https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1864-6382
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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the relationships between nationalism and conspiracy theories during the COVID-19 pandemic. We focus on the two main issues: 1) the intensity and character of belief in the COVID-19 conspiracy theories across five European societies: Germany, England, Ireland, Serbia, and Sweden; and 2) how is the commitment to specific nationalist ideologies linked with the belief in conspiracy theories. The data indicates that those who described themselves as highly religious and politically right-wing are more prone to believe in the strong versions of conspiracy theories. Furthermore, primordialism and the nation-centric view of the world are positively correlated with the propensity towards stronger versions of conspiracy theories. The paper zooms in on the significant differences across the five countries: the Serbian respondents stand out in terms of their strong beliefs in conspiracy theories while the Irish and Serbian respondents who are prone to strong version of conspiratorial thinking also subscribe more to the primordialist understanding of nationhood.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 We would like to thank Egle Gusciute, Mat Creighton and the three anonymous reviewers for their excellent comments on the early drafts of this paper.
2 Since UK health policies are devolved England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have instituted different rules during the covid 19 pandemic. This included different lockdown regulations, advice on working practices and mask mandates among others. To avoid these internal complexities and differences this project focused on England as the largest political entity in the UK. For more information about these different policies see: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/article/explainer/coronavirus-lockdown-rules-each-part-uk.
3 There have been several recent publications that have focused on the relationship between nationalism and conspiracy theories in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (Zhai & Yan, Citation2023; Jia & Luo, Citation2023 and Rieger, Citation2021). However, these studies tend to focus on a single case study or do not engage with the sociological theories of nationalism.
4 Obviously, the conspiracy communities are not fixed and permanent groups but are highly dynamic entities that wax and wane as social environment changes. The membership of these communities oscillates and is impacted by the wider social processes (Sunstein & Vermeule, Citation2009).
5 These datasets are publicly available. Our case study justification was made for the entire project ‘World problem, national solutions: The impact of national past on behaviour during the pandemic’.
7 No data available for Serbia.
10 The distinction between these three versions of conspiracy theory draws on the existing theoretical models and empirical research that differentiate between the strong and weak forms of conspiratorial beliefs (see Wang & Kim, Citation2021; van Prooijen, Citation2020; Müller, Citation2016). We have just expanded this standard distinction into the three rather than only two categories (strong, medium, and weak) to capture the intensity and complexity of these beliefs. Of course, such theoretical models can never be free from bias.
11 This section draws on the single open-ended question from our survey: ‘Who were the main villains of the COVID-19 pandemic?’.
12 The Serbian case indicates clearly how the organisational power of the nation-state can be used effectively to enhance the conspiratorial thinking in the public sphere.
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Notes on contributors
Siniša Malešević
Siniša Malešević is Full Professor and Chair of Sociology in University College, Dublin. His recent books include: Why Humans Fight: The Social Dynamic of Close-Range Violence (Cambridge UP, 2022), Grounded Nationalisms: A Sociological Analysis (Cambridge UP, 2019), The Rise of Organised Brutality: A Historical Sociology of Violence (Cambridge UP, 2017), and Nation-States and Nationalisms: Organization, Ideology and Solidarity (Polity, 2013). He is a recipient of several book awards, and his work has been translated into 14 languages.
Gordana Uzelac
Gordana Uzelac is Senior Lecturer in Sociology who specialises in theories of nations and nationalism, issues of ethnic and national identity in the former Yugoslavia and in the UK. She applies her expertise in quantitative and qualitative methodology on studying perceptions of the nation as well as forms of nationalist ideologies. Her work has been published by Routledge and in leading journals in her field such as Nations and Nationalism, Nationalities, as well as Ethnic and Racial Studies.
Sarah Carol
Sarah Carol is Assistant Professor in the School of Sociology. She works in the field of migration and religion. Her work has appeared in journals such as Social Forces, International Migration Review, Urban Studies, Sociology of Religion and many more. For her article on attitudes towards abortion, she received the Distinguished Sociology of Religion Journal Award from the Association for the Sociology of Religion.
Lea David
Lea David is Assistant Professor in the School of Sociology. Her work examines the impact that the international human rights regime has on nationalist ideologies. She published her book ‘The Past Can't Heal Us: The Dangers of Mandating Memory in the Name of Human Rights’ with Cambridge University Press in 2020. Her articles appeared in journals such Thesis Eleven, Critical Sociology, Memory Studies, and Human Rights Quarterly.