Parliamentary inquiries as minority rights: are legal transplants possible?

ABSTRACT

Committees of inquiry, in related literature, are often called as ‘sharpest sword’ of the opposition. However, this sharpness is highly dependent on how much rights the opposition is effectively provided by the fine details of the procedural rules, and whether these rights are justiciable. According to the German model, the inquiry must be launched if a quarter of the MPs require it, and the opposition enjoys minority rights also during the inquiry. Many countries implemented the first, but not the second element in their parliamentary procedures (Hungary, Kosovo, Albania, Lithuania), which led to ineffective inquiries. The only positive example for a successful transplant of the mandatory minority initiative for launching an inquiry is the neighbouring country, Austria. In most of the other countries, the majority is more effective in conducting inquiries, and, lacking judicial remedies, the opposition cannot put its right to inquiry in practice effectively. It seems that the mandatory minority initiative hardly works properly outside its original home country, Germany, and the only successful transplant country, Austria. Another evidence that legal transplants cannot survive if the legal environment and culture is not fertile and developed enough.

KEYWORDS:

• Committee of inquiry
• legal transplants
• opposition
• parliament
• parliamentary procedure parliamentary scrutiny

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Péter Smuk, ‘Ellenzéki jogok a parlamenti jogban, különös tekintettel a parlament ellenőrzési tevékenységére’ (2007) 2 Jogtudományi Közlöny 62.

2 Csaba Erdős and András Téglási, ‘Az Országgyűlés’ in Az állam szervezete (Dialóg Campus 2018).

3 See e.g. the British tradition for parliament to ‘send for persons, papers and records’. For an international comparision of parliamentary inquiries see Zsolt Szabó Parlamenti vizsgálóbizottságok (Patrocinium 2011).

4 Tilman Hoppe and Juan Ticona, ‘Parliamentary Inquiries: An Underestimated Anticorruption Tool’ (2022) 2 International Journal of Parliamentary Studies 202.

5 Dieter Engels, Parlamentarische Unitersuchungsausschüsse (Heidelberg 1991).

6 Matthias Riede and Henrik Scheller, ‘Parlamentarische Untersuchungsausschüsse im Deutschen Bundestag – bloßes Skandalisierungsinstrument der Opposition?’ (2013) 1 Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 137.

7 Christoph Konrath and Christoph Neugebauer and Rosi Posnik, ‘Das neue Untersuchungsausschussverfahren im Nationalrat’ (2015) 23 Journal für Rechtspolitik 216.

8 Vlad Perju, ‘Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing, and Migrations’, in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2016).

9 The general trend is that a quota is set for the initiative. In France, also any political group may initiate an inquiry, but this is only a proposal, not a final decision. In none of the countries may a single political group oblige the launch if an inquiry committee.

10 Art. 44 (1) German Fundamental Law.

11 Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Untersuchungsausschüsse des Deutschen Bundestages (PUAG, 2001.06.19.) 1.§ (1) [German Act on Parliamentary inquiry committees].

12 PUAG, art. 17. sec (2).

13 Országgyűlésről szóló törvény [Act on the Hungarian National Assembly] 2012/36, art. 24.

14 Diane Fromage, The European Parliament's Right of Inquiry in Context (European Parliament, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2020).

15 K. P. Poole, ‘The Powers of Select Committees of the House of Commons to Send for Persons, Papers and Records’ (1979) 3 Parliamentary Affairs 268.

16 Fromage, 2020, 5.

17 ECHR 6091/06.

18 Peter Bussjäger, ‘Untersuchungsausschüsse im Bund und be den Ländern’ (2016) 8 Österreichische Juristenzeitung 348.

19 In 1987 for example, the Greek parliament rejected a motion to set up a committee of inquiry with 156 votes against 125. Two-fifths of MPs were for the motion, but not the majority of the plenary. Gerassimos Theodossis, ‘Die griechische Verfassung von 1975/1986 und die Einsetzung von parlamentarischen Untersuchugsasusschüssen’ (1989) 38 Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts 118.

20 Poslovnik o parlamentarni presikavi, 1993.11.09. [Slovenian Act of Parliamentary Inquiries] art. 3.

21 PUAG, art. 2. sec. (2).

22 BverfGE 49, 70, (88).

23 Roland Pofalla, ‘Das Bepackungsverbot gemäss § 2 Abs. 2 PUAG am Beispiel des „Lügenuntersuchungsausschusses”’ (2004) 8 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 335.

24 PUAG, art. 2.

25 Julia Platter, Das parlamentarische Untersuchungsverfahren vor dem Verfassungsgericht (Duncker & Humblot, 2004).

26 Paul J. Glauben, Lars Brocker, Das Recht der parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschüsse in Bund und Ländern (Heymann Verlag, 2004).

27 PUAG, art. 1. sec. (2).

28 PUAG, art. 2. sec. (3).

29 Regime Jurídico dos Inquéritos Parlamentares, 1993. 03.01. [Act on the Inquiry Committees of the Spanish House of Representatives], art. 3.

30 Austrian Federal Constitution, Art. 138b Sec. 1.; Rebeka Kiss, ‘Parliaments v. Courts: Who Has the Final Word?’ (2022) 1 International Journal of Parliamentary Studies 87.

31 Olivier Rozenberg, Inquiries by Parliaments (European Parliament, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2020).

32 Matthias Keppel, ‘Political Control and Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry: Strengthening the Quality of Democracy’ (2023) 14 Journal of the Knowledge Economy 1298.