Transplantation theory in terrorism: an exploratory analysis of organised crime and terrorist group expansion

Figures & data

Table 1. Summary of the push and pull dynamics together with the command-and-control factors.

Consists of:	Type:		Factor:
Push/Supply	Willing/Planned		(a) Desire to attain capabilities, resources and investments not available in the territory of origin. (b) Desire to conduct activities in a territory due to ideological reasons. (c) Possession of knowledge, skills and connections that are conducive to take advantage of opportunities in a foreign territory.
	Unwilling/Unplanned		(x) Pressure, policies or crackdowns from authorities in area of origin. (y) Competition or conflicts with competitors or other illicit actors. (z) General migration in which terrorists with relevant skills, knowledge and connections flow through.
Pull/Demand	Local Conditions/Opportunities	(1) Economic	Illicit	Presence and access to supply and demand for criminal services, protection, materiel, recruits (black markets) Presence and access to illicit trade and trafficking routes.
			Licit	Sectors with high unemployment and disenfranchisement. Low technology and professionalisation. Societies undergoing sudden change and economic booms.	Access to capabilities, resources and investments. Presence of competitors. Presence of brokers and facilitators.
		(2) Cultural		Low level of general societal trust Legitimation of ethnic groups, rise in their socioeconomic status and decreased marginalisation (ethnic succession). Presence of diasporas and open borders giving opportunities for transnational crimes. Strong group reputation. Strong existing local ties and kinship networks.
		(3) Institutional		Lax security and law-enforcement. Poor regulation and oversight of economic sectors. Government authority corruption. Ineffectiveness of government institutions.
Command & Control/Limitations	Monitoring of Agents. (Covert) communication between the actor and agent.			Ease of collecting information in the foreign territory Reputation management in the foreign territory

Figure 1. Number of al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda affiliates’ attacks in the Sahel between 1997 and 2022.

Note. Number of al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda affiliates’ attacks in the Sahel between 1997 and 2022. Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED), concluded December 2022. These dates also correspond to an increase in transnational activities as AQIM and later JNIM start to expand outside of Algeria initially and Mali eventually. Own work.

Table 2. Summary of the push and pull dynamics together with the command-and-control factors for JNIM.

Consists of:	Type:	Factor:
Push/Supply	Willing/Planned		(a) JNIM actively seeks out artisanal gold mines and trafficking routes in the Sahara-Sahel region. (b) Al-Qaeda stated and continually confirms the importance of Africa for waging global Jihad. (c) JNIM has local knowledge of the Sahara-Sahel, skilled individual members and local connections that are conducive for them to take advantage of local opportunities.
	Unwilling/Unplanned		(x) JNIM has been pushed out of areas due to French forces pressure as have its predecessor groups in Algeria. (y) JNIM has been pushed out of ISGS controlled areas in Niger. (z) JNIM has benefited from African migration routes to enable fast movement and (illicit) trade.
Pull/Demand	Local Conditions/Opportunities	(1) Economic	Illicit	The Sahara-Sahel region has ample trafficking and smuggling routes and bustling black markets where JNIM provides protection, security and other criminal services in addition to profiting from illicit trade.
			Licit	The Sahara-Sahel region has large disenfranchised populations whom JNIM exploits. Presence of large pastoral and nomadic populations working in primary sectors. Outbursts of violence and continual political and socio-economic instability and changes.	Presence of unregulated artisanal gold mines and national parks. Limited presence of capable and sizeable competitors. JNIM can rely on brokers and facilitators in the region.
		(2) Cultural		Traditional societies with low general societal trust in the Sahara-Sahel to outsider groups. Arab, Tuareg and Fulani tribes offer JNIM legitimacy as a security providing actor. JNIM offers individuals prestige by lifting their socioeconomic status through membership and association. Having members from various regional tribes across the Sahara-Sahel gives JNIM a wide reach to conduct transnational criminal activities. JNIM and al-Qaeda have a strong reputation across the region conducive to attracting recruits. Through intermarriage JNIM has benefited from strong existing local ties and kinship networks in the Sahara-Sahel region.
		(3) Institutional		The states in the Sahara-Sahel region generally have lax security and law-enforcement. The economic sectors in the region are poorly regulated with little oversight. Governments and authorities across the Sahara-Sahel suffer from rampant corruption. Government institutions across the regions are generally ineffective.
Command & Control/Influence	JNIM monitors subgroups through subcommanders. (Covert) communication between JNIM’s subgroups and al-Qaeda is difficult and has resulted in several leaders being eliminated by authorities.			Through their embeddedness in the Sahara-Sahel, JNIM can collect information relatively easily. JNIM relies on the al-Qaeda name and embeddedness in local groups to manage their reputation.