Hoping for the Best, Preparing for the Worst: China’s Varied Responses to US Strategic Competition

ABSTRACT

America’s embracement of a competition posture against China has redefined their bilateral relationship and reordered the latter’s strategic environment. However, how China has responded to US strategic competition has been understudied. This study seeks to fill the gap by using structural realism to gauge China’s reactions. It argues that China’s periodic confrontations with the United States, such as the one over Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit, do not define its strategy towards the United States. In fact, this strategy incorporates three components: binding, balancing, and competition. China continues to seek to bind further with the US to limit Washington’s ability to shift towards a full containment posture. As the same time, China has also been pursuing bolder or new balancing and competition measures to safeguard its security and influences. While binding represents China ‘hoping for the best’, balancing and competition show it is ‘preparing for the worst’. China’s balancing and competition measures have only further intensified the strategic rivalry with the US, even though Beijing prefers as much cooperation with Washington as possible.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

¹ White House, ‘United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China’, May 26, 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/articles/united-states-strategic-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/; Sarah Zheng, ‘US-China Ties: Competition, Not Engagement from Now On, Kurt Campbell Says’, South China Morning Post, may 27, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3135066/us-china-ties-competition-not-engagement-now-kurt-campbell.

² Xinhua News Agency, ‘Full Text of the Report to the 20^th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party’, October 25, 2022, https://english.news.cn/20221025/8eb6f5239f984f01a2bc45b5b5db0c51/c.html.

³ Xinhua News Agency, ‘Full Test of Xi Jinping’s Report at the 19^th CPC National Congress’, November 3, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017–11/03/c_136725942.htm.

⁴ Chris Buckley, ‘China Hangs on Xi’s Every Word. His Silence Also Speaks Volumes’, The New York Times, October 22, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/22/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-congress-security.html.

⁵ Evan S. Medeiros, ‘China Reacts: Assessing Beijing’s Response to Trump’s New China Strategy’, China Leadership Monitor, No. 59 (Spring 2019), https://www.prcleader.org/medeiros; Ryan Hass, ‘How China Is Responding to Escalating Strategic Competition with the U.S’. China Leadership Monitor, No. 71 (Spring 2022), https://www.prcleader.org/hass-1.

⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1979).

⁷ Ibid., p. 72.

⁸ Ibid., p. 105.

⁹ Ibid., p. 118.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 91.

¹¹ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 128–161.

¹² Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), p. 178.

¹³ John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 3.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁵ Thomas F. Lynch III, ‘Major Findings on Contemporary Great Power Competition’, in Thomas F. Lynch III, ed., Strategic Assessment 2020 L Into a New Era of Great Power Competition (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press 2020), p. xvi.

¹⁶ Michael J. Mazzar, Jonathan Blake, Abigail Casey, Tim McDonald, Stephanie Pezard, and Michael Spirtas, Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Rand Corporation 2018), p. 5.

¹⁷ For a synthesis of the issue, see Steven E. Lobell, ‘Structural Realism: Offensive and Defensive Realism’, in Robert A. Denemark, ed., The International Studies Encyclopedia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 6651–6669.

¹⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Evaluating Theories’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), p. 916.

¹⁹ David M. Edelstein, Over the Horizon: Time, Uncertainty, and the Rise of Great Powers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020).

²⁰ David M. Edelstein, ‘Cooperation, Uncertainty, and the Rise of China: It’s All About “Time”’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Spring 2018), p. 158.

²¹ Stacie E. Goddard, When Right Makes Might: Rising Powers and World Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018).

²² Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2000).

²³ Iain Marlow, ‘China Seeks to Tone Down Assertive Diplomacy That “Backfired”, US Official Says’, Bloomberg News, December 9, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-08/white-house-s-china-view-beijing-wants-stability-after-assertive-push.

²⁴ Daniel H. Nexon, ‘The Balance of Power in Balance’, World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 2 (April 2009), p. 346.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Wang Honggang, “Making Sense of China’s Strategy toward the United States” (理解中国的对美战略), China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, March 9, 2021, http://www.cicir.ac.cn/NEW/opinion.html?id=d40fa80b-1aeb-4650-9f5f-9476335f289c.

²⁷ Wang Honggang, ‘How China Should Respond to Sino-US Competition’ (中国将如何应对中美博弈), China & US Focus, December 19, 2019, http://cn.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/20191212/41669.html.

²⁸ Wu Xinbo, ‘塑造中美战略竞争的新常态’ (Shaping the New Normal of Sino-US Strategic Competition), Guoji wenti yanjiu, No. 2, 2022, p. 48.

²⁹ Xinhua News Agency, ‘Xi Speaks with Biden Over Phone’, July 29, 2022, https://english.news.cn/20220729/28e38973384f488996949220c94ecdce/c.html.

³⁰ ‘Wang Yi Interviewed by Xinhua News Agency on Current Sino-US Relations’ (王毅就当前中美关系接受新华社专访), Foreign Ministry of China, August 5, 2020, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/zyjh_673099/202008/t20200805_7588953.shtml.

³¹ ‘Xi Jinping Held Video Meeting with US President Biden’ (习近平同美国总统拜登举行视频会晤), Foreign Ministry of China, November 16, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/kjgzbdfyyq_699171/202111/t20211116_10448827.shtml.

³² ‘Sino-US Leadership Meeting Points Directions and Injects Dynamism for the Development of Bilateral Relations: Vice Minister Xie Feng Interviewed by Media’ (中美元首会晤为两国关系发展指明方向、注入动力——外交部副部长谢锋接受媒体采访问答全文), Foreign Ministry of China, November 16, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zyjh_674906/202111/t20211116_10449003.shtml.

³³ Peter Prengaman, ‘At Davos, Kerry Cites Progress on China-US Climate Group’, Associated Press, May 25, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-world-economic-forum-climate-politics-technology-f783a29f3f1a54e6dc78f5efc0210e15.

³⁴ Lingling Wei, ‘Xi Sought to Send Message to Biden on Taiwan: Now Is Not Time for a Crisis’, Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-sought-to-send-message-to-biden-on-taiwan-now-is-no-time-for-a-crisis-11660240698.

³⁵ Alex Gangitano, ‘Biden Says He’s “Not Worried” About China’s Response to Pelosi Visit to Taiwan’, The Hill, August 8, 2022, https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/3592512-biden-says-hes-not-worried-about-chinas-response-to-pelosi-visit/.

³⁶ ‘Xi Jinping: Some Important Issues for the Country’s Medium and Long-Term Economic and Social Development Strategies’ (习近平: 国家中长期经济社会发展战略若干重大问题), Qiushi, October 31, 2020, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020–10/31/c_1126680390.htm.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 138–139.

⁴⁰ Scott Malcomson, ‘The New Age of Autarky: Why Globalization’s Biggest Winners Are Now on a Mission of Self-Sufficiency’, Foreign Affairs, April 26, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-26/new-age-autarky?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIk96GqKCX_QIVUYrCCh0CkQ4QEAAYASAAEgL1t_D_BwE.

⁴¹ The Government of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14^th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Goals for 2035’ (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要), March 13, 2021, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021–03/13/content_5592681.htm.

⁴² Wendy Wu, Orange Wang, and Jane Cai, ‘Self-Reliance Highlighted As China’s Top Economic Priority Amid Turbulent Geopolitical Times’, South China Morning Post, March 6, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3169405/self-reliance-chinas-top-economic-priority-turbulent.

⁴³ Kinling Lo, ‘Xi Jinping Urges China to Go All In on Scientific Self-Reliance After ZTE Case Exposes Hi-Tech Gaps’, South China Morning Post, May 28, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2148189/xi-jinping-urges-china-go-all-scientific-self-reliance-after-zte.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Xinhua News Agency, ‘Xi Jinping Emphasized Controlling Scientific and Technological Fates in Our Own Hands to Promote the Independence, Autonomy, and Security of the Country’s Development’ (习近平在湖北武汉考察时强调 把科技的命脉牢牢掌握在自己手中 不断提升我国发展独立性自主性安全性), June 29, 2022, http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2022–06/29/c_1128787427.htm.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Xinhua News Agency, ‘At the Second Collective Study Session of the CCP Politburo, Xi Jinping Emphasized Constructing A New System of Development to Enhance Its Security and Initiatives’ (习近平在中共中央政治局第二次集体学习时强调 加快构建新发展格局 增强发展的安全性主动权), February 1, 2023, http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2023–02/01/c_1129328274.htm.

⁴⁸ Adam Segal, ‘China’s Move to Greater Self Reliance’, China Leadership Monitor, Issue 70, Winter 2021, https://www.prcleader.org/segal.

⁴⁹ Kevin Breuninger, ‘Biden Signs China Competition Bill to Boost US Chipmakers’, CNBC, August 9, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/09/biden-to-sign-chips-act-china-competition-bill.html.

⁵⁰ Karen M. Sutter, ‘China’s New Semiconductor Policies: Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service, April 20, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46767.

⁵¹ Yoko Kubota, ‘China Sets Up New $29 Billion Semiconductor Fund: Government-Backed Fund Is Part of Continuing Efforts by China to Become Less Dependent on US Technologies’, Wall Street Journal, October 25, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-sets-up-new-29-billion-semiconductor-fund-11572034480.

⁵² Sutter, p. 6.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 7.

⁵⁴ Debby Wu and Jenny Leonard, ‘China’s Top Chipmaker Achieves Breakthrough Despite US Curbs’, Bloomberg, July 21, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-21/china-s-top-chipmaker-makes-big-tech-advances-despite-us-curbs.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Hans Kristensen, ‘Review of NASIC Report 2017: Nuclear Force Developments’, Federation of American Scientists, June 30, 2017, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2017/06/nasic-2017/.

⁵⁷ John Vandiver, ‘Breathtaking Expansion: US Strategic Command Leader Expects Further Revelations of China’s Nuclear Weapons Advancement’, Stars and Stripes, October 18, 2021, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2021-10-18/china-us-russia-nuclear-weapons-hypersonics-stratcom-3283272.html.

⁵⁸ Joby Warrick, ‘China Is Building More Than 100 New Missile Silos in Its Western Desert, Analysts Say’, The Washington Post, June 30, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-nuclear-missile-silos/2021.

⁵⁹ Helene Cooper, ‘China Could Have 1,000 Nuclear Warheads by 2030, Pentagon Says’, New York Times, November 3, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/03/us/politics/china-military-nuclear.html.

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⁶¹ Minnie Chan, ‘China Building Up Nuclear Arsenal in Response to US Pressure’, South China Morning Post, November 4, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3154894/china-building-nuclear-arsenal-response-us-pressure.

⁶² Minnie Chan, ‘China Building Up Nuclear Arsenal in Response to US Pressure’.

⁶³ See note 2.

⁶⁴ Amber Wang, ‘Analysts Seize on Xi’s Mention of Strong “Strategic Deterrence” As Sign of China’s Nuclear Build-up’, South China Morning Post, October 18, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3196408/analysts-seize-xis-mention-strong-strategic-deterrence-sign-chinas-nuclear-build.

⁶⁵ Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, ‘China’s Nuclear Missile Silo Expansion: From Minimum Deterrence to Medium Deterrence’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1, 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/09/chinas-nuclear-missile-silo-expansion-from-minimum-deterrence-to-medium-deterrence/.

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⁷¹ Xinhua News Agency, ‘First Time: Russian Strategic Bombers Landing in China after Joint Patrol’ (首次！联合巡航后，俄军战略轰炸机降落中国), http://www.news.cn/mil/2022–12/01/c_1211705905.htm.

⁷² Brad Lendon, ‘Why Russian and Chinese Warships Teaming Up to Circle Japan Is a Big Deal?’ CNN, October 25, 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/25/asia/china-russia-naval-flotilla-circles-japan-intl-hnk-ml/index.html.

⁷³ PLA Daily, ‘First Joint China-Russia Sea Patrol Successfully Concluded’ (中俄首次海上联合巡航圆满结束), October 24, 2021, p. 4.

⁷⁴ Alex Wilson and Hana Kusumoto, ‘Chinese, Russian Naval Vessels Circled Japan Over Three Weeks in June’, Stars and Stripes, July 1, 2022, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2022-07-01/china-russia-navy-japan-6515423.html.

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⁸¹ Daniel H. Nexon, ‘The Balance of Power in Balance’, p. 345.

⁸² Bundesregierung, ‘Chancellor Angela Merkel in Paris: Taking Multilateralism to the Next Level’, March 26, 2019, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/taking-multilateralism-to-the-next-level-1594822.

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⁸⁷ Daniel H. Nexon, ‘The Balance of Power in Balance’, World Politics, p. 346.

⁸⁸ Wang Yi, ‘China’s Diplomacy Amid Changes Unseen in Hundred Years and the Global Pandemic’ (王毅: 百年变局与世纪疫情下的中国外交), Foreign Ministry of China, December 11, 2020, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/zyjh_673099/202012/t20201212_7478649.shtml.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Wang Yi, ‘China’s Diplomacy in 2021’.

⁹¹ Centre for Strategic and International Studies, ‘China is Exploiting the Pandemic to Advance Its Interests, with Mixed Results’, September 21, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-exploiting-pandemic-advance-its-interests-mixed-results.

⁹² Jacob Gunter and Helena Legarda, ‘Beyond Blocs: Global Views on China and US-China Relations’, Mercator Institute of China Studies, April 18, 2022, https://merics.org/en/report/beyond-blocs-global-views-china-and-us-china-relations.

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⁹⁴ BBC News, ‘Ukraine War: Zelensky Wants Xi Jinping Meeting Following China’s Peace Plan’, February 25, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64762219.

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⁹⁶ Maria Fantappie and Vali Nasr, ‘A New Order in the Middle East: Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement Could Transform the Region’, Foreign Affairs, March 22, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/iran-saudi-arabia-middle-east-relations?mkt_tok=NjU5LVdaWC0wNzUAAAGKuAb2Lske4SuoFtZUijrGTxiMlh0UoJXqFR2lgSR8IvX6x0FRO19Oncc_I9td8lNaZFQKhMSuYGAF52tiEKzg6jclhO4jTIWn98ZE-vP32Es.

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⁹⁸ ‘Wang Yi: Clarifying China’s Three Redlines for Sino-US Relations’ (王毅: 明确中方对中美关系的三条底线), Foreign Ministry of China, July 26, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/wjbxw_674885/202107/t20210726_9177102.shtml.

⁹⁹ ‘State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi Interviewed by Xinhua News Agency and CCTV on the International Situation and China’s Diplomatic Works in 2021’ (王毅国务委员兼外长就2021年国际形势和外交工作接受新华社和中央广播电视总台联合采访), Foreign Ministry of China, December30, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/zyjh_673099/202112/t20211230_10477288.shtml.

¹⁰⁰ The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, ‘China: Democracy that Works’, White Paper, December 4, 2021, http://www.news.cn/english/2021–12/04/c_1310351231.htm.

¹⁰¹ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “China Touts Its Own ‘Socialist Democracy’ After Biden’s Summit,: Axios, https://www.axios.com/2021/12/14/beijing-propaganda-biden-summit-democracy.

¹⁰² Anatoly Antonov and Qin Gang, ‘Respecting People’s Democratic Rights’, The National Interest, November 26, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russian-and-chinese-ambassadors-respecting-people’s-democratic-rights-197165.

¹⁰³ Xinlu Liang, ‘Xi Jinping Hails China Modernization Miracle As Path For Developing Countries’, South China Morning Post, February 8, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3209450/xi-hails-china-modernisation-miracle-path-developing-countries.

¹⁰⁴ Yan Xuetong, ‘Why and How to Prevent Escalating Sino-US Ideological Rivalry?’ (为何及如何防范中美意识形态之争加剧), Guoji zhengzhi kexue, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2020), pp. III-VI.

¹⁰⁵ Jevans Nyabiage, ‘China Opens Party School in Africa to Teach Its Model to Continent’s Officials’, South China Morning Post, February 26, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3168462/china-opens-party-school-africa-teach-its-model-continents.

¹⁰⁶ Ben Smith, ‘When Covid Hit, China Was Ready to Tell Its Version of the Story’, New York Times, May 9, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/09/business/media/china-beijing-coronavirus-media.html.

¹⁰⁷ Jie Dalei, ‘Ideology and Sino-US Strategic Competition’ (意识形态与中美战略竞争), Guoji zhengzhi kexue, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2020), p. 84.

¹⁰⁸ Yan Xuetong, note 105.

¹⁰⁹ Zhao, The Dragon Roars Back, p. 218.