and the growth of its internal conflicts see Cohen (1966, pp. 91–118).

50 Charter of privileges granted by Francesco Gonzaga to the Jewish merchants of Mantua (28 October 1540) in Simonsohn (1973, pp. 768–770).

51 On this topic see Geertz et al. (1979, pp. 123–311) and Melis (1972).

52 Probably the author had in mind the Da Rietis, who in the 1580s moved to Mantua where they remained apparently uninterested in the trading of silk, grain and valuable assets.

53 In Renaissance Venice, for instance, Jewish banks were the mean to protect the more lucrative strazzaria business; see Scuro (2020, pp. 253–261) and Pullan (1971, pp. 539–540). In his essay about the connections existing between Jewish bankers of Tuscany and the Venetian region, Michele Luzzati argued that they were always involved in any kind of precious objects trade, and that fuelled a much larger business than the one of a single bank; see Luzzati (1985b, p. 260), Romani (2013, pp. 365–385; 2017, pp. 183–195), and Castelli (1959, pp. 83–84).

54 Note that the demographic decline in some areas of the Gonzagas’ state meant, ultimately, an increased capacity for export. Renzo Corritore correctly, in our opinion, interpreted the dukedom's further ruralisation as the result of a long-term economic conversion; see Corritore (1996, pp. 206–209, 214). For a different interpretation see Vivanti (1959, pp. 24–25).

55 For instance, as in Vertecchi (2013) and Clerici (2021a, pp. 7–9).

56 See the text of the charter of privileges granted by duke Guglielmo (4 April 1587) in Simonsohn (1973, pp. 775–778). Vincenzo I Gonzaga himself owed 20,000 ecus to Giuseppe Fano, for supplies of jewels, and was thus compelled to cede to him a part of one of his possessions, without even then entirely extinguishing the debt; ASMn, MCA A VI (1588–1594) and A VI (1595–1599), 3 April 1591; 2 July 1597. Concerning the theme of the general existence of not only muddled but sometimes contradictory rules see Groppi (1999, p. 536).

57 In 1605 the duke reserved the right to concede the affittanze as he pleased; see the Charter of Privileges granted by duke Vincenzo in Simonsohn (1973, pp. 779–783).

58 ASMn – AG, b. 2064. The document (undated) is part of a file dated 10 November 1615, hinting at a quarrel between Salomone and Abram Vita from Ferrara.

59 As for rice as provision for troops see Lanaro (1998). See also ASMn, MCA, H V (1559–1746), (25 October 1746). On rice production in early modern Veneto and the consequences in the occupation of cultivated land, see Ciriacono (2006, pp. 30–31, 69–71).

60 If compared to other Italian areas, Mantua and Cremona seem to have been less affected by the crisis, see Alfani (2010, p. 103).

61 ASMn, MCA, H V (1559–1746) (10, 24 and 29 May 1591). Also Christians were involved in the business. In the same period an aristocrat from Verona living in Mantua bought 56 tons of rice and was given permission to export it (Corritore, 2000, p. 64). The loss of the Chamber registries does not allow a serial reconstruction of the buying and selling. The Sullams were among the few Sephardic Jews living in Mantua and they were the city’s main bankers. For their trading activities see, Simonsohn (1973, p. 278) and Romani (2017, pp. 187–189, 191–192).

62 Sullam’s credit was the result of a loan and the sale of a diamond, ASMn, MCA, A VI (1600–1606) (8 December 1606). About the renewal of stocks see Ongaro (2019, p. 34). See also: ASMn, MCA H IV (1559–1746) (16 June 1570, 26 January 1574, 20 May 1574, 28 March 1579, 6 February 1582, etc.).

63 ASMn, MCA H V-VIII (1568–1751), (21 November 1608).

64 Corritore (2000, p. 65). For Cases and Melli see also the Table 1.

65 ASMN, MCA H IV (1559–1746), (13 January 1621). Rice is harvested between September and October.

66 ASMn, MCA, H IV (1559–1746), (20 September, 11 October, 25 October and 10 November 1600).

67 ASMn, MCA, H IV (1559–1746), (18 July 1608).

68 ASMn, MCA, H IV (1559–1746) (10 September 1608). To draw a comparison, 5507 sacchi of wheat were sufficient to feed the population of Mantua (31,422 mouths in 1592) for a month; ASMn, AG, b. 3206. On Norlenghi see also ASMn, AG, 3221–3222, passim.

69 ASMn, MCA, H IV (1559–1746) (27 October 1611). Dattilo Galli was probably the banker who got the condotta in 1605; see Castelli (1959, p. 77).

70 ASMn, MCA, H IV (1559–1746) (8 March 1622).

71 The licence to export or the ‘right of way’ had a cost which varied according to the quantity and quality of the goods. In the first half of the seventeenth century Jews rarely obtained permits to export cereals. The trend changed in the second half of the century, during the decline of the state. For the period 1674–1694 the records are kept in a more irregular way, but it can be inferred that permissions for (at least) 32,216 sacchi were granted; ASMn, AG, 3221–3222D.

72 As an example, in 1623, on the basis of a licence for the right of way originally intended to haul 2000 sacchi on behalf the duke of Modena, Lazzarino Italia was accused of moving instead 20,000 sacchi; ASMn, AG, b. 3391 (16 November 1623). See also b. 3206 (20 September 1646).

73 In 1618, for instance, no Jew asked for a permit (or obtained one) and only four permits were recorded for Christians. More operations were recorded in the years 1621, 1624, and 1625. The data for 1621 can be explained by the famine which hit Modena. In that year also the pope asked for the right of way in the state for 100,000 sacchi of wheat to be sent to Romagna. ASMn, AG, 3211 (3 November 1621).

74 During some periods Christians were granted more permits that Jews, during others the contrary was the case. Sometimes all permissions given in a certain period belong to a single person. For instance, between 23 May 1613 and 27 August 1613, 13 permissions were granted, yet the only Jew involved was Jacobus Melli, who got a 10,000 sacchi tratta (777 tons) and transported on 8 occasions a total of more than 2000 sacchi; ASMn, AG, 3221–3222A.

75 See for instance ASMn, AG, 3221–3222A (4 July 1614).

76 In the 1620s the accounting records were more numerous but less detailed and they do not show any buying and selling authorizations.

77 Rossini (1985, pp. 75–78) and ASMn, AG, 3221–3222B.

78 See the charter of privileges granted by duke Vincenzo I Gonzaga (1 October 1605), in Simonsohn (1973, pp. 781–783).

79 Ibid. and ASMn, AG, b. 3391 (18 November 1623 and 8 January 1624).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Marina Romani

Marina Romani earned her PhD in Economic and Social History at the Bocconi University in Milan and is Associate Professor of Economic History at the University of Genoa. She has been part of several research projects such as ‘Corporate Institutions, Professional Groups and Associative Forms of Labour in Modern and Contemporary Italy’ (coordinated by Prof. A. Moioli); ‘Banks, Credit and Citizenship in Italy from the XIII to the XVIII Century’ (coordinated by Prof. G. Todeschini) and ‘The Long History of Anti-Semitism. Jews in Europe and the Mediterranean (X-XXI centuries): Socio-Economic Practices and Cultural Processes of Coexistence between Discrimination and Integration, Persecution and Conversion’ (as a point person of the Unit of the University of Genoa, coordinated by Prof. Germano Maifreda). Her research interests cover Jewish studies, historical demography (history of plagues), history of money and banking. She is the authors of monographs and essays on these topics.

Rachele Scuro

Rachele Scuro gained her PhD in Medieval History at the University of Siena and has later worked as a postdoctoral researcher and collaborator at the universities of Basel, Verona, Cambridge, Milan-Bicocca, and is currently postdoctoral fellow at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. Her research topics focus on the social and economic history of late Medieval and Renaissance Italy, in particular Venice and its state between the later 14^th and early 17^th centuries. She has also extensively worked on the history of the European Jews, with special attention to the cases of the Venetian Ghetto and the Veneto Jewry. She is a member of the AISG (Associazione Italiana per lo Studio del Giudaismo) and EAJS (European Association of Jewish Studies), and the author of several essays and articles on Early modern Jewish history.