![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
Since the devastating 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai, and especially with the rise of hardline Hindu nationalism under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a consensus has evolved in India that its failure to respond forcefully to the attack diminished its national security. Trumpeting assertiveness and underplaying restraint have strengthened Modi’s electoral position, indoctrinated most of India’s foreign and security establishment, and energised India’s foreign brand. But space has shrunk for public advocacy and discussion of restraint. As India’s economy continues to grow, Modi’s aggressive statecraft will pose a dilemma. While India’s means of implementing it will become more potent, it will have more to lose from the instability it can cause.
Notes
1 Thomas L. Friedman, ‘The Israeli Officials I Speak With Tell Me They Know Two Things for Sure’, New York Times, 29 October 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/29/opinion/israel-hamas-ceasefire.html.
2 Government of India, ‘Excerpts of PM’s Intervention in Lok Sabha During Discussion on the Recent Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai’, 11 December 2008, https://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details.php?nodeid=739.
3 Quoted in Suhasini Haidar, ‘India, Pakistan Will Inevitably Return to Talks, Says Kasuri’, Hindu, 6 October 2015, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-pakistan-will-inevitably-return-to-talks-says-kasuri/article7727584.ece.
4 Raju Gopalakrishnan, ‘India Directs Anger at Politicians After Mumbai Attacks’, Reuters, 30 November 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSCOL205967/.
5 See, for example, Antara Desai, ‘India: Counterterrorism Under the New Government’, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, vol. 6, no. 5, June 2014, pp. 16–20.
6 See ‘What Is India’s “Cold Start” Military Doctrine?’, The Economist, 31 January 2017, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/01/31/what-is-indias-cold-start-military-doctrine.
7 See Narendra Modi, ‘Full Text of Shri Narendra Modi’s Speech at Ex-servicemen’s Rally, Rewari’, 15 September 2013, https://www.narendramodi.in/full-text-of-shri-narendra-modis-speech-at-ex-servicemens-rally-rewari-2798.
8 Bruce Stokes, ‘How Indians See Their Place in the World’, Pew Research Center, 19 September 2016, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/09/19/3-how-indians-see-their-place-in-the-world/.
9 See ‘India’s Defence Minister Warns Against Nuclear Weapons in Call with Russian Counterpart’, Reuters, 26 October 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/indias-defence-minister-warns-against-nuclear-weapons-call-with-russian-2022-10-26/.
10 See Antoine Levesques, Desmond Bowen and John H. Gill, ‘Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities’, IISS, May 2021, p. 17, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/nuclear-deterrence-and-stability-in-south-asia---perceptions-and-realities.pdf.
11 See ‘The India–Pakistan Security Crisis’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 25, no. 10, April 2019, https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2019/india-and-pakistan/.
12 See ‘Had Pakistan Not Returned Abhinandan It Would Have Been “Qatal ki Raat”: PM Modi’, Indian Express, 21 April 2019, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/had-warned-pakistan-of-consequences-if-iaf-pilot-abhinandan-varthaman-not-returned-pm-modi-5687029/.
13 See Sanjeev Miglani and Drazen Jorgic, ‘India, Pakistan Threatened to Unleash Missiles at Each Other: Sources’, Reuters, 18 March 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1QZ0F0/. India’s position may have been influenced by Trump’s unsolicited offer to mediate. See White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference’, Hanoi, Vietnam, 28 February 2019, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference-hanoi-vietnam/.
14 At the same time, Modi’s jingoism, expressed on social media, may have created space for quiet de-escalation by overstating India’s assertive response. See Lawrence Freedman and Heather Williams, Changing the Narrative: Information Campaigns, Strategy and Crisis Escalation in the Digital Age, Adelphi 493–495 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2023).
15 ‘India–China Standoff: Confident Present Conflict Will Be Resolved Through Diplomacy, Says BJP’s Ram Madhav’, India Today, 25 May 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-china-stand-off-tension-bjp-ram-madhav-resolved-diplomacy-1681575-2020-05-25.
16 See Sanjeev Miglani, ‘Insight – With Canal and Hut, India Stands Up to China on Disputed Frontier’, Reuters, 24 September 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0HJ2FT/; and Shams Irfan and Gerry Shih, ‘Age-old Cashmere Trade Ensnared in Military Tensions High in the Himalayas’, Washington Post, 2 January 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/01/02/india-china-himalaya-cashmere-wool/.
17 Government of India, Press Information Bureau, ‘Situation Update: Eastern Ladakh’, 31 August 2020, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1649940.
18 See ‘India–China Border Tension: Both Sides Position Tanks Within Firing Distance at Pangong Tso’, Business Today, 8 September 2020, https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/economy-politics/story/india-china-border-clash-indian-chinese-army-tanks-within-firing-distance-pangong-lake-lac-271808-2020-09-01; and ‘India and China Exchange the First Gunshots in 45 Years’, The Economist, 8 September 2020, https://www.economist.com/asia/2020/09/08/india-and-china-exchange-the-first-gunshots-in-45-years.
19 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of India, ‘Ambassador Sun Weidong’s Remarks Regarding Recent Media Queries on the Bilateral Meeting Between Foreign Ministers of China and India’, 14 September 2020, http://in.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/embassy_news/202009/t20200914_2146831.htm.
20 See Ambassador K. Nagaraj Naidu, ‘Upholding the Collective Security System of the UN Charter: The Use of Force in International Law, Non-state Actors and Legitimate Self-defense’, Permanent Mission of India to the UN, 24 February 2021, https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/IndiaatUNSC?id=NDE3Nw.
21 ‘I thank Prime Minister @netanyahu for his phone call and providing an update on the ongoing situation. People of India stand firmly with Israel in this difficult hour. India strongly and unequivocally condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.’ Narendra Modi (@narendramodi), post to X, 10 October 2023, https://twitter.com/narendramodi/status/1711669988116050142.
22 See Indian Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Official Spokesperson’s Response to Media Queries Regarding Iran’s Air Strikes in Pakistan’, 17 January 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/response-to-queries.htm?dtl/37515/Official_Spokespersons_response_to_media_queries_regarding_Irans_air_strikes_in_Pakistan.
23 See Roula Khalaf, Benjamin Parkin and John Reed, ‘Narendra Modi Responds to Assassination Claims’, Financial Times, 20 December 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/160235af-1584-4ec7-8aad-a3de70753f30.
24 See Shishir Gupta, ‘Why Joe Biden Is Skipping [sic] Republic Day Celebrations on January 26? This Is the Real Reason’, Hindustan Times, 15 December 2023, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/why-joe-biden-is-skipping-republic-day-celebrations-on-january-26-this-is-the-real-reason-101702644721372.html.
25 See Christopher Clary, ‘The Curious Case of the Accidental Indian Missile Launch’, War on the Rocks, 17 March 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/the-curious-case-of-the-accidental-indian-missile-launch/; and Debak Das, ‘Not Much Happened After India’s Accidental Cruise Missile Launch into Pakistan – This Time’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 25 March 2022, https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/not-much-happened-after-indias-accidental-cruise-missile-launch-into-pakistan-this-time/.
26 See, for example, Aarish U. Khan, ‘Reassessing the BrahMos Missile that Landed in Pakistan’, Diplomat, 29 September 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/reassessing-the-brahmos-missile-that-landed-in-pakistan/.
27 See Suhasini Haidar and Kallol Bhattacherjee, ‘Backchannel Diplomacy Played Its Part in India, Pakistan Decision to Cease Fire Along LoC’, Hindu, 25 February 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/analysis-indications-that-india-and-pakistan-have-been-in-back-channel-talks/article61747025.ece.
28 Rajat Pandit, ‘India Wants First Disengagement at Depsang-Demchok’, Times of India, 25 August 2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-wants-first-disengagement-at-depsang-demchok/articleshow/103038383.cms.
29 Claims of restraint and punishment alike feature in India’s publicly released military doctrines between 2006 and 2018. The 2022 Indian Air Force doctrine does not refer to restraint, but does refer to punishment. See Indian Air Force, ‘Doctrine of the Indian Air Force’, 2022, https://indianairforce.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2MB.pdf.
30 See Mahima A. Jain, ‘“A New, Emerging Indian Security Doctrine in the Indian Ocean Is Set to Challenge the Narrative and Impact of China’s Influence” – Rahul Roy-Chaudhury’, LSE Blogs, 27 October 2017, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2017/10/27/a-new-indian-security-doctrine-is-emerging-in-the-indian-ocean-which-is-set-to-challenge-the-narrative-and-impact-of-chinas-influence-rahul-roy-chaudhury/. The expression tends to be used pejoratively. For an in-depth, first-hand account of Doval’s conception of nationalsecurity statecraft, see Ajit Doval, ‘State Security, Statecraft and Conflict of Values’, Speech to the Lalit Doshi Memorial Foundation, 4 August 2015, https://ldmf.org.in/pdfs/State_Security_Statecraft_and_Conflict_of_Values.pdf.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Antoine Levesques
Antoine Levesques is IISS Research Fellow for South and Central Asian Defence, Strategy and Diplomacy.