The armed struggle of the 1980s in Iranian Kurdistan: a space for survival

ABSTRACT

The armed struggle of the entire decade of the 1980s in Iranian Kurdistan is an understudied subject. It deserves scholarly attention for its significance for the continuation of the post-1979 Kurdish movement and the way militarization made violent forms of resistance attractive. The armed struggle was triggered by the remilitarization of Kurdistan, vigorously defying the new Islamic regime which had suppressed the opposition across Iran by the early 1980s. In contrast to powerful discourses and prevalent assumptions, armed struggle is not intrinsic to Kurdish political movements, nor does it constitute an integral part of the plan to achieve political and cultural rights. Based on the events following the 1979 Revolution, this article presents armed struggle as a space for the continuation of the Kurdish movement when de facto self-rule is terminated by militarization and dictatorship. It analyses several significant aspects of the armed struggle of the 1980s in order to make a connection between the past and the present. Methodologically, the article follows a comparative analysis of various forms of armed struggle around the world to analyse the characteristics of the Kurdish armed struggle.

Acknowledgments

I have used many important sources archived by the online Arshiv-e Asnad-e Oposision-e Iran (The Archive of the Iranian Opposition), available at http://iran-archive.com/fa, and Hawalname-i Kiteb [Book Gazette], available at http://www.hewalname.com/ku/. I would like to thank the organizers for these important digitized archives. My special thanks go to Hatam Manbari, for providing me with valuable information on KDPI’s cultural activities, and the reviewers of this article for their valuable comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Cf. Abbas Amanat, Iran: A Modern History (New Haven, London, 2017), 817.

² Cf. Ofra Bengio, ed., Kurdish Awakening: Nation Building In A Fragmented Homeland (Austin, 2014), 5 and 2–5. Similarly, in Nader Entessar, ‘The Kurds in Iran: The Quest for Identity,’ in Kurdish Awakening: Nation Building in a Fragmented Homeland, ed. Ofra Bengio (Austin, 2014), 239–43, the armed struggle in the 1980s does not even get a mention in a review of the events in Iranian Kurdistan following the 1979 Revolution.

³ A recent study is an exception, see Allan Hassaniyan, Kurdish Politics in Iran: Crossborder Interactions and Mobilization since 1947 (Cambridge, 2021).

⁴ See Ahsan I. Butt, Secession and Security: Explaining State Strategy Against Separatists (London, 2017), 1–41; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,’ American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75.

⁵ On the armed struggle in Iraqi Kurdistan see Mala Bakhtiyar, La Bri Birewari [Instead of Memoirs] (Tehran, 2020).

⁶ Howard Zinn, A People’s History of The United States (New York, 1990), 464.

⁷ Cf. Margrit Schiller, Remembering the Armed Struggle: Life In Baader-Meinhof, trans. Lindsay Munro (London, 2009).

⁸ Cf. Masud Ahmadzadeh, Mobareze Mosalahane: Ham Estrategy va ham Taktik [Armed Struggle As Both Strategy And Tactic] (1970) http://www.Iran-archive.com/sites/default/files/sanad/cherikha_ta_1357-mobarezeh_masud.pdf. Bijan Jazani, a leading figure of the Fedayyan was an exception. He demanded ‘to determine strategy in accordance with an understanding of socioeconomic conditions’. See Bijan Jazani, Tarhe Jameshenasi va Mabanie Esteratejik Jonbeshe Enqelabi Iran [The Sociology and the Strategic Foundations of the Revolutionary Movement of Iran], vol. 1 (Online, 2003), 4.

⁹ See Ervand Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran (London, 1999); Maziar Behrooz, Rebels With A Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran (London, 1999).

¹⁰ For their efforts to defend the Kurdistan Republic see Abulhassan Tafaroshian, Qiame Afsarane Khorasan [The Uprising of the Khorasani Officers] (Tehran, 1986), 102-110; Ganjali Sabahi, rooz-haye Separi Shodeye Man [My Past Days], trans. from Persian B. Motalebzadeh (Tehran, 2013).

¹¹ Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, The CIA, And the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations (New York, 2015), 168–69. (For this article, the EPUB version of this book has been used).

¹² See the memoirs of a Tudeh officer Gholam Abbas Foroutan, Afsaneye Ma [Our Myth] (Iran, n.d.); Abrahamian, The Coup, 181.

¹³ Cf. Nelson Mandela, Long walk to Freedom (London, 1995).

¹⁴ Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (Oxford, 2003), 339–40.

¹⁵ Ibid., 82.

¹⁶ See David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London, 2004), Ch. 7.

¹⁷ See Marouf Cabi, The Formation of Modern Kurdish Society in Iran: Modernity, Modernization, and Social Change 1921–1979 (London, 2022), Ch. 1.

¹⁸ On dissatisfaction with the nature of the state as a significant factor for ethnic rebellions in Iran see Ali M. Ansari, Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran (Cambridge, 2012), 120.

¹⁹ On Iraq see Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge, 2007).

²⁰ Roger Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe (Cambridge, 1996).

²¹ On political myths see Henry Tudor, Political Myth (London, 1972), 138.

²² See the Kurdish and Iranian parties’ publications in 1980.

²³ See the 26-Article Plan for Autonomy, 1979, in Jalil Gadani, Penja Sal Khabat [Fifty Years of Struggle], vol. 1 (Kurdistan. Duhok, 2008), 249–56.

²⁴ Editorial, ‘No choice but to continue armed struggle,’ Pesh Marg, no. 18 (Mar. 1988): 2.

²⁵ See the organ of the Organization of the People Fadayyan Guerrillas of Iran, Kar [Labour], No. 52, 13 Farvardin 1359 [2 April 1980], 5.

²⁶ See Ettelaat, 16 Azar 1358 [7 December 1979], for a comprehensive report on this incident; and Kar, No. 31, 19 Shahrivar 1358 [10 September 1979], 1 and 7.

²⁷ See Kar, No. 53, 20 Farvardin 1359 [9 April 1980].

²⁸ See Kar, Vol. 2, No. 59, 3 Ordibehesht 1359 [23 April 1980].

²⁹ See Kar, 48, 27 February 1980.

³⁰ See Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oxford, 1988), 143; David Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution (New York, 1990), 192–98. For the announcement cf. ‘Banisadr announces the principles of the Cultural Revolution,’ Keyhan, 2 Ordibehesht 1359 [22 April 1980]; Keyhan, 22 April 1980, second print, p.1; Keyhan, 22 April 1980, second print, p.10; Keyhan, 20 April 1980.

³¹ In ‘A Brief discussion on Socialism’ (first published in 1983 in Kurdish), Dr Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, the general secretary of the party, explains that while the party is not a Marxist organization, […] ‘it has to address social issues and ‘we believe that the only way to solve social issues, in a fundamental way, is the construction of socialism’. See Abdulrahman Ghassemlou, Kurta Basek la sar Sosializm [A Brief Discussion on Socialism] (Sweden, 2003), 7 and 9; for debates in KDPI on the dictatorship of the proletariat, the meaning of socialism and its construction, see ibid., 38; and Karim Hesami, Lekolinewei ‘Kurte Basek le ser Socializm’ [An Analysis of ‘A Brief Discussion on Socialism’] (Kurdistan, 1984); and the pedagogical internal journal of KDPI, Tekosher [Struggler], No. 4, Jan.-Feb. 1983, 15 and 34.

³² There was also Jahad-e Sazendegi or the Reconstruction Jihad, which engaged with economic activities but also facilitated infrastructure for the movement of the military.

³³ According to official statistics the total population of the Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, and Kermanshah provinces in 1966 was around 2 and a half million with an annual growth rate of between 2.7% and 3.1%. See, respectively, Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical Yearbook of Iran 1352 [March 1973—March 1974] (Iran: Statistical Centre of Iran, 1975), 21; and Statistical Centre of Iran, Iran Statistical Yearbook (Tehran: Dargahe Mellie Amar, 2017–2018 (1396)), 130.

³⁴ This is based on Statistical Yearbook of Iran 1352 [March 1973—March 1974], 2.

³⁵ M. Morad, ‘Akherin Safhaye Taqwim,’ [The Last Page of the Calendar] Ketab-e Jomʿe 1, no. 20 (6 Dey 1358 [27 December 1979]): 3.

³⁶ Ibid. For justifying the government’s proposed Khod-gardani cf. Mahmood Naderi, Hezbe Democrate Kordestane Iran (Tehran, 2016), 333–44.

³⁷ Gadani, Penja Sal Khabat, vol.1, 267–68. Gadani (1945–2020), a senior member of KDPI, was a member of the KDPI’s Central Committee and its Political Office at the time.

³⁸ Bahman Saʿidi, Khabat Baraw Sarkawtin: Didarek Lagal Ebrahim Alizada [Struggle Towards Victory: A Meeting with Ebrahim Alizadeh] (Kurdistan, 2012), 553–54.

³⁹ See Kar, special issue on Kurdistan, 7 Ordibehesht 1359 [27 April 1980].

⁴⁰ See Marouf Cabi, Evin w Qin: Hangawek Baraw Tegaishtn La Rabrdu [Love and Hatred: A Step Towards Understanding the Past] (Sulaymaniyah, 2016). In a chemical attack on the Boteh Valley 24 Komala peshmergas were killed. It was a warning against Komala’s close relationship with the Patriotic Union of [Iraqi] Kurdistan and carried out in retaliation for the public criticism and demonstrations of the organization’s branch in Europe against the Iran-Iraq war and the Baʿthist regime. Moreover, a unit of Komala, who were attempting to move away from the region, were seriously affected by the Iraqi regime’s chemical attack on Halabja in March 1988. As a result of their hideout being revealed and attacked by Iran’s military forces, 60 peshmergas were killed, while 12 were captured and then executed during the infamous 1988-execution of political prisoners in Iran. See ibid. KDPI’s headquarters were also attacked, for example in 1980, or affected by Iraq’s military presence.

⁴¹ See Hatam Manbari, Azar u Azmun [Pain and Experience] (Sweden, 2016); Golrokh Qobadi, Shaqayeqha bar Sanglakh: Zendegi wa Zamaneye Yek Zane Kord az Kordestane Iran [Poppies on Rocks: The Life and Time of a Kurdish Woman from Iran] (2015); Siamak Shami, Gordan 22 (Sweden, 2013); Khalid Rahmanpana, Chegoone Fulad Abdideh Shod [How the Steel Was Tempered] (2010); Nahid Vafaiy, Jelwehaye Zendegi [The Shine of Life] (Stockholm, 2018).

⁴² Dr Mostafa Izadi, Jawad Esteki, and Masood Yaran, Tarikhe Bist Sale Pasdari az Enqelabe Eslami dar Gharbe Keshwar [Twenty-Year Defence of the Islamic Revolution in the West of the Country], vol. 6 [1387] (Tehran, 2000).

⁴³ Ibid., 657.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 658.

⁴⁵ On Fuad Mostafa Soltani see Malaka Mustafasultani, Reza Mustafasultani, and Heshmat Mustafasultani, Kak Fuad Mustafasultani, in Persian, (Stettin, 2017).

⁴⁶ Cf. Rega-i Gel, 2:24 (Azar 1363 [Nov. 1984], 20–23.

⁴⁷ On the split see Fedayyan-Minority’s organ: Kar, vol.2, No. 61, special issue, (14 Khordad 1359 [4 June 1980], 1–6. The ‘opportunistic’ stance of the central committee of the Fedayyan organization is criticized in Kar, Vol. 2, No. 62, (20 Khordad 1359 [10 June 1980], 1, and 7–8.

⁴⁸ See the organs of the People’s Fedayyan Rega-i Gel (People’s Way), published by its Kurdistan Branch, and Kar (Labour), published across Iran: Rega-i Gel, Vol. 2, No. 24 (Azar 1363 [Nov. 1984]), 28; Kar, Vol. 2, No. 77, Mehr 1359 [Sep. 1980]), 16; see the organ of the Organization of the Revolutionary Workers of Iran (Workers’ Way) in Kurdistan: Regai Kar (Kurdish: Workers’ Way), Vol. 1, No. 1, Shahrivar 1362 [Aug,-Sep. 1983], 27; and Mokhtar Niknezhad, Khaterate Jangal [Memoirs of Jangal] (Online, 1984), available at https://rb.gy/zqz6e1 (accessed: 21 June 2021).

⁴⁹ On the global intellectual transformations in this period see Stephanie Cronin, Social Histories of Iran: Modernism and Marginality in the Middle East (Cambridge, 2021), 21–56.

⁵⁰ Gadani, Penja Sal Khabat, vol.1, 312–14.

⁵¹ On KDPI see The Commission of Social Affairs, Komal [Society], No. 1 (Rashama-i 1361 [Feb.-Mar. 1983], Introduction, republished by KDPI’s Naghadah City Committee. The party estimated the expenditure for education [mostly in rural areas] for the school year of 1360–61 [1981–2] to be 3,500,000 Iranian tomans, an equivalent of around $95,000 at the time; this is claimed to be collected mostly through public donation. The school year covered 9,684 mainly primary students in 286 schools across the free zones, employing 394 [voluntary] teachers. For this see Ibid., 8. On Komala see Commission of Education, Khwendnewey Kurdi [Kurdish: Reading Kurdish] and Basavad Shavim [Persian: Becoming Literate], books for primary school pupils, published in 1983.

⁵² Tayfour Bathayi was a member of the Fedayyan before the Revolution. Along with Khosro Golesorkhi and Nematolla Daneshiyan, he was charged with an attempt to kidnap the Queen Farah Pahlavi. Golesorkhi and Daneshiyan were executed. Bathayi was sentenced to life but was freed during the Revolution.

⁵³ Sherko Bekas, Diwani Sherko Bekas (Sweden, 2006), 383–4.

⁵⁴ See the ceremony on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6xIMZFc488, accessed 19/02/2021.

⁵⁵ In its journals and political manifesto, KDPI also addressed ‘gender-based discrimination’ from a progressive perspective and in the context of the relations of production. See the internal journal of Tekosher [Struggler], No. 6 (Jozerdan 1363 [May-Jun. 1984], 36–46; on the International Women’s Day, see Tekosher, No. 5 (Banemer 1362 [Sep-Oct. 1983]), 19–27. All the parties addressed social and legal issues in their manifestos. KDPI’s Penal Code included several articles (67, 68, 71) which restricted gender-based discrimination in family and marriage. For this see Tekosher, No. 5 (Banemer 1362 [Sep-Oct. 1983]), 21.

⁵⁶ See Maryam Firouz, Tarikhcheye Tashkilate Democratice Zanane Iran [The History of the Democratic Organization of Women in Iran] (Tehran, 1360 [1981]); Tara Povey and Elaheh Rostami-Povey, eds., Women, Power and Politics in 21st Century Iran (New York, 2012), Ch. 1; Afsaneh Najmabadi, ‘Hazards of Modernity and Morality: Women, State and Ideology in Contemporary Iran,’ in Women, Islam & State., ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (Basingstoke, 1991); Cabi, Modern Kurdish Society, Ch. 5.

⁵⁷ See Victoria Gonzalez and Karen Kampwirth, eds., Radical women in Latin America: Left and Right (Pennsylvania, 2001), 79–109.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ See Golrokh Qobadi, ed., Golzare Shaqayeqha: Nagoftehaye Zanane Mobareze Kordestane Iran (Germany, 2020); Vafaiy, Jelwehaye Zendegi; and the interviews conducted with many previous women peshmergas, available in the online project of ‘Tarikh-e Shafahi-ye Chap dar Kordestan’ [The Oral history of the Left In Kurdistan].

⁶⁰ Conversation with Hatam Manbari, (02/11/2021).

⁶¹ See Tekosher No. 21 [Jozerdan 1367 [may.Jun.1988], 17.

⁶² Cabi, Evin & Qin, 113; Marouf Cabi, Dashti Dareh [The Dareh Fields] (Sulaimaniya, 2013), 140–44. For mistreatment during intraparty conflicts between KDPI and KDPI-RL see Manbari, Azar u Azmun, 311–14.

⁶³ Cf. quotations in Maryam Alemzadeh, ‘The attraction of direct action: the making of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in the Iranian Kurdish conflict,’ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (2021), https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2021.1990013.

⁶⁴ Chamran’s interview is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UIj4g1PsqaM.

⁶⁵ See the daily newspaper of Ettelaat, September 1979; and the organ of the Fedayyan Guerilla organization, Kar, Vol. 2, No. 30, 12 Shahrivar 1358 [3 September 1979], 1.

⁶⁶ See Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions.

⁶⁷ Many sources include a partial analysis of the revolutionary culture. See Behrooz, Rebels With A Cause; Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions.

⁶⁸ Cf. Komala, ‘Khoroush-e Enqelab va Zouze-ye Tavabin,’ [the Roar of the Revolution and the Wailing of the repenters], Pishraw, No. 5 (Jun. 1983). On a case of revolutionary courts see Parvin Kaboli, Qahramane Man: Zendegie ‘Azizeh A’zami [My Heroine: The life of Azizeh Azami] (Online, 2021).

⁶⁹ There was an incident of intraparty conflict in the Fadayyan Aqalia on 24 January 1986, which happened in one of their bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. As a result, five members were killed. The situation came quickly under control by the intervention of the Patriotic Union of Iraqi Kurdistan, which published the result of its investigation in ‘Tozihat-e Komision-e Tahqiq-e Etehadiye-ye Mihani-ye Kordestan dar bare-ye Ruidad-e mian-e Chrikha’, (in Persian), 22 February 1986.

⁷⁰ On some aspects of the roots of the conflict between the two see Marouf Cabi, Marouf Cabi, ‘The Roots and the Consequences of the 1979 Iranian Revolution: A Kurdish Perspective,’ Middle Eastern Studies 56, no. 3 (2020).

⁷¹ See KDPI-RL’s first announcement in Jalil Gadani, Penja Sal Khabat [Fifty Years of Struggle], vol. 2 (Kurdistan, Duhok, 2008), 23–27. DPIK-RL immediately declared ceasefire, see ibid., 42–43; KDPI-RL’s Kurdistan, No. 134.

⁷² For efforts of other political groups to end the conflict, see ibid.,vol. 1, 351–52. For the views of KDPI and Komala on the conflict see KDPI, Shesh Jarian-e Siasi va Dargiriha-ye Komala va Democrat [The Six Political Trends and the Clashes between Komala and Democratic Party] (Kurdistan: KDPI Publications, 1987);

and Komala, Faje’eye Oraman [The Tragedy of Oraman] (Kurdistan: Komala Publication, 1984).

⁷³ Tensions between DPIK and the Peykar Organization, which was a fierce citric of the former, also culminated in an armed incident in February 1981 in the city of Bukan. For this see Sazman-e Vahdat-e Komonisti, ‘Hamle-ye Hezb-e Democrat be Sazman-e Peykar Mahkoom Ast,’ 8 March 1981; Peykar 97, 9 March 1981; http://www.peykarandeesh.org/index.php/41-rchive/archivepeykar/1349-2021-03-21-08-04-29 (accessed 19/12/2021).

⁷⁴ On Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1970s and 1980s see Haval Kwestani, Aw Rozhanei Nishtiman hi Hamuan boo [The Time when the Homeland Was for All] (Kurdistan, Slemani, 2017), 200–01; Bakhtiyar, La Bri Birewari.

⁷⁵ On Husseini and the Negotiation Mission see Keyhan, 6 Farwardin 1358 [22 March 1979]. As another example, Mohamadamin Sheikholeslami, known as Haemin, the most popular poet in Iranian Kurdistan, was ostracized by the Kurdish parties for many years for his different stance on the Kurdish movement and its relationship with the new regime.

⁷⁶ There are different statistics for different periods. As a passing remark, an article claims that KDPI lost ‘more than four thousand peshmergas’ by May 1988, see Tekosher, No. 21 {Jozerdan 1367 [Jun.- May 1988], 6. The party’s total loss by March 1983 is shown in a table to be 1,339 peshmergas, see Komal, No. 1, 6. In total, several hundred members of other Iranian parties are estimated to have died in battles or prison in Kurdistan.

⁷⁷ For the cases of 52 peshmergas see Cabi, Evin & Qin, 104–16.

⁷⁸ See Kar, Vol. 2, No. 52, 13 Farvardin 1359 [2 April 1359]; and the statistics quoted in Gadani, Penja Sal Khabat, vol.1, 395–401.

⁷⁹ Quoted in English, Armed Struggle, 244.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 338.

⁸¹ The topic of the role of peshmerga in the Kurdish movement is beyond the scope of this paper and demands further research. However, the 1980s can be regarded as an example.

⁸² On this aspect of the modern state see Stephanie Cronin, Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran: Opposition, Protest and Revolt, 1921–1941 (New York, 2010).

⁸³ See Stephanie Cronin, ed., The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society Under Reza Shah, 1921–1941 (London, 2003).

⁸⁴ On Khoybun and Simko see McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 202–07 and 214–226.

⁸⁵ See Burhan Qaneʿ, ed., Divani Qaneʿ (Iran, 2014).

⁸⁶ See Shvan Parvar’s song Who Are We? which is a concise national narrative of the Kurds: YouTube: Shvan Parvar, ‘Kine Em’, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6W3nl0CHcsM, accessed 01/11/2021.

⁸⁷ See the journals of Nishtiman (Motherland) and Kurdistan, published prior to or during the Kurdistan Republic of 1946.

⁸⁸ See Muhammad Khezri, Laparayek la Tekoshan w Julanaway Salakani 42–47 Hezbi Dimukrati Kurdistan [A Page from the Struggle and Movement of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (1963–68)] (Sweden, 2003).

⁸⁹ See Cabi, Modern Kurdish Society, Ch. 4.

⁹⁰ Saʿidi, Struggle Towards Victory, 83–84.

⁹¹ Cronin, Social Histories of Iran, 40.

⁹² See Behrooz, Rebels With A Cause, 70–73. For more on Fadayyan see ibid., 43–47 and Ch. 2.

⁹³ Cf. interviews with senior IRGC members in Alemzadeh, ‘The attraction of direct action.’

⁹⁴ See Abbas Vali, Kurds and the State in Iran (London, 2011), 19.

⁹⁵ For political developments in Iran since the summer of 2000, see Ali M. Ansari, Iran, Islam, and democracy: The Politics Of Managing Change, ed. 2nd (London, 2019).