Not an ‘ordinary Under-Secretary’ for India: the unconventional political career of Lord Lothian

ABSTRACT

Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) (1882–1940) had a close association with India for almost thirty years. He played a crucial role in the development of the early policy of The Round Table towards the subcontinent. He was a short-lived junior minister in charge of Indian affairs during a critical phase of the late colonial constitutional reforms. After his resignation he maintained an active relationship with India and an influential presence. During all of this time he consistently advocated the encouragement of a competitive party political system which he saw as the best guarantee of the growth of democracy on the subcontinent.

KEYWORDS:

• India
• Lord Lothian
• Samuel Hoare
• constitutional reform
• franchise
• political parties

Introduction

Philip Kerr (created eleventh Marquess of Lothian in March 1930) spent all of his life in public service of considerable eminence. Recruited directly from university to work in South Africa in 1905, he joined the collection of administrators that later became known as Milner’s Kindergarten. He died an early death in post as the Ambassador to the United States in 1940. In the intervening years he had served as Private Secretary to Prime Minister Lloyd George, briefly edited the Daily Chronicle and spent nearly fifteen years as the Secretary of the Rhodes Trust.¹ In addition to being a pivotal figure in the Round Table movement, he was also the founding editor of The Round Table journal, to which he became a prominent contributor as the author of almost one hundred articles. It is surprising, therefore, that Lothian only occupied the role of a government minister for a little over twelve months (24 August 1931–28 September 1932). And that episode was characterised by the strict conditions he demanded before accepting the post and his unconventional conduct in office that often resulted in the exasperation of his colleagues. An unexpected departure from his post was followed by an energetic pursuit of his priorities after his resignation.

In August 1931, only eighteen months after being inducted to the House of Lords Lothian was recruited into the national government of Ramsay MacDonald. After the general election two months later he was appointed deputy to Samuel Hoare, the new Secretary of State for India. Hoare revealed later that a fellow Conservative had been suggested as his Under-Secretary but he had preferred to see the Liberal Lothian at the India Office. Hoare recognised Lothian’s ‘exceptional knowledge of constitutional theory and practice’ and respected his wide range of contacts in India (Templewood, 1954, p. 70). Lothian had played a prominent role in the development of thinking about the place of India in the Empire and was a leading participant in the Round Table debates on the future of the subcontinent (Anon [Philip Kerr], 1912, Duncan, 2022a, pp. 984–6; Ellinwood, 1971). Lothian also possessed the immediate practical advantage of being in a position to help steer through the House of Lords what was anticipated to be a prolonged and bitterly contested legislative programme to create a new constitutional framework for India. Whilst there was considerable multi-party support for Indian reform, any further moves towards self-government were being vigorously opposed by the so-called Diehards within the Conservative Party.

However, Lothian’s appointment was bound to stir controversy – he always kindled very strong, and very different, reactions. For Beatrice Webb (1917, p. 3499), who came across him in his early days as a member of Lloyd George’s secretariat, he was an ‘aristocratic dreamer with sentimentally revolutionary views’. Commenting on his later years, Robert Vansittart at the Foreign Office thought him ‘an incurably superficial Johnny-know-all’ (Roi, 1997, p. 76). Others, appalled by his later association with some of the strongest advocates of appeasement, came to call him ‘Lord Loathsome’ (Lanyi, 1963, p. 324). The young daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru urging her father to decline an invitation to a weekend house party declared, with all the certainty of a Somerville undergraduate that ‘He is a thorough Fascist & doesn’t make any bones about it. Your staying with him would amount to the same as if you spent a weekend with Hitler himself or with Mussolini’ (Gandhi, 2005, p. 207). Yet for Rudyard Kipling, Lothian’s reformist and liberal views were such a danger to the future of the Empire that the Bard of the Raj resigned in protest from the board of the Rhodes Trust when Lothian was appointed as its secretary (Pinney, 2004, pp. 237–9).

However Lothian’s record in India was treated, at least in the UK and with the exception of the Diehards, with unchallenged approval. His work on reforming the franchise was thought to represent ‘the most important’ of the fact – finding committees set up by the Round Table Conferences and ‘an impressive testimonial to Lord Lothian’s energy and power of leadership’.² The Economist believed the ‘cause of Indian self-government has been well served’ by his work.³ R. Butler (1971, p. 45) later spoke of his ‘strongest respect for Lothian’s acute intellect’ and pointed to his report being seen as ‘unusually distinguished for its liberalism’.

Exceptional terms of appointment

The confirmation of Lothian’s appointment came only after he had sought and secured a series of special arrangements as the condition of accepting his position. He made it clear that he would take on the job providing that substantial progress was being made towards political reform. He would continue with his new assignment only if he was satisfied that the process was advancing towards widening the areas of Indian responsibility and self-government, and placing real authority in the hands of Indians. However, should progress falter, then, he declared bluntly to the Prime Minister, he would resign ‘in order to attend to his estates’.⁴ In addition, and certainly drawing on his experience as Lloyd George’s private secretary, he required and was granted, as a condition of his appointment and exceptionally as a junior minister, the right of direct access to the Prime Minister (J. Butler, 1960, p. 179).

Lothian negotiated further concessions when he assumed control of the Franchise Committee. This body was dispatched to the subcontinent soon after Lothian had joined the India Office. In yet another unconventional twist the Prime Minister agreed that whilst abroad he would be released from all duties as Under-Secretary of State for India, but nonetheless he could retain his official title.⁵ The formula was replete with ambiguities that Lothian would later make the most of. Overall there could be little doubt that he had most certainly been appointed with the assurance that his post would have ‘a status of somewhat more responsibility than that of an ordinary Under-Secretary’ (Ibid.).

Standing up to the viceroy

Lothian arrived in India to be met by Congress demonstrations that denounced his delegation as ‘thick-skulled brazen-faced bounders and buffoons’ who should realise ‘the contempt and loathing in which … they are held by the people of Bombay’. The leaflets on the quayside demanded ‘LOTHIAN GO BACK’.⁶ Any lingering hopes Lothian may have harboured about the participation of the predominantly Hindu Indian National Congress in his proceedings were put aside.

Lothian’s committee also faced the prospect of a boycott by the Muslim representatives. The pressure had started at the end of the first Round Table Conference when a variety of Muslim delegates had lobbied for a statement of intent about the future of the electoral arrangements for their co-religionists; they wanted the details of a so-called communal award as soon as possible (Moore, 1974, pp. 160–4). The issue rumbled on through the second conference. Although Lothian’s committee, strictly speaking, had been barred from considering the issue of separate communal electorates, the subject repeatedly intruded into its deliberations.

As Moore (1974, p. 261) has remarked, from 1931 onwards ‘concern for the allegiance and co-operation of the Muslims was a leading motif of British policies’ and yet it was a motif embraced in different degrees by the principal protagonists. For the Viceroy Willingdon it was a prime concern; he was in no doubt that the Muslim interest had to be kept on side. He pointed out that the Muslims had been supporting the administration during the disturbances of civil disobedience ‘and I don’t want to lose them if I can possibly avoid it’. To this end Willingdon repeatedly pressed for an early announcement of an electoral communal award. He believed that just the broadest indication of the likely shape of a settlement would help to keep the Muslims involved in the whole gamut of discussions about the reforms and other matters. Willingdon’s Private Secretary also revealed that the Viceroy was making every effort to encourage Hoare to make an early declaration of intent.⁷ The Viceroy wrote to Hoare urging an announcement, without which, he claimed ‘the Muslims won’t discuss anything further’.⁸ Later Willingdon expanded on his assessment of the situation of the Muslims:

We are dealing with people emotional, suspicious, apprehensive of their future and apt to be hasty in opinion and violent in action. If the Muslims are now carried away into opposition we shall be faced with a situation in this country which almost certainly will demand measures more drastic than any we have yet taken.⁹

The Viceroy exerted enormous pressure to get an early electoral settlement for the Muslims. However it was widely thought that Willingdon’s opinion was unduly swayed by some of his advisors and particularly Sir Fazl-i-Hussain, the most influential member of his Executive Council (Nugent, 1979). Sir Fazl was reputed to be ‘a shrewd operator’ and ‘the Viceroy leaned a lot on his advice’.¹⁰ Lothian, in a series of robust interventions, exploited his exceptional right of direct access to the Prime Minister and urged MacDonald to postpone any decision until he had completed his work in India.¹¹ Lothian pleaded that an early announcement would compromise his enquiries. He also tried to impress upon Willingdon that ‘it would be suicidal to run the risk of smashing up the Franchise Committee, and its work, rather than delaying for a couple of months’.¹² Lothian believed that any announcement, whatever the content, was bound to result in dissatisfaction and would precipitate the withdrawal of participation from one quarter or the other. Lothian stood his ground and repeatedly urged the postponement of any sort of ‘Communal Award’ to the Viceroy, to the Secretary of State and, by way of his extraordinary access, to the Prime Minister as well.

Lothian’s position won the day and Hoare eventually ruled that he could not consider a conclusion ‘until Lothian’s findings are available’. He emphasised that he wanted all the evidence, both about other minority interests as well as the Muslims, before making any decision.¹³ The Cabinet were informed by Hoare that Willingdon had made representations on behalf of the Muslims that ‘had asked for a declaration, which went further than the Cabinet Committee on India were willing to accept’.¹⁴ Lothian had ensured that all interests and ‘minorities’ were to be given due consideration and none was to be allowed to jump the queue. It had been a sustained confrontation in which a newly appointed junior minister had persisted with his case in the face of well-entrenched influential interests. Remarkably, Lothian had successfully rebuffed not only the demands of the powerful Muslim lobby but those of the Viceroy of India as well. It was an extraordinary achievement.

Lothian was equally insistent in his more immediate practical efforts to find ways to expand the electorate. He had during the course of his enquiries in India in effect asked the provinces to state the maximum numbers of voters with which the administrative machinery could cope. Some provincial governments were resistant to this approach. One complained about the way in which it felt it had been ‘pressed’ to consider as many potential voters as was logistically feasible. As Lothian persisted, it protested that this was ‘not the point of view from which the Local Government would themselves have preferred to approach the problem of the franchise’.¹⁵

During his time away on the committee tour Lothian also continued to remain active in promoting his views about the future of reform in India. He made frequent public statements and kept up a regular correspondence with influential figures in the UK. He sustained a constant commentary advocating expansion of the electorate, early elections and the extension of self-government. He wrote (privately) to Geoffrey Dawson, editor of the London Times, urging him to understand that early elections were the only way forward.¹⁶ To Jan Smuts he had stressed the need for a ‘very liberal franchise’.¹⁷ And he never tired of reminding Hoare of his conviction that it was imperative ‘to transfer responsibility, at any rate in the Provinces, at the earliest possible moment’.¹⁸ But it was Lothian’s more public statements that were to cause the greatest furore. A series of interviews followed by his farewell address, were widely reported and suggested a course of action rather more radical than any accepted policy.¹⁹ Hoare was horrified that his deputy was overstepping the mark and issued a stern warning that on his return to the UK he was to give no interviews of any kind to the press. He pointed out that the majority of MPs were ‘more restive than ever’ and things might get out of hand:

I had the greatest difficulty with them over the interview that you were reported as having given to the Daily Herald, and they are now furious over your farewell words to India.²⁰

Hoare’s extreme reaction, effectively gagging Lothian, was in part a reflection of the general anxiety that pervaded government at this time about media coverage of the reform process. Within the India Office a view had taken hold that a lack of finesse on the part of officials in India when dealing with the press were now jeopardising the entire programme of constitutional review.²¹ Even senior bureaucrats within the Indian Civil Service criticised ‘the amateur efforts of Government’.²² And the Prime Minister made it clear that he wanted Hoare to ‘tell the Indian Government quite plainly of the mess which they have made with their Press!’²³ The Secretary of State wrote repeatedly to the Viceroy urging immediate improvements in official communications. But as Hoare wearily confessed to the Prime Minister he couldn’t be at all sure Willingdon was likely to do anything about it.²⁴

‘A queer collection of freaks and faddists’

At times it seemed merely the presence of Lothian and his committee in India was enough to irk senior members of the colonial administration. The Governor of the United Provinces, Malcolm Hailey, cooperated, if a little frostily, with Lothian’s enquiries (Duncan, 2019, pp. 137–8). However Hailey thought aspects of Lothian’s endeavours were futile. He was particularly sceptical about his efforts to increase the number of ‘untouchable’ voters and thought their interests better served through the appointment of nominated representatives. Gilbert Laithwaite, the Secretary to Lothian’s committee, reported to his colleagues at the India Office that Hailey ‘was emphatic in a private talk with some of us this morning that he could not see any alternative whatsoever to nomination’.²⁵ But privately Hailey’s reservations went even further and he launched an extraordinary campaign of criticism of the membership and competence of Lothian’s team. It was composed of people who were, he complained, ‘intellectually the least competent body of the many which in my time have visited India’. In these exchanges and a number of subsequent letters Hailey took to describing the members repeatedly as ‘a queer collection of freaks and faddists’.²⁶

The Viceroy also decided that Lothian was to blame for the arrival of other delegations whose presence he did not welcome. After the visit of one group, about which he claimed to have evidence of ‘the outrageous way in which they have been behaving’, he decided to complain to Hoare. He encouraged Hoare to ‘tell Lothian, who is largely responsible for these people being sent out here, when you see him, that his friends have been a perfect nuisance to us’. Willingdon was convinced they would return to the UK with nothing but ‘the most lurid stories of the brutality of the Government of India’. They are, he went on, ‘just the sort of people we don’t want in India at this juncture’.²⁷ The Viceroy’s suspicions were unfounded – Lothian had very little involvement with the delegation. The security and intelligence services had kept a close eye on this delegation, intercepting mail and bank transactions as well as following their travels in India. This surveillance resulted in a bulky file of more than 300 pages of records being compiled. The contents reveal that Lothian in fact had little to do with the visit and the Viceroy’s irritation was completely misplaced.²⁸ But by this time, towards the end of his tenure, Lothian had become regarded by some, like Willingdon, as an inveterate troublemaker repeatedly acting beyond his brief.

For others, like Churchill and the Diehards, the very thought of Lothian investigating the means by which the Indian franchise could be extended was just absurd. The campaign against reform had been stepped up with Churchill’s formal break with the Conservative leadership and his speeches to the newly formed Indian Empire Society in early 1931 (James, 1974, pp. 4982–7; 5003–9). Churchill’s most scornful attack on Lothian’s efforts to expand the electorate came at a private meeting of the Society in Bedford in May 1932 just after Lothian had returned. ‘I know that everybody here agrees with me that democracy is totally unsuited to India, and that the Franchise is almost a farce’ was Churchill’s opening call. But he went on to tell his audience that it was ‘humiliating to remember that this policy was introduced by a Conservative Government, supported by a Commission which had a Lord at its head’ (Gilbert, 1977, p. 433).

The protests about Lothian’s unconventional pronouncements and interventions eventually took formal shape in parliament shortly after his return from India. Lord Lloyd, a former Governor of Bombay and a prominent Diehard, put down a question asking whether Lothian’s opinions in his farewell speech had the sanction of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. Lothian carefully and creatively deployed in his defence the ambiguous status MacDonald had conferred on him. He responded:

My Lords, as was announced at the time, before I left this country for India I was released by the Prime Minister from my duties as Under-Secretary of State for India … In the same way therefore any public utterance which I made in India was made in my personal capacity and not as representing either the Viceroy or the Secretary of State.²⁹

Subsequent scholarship has tended to regard Lothian’s franchise enquiries and recommendations as routine and unexceptional. McMillan (2005, p. 49), for example, thinks his findings were ‘undramatic’. In fact Lothian was not entirely happy with the outcome of his work and he wrote a supplementary note to the Viceroy expressing his reservations.³⁰ But the franchise report provided the foundation of all the subsequent deliberations on the electoral components of the constitutional reforms and the fundamentals of his recommendations were never rejected.

The drama of departure

Over the weekend of 24/25 September 1932 all the senior figures at the India Office were urgently called in to consider events in India. The Prime Minister returned from Chequers and met with Hoare and Lothian at Downing Street. The previous week the Liberals supporting the National government had been in session contemplating withdrawing support from the government as it abandoned free trade and moved to ‘imperial preference’ under the terms of the Ottawa agreements.³¹ The government was facing major crises on two fronts.

Lothian’s departure from office came in a flurry of intense activity over the next few days. Of all the possible Liberal resignations on the terms of the Ottawa trade agreements it was Lothian’s that caused the most speculation. The London Times thought that the replacement of Lothian in the Indian brief would be ‘the principal difficulty’ and his possible departure was regarded by his colleagues as ‘less intelligible than any other’. With the reform process about to enter a new ‘particularly delicate’ stage, and with Lothian having ‘all the latest developments at his finger-tips’, The Times observed, ‘There is no stronger case imaginable for continuing to serve in a National Government at a time of imminent difficulty’.³²

Given he had devoted all his efforts in government to the India question many wondered if he would feel obliged to follow the other National Liberals out of office on the entirely unrelated issue of the Ottawa agreements. Lothian would be leaving the government when he had no disagreement at all with the administration in the policy area with which he had been primarily, in fact exclusively, involved. What is more there was probably no other politician in office who could match his detailed knowledge and understanding of India, and particularly the current state of the reform negotiations. Hoare had no doubts at all that Lothian would be ‘exceedingly silly in not stopping on and in not dissociating himself from Samuel and Samuel’s crowd’.³³ As was reported ‘it was hoped to the last that Lord Lothian, whose work in the Government had been wholly concerned with India, might remain in the Government, at least for the present’.³⁴ And this was particularly and especially the case when it came to the specific provisions of the Communal Award. There was no other politician who had as much detailed knowledge of the Award, or understanding of the consequences of tinkering with its provisions

The crisis in Indian affairs had been precipitated by Gandhi embarking on a fast, as he put it ‘unto death’, in protest against the electoral provisions for the ‘untouchables’ in the Communal Award. Gandhi interpreted the proposals as a move to establish a separate electorate for the small numbers of untouchables who were likely to be enfranchised under Lothian’s proposals. However Lothian, who had been responsible for the details of the settlement, did not believe his recommendations in any way amounted to the introduction of a separate electorate for the untouchable voters.³⁵ Lothian had always been totally opposed to further segmenting the electorate and regretted that the practice had ever been introduced by the British:

They [separate electorates] are the negation of responsible government and by entrenching communal division in the constituencies, make healthy political life in the provinces and anything like a true Indian nationality impossible while they last. So far as it goes this argument is unanswerable. It is an absurd and preposterous system.³⁶

He was bewildered that Gandhi was threatening to starve himself to death on the basis of a policy document that Lothian thought he had misunderstood. Hoare reassured the Prime Minister that ‘Lothian’s scheme … made Gandhi’s threat altogether unreasonable’.³⁷ Lothian urged Hoare to take action:

I think we ought to take steps to make clear to him that we are not creating separate electorates for them and that they are voting in the ordinary Hindu constituencies.³⁸

Hoare in turn encouraged the Prime Minister to intervene, which he did by writing personally to Gandhi (in a letter most probably drafted by Lothian) expressing ‘much surprise’ and ‘sincere regret’ at his decision to embark on a fast. In final exasperation Macdonald repeated that he was baffled by Gandhi’s course of action and put it to him that:

In the light of these very fair and cautious proposals I am quite unable to understand the reason of the decision you have taken and can only think that you have made it under a misapprehension of the actual facts.³⁹

In the end the crisis was resolved by an agreement (the Poona Pact) between the affected Indian interests themselves.⁴⁰ But it required the authorities in both Delhi and London to take urgent action to avoid a calamity in view of Gandhi’s health. The Government of India abandoned any attempt to measure reaction to the agreement or to confirm the extent of support for it – it was waved through without any further consideration.⁴¹ In London similar precipitate action was taken and the Prime Minister admitted he had agreed to the terms of the Pact without consulting the cabinet.⁴² Lothian, with his expert knowledge of the terms of the Communal Award and of the implications of revising it, was in close attendance giving advice through the whole process. It was the last service he provided for the government and, feeling he had to keep the faith with his fellow Liberals, he resigned with them on the same day.

Confronting the diehards

When Lothian left office Hoare reassured the Viceroy ‘he has left most friendlily disposed towards us and will give us all the help he can’ (R. Butler, 1971, p. 45). Lothian informed The Times in a similar vein that he had resigned ‘with great regret’ and that:

My resignation is in no way connected with Indian affairs, about which I am in complete agreement with the policy of the Government. It is our intention to support the Government in giving effect to the national policy contained in the Prime Minister’s declaration of December 1, 1931.⁴³

And it became clear at the debate initiating the debate on the White Paper and the establishment of Joint Select Committee to consider it that he intended to do precisely that:

I believe the White Paper is sound. I do not say in all its details it is perfect – I think that co-operation between Indians and members of the Joint Select Committee may improve it – but in fundamentals it is based on the ultimate realities of the Indian problem of today.⁴⁴

In part Lothian’s stance was simply an acceptance of the view that had been articulated by Permanent Secretary Findlater Stewart that ‘the scheme we are now working on at the India Office must go through in some form, since the wit of man can devise no other’ (R. Butler, 1971, p. 49). But the commitment Lothian brought to the task was fuelled in large part by the vigour and fervour he had always shown in support of the reforms. He became, as one former Secretary of State for India expressed it, ‘Perhaps the most vehement of all those who have supported the White Paper’.⁴⁵ During the following parliamentary marathon that marked the way to the Government of India Act of 1935 Lothian always played a prominent part. He was one of the best informed and most enthusiastic and effective supporters of the reform programme. Lothian contributed to almost every Lords debate strenuously confronting the relentless Diehard resistance (J. Butler, 1960, pp. 183–9; May, 1995, pp. 275–7). As he promised to Hoare, he was always ready and eager to take on Churchill and the Diehards as they set about ‘mobilising their storm troops’.⁴⁶

Maintaining the Indian connection

After leaving office Lothian sustained his vast range of contacts with India and maintained a regular correspondence with leading political figures. Later on he even spent time with Gandhi at one of his ashrams where, as he described to his sister, he lived in a mud and wattle hut, was fed on vegetarian food and slept out under the stars (J. Butler, 1960, p. 186). Perhaps his most important relationship was with Jawaharlal Nehru.⁴⁷

His exchanges with Nehru revealed the political chasm between them but he persisted with the dialogue.⁴⁸ In spite of their profound differences Lothian encouraged understanding and tolerance of Nehru to a British public increasingly weary of the ‘Indian question’. Reviewing Nehru’s autobiography he commended his ‘astonishing philosophical detachment and unflinching honesty’. He remarked that despite his imprisonment by the British for almost seven years (by that point) he was ‘utterly without personal bitterness and that Nehru’s fundamental quarrel was with ‘imperialism, capitalism, and religious and social obscurantism’ (Lothian, 1936, p. 1031).

Lothian repeatedly corresponded with Nehru about the importance of the growth of political parties and the development of a competitive party political system. He was clearly familiar with the works of contemporary thinkers on political parties like Michels and Ostrogorski and in one article referred explicitly to the importance of the latter:

India has to develop the political organisms – the party structures so lucidly described by Ostrogorski in his monumental history of parties – which alone will enable her to discharge the function of government in a constitutional manner. (Anon [Philip Kerr]., 1930, p. 690)

In a lecture to the Royal Institute of International Affairs he used words almost identical to the opening of Michels’ Political Parties (‘Democracy is inconceivable without organisation’’) when he told his audience ‘If you are going to make democracy work successfully in India, as elsewhere, you need good party organisation’ (Lothian, 1932, pp. 597–8).

Lothian’s faith in an expanded electorate nurturing the growth of political parties and a competitive party political system never wavered. He thought that fretting about the specific details of a constitution was perhaps not as important as India developing ‘a virile, constructive party life’. He had always stressed the relationship between expanding the electorate and encouraging the growth of political parties. And for Lothian political parties ‘concerned with political, social and economic reform are the dynamic force which puts force and vitality into the constitutional machine’ (Nehru, 1958, pp. 135–6).

Encouraging congress into office

Lothian’s last major intervention in the context of India were his efforts urging the elected Congress majorities to take office in the provinces in the aftermath of the first elections held under the new constitution. Congress had won half of all the seats but in the seven provinces where it was in the majority it hesitated to announce it would take office until any ambiguity about the exceptional powers of the Governor had been clarified. Gandhi issued a press statement on 30 March reaffirming that Congress could not take office unless:

There was a gentlemanly understanding between the Governors and their Congress Ministers that they would not exercise their special powers of interference so long as the Ministers acted within the Constitution. (Mahatma Gandhi, collected works, 1999, pp. 87–8)

Lothian responded almost immediately with a public announcement pointing to the flaws in Gandhi’s argument.⁴⁹ He followed this up with an intervention in the House of Lords delivering a long analysis that emphasised ‘the idea that the Constitution gives to the Governors wide, arbitrary, and irresponsible powers is a complete delusion’.⁵⁰ It is impossible to gauge the impact of Lothian’s intervention. Although The Times felt his statement ‘ought to carry some weight in Congress circles’ it had no immediate effect.⁵¹ The Congress announcement that it would take office did not come for another three months.

This last episode of Lothian’s involvement with India revealed once again further evidence of the basis of the political philosophy that had guided him for the previous thirty years. His belief in the value of the growth of political parties in promoting political life was demonstrated once more. He saw the acceptance of office by the Congress as the next vital step in the development of India’s party political system. As an Imperialist, albeit a liberal as well as a Liberal one, he imagined that development taking place whilst India remained within the Empire. He never conceived of India leaving the Empire. Nor did he ever advocate universal suffrage for India, or call for Indian independence, but he was willing to consider those eventual possibilities to a far greater extent than most of his colleagues.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. There was some speculation that he was considered for the office of Viceroy when Irwin retired. Reports Lord Lothian Slated for Viceroy. New York Times 14 October 1930; Who will be the next Viceroy? The Times of India 21 October 1930; The Next Viceroy. The Times of India 31 October 1930.

2. The Indian Franchise. The Times (London) 3 June 1932.

3. 3.The Lothian Report, The Economist 11 June 1932.

4. Lothian to MacDonald, 9 November 1931, GD40/17/160, Lothian Papers, National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh (NAS). Lothian on inheriting his peerage had acquired extensive financial liabilities.

5. MacDonald to Lothian, 11 January 1932, L/PJ/9/82, India Office Records, British Library. London (IOR).

6. Laithwaite Papers, Mss Eur F138/15, British Library, London, (BL). Interestingly the Cabinet was given a totally different account and assured that there had been ‘no open demonstration of hostility towards any of the Committees [dealing with constitutional reform]’, Cabinet Paper, India, 16 February 1932, CAB 24/228/27, National Archives of England and Wales, London, (NAEW).

7. Mieville to Hailey, 16 March 1932, Hailey Papers, Mss Eur E220/23b, BL.

8. Willingdon to Hoare, 14 March 1932, Hoare Papers, Mss Eur E240/5, BL.

9. Willingdon to Hoare, 10 July 1932, Hoare Papers, E240/11, BL.

10. Willingdon was not known for his close attention to detail. His successor Linlithgow was surprised how rarely he came across a file signed off by Willingdon ‘let alone an actual Viceregal minute’ (Tinker, 1997, p. 131), Cross believed that Hoare would never have appointed Willingdon (Cross, 1977, p. 143).

11. Lothian to MacDonald, 4 February 1932, Lothian Papers, GD40/17/160, NAS.

12. Lothian to Willingdon, 24 February 1932, Lothian Papers, GD40/17/160, NAS.

13. Hoare to Willingdon, 18 March 1932, Hoare Papers, Mss Eur E240/1, BL.

14. The Communal Problem, 23 March 1932, Cabinet Papers, CAB 23/70/19, NAEW.

15. Government of the United Province (GUP) to Government of India (GoI), 11 July 1932, L/PJ/9/94, IOR.

16. Lothian to ‘Robin’, 29 March 1932, Lothian Papers, GD40/17/159, NAS.

17. Lothian to Smuts, 7 January 1932, Lothian Papers, GD40/17/160, NAS.

18. Lothian to Hoare, 19 February 1932, Lothian Papers, GD40/17/160, NAS.

19. Self-Rule, India’s Only Remedy, Daily Herald (London), 14 March 1932; India’s ‘Novice’ Election, Daily Herald (London), 11 May 1932; Mitra, N. N. (ed.), (1932), 62.

20. Hoare to Lothian, 11 May 1932. Lothian Papers GD40/17/264/370 NAS. Shortly after Lothian was sternly rebuked by Hoare again for circulating unauthorised proposals around the India Office, Hoare to Lothian, 20 July 1932, Lothian Papers, GD40/17/264/371, NAS.

21. See Hoare to Prime Minister, 20 August 1932, L/PO/6/77, IOR; Hoare to Willingdon, 1 July 1932; 11 August 1932, Hoare Papers, Mss Eur E240/2, BL.

22. Williamson (Commissioner Benares Division) to GoI, 4 May 1932, Home Pol. 14/28 1932, National Archives of India (NAI). See also, Publicity Work, Home Pol. 62/32, 1932, NAI; Question of Improving Propaganda and Publicity Work in India, Home Pol. 35/17, 1932, NAI.

23. Prime Minister’s Private Secretary to Hoare, 23 August 1932, L/PO/6/77, IOR.

24. Hoare to Prime Minister, 20 August 1932, L/PO/6/77, IOR. Willingdon finally took action by moving around the senior personnel in the Directorate of Public Information and the Intelligence Bureau, see Willingdon to Hoare, 22 August 1932; 12 September 1932, Hoare Papers, Mss Eur E240/5, BL.

25. Laithwaite to Dawson, 19 March 1932, Laithwaite Papers, Mss Eur F138/15, IOR.

26. Hailey to Irwin, 31 May 1932, Hailey Papers, Mss Eur E220/24a, BL: inter alia, Hailey to Brown, 15 June 1932, Hailey Papers, Mss Eur E220/24b, BL.

27. Willingdon to Hoare, 9 October 1932, Hoare Papers, Mss Eur E240/5, BL.

28. The file revealed Lothian had one meeting with one member of the party at which he advised that the delegation would not be permitted to visit imprisoned activists and suggested some non-Congress ‘liberal’ leaders they should contact. Visit to India under the auspices of the Congress of a delegation of the India League London, Home (Political) file 40/XII, 1932 NAI.

29. Hansard (House of Lords) 28 June 1932, vol. 85, c. 285. See also Daily Telegraph 29 June 1932.

30. Lothian to Willingdon, The Communal Question and the Franchise Committee Report, 8 May 1932, Hailey Papers E220/54, BL.

31. Liberals and Ottawa. The Times (London), 22 September 1932.

32. Lord Lothian’s Position. The Times (London), 27 September 1932.

33. Hoare to Willingdon. 30 September 1932, Hoare Papers, E240/2, BL.

34. Cabinet and Ottawa. The Times (London), 29 September 1932.

35. Hoare to MacDonald, 19 July 1932, L/PO/6/80. IOR.

36. Lothian to Hoare, The Communal Settlement, 19 July 1932, L/PO/6/80, IOR.

37. See Hoare to MacDonald, 20 August 1932. Hoare Papers, Mss Eur E240/16, BL.

38. Hoare to Turnbull, 23 August 1932, L/PO/6/77. IOR.

39. MacDonald to Gandhi, 8 September 1932, ibid.

40. For further details of this episode see Duncan, 2022b.

41. As the government warned ‘There is no time for procedure suggested in our telegram of yesterday’. GoI to all Local Governments 24 September 1932; 25 September 1932 Home Pol. file 41/5, 1932 NAI.

42. Cabinet Meeting 28 September 1932, CAB 23/72/8, NAEW. The hurried resolution dictated by Gandhi’s threats was reflected on, and regretted, for years to come. It was pointed out that the content had been concluded ‘in a great hurry, under pressure of Mr. Gandhi’s “fast unto death”’(Joint Committee, 1934, 437.). Later it was remarked that ‘The agreement was, it appears, concluded under conditions which precluded any close examination of all its implications, nor does there appear at the time to have been any detailed discussion as to how its aims could best be realized’ (Indian Delimitation Committee, 1936, pp. 102–3).

43. Cabinet and Ottawa. The Times (London) 29 September 1932.

44. Hansard (House of Lords) 4 April 1933, Vol.87, c. 288.

45. Hansard (House of Lords) 6 April 1933 Vol. 87, c. 398.

46. Lothian to Hoare, 21 February 1933, Lothian Papers, GD40/17/264/368, NAS.

47. Lothian eventually hosted a weekend house party at his country home in Norfolk for Nehru. Having advised him to have nothing to do with the ‘thorough Fascist’, Indira accompanied her father.

48. See particularly Lothian to Nehru 31 December 1935, Nehru to Lothian 17 January 1936 (Nehru, 1958, pp. 129–51).

49. The Times (London), 6 April 1937.

50. Hansard (House of Lords) 8 April 1937, Vol. 104, c. 871.

51. The Times (London), 8 April 1937.