The dual ‘dual’ policy: Two conceptions of ‘deterrence and reassurance’ in Norwegian security policy and analyses

ABSTRACT

This article argues that the conceptual basis for the Norwegian policy framed by ‘deterrence and reassurance’ towards the Soviet Union/Russia has consisted of two divergent ‘balancing acts’. One is ‘calibrated deterrence’, where reassurance is the means to ‘balance’ the deterrent effect. The other is a ‘balance’ between two theoretically conflicting means of achieving security: calibrated deterrence, versus reassurance understood as efforts and means to achieve common security. The argument implies that reassurance balancing deterrence has represented different things according to its use. Clarifying these distinct dyads improves our theoretical understanding of how states conduct their deterrent policies.

KEYWORDS:

• Reassurance
• deterrence
• calibrated deterrence
• security policy
• Norway
• Russia

Introduction

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has refocused attention on how Moscow’s strategic intentions and actions towards its neighbours remain a key concern for European security. For Norway, the only NATO country that has bordered the Soviet Union/Russia since the founding of the alliance in 1949, its main approach in influencing its neighbours intentions in order to prevent conflict or war, has been categorised as a ‘balancing act’ between ‘deterrence and reassurance’.¹ The act of balancing is traditionally referred to as a consistent thread in Norwegian security policy towards the Soviet Union since the beginning of the Cold War, and later Russia, while the balancing point has over the years oscillated between the two strategies.² In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, academics, policymakers and defence officials have questioned whether Norway should continue to pursue a balanced policy or if deterrence is the only language an aggressive and revisionist Russia understands.³ Yet, in both policy and scholarly discussions, we find divergent and partly inconsistent accounts of the ‘balancing act’, making it rather vague what it would imply for the Norwegians to give up reassurance and its balancing of deterrence. Existing policy and scholarly discussions in Norway lack a common framework or understanding of what the balancing act has been about particularly the role and character of the reassurance part.

This article argues that Norwegian security policy-making and academic analyses have made incoherent references to two divergent ‘deterrence and reassurance’ dyads. One dyad reflects the small state’s aim for calibrated deterrence, where reassurance constitutes the means to temper the deterrent effect. A prominent example has been Norway’s ‘calibration’ of the effect of its membership in the NATO alliance by entertaining self-imposed restrictions on allied activity on Norwegian territory in peacetime.⁴ The second dyad is identified as a pursuit of opposites or the balance between two theoretically conflicting means of achieving security: on the one hand, deterrence, which encompasses the efforts of securing proper defence, i.e., the calibrated deterrence in the first balancing act. On the other hand, reassurance, which in this framework can be understood as conciliation, an aim for détente and ‘common security’. This line of thinking is evident when considering Norway’s cooperation and common regulation with the Soviet Union/Russia.

The argument that two distinct balancing acts operate in tandem enhances our theoretical and empirical understanding of ‘deterrence and reassurance’ in several ways. First, it enlightens us as to how this Norwegian dual policy has been construed and clarifies how the concept of reassurance balancing deterrence has encompassed different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. This challenges the traditional portrayal of the dual policy as one singular balancing act between two strategies. Second, this article suggests that ‘deterrence measures’ and ‘reassurance measures’ do not, in and of themselves, exist. A ‘reassurance’ label can be applied to different policies. Classification is dependent on context. This challenges common portrayal of concrete policies, such as allied presence or the ban on nuclear port calls, as unambiguous displays of either deterrence or reassurance.

This article is structured as follows: the first part presents related dyads in the international relations literature, introduces the origin of ‘deterrence and reassurance’ as paired concept in the context of Norway and provides a brief account of its evolution. The second part identifies and discusses the two diverging conceptions of ‘deterrence and reassurance’ in both political practice and analytical conceptions of Norwegian security policy. The final, concluding part highlights the conceptual and theoretical implications of these findings, including the study’s relevance to current security dynamics. It suggests how this more complex understanding of deterrence versus reassurance can guide Norway and the wider Nordic region in applying ‘balanced’ approaches when it comes to the future theory and practice of deterrence.

Theories of reassurance balancing deterrence

When considering how reassurance has ‘balanced’ deterrence in Norwegian security policy, there is a risk that similar paired concepts in the international security policy discourse could confuse the reader from the start. It is therefore necessary to first clarify the character of related dyads that are in use within the broader literature.

One way of referring to deterrence and reassurance in a NATO context is the US policy of deterring Russia and reassuring its allies, the latter is a variant of assurance theory labelled as ‘alliance commitments’.⁵ This use of the paired concept originated in the early 1980s when first applied by the military historian Michael Howard to describe the dual role of America's military presence in Western Europe during the Cold War: it deterred Soviet aggression, while simultaneously reassuring Western Europe that the US was committed to its defence.⁶ This line of thinking re-emerged in 2014 in response to Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and involvement in eastern Ukraine.⁷ Enhanced military presence on the eastern flank of the Alliance had the explicit purpose of deterring Moscow from further aggression, while reassuring allies and partners of the United States’ commitment to their security.

Another similarly paired concept is the understanding of ‘deterrence and assurance’ towards an adversary, as first elucidated by economist Thomas Schelling in 1960. Assurance, according to Schelling, was not a separate strategy, but constituted an essential component of deterrence: ‘To say, “One more step and I shoot”, can be a deterrent threat only if accompanied by the implicit assurance, “And if you stop I won’t”’.⁸ This variant of ‘assurance’,⁹ can be read as an implicit promise to adversaries: if you don’t advance move, we won’t either.¹⁰

A third use of the dyad is combining the ‘deterrence’ and ‘spiral’ models as articulated by political scientist Robert Jervis: ‘we need to ask whether the states can protect themselves without greatly increasing their ability to menace the adversary’.¹¹ When linked to these combined models, reassurance has been understood as ‘a strategy of demonstrating non-aggressive intentions to an adversary as a way of compensating for the potential limitations of deterrence and reducing the chances of an unintended conflict’.¹²

The origin of the Norwegian dyad

The original paired concept of ‘deterrence and reassurance’ in a Norwegian context was first articulated by then-scholar and later policy maker Johan Jørgen Holst in the 1966 article ‘Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv [Norwegian security policy in a strategic perspective]’.¹³ Holst argued that the purpose of Norwegian security policy towards its great power neighbour in the east was ‘to influence Soviet intentions rather than containing her capabilities per se’.¹⁴ He argued that in order to do so, ‘it would seem important to achieve a reasonable and viable balance between deterrence and reassurance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union’.¹⁵ It was ‘desirable to deter expansionist plans and equally important to avoid provocations which might generate Soviet incentives for pre-emptive or compensatory actions on the Northern flank’.¹⁶ For small states, Holst argued, it was important to find a ‘stable position between deterrence and provocation’.¹⁷

Although Holst’s analytical conceptualization was new in the mid-1960s, the policy he described and referred to as the empirical basis for his analyses, went back to the beginning of the Cold War.¹⁸ The preconditions for the balancing act stemmed from the fundamental lessons Norwegian policy makers absorbed after the Second World War. Neutrality, it was realised, was no guarantee for keeping Norway out of future great power wars, due to its geostrategically important location and vast coastline. Furthermore, Norway was unable to defend itself alone, and a security guarantee of assistance in times of crisis or war had to be agreed and prepared in peacetime. With the dawn of the Cold War and facing perceived security challenges from the East, signing the Atlantic Treaty and receiving guarantees from the US became the only solution.¹⁹

At the same time, Norway was the only country among the original 12 signatory states to border the Soviet Union both on land and at sea, and in a region of strategic importance to the superpower,²⁰ and it was therefore in Norway’s interest to keep NATO’s Northern flank an area of low tension. This was evident even prior to the signing of the Treaty. In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the Soviet Union and Norway from January to February 1949, the Norwegian government declared that Norway would never partake in a policy of ‘aggressive intent’ and would never permit Norwegian territory to be used in the service of such a policy.²¹ Furthermore, Norway did not ‘intend to join any pact with other states entailing commitments for Norway on opening bases for foreign armed forces on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is not under attack or exposed to threats of attack’.²² This so-called ‘base policy’, i.e., the non-bases policy, was later followed by additional ‘self-imposed restrictions’ during the 1950s and 1960s. These included political commitments not to permanently deploy nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory in peacetime, as well as various geographical restraints on allied exercises and activities in Finmark, the northernmost county in Norway.²³

It was, in particular, this combination of NATO membership, on the one hand, and self-imposed restrictions on the other that Holst perceived as representative of the mentioned position between ‘deterrence and provocation’.²⁴ The main purpose of the Norwegian integration into NATO was to deter the Russians from an attack and avoid political pressure.²⁵ The US security guarantees were fundamental in the policy of deterrence, while self-imposed restrictions aimed at ‘reassuring’ the Soviet Union in regards to the defensive character of Norwegian defence integration with the West. In addition to the restraint on allied activity, Holst also highlighted the importance of communication: explaining actions and dispositions would, he argued, contribute to preventing any misconceptions about them.²⁶

To some extent, Holst’s original take coincides with the variant of ‘reassurance’ related to the combination of Jervis’ two models above. Internationally, the American political scientist Richard Ned Lebow was, it has been claimed, the first in 1985 to assign the label ‘reassurance’ to such policy.²⁷ Hence, even though the Norwegian conceptualization of reassurance originated 20 years prior to when Lebow linked the word/concept reassurance to similar policy – and has figured as a key component of Norwegian security policy ever since – it has largely been omitted by international theorists analysing reassurance. Obversely, Norwegian reassurance literature has, until recently, paid little attention to broader reassurance theories when considering Norway.

The evolution of the reassurance concept as part of the Norwegian dyad

Since the signing of the Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and Holst’s original conceptualization in 1966, ‘deterrence and reassurance’ has survived and evolved as a conceptual framework for Norwegian policy towards the Soviet Union/Russia, both in practical policy rhetoric and academic analyses.

Yet, scholars and policy makers have scarcely wondered whether the concepts have been used to describe the same policy all along. It is, for example, worth noting that even if the Norwegian strategic situation and threat perceptions in the period have included both a direct attack against Norway and an attack against NATO somewhere else which would involve Norway in some form, we lack analyses that explicitly address whether Norwegian policy makers have squared the concepts differently according to the various threat perceptions and scenarios. This section focuses on providing a brief (non-exhaustive) overview of some significant markers as to how these concepts have figured in policy and academic analyses, focusing in particular on reassurance.

Regarding official policy rhetoric, the explicit conceptual dyad has figured in governmental documents since the 1970s. Prior to Holst’s conceptualization, other words were used to describe the same ‘reassurance policy’, such as framing of the bases policy as a signal of ‘non-aggression’. A variant of the paired concept appeared in the Ministry of Defence’s budget proposition for the first time in 1976.²⁸ How it has figured in practical policy making since then would require its own study. But the MoD’s budget proposition functions as a good indicator of the concepts used over the years, as it represents a government document that has been published yearly in the same format up until today. When ‘securing and reassurance’ [sikring og beroligelse] appeared in 1976, Holst had taken office in the MoD as state secretary. We can only speculate as to why ‘deterrence’ was exchanged for ‘securing’. Perhaps ‘securing’ one’s own territory was considered less ‘aggressive’ or ‘hostile’, and therefore more palatable to domestic critics than ‘deterring’ an opponent. Deterrence, however, returned and with a few exceptions, the paired concept was continuously used in the MoD’s budget propositions until the mid-1990s.²⁹ The word then nearly disappeared in official policy documents and did not reappear until the 2010s. As we shall return to later, this coincided with the overall shift in emphasis on Norway’s relations with Russia in particular and the broader security policy in general. Faced with an assertive Russia as menace to the international state, the concepts resurfaced in the political discourse. However, Norway first adopted NATO’s language in the mentioned ‘Howard-way’: deterring Russia and reassuring allies. Since 2014, ‘reassurance’ also reemerged in Norwegian policy towards Russia. When in 2019 the long-term plan for the Armed Forces declared that ‘balance between deterrence and reassurance’ was Norway’s ‘main strategic stance’, both concepts were aimed at Russia and not its NATO allies.³⁰

Turning to the academic framing of the concepts, some illustrative examples are worth paying attention to. In 1986, historian Rolf Tamnes functionally linked the policy towards the Soviet Union to the Norwegian alliance strategy, through the paired concept of ‘integration and screening’.³¹ Since then, ‘integrating’ military cooperation with allies has been framed as a means of deterring the Soviet Union/Russia, while avoiding further integration (‘screening’) allied activity on Norwegian territory has been considered as a means to reassure the Soviet Union/Russia about the defensive character of Norway’s membership in the alliance.³² Historian Olav Riste has also related ‘deterrence and reassurance’ to the policies of ‘great power guarantees and isolationism’, a paired concept used to describe the period before the Second World War.³³ In 1992, historian Geir Lundestad argued that Norwegian reassurance policy consisted of the aforementioned ‘screening’ but also ‘conciliation’, the latter defined as ‘Norwegian attempts to soften and, at its most ambitious level, even to transform the nature of the conflict with the Soviet Union’.³⁴ When Hanne Helèn Bragstad in 2016 analysed ‘deterrence and reassurance’ in Norwegian security policy, she compared reassurance with politics that had the ‘intention of building confidence’ towards Russia’.³⁵ Her analysis went from what was named ‘traditional reassurance measures’ such as the self-imposed restrictions to ‘modern reassurance measures’ including dialogue and cooperation.³⁶ In 2021, the political scientists Johannes Gullestad Rø and Ida Maria Oma both pointed out how insights from Jervis’ two aforementioned models are represented – though not delineated – in the traditional analyses of Norwegian policy.³⁷ Oma argues that ‘strictly defined’, ‘Norwegian’ reassurance adheres to the following definition: ‘a strategy of demonstrating non-aggressive intentions to an adversary as a way of compensating for the potential limitations of deterrence and reducing the chances of an unintended conflict’.³⁸ In 2023, Ole Martin Stormoen distinguished between passive and active reassurance, where passive was seen as ‘limitations on deterrence (the self-imposed and unilateral restrictions on allied activity)’, while active reassurance in practical policy included the practices and initiatives that ‘in theory provides confidence, mutual dependency and … a gradual convergence towards mutual interests, perceptions of reality, norms and practises’.³⁹ I have recently argued that over time, ‘reassurance’ has served as an umbrella concept for three different functions in Norwegian security policy towards Soviet Union/Russia.⁴⁰ The first, designated crisis management, includes ‘efforts at risk reduction, avoiding misunderstandings, and unintended incidents as well as handling them if they occur, all in order to avoid unwanted escalation to a security-policy crisis’. Second, deterrence calibration, ‘involves taming the deterrence posture in order to maintain a status quo of low tension’. The third is a transformative element of the reassurance policy, concilitation, which in the words of historian Geir Lundestad includes ‘attempts to soften and, at its most ambitious level, even to transform the nature of the conflict with the Soviet Union’.⁴¹

Considered together, in both practical policy and academic analyses, ‘reassurance’ has thus encompassed a variety of elements. One question arising from this observation, is how these various types of reassurance have related to the deterrence policy in a ‘balancing act’: is the character of the ‘balancing act’ the same when deterrence is ‘balanced’ by different types of ‘reassurance’?

Two different conceptions of Norwegian ‘deterrence and reassurance’

This section suggests that the Norwegian balancing act in reality has involved two different ‘deterrence and reassurance’ conceptions, rather than one.

Balancing act I: ‘Calibrated deterrence’

The first balancing act that stands out in the conceptualisation of Norwegian ‘deterrence and reassurance’ represents what we can label a ‘calibrated deterrence’ strategy. Reassurance thus represents the efforts undertaken to limit the deterrent effect, in order to avoid a situation where the counterpart deems countermeasures necessary.

Some illustrative analytical examples of this variation are found both in Holst’s original conceptualization from 1966 as well as in the aforementioned insights when combining Jervis’ two models. Read carefully, Holst’s statement about striking a ‘balance between deterrence and provocation’ indicates that this is not really a balance between two strategies or objectives. Rather, reassurance is represented in actions apt to avoid that the deterrent policy will be perceived as provocation. It is not ‘between’ alternatives of two distinct axis but ‘between’ two points on a gamut, an integrated endeavour on a singular deterrence axis (confer Figure 1).

Figure 1. Balance I: ‘calibrated deterrence’.

One could argue that this has been a means of deterring Moscow from hostilities without simultaneously provoking actions one tried to deter in the first place. This is in line with Rø’s linking of the insights from combining the spiral- and deterrence model to the concept of ‘security dilemma sensibility’, understood as ‘the ability to understand […] the role that one’s own actions play in provoking fear’.⁴² It is, in short, ‘deterrence within reasonable limits’.⁴³ Deterrence is the baseline objective and reassurance is the calibrating instrument that can tame that deterrent. Which policy efforts are suited to calibrate the deterrent effect are dependent on context and circumstance.

These insights from combining the deterrence and spiral model indicate that even the reassurance element represents realpolitik of a particular nuance; it is in a country’s pure security interest to deter a conflict without provoking one. Even if the calibration as such is not a uniquely Norwegian feature, Norway has historically had a different outlook than that of its allies, due to its size, history, and geographical proximity to Russia. The emphasis on calibrating deterrence has arguably been deemed more acute in Oslo than in Washington. The combined pressure of being a small state bordering an antagonistic great power and declaring oneself dependent on the protection of another has prompted this balancing act.

Turning to specific historical examples of how this ‘balancing act’ has played out in Norwegian policy, the case of prepositioning allied military material in Norway provides an illustrative example.⁴⁴ The issue of prepositioning arose on the Norwegian policy agenda in the mid-1970s, in response to Soviet military build-up in the High North. One of the most important fora for discussing this issue was an official US-Norwegian ‘study group’, established in December 1976.⁴⁵ In a secret report disseminated to the Norwegian government in 1979, the group recommended, among other things, the prepositioning of equipment for an amphibious brigade of the US Marine Corps in Norway.⁴⁶ The plans, however, were leaked to the public in February 1980, which resulted in an extensive public outcry regarding the issue. Nevertheless, Norway and the US eventually signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Prestockage and Reinforcement of Norway in January 1981.⁴⁷

The case has been regarded as a core example of the Norwegian deterrence/reassurance-relation in two ways. First, it has been argued that prepositioning represented an increase in deterrence at the expense of traditional reassurance measures, such as the bases policy. When the Norwegian Government in 1977 specified that the bases policy did not rule out prepositioning allied material on Norwegian territory, this resulted in, it is argued, ‘less screening and more integration [into allied activity]; in other words, more deterrence and less reassurance’.⁴⁸ Second, the case is considered characteristic as to how the deterrence/reassurance dyad is related to the formation of the prepositioning measure itself. The decision to situate the US Marine’s equipment in mid-Norway has been identified as an archetypal feature of Norwegian reassurance thinking: it was not located in the North, but in Trøndelag, at a purportedly ‘unprovocative distance’ from the Soviet border.⁴⁹

However, probing the basis of both arguments, the relationship between deterrence and reassurance as related to pre-storage is more complex than is traditionally presented.

The first argument – in which the base policy is made equal to reassurance, on the one hand, and prepositioning of allied forces is made equal to deterrence on the other – fails to recognise how both the bases policy and prepositioning have represented both deterrence and reassurance. The bases policy in fact contained a deterrent element, given its conditionality. We recall the initial declaration by the Norwegian government in 1949 that refrained from allowing allied bases on its territory included the condition that Norway was not under threat. If Moscow was concerned about foreign bases on Norwegian territory, this could thus have served as a deterrent. Furthermore, when it comes to prepositioning allied forces, not only did the Norwegian Government consider it as compatible with the bases policy but it was officially stated that prepositioning was a precondition for continuing the no-bases policy in the strategic environment of the 1970s. This argument was spelt out in various contexts. As Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund explained to the Soviet Ambassador Kirichenko in February 1980, prepositioning was a prerequisite for maintaining the bases policy under altered military technological circumstances.⁵⁰ Frydenlund argued that in 1949, when the bases policy was formulated, Norway could rely on military assistance at sea. However, as this was no longer the case, the conditions for maintaining the bases policy had to be updated.⁵¹ Ultimately, the alternatives seemed to be either prepositioning or dismissing the bases policy completely. Framed in this way, prepositioning in the current situation appears as the least provocative alternative, almost a sort of reservation.

Moreover, the argument that prepositioning represented both deterrence and reassurance in and of itself comes across as more complex on closer scrutiny. Although the mid-Norway (or Trøndelag) option has come to represent a core example of reassurance, what it represented to actors involved in the process, was not a given. Johan Jørgen Holst is one such example. When in April 1980 defence minister Thorvald Stoltenberg voiced the idea of considering options other than Northern Norway for the location of the material, Holst was sceptical. He argued that such an option represented a new self-imposed restriction and could arguably ‘lead to misunderstandings with the West and increased pressure from the East’.⁵² Yet, when the Government selected Trøndelag 4 months later, Holst defended the solution ‘more elegantly than any other’.⁵³ Another example is from a military point of view. Long before the issue arose on the public agenda in 1980, high-ranking officers in the Armed Forces had considered the Trøndelag option an asset in the Norwegian reinforcement plan. Trøndelag was more accessible than Northern Norway, thus increasing the chances of availability in times of crisis.⁵⁴ The arrangement was considered militarily more flexible than the US supplying Northern Norway, a flexibility that was considered an asset in the Norwegian defence posture. Finally, across the political spectrum, it was argued that a location in mid-Norway would not necessarily represent reassurance and low tension in the long run. When representatives from the governing Labour Party presented the mid-Norway location as a prerequisite for underscoring the defensive character of the prepositioning measure, critics pointed to this as being an illogical argument: if the nature of stored military material made it impossible to interpret the prepositioning as an offensive act, this was valid regardless of its location. In the political discussion, it was thus argued that Trøndelag as a location was necessary to secure low tension. The opposite argument was also voiced, as the policy could leave an impression of Norway submitting to external pressure, which in turn could bring about increased external coercion and tension in the long term.⁵⁵ The relation between the bases policy, the prepositioning of allied military material and the design of this last measure indicate the intrinsic nature of deterrence and this form of reassurance in Norwegian politics.

In summary, within the framework of these interpretations, the actions involved should be considered together along one axis, not separated in two. The choice of metaphor matters because it allows disparate interpretations. Placing deterrence on one track and reassurance on the other would omit what appears important in this regard, that is, reassurance’s function in the execution of deterrence. It represents a particular way of finding the balancing point of just enough deterrence. Exactly where that is, and what it entails, is dependent on the context and the totality of the circumstances in which it is carried out.

Balancing act II: ‘Calibrated deterrence’ versus ‘conciliation’

It is also possible to identify another balancing act in the Norwegian scholarly and policy debate about ‘deterrence and reassurance’. In this instance, the two concepts can be perceived as two separate paths, representing two theoretically conflicting means of achieving security: deterrence encompasses the small state way of securing proper defence through ‘calibrated deterrence’, while reassurance can be framed as ‘conciliation’ or how ‘common security’ is achieved. Both can be pursued at the same time, while the act of balancing can indicate which path is most important (confer Figure 2).

Figure 2. Balance II: ‘calibrated deterrence’ versus ‘common security’.

Examples of this balancing act are particularly illustrative when it comes to the Norwegian policy in the post-Cold War era. The transition of power in Moscow in 1985 heralded increased cooperation and commonality of interest across the East-West-divide more generally and in the Arctic more specifically.⁵⁶ Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Norwegian efforts to include the ‘new neighbour’ Russia in an international cooperative structure gathered pace. Norway played a prominent role in establishing the Euro-Atlantic Barents region, a core framework for extensive multilateral cooperation that was formalised in 1993. Areas of cooperation within this format included the environment, economy, science and technology, regional infrastructure, indigenous people, culture, health and tourism.⁵⁷ In addition, existing bilateral relations and regimes between Norway and Russia were developed further and new ones emerged in both the civilian and military sphere, such as the signing of bilateral framework agreements on defence-related cooperation, including various environmental aspects and the development of joint annual military activity plans.

As Foreign Minister Johan Jørgen Holst argued in 1993, integrating Russia into Europe and European security structures was a ‘vital Norwegian interest’.⁵⁸ Holst believed that the new networks and cooperative measures would be advantageous and function as ‘stabilizing elements’ regardless of the – highly uncertain – political development in Russia. The Norwegian government’s enhanced focus on cooperation had a ‘long term political goal’ and was in Holst’s view ‘expressive of a sober consideration of our long-term interests, not a policy based on “fair-weather”’.⁵⁹

On this basis, a broader solution was articulated. In the Norwegian long-term plan for the Armed Forces published in 1992, it was stated that the Norwegian security policy had to be the ‘result of a consideration with regard to both securing and restraint, combined with an active development of a commonality of interest’.⁶⁰ The plan stipulated that, even in this new era of cooperation, Norway would need allied support but aimed at the same time to develop ‘multilateral cooperation aimed at weakening the impact of potential differences and the role of military issues in neighbourly relations’.⁶¹ In 1994, the Ministry of Defence summed up the balancing act Norway was currently facing. On the one hand, Russia still had considerable military capacity in the North. On the other, it was important to ‘contribute to developing political and economic cooperation in the High North’.⁶² Overall, we note that ‘securing and restraint’ formed one part of the equation and ‘commonality of interest’ the other. The cooperation and commonality of interest was given weight to the extent that even the self-imposed restrictions were framed as a matter of cooperation.⁶³

Historical analyses of the period have interpreted this development through the conceptualization of a deterrence/reassurance dyad. In 1997, historian Rolf Tamnes argued that after the Cold War, the ‘new policy’ was still based on the ‘two pillars’ of ‘deterrence and reassurance’, but that the emphasis of the balancing act had shifted.⁶⁴ This understanding of how the balancing point ‘tipped’ in favour of reassurance in the 1990s was still in use in 2021: ‘[The Norwegian] orientation towards cooperation [with Russia in the 1990s] illustrates that the balancing point was adjusted in favour of reassurance as understood in a wide sense and arranged towards more long-term conflict prevention’.⁶⁵

It is interesting to note, however, that not only is reassurance understood in a ‘wide sense’ but the measures previously referred to as indicators of reassurance are no longer given weight when explaining this balance. In the mid-1990s, the Norwegian Government revised these self-imposed restrictions and opened the door for more extensive foreign military activity. For example, smaller allied and foreign forces were allowed to participate in training and military exercises in Finmark county, and the practice of not allowing allied activity east of the 24th meridian was adjusted eastward to the 28^th.⁶⁶ As we remember from the first balancing act, such adjustments have traditionally been considered an indicator of less reassurance. If these two things can ring true at the same time in our evaluation of the 1990s – that the self-imposed restrictions as the prime example of reassurance diminished and that reassurance was increasingly emphasized over deterrence – then the two reassurances do not form part of the same balancing act.

The two ‘pillars’ of ‘deterrence’ and ‘reassurance’ Tamnes refers to, are thus possible to link to the broader equation of the second balancing act, in which the two concepts represent theoretically conflicting traditions of thought. Deterrence represents the mentioned calibrated version of the realpolitik tradition, as demonstrated in the first balancing act. While reassurance is defined by conciliation, the tradition of internationalism and the means by which ‘common security’ is achieved. In essence, in the 1990s and early 2000s Norway held on to (calibrated) deterrence when adhering to ‘the main strategic stance with emphasis on the defence of Northern Norway and allied participation in the north’, but gave conciliation increasing weight when attempting to ‘develop cooperation in the north’.⁶⁷ The first balancing act was not abandoned, but the calibrated deterrence was now framed as one particular realpolitik, one part of a broader equation where it was balanced against ‘conciliation-reassurance’.

How this conciliation aspect was given weight in the broader equation, is also illustrated by the shifting focus – and framing – of Norwegian policy in the Northern region. As Russia was becoming a strategic partner, security issues were still relevant, but receded in the background of other concerns. A broader so-called ‘High North Policy [Nordområdepolitikk]’ focusing rather on civilian cooperation, environmental and economic issues, became the framework for the official Norwegian policy in the North.⁶⁸

Then, after the idea of common security had dominated relations between Russia and the West – and also constituted much of the reassurance concept – realpolitik reappeared on the agenda in the 2010s. From 2007 onwards, faced with Russia reasserting its status as a great power on the international stage, security and defence policy gradually returned as a priority in Norwegian official documents.⁶⁹ If the shift occurred gradually, 2014 marked a turning point in the decisive return of deterrence, and even more so after 2022, when the conciliation aspect nearly disappeared. Even if the emphasis on the broader balance shifted from conciliation and back to deterrence, the efforts of crisis management and calibration were still relevant. However, it appears that using the term ‘reassurance’ was to some extent confusing. When Norway suspended ‘all military cooperation’ with Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, some measures were retained for safety and security reasons, which can be considered in the reassurance category I label as ‘crisis management’.⁷⁰ Certain elements of ‘cooperation’ were simply not aimed solely at interacting with Russia as a strategic partner. Consequently, ‘reassurance’ had to be understood anew not only through a cooperative conciliation lens but also within the framework of a realpolitik tradition.

It is important to note that the broader equation in general – between calibrated deterrence and concilitation – and the ‘conciliation tradition’ in particular, were by no means exclusive to Norwegian security policy after the Cold War. Norwegian efforts at cooperation, common regulation and détente with Moscow, both bilateral as well as their emphasis on adhering to multilateral regimes and agreements, were very much alive during the Cold War too, although the word ‘reassurance’ was not necessarily used to describe the policy. As Lundestad notes, the elements of conciliation fluctuated throughout the period. He argues that ‘conciliation’ expanded from the mid-1950s, due to the interest displayed by leading Norwegian politicians, including Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen, in ‘transforming the relationship with the Soviet Union into a more cooperative one’.⁷¹ Illustrative of this idea are the attempts to engage with Warsaw Pact countries in exploring the ideas of establishing zones of de-nuclearization to reduce East-West tension.⁷² Another later example of reoccurring discussions regarding a ‘Nordic nuclear-free zone’ can, as I have argued elsewhere, ‘be viewed as part of the same ambition to effect real change to the nature of not only Norwegian-Soviet/Russian relations, but also between the Soviet Union/Russia and the West’.⁷³

Furthermore, such ideas were not limited to Norway. They can be linked, for example, to the German ‘ostpolitik’, the NATO policy of ‘détente’ and what has been named ‘ordenspolitik’ in the Danish literature.⁷⁴ The NATO policy of ‘deterrence and détente’ was originally introduced in the so-called ‘Harmel report’ of 1967. The report ‘advocated the adoption of a dual-track policy for NATO’. The reason for this, it was argued, was because ‘Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary. […] The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees’.⁷⁵ Understood in this way, the ‘Norwegian’ second balancing act similarly appears applicable with respect to the NATO case: ‘Appropriate security guarantees’ equals deterrence, while ‘achieving a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe’ equals reassurance.

By considering the two different Norwegian conceptions of the deterrence-reassurance dyad together, we find that they have coexisted in Norwegian post-war security policy but have been given different weight, both in explicit policy making and in academic analyses. However, a precise understanding of exactly how these dyads have been given different weight over time requires a separate study.

Concluding outlook: The dual ‘dual’ policy in future theory and practice

This article’s argument that there have been two different ‘deterrence and reassurance’ concepts in the policy making and academic analyses of Norwegian security policy represents an oversimplification. Policy elements can be understood within both balancing acts, and the two traditions represent by no means an exhaustive account of Norwegian security policy towards its great power neighbour to the East.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, this study represents new ways of thinking about the ‘dual’ Norwegian policy towards the Soviet Union/Russia that runs counter to prevailing approaches.

From a theoretical perspective, the case suggests new insights when ‘deterrence and reassurance’ is considered as a whole, instead of as two separate strategies with associated elements to them. Individual measures have neither ‘been’ deterrence nor reassurance, at least not in and of themselves. This is due to the dependency of context: both historical contexts, the conceptual framework in which they are understood and described, and the intention behind the measures undertaken by the actors involved.

This way of thinking allows for new perspectives beyond the Norwegian case. Future studies, for example, of NATO’s ‘deterrence and détente’ or even the German ‘ostpolitik’, are worthy of scrutiny through such a framework. The paired concepts of deterrence and reassurance, or concepts similar to these, are also found in the security policies of other Nordic countries.⁷⁷ The article’s way of framing the two balancing acts could also prove relevant and advantageous in analysing and comparing the security policies of other Nordic countries.

The article’s argument has provided guidance in understanding where the policy and analyses are today: where the alleged conceptual confusion stems from, and why the debates on deterrence and reassurance differ as substantially as they do. When the two balancing acts are mixed with each other – that the deterrence from the first is argued ‘balanced’ by the reassurance of the second or vice versa – illogical misunderstandings occur. In addition, the two balancing acts can be helpful to avoid throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Recent analysis by scholars, defence officials and policy makers about how Norway should conduct its policy towards Russia following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, provide illustrative examples. In May 2022, Elisabeth Natvig claimed in the Norwegian Daily Dagens Næringsliv that the Norwegian policy of balancing deterrence with reassurance, was now history: ‘Keeping up with the same rhetoric of reassurance and deterrence should be discussed. We started before Christmas with dialogue with Russia, that is now gone from the language’.⁷⁸ Six months later, Foreign Minister Anniken Huitfeldt declared, ‘We still have to rely on deterrence and reassurance to further our own security’.⁷⁹ What seems like a disagreement – whether or not reassurance remains relevant – might instead be references to different things under the same name. According to Natvig, dialogue can be seen as the second balance, while Huitfeldt in May 2023, explicitly addressing the question of the continued relevance of the policy of reassurance and dialogue, said that ‘[r]eassurance is about avoid[ing] misunderstandings, because we live so close to one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals. That is still a matter of concern. […] Reassurance/dialogue as a description of Norwegian security policy is something I don’t recognize […]’.⁸⁰

The examples show that if we embrace the idea that there have not been one but different kinds of dyads, we are better equipped with a toolbox apt to provide a far more precise picture of the world, both when it comes to understanding the policy of the past but also in discussing the present and shaping future security policy. This holds true both for Norway and the wider region. To Norway, it can ensure that important elements of the ‘calibrated deterrence’ tradition are not discarded along with many of the more ambitious elements of the Norwegian conciliation policy. This more complex understanding of deterrence versus reassurance could also be useful in guiding future Swedish and Finnish security policy, particularly in the realisation that the realist calibration of security policy is not equal to a submissive approach towards great powers.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Johannes Gullestad Rø, James Cameron, Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, participants in the Oslo Nuclear Project’s ‘Deterrence and Reassurance in the Nordic Region’ workshop and the two anonymous reviewers for valuable feedback.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work has been supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence.

Notes on contributors

Ingeborg Nortvedt Bjur

Ingeborg Nortvedt Bjur is a Ph.D. fellow at the Norwegian Institute of Defence Studies/Norwegian Defence University College and the University of Oslo. Her dissertation focuses on Norwegian reassurance policy towards the Soviet Union and latterly Russia since the Cold War.

Notes

¹ The terms in Norwegian are ‘avskrekking og beroligelse’. Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv’, Internasjonal politikk 5 (1966), 463–490; Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘Vilje til beredskap – evne til forsvar: Langtidsplan for forsvarssektoren’, Proposition to the Parliament 62 S 2019–2020.

² John Kristen Skogan, ‘Virkemidler, begrensninger og forutsetninger i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk’, in NUPI notat, Vol. 192, (Oslo: NUPI 1980); Ida Maria Oma, ‘Sikkerhetspolitikk på kjente stier’, in Helge Pharo et al. (ed.), Historiker, strateg og brobygger: festskrift til Rolf Tamnes, 70 år (Oslo: Pax forlag A/S 2021).

³ T. Gjerstad, ‘Sjefen i Forsvarsstaben om Nato-utvidelse: – Vi blir en lillebror til Sverige og Finland’, Dagens Næringsliv, 30 May 2022, https://www.dn.no/politikk/sjefen-i-forsvarsstaben-om-nato-utvidelse-vi-blir-en-lillebror-til-sverige-og-finland/2-1-1,225,519. Kristin ven Bruusgaard, ‘Bør Norge søke å berolige et ekspansjonistisk Russland?’ Dagens, Næringsliv, 25 Feb. 2022, https://www.dn.no/kronikk/russland/ukraina/jonas-gahr-store/kronikk-bor-norge-soke-a-berolige-et-ekspansjonistisk-russland/2-1-1,174,250.

⁴ Rolf Tamnes, Integration and screening: the two faces of Norwegian alliance policy, 1945–1986, vol. 5 (1986), FHFS notat (trykt utg.) (Oslo: Forsvarets høgskole 1986).

⁵ Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘Varieties of Assurance’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/3 (June 2012), 375–399.

⁶ Michael Howard, ‘Deterrence, Consensus and Reassurance in the Defence of Europe (1983)’, Adelphi series 58/472–474 (2018), 251–272.

⁷ The White House, ‘FACT SHEET: European Reassurance Initiative and Other U.S. Efforts in Support of NATO Allies and Partners’, 3 Jun. 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/03/fact-sheet-european-reassurance-initiative-and-other-us-efforts-support-.

⁸ Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1960).

⁹ Also labelled as ‘deterrence-related assurance’, see Knopf, ‘Varieties of Assurance’, 375–399.

¹⁰ David Santoro and John K. Warden, ‘America’s Delicate Dance Between Deterrence and Assurance’, National Interest, 1 Feb. 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-delicate-dance-between-deterrence-assurance−15,076?page=0%2C2.

¹¹ Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, vol. 49, Limited paperback ed. (Princton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1976).

Robert Jervis, How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2017), 218.

¹² Knopf, ‘Varieties of Assurance’, 383.

¹³ Holst, ‘Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv’, 463–490. An English version of the article was made available the same year: Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Norwegian Security Policy: The Strategic Context’, Cooperation and Conflict 1/4 (1966), 64–79. The year after, in 1967, these analyses were developed further into a two-volume monograph. Johan Jørgen Holst, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv. Bind 1: Analyse (Oslo: Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt 1967); Johan Jørgen Holst, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv. Bind 2: Dokumentasjon, vol. 2 (Oslo: Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt 1967).

¹⁴ Holst, ‘Norwegian Security Policy: The Strategic Context’, 65.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Holst, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv. Bind 1: Analyse, 40.

¹⁸ The article also represented Holst’s subjective evaluation of how the Norwegian security policy should be crafted. Distinguishing between the analytical and the normative aspects of his analysis is not straightforward. Up until the 1990s, Holst would play a key role in shaping Norwegian security policy in both academia and politics, as James Cameron elaborates in his contribution to this volume.

¹⁹ Olav Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations – A History (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 2001), 202 ff.

²⁰ Sven Holtsmark and Rolf Tamnes, ‘The Geopolitics of the Arctic in Historical Perspective’, in Rolf Tamnes and Kristine Offerdal (eds.), Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic (London: Routledge 2014), 12–48.

²¹ Quoted in Olav Njølstad, Jens Chr. Hauge: fullt og helt (Oslo: Aschehoug 2008), 425. Translation from Norwegian by the author.

²² Ibid.

²³ How controversial it was for Norwegian leaders to advocate these policies vis-à-vis their Allies, has varied over time and between measures. For example, the (no) bases policy in 1949 was, in the words of then Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, ‘fully accepted’ by the Alliance, and that the British and US government had agreed to ‘avoid any challenge towards the Soviet Union, therefore one had no plans to establish bases so close to Soviet territory as Norway’. Halvard Lange, Norges vei til Nato (Oslo: Pax forlag 1966), 48; The later denial of stationing nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil was a different story, where Norway experienced considerable pressure from the Alliance. Kjetil Skogrand and Rolf Tamnes, Fryktens likevekt (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag 2001), 128–150; Geir Lundestad, ‘The Evolution of Norwegian Security Policy: Alliance with the West and Reassurance in the East’, Scandinavian Journal of History 17/3 (1992), 236.

²⁴ Holst, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv. Bind 1: Analyse, 40.

²⁵ Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Pharo, Kald krig og internasjonalisering, 1949–1965 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1997), 66.

²⁶ Holst, ‘Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv’, 465.

²⁷ Knopf, ‘Varieties of Assurance’, 383.

²⁸ John Kristen Skogan, Virkemidler, begrensninger og forutseetninger i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk, vol. 192, NUPI notat (Oslo: NUPI 1980), 3, footnote 2.

²⁹ The yearly ‘St.prp. 1’ from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence are available at Stortinget.no.

³⁰ Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘Vilje til beredskap – evne til forsvar: Langtidsplan for forsvarssektoren’, St.prp. 62 S (2019–2020), https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/prop.-62-s −20,192,020/id2697623/.

³¹ Tamnes, ‘Integration and Screening: The Two Faces of Norwegian Alliance Policy, 1945–1986’.

³² Sven G. Holtsmark, ‘Norge og Sovjetunionen – bilateralisering og fellesstyre’, in Chris Prebensen and Nils Skarland (ed.), NATO 50 år: norsk sikkerhetspolitikk med NATO gjennom 50 år (Oslo: Den norske atlanterhavskomité 1999), 42.

³³ Olav Riste, ‘Isolasjonisme og stormaktsgarantiar: norsk tryggingspolitikk 1905–1990’, in Forsvarsstudier 3 (Oslo: Institutt for forsvarsstudier 1991).

³⁴ Geir Lundestad, ‘The Evolution of Norwegian Security Policy_ Alliance with the West and Reassurance in the East’, Scandinavian Journal of History 17/3 (1992), 227–256.

³⁵ Hanne Helèn Bragstad, ‘Avskrekking og beroligelse i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk overfor Russland’, master’s thesis, Forsvarets høgskole, 2016, 11.

³⁶ Bragstad, ‘Avskrekking og beroligelse i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk overfor Russland’.

³⁷ Rø, ‘Den tause teoretiker’; Oma, ‘Sikkerhetspolitikk på kjente stier’.

³⁸ Ida Maria Oma, ‘Avskrekking og beroligelse – den “doble strategi” som kom inn fra kulden’, IFS Insights 7 (Oslo: Institutt for forsvarsstudier 2021).

³⁹ Ole Martin Stormoen, ‘Beroligelse 2.0: Teori, praksis og rammevilkår i en ny tid’, Internasjonal Politikk 81/2 (2023), 171.

⁴⁰ Ingeborg Nortvedt Bjur, ‘Enduring Principles, Changing Practices? Norway’s Reassurance Policy towards Russia in the Face of NATO’s Nordic Enlargement’, H-Diplo | Robert Jervis International Security Studies Forum, Policy Roundtable II-4, 7 Jul. 2023, https://issforum.org/to/jprII-4.

⁴¹ Lundestad, ‘The Evolution of Norwegian Security Policy : Alliance with the West and Reassurance in the East’, 228.

⁴² Rø quotes Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2008). See: Rø, ‘Den tause teoretiker’, 366.

⁴³ Johannes Gullestad Rø, ‘Den tause teoretiker’, in Helge Pharo et al. (ed.), Historiker, strateg og brobygger: festskrift til Rolf Tamnes, 70 år (Oslo: Pax forlag A/S 2021).

⁴⁴ I first made use of this case as an example of calibrated deterrence in Ingeborg Bjur, ‘Avskrekking på norsk’, Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, 41/1, 5-20, (2024).

⁴⁵ See Stian Bones, ‘Et forsvarsproblem og et mulig sikkerhetsdilemma: Allierte forsterkninger og sikkerhetspolitikk i nord, 1960–1980’, in Njord Wegge (ed.), Sikkerhetspolitikk og militærmakt i Arktis (Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk 2023), 101–124. https://doi.org/10.23865/noasp.183.ch5

⁴⁶ Ole Jørgen Maaø, ‘Vitenskap for politikk? Systemgruppen ved Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt og norsk forsvarspoliitkk fra 1950 til 1980’, doctoral dissertation, NTNU, 2014, 279–324; Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North.

⁴⁷ See ‘Memorandum of Understanding between Norway and USA governing prestockage and reinforcement of Norway’, 16 Jun. 1981, https://lovdata.no/dokument/TRAKTATEN/traktat/1981-01-16-2/KAPITTEL_1#%C2%A71.

⁴⁸ Paal Sigurd Hilde, ‘Forsvar vår dyd, men kom oss ikke for nær. Norge og det militære samarbeidet i NATO’, Internasjonal politikk 77/1 (2019), 69.

⁴⁹ See for example Oma, ‘Sikkerhetspolitikk på kjente stier’, 376–406.

⁵⁰ Norwegian Ministry of Defence (FD), archive 1980, 011.1 Norge, j.nr. 004079: ‘Samtale mellom utenriksminister Frydenlund og Sovjetunionens ambassadør Kirichenko 26. februar 1980’, 26 Feb. 1980.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Tamnes, Oljealder, 109.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ministry of Defence, ‘Info-bank’, 7 Oct. 1980, referred to as such in Erik Breidlid, ‘Spillet om lagrene: forhåndslagring av militærmateriell for en amerikansk marineinfanteribrigade i Trøndelag og for en ny norsk brigade i Nord-Norge; bakgrunn, beslutning og gjennomføring’, dissertation, University of Oslo, 1984, 45.

⁵⁵ For a detailed breakdown of this criticism, see for example the discussion in the Enlarged Committee on Foreign and Constitutional Affairs, ‘Møte i den utvidede utenriks- og konstitusjonskomite torsdag den 4. september kl.12.00’, The Norwegian Parliament, 1980, https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/stortingsarkivet/duuk/1976–1980/1980_0904.pdf.

⁵⁶ Kristian Åtland, ‘Mikhail Gorbachev, the Murmansk Initiative, and the Desecuritization of Interstate Relations in the Arctic’, Cooperation and Conflict 43/3 (Sept. 2008), 289–311.

⁵⁷ See Geir Hønneland, Barentsbrytninger. Norsk nordområdepolitikk etter den kalde krigen (Kristiandsand: Høyskoleforlaget 2005).

⁵⁸ Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Overgangstid. Utenriksminister Johan Jørgen Holsts redegjørelse for Stortinget 25. oktober 1993’, in Atlanterhavskomiteens serier 169 (Oslo: Den norske atlanterhavskomité 1994), 7. Holst passed away in January 1994.

⁵⁹ Holst, ‘Overgangstid. Utenriksminister Johan Jørgen Holsts redegjørelse for Stortinget 25. oktober 1993’, 7–8

⁶⁰ Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘Hovedretningslinjer for Forsvarets virksomhet og utvikling i tiden 1994–98’, (St.meld. 16, 1992–93), 25.

⁶¹ Original: ‘flersidige samarbeidsordninger som kan bidra til å svekke betydningen av eventuelle motsetninger og de militære spørsmåls rolle i nabostatsforbindelsene’. Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘Hovedretningslinjer for Forsvarets virksomhet og utvikling i tiden 1994–98’, (St.meld. 16, 1992–93), 25.

⁶² Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘St. prp. nr. 1 (1994–1995)’.

⁶³ See Anders Dramstad, ‘Beroligelses- og avskjermingsaspektet i støpeskjeen? Utviklingen av de selvpålagte restriksjonene innen norsk forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikk’, masteroppgave, UiT Norges arktiske universitet, 2021.

⁶⁴ Tamnes, Oljealder, 134.

⁶⁵ Oma, ‘Sikkerhetspolitikk på kjente stier’, 383.

⁶⁶ Dramstad, ‘Beroligelses- og avskjermingsaspektet i støpeskjeen? Utviklingen av de selvpålagte restriksjonene innen norsk forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikk’, 121.

⁶⁷ Tamnes, Oljealder, 134.

⁶⁸ Ingeborg Nortvedt Bjur, Paal Sigurd Hilde, and Karen-Anna Eggen, ‘Security policy, Russia, and the High North’, in Andreas Østhagen (ed.), Norway’s Arctic Policy: Geopolitics, Security and Identity in the High North (Edward Elgar Publishing 2023), 38–56.

⁶⁹ Bjur, Hilde, and Eggen, ‘Security policy, Russia, and the High North’, 41.

⁷⁰ Ingeborg Nortvedt Bjur, ‘Enduring Principles, Changing Practices? Norway’s Reassurance Policy towards Russia in the Face of NATO’s Nordic Enlargement’, H-Diplo | Robert Jervis International Security Studies Forum, Policy Roundtable II-4, 7 Jul. 2023, https://issforum.org/to/jprII-4.

⁷¹ Lundestad, ‘The Evolution of Norwegian Security Policy : Alliance with the West and Reassurance in the East’, 237.

⁷² See also Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations – A History, 228.

⁷³ Bjur, ‘Enduring Principles, Changing Practices? Norway’s Reassurance Policy towards Russia in the Face of NATO’s Nordic Enlargement’.

⁷⁴ Nikolaj Petersen, ‘Hinsides Den kolde Krig: Danmarks internasjonale ordenspolitk 1990–2009’, in Carsten Due-Nielsen et al. (ed.), Nye fronter i Den kolde krig (København: Gyldendal 2010).

⁷⁵ NATO, ‘The Future Tasks of the Alliance’, Report of the Council, Dec. 1967, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_26700.htm.

⁷⁶ We lack, for example, the perspective of how Norwegian security policy has been tied to a Norwegian self-image pertaining to a high moral standard, tendencies of pacifism, etc. It is possible to argue that the ‘Norwegian peace discourse’ is omnipresent in both of the abovementioned balancing acts. Svein Vigeland Rottem, ‘Forsvaret i nord – avskrekking og beroligelse’, Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning 48/1 (2007), 63–87; Halvard Leira, ‘Folket og freden: utviklingstrekk i norsk fredsdiskurs 1890–2005’, Internasjonal politikk 63/2–3 (2005), 135–160.

⁷⁷ See for example Agger, Jonathan Søborg, ‘Ikke-provokation, beroligelse og afspending. Karakteren af dansk imødekommene politik over for Sovjetunionen 1949–1969’, doctoral dissertation, Københavns Universitet, 2007; Olof Kronvall, Den Bräckliga Barriären: Finland I Svensk Säkerhetspolitik 1948–1962 (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan 2003).

⁷⁸ Dagens Næringsliv, ‘−Vi blir en lillebror til Sverige og Finland’, 31 May 2022, 14–15

⁷⁹ NUPI, ‘The Russia Conference 2022: The Russian Economy, Energy Sector and Climate Change: What Now?’, 15 Nov. 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XP-0h05sCCs&t=393s.

⁸⁰ The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, ‘Meeting w/NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Minister of Foreign Affairs Anniken Huitfeldt’, 30 May 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JwSTwBkx09g&t=3714s, English translation retrieved from https://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/.