Basin organization and members’ development agenda in the Global South

ABSTRACT

In Global South river basins, urbanization, population growth and demand for resources linked to economic growth pose multiple challenges, compounded by the crises of climate change. For Global South countries, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals are opportunities to combine integrated strategies tackling their environmental sustainability and socioeconomic development issues. This article uses the Mekong River Commission and the development of hydropower by Lao PDR case to investigate the ability of River Basin Organizations to coordinate with Member States for consistent regional and national application of transboundary water cooperation best practices while answering both scales’ sustainable development agendas.

KEYWORDS:

• Transboundary water
• cooperation
• international water law
• river basin organization
• sustainable development
• Global South
• Mekong River Commission
• Lao PDR

Introduction

The increasing pressure on freshwater resources and the significance of its sustainable management has become undeniable. Water security challenges resulting from climate change, population growth and economic development are now the source of tensions between countries that are part of river basins. Adaptability and flexibility of transboundary freshwater governance can help deal with emerging issues. International water law principles like the ‘equitable and reasonable utilization’ and international cooperation such as those framed by River Basin Organizations (RBOs) provide guidance to produce specific obligations for parties to transboundary water agreements: they enable the inclusion of the socioeconomic growth parameter, a cornerstone of the Global South’s agenda. In the context of multiple scales of frameworks, the article investigates if RBOs can provide a cooperation and capacity-building platform to support national and regional development agendas. It starts with a reminder about the emergence of sustainable development presented as a key for the Global South¹ to attain economic growth. It links Sustainable Development Goal 6 (SDG6), international water law, and RBOs in the shaping and implementation of measures to ensure sustainable use of water in line with all Member States’ needs. After shedding light on some challenges RBOs and their members encounter in cooperating in the Global South context, the case of the fast growth and related booming energy demand seen in the Lower Mekong Basin and Lao PDR’s hydropower development agenda illustrates the difficulties for the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in coordinating both socioeconomic development and protection and sustainable use of the water resources for national and regional scales. The article ends by opening a discussion on the complexity brought by the multiple scales of governance, each coming with a large number of stakeholders. Information used for the analysis comes from primary and secondary sources and interviews with MRC stakeholders conducted in winter 2021–2022 as part of more extensive research.

Sustainable use of natural resources and development agenda in the Global South

The conflicting connection between environment and development was addressed in 1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Development when sustainable development was defined in ‘Our Common Future’ as ‘development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’, environmental sustainability meaning maintaining ‘a stable resource base’ and ‘avoiding over-exploitation of renewable resource systems’ (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).

Global South, climate change and Sustainable Development Goal 6

According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the link between the environment and sustainable development is a challenge, and the two need ‘de-coupling’. Although economic growth supports environmental objectives’ financing, it also contributes to the degradation of natural resources (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). Indeed, economic growth is paralleled by increasing demand, which puts pressure on natural resources and leads to environmental degradation in the absence of appropriate and integrated incentives for their sustainable use. ‘Least-Developed Countries’ (LDCs) and others part of the Global South addressed extreme poverty eradication, environmental protection, and economic development with the eight Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 2015), which they further pursued and complemented with climate change and more specific sustainability-related targets with the United Nations 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The overall improvement in socioeconomic and environmental conditions is even more pressing for the 46 LDCs, which must link their development programmes to a greater number of variables without placing the entire burden on their natural resources. The recent inclusion of water in the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference Declaration reaffirms the global commitment for climate and water action (UN Water, 2022). Indeed, vulnerabilities caused by booming demography, poverty, inequalities, and lack of capacity and finance are increasing risks and impacts of climate change and global warming in the Global South (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022).

Therefore, on top of pre-existing challenges such as limited governance and legal capacities, adaptation to climate change supported by data and monitoring programmes became crucial in basins and national strategies. SDG6 to ‘ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all’ targets the reduction of water scarcity and water stress (target 6.4), implementing Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM, target 6.5.1) and developing water-related international cooperation such as RBOs (target 6.5.2). UN agencies and development partners are an important source of aid for Southern RBOs and their programmes to reach SDG6 targets. For instance, the strengthening of climate resilience measures is part of the Programme for Integrated Development and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Niger Basin funded by the World Bank and the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), to name only a few (African Development Bank, 2018).

The UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and UNESCO are the custodian agencies to which countries are invited to report their progress on SDG6.5.2 related to transboundary cooperation (UN Water, 2021). Through UNECE’s active work to grow awareness about transboundary water cooperation, governance best practices, and funding facilitation, the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (known as the Water Convention) recently welcomed new Parties, many from the African continent where sub-Saharan countries showed headways in areas covered by cooperation operational arrangements (UNECE, 2022). Among achievements since the first reporting exercise conducted by UNECE in partnership with UNESCO published in 2018, we can cite the establishment of a regional working group for the Senegalo-Mauritanian Aquifer, the revitalization of dispositions in the Buzi River Basin, and a data-gathering cooperation agreement between Panama and Colombia regarding the Rio Jurado (UN Water, 2021).

Although challenges posed by climate change highlighted the significance of risk planning and water dependency at a regional level and communication and data-sharing mechanisms aid in reducing uncertainty, improving planning and reinforcing the adaptive capacity (Milman et al., 2013), they do not necessarily imply shared perception of uses and norms among countries and scales of cooperation.

Framing transboundary water cooperation and the sustainable use of water resources in river basins

Transboundary cooperation, climate change adaptation and application of IWRM can be linked to the implementation of international water law and the principle of equitable and reasonable use (United Nations, n.d., p. 6). The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (United Nations, 1997) and the UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Water Convention, 1992) provide general provisions for transboundary water cooperation. They encourage States’ Parties to implement water-sharing principles, give general obligations to riparian members to cooperate, protect the environment, promote dispute settlement/avoidance mechanisms, and participation of non-state actors² (Boisson de Chazournes, 2003). Not explicitly mentioned, the latter is an intrinsic component of the ‘appropriate measures’ to prevent significant harm (article 7 of the Watercourses Convention and article 2 of the Water Convention) through the conduct of environmental impact assessments (articles 12 and 3 of the Watercourses Convention and the Water Convention, respectively) and consultation procedures (article 10 of the Water Convention). The due diligence obligation (known as the ‘no-harm rule’), the equitable and reasonable utilization principle and the principle of cooperation are the three guiding principles the Water Convention and the Watercourses Convention provide to support the application of measures that place the precaution above the prevention. It asks Parties not to use the lack of scientific knowledge as a way to circumvent implementing the measures necessary to safeguard the international watercourse and avoid transboundary impacts (UNECE, 2013). Meanwhile, the Watercourses Convention advises States’ Parties to aim at ‘optimal and sustainable utilization’ and benefits from their shared watercourse, ‘taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned’. Countries and RBOs fostering cooperation may define the equitable and reasonable use of their basins’ water resources using factors and circumstances such as geographic, social, and economic, the dependence of the population on the water, and the effects of the use (United Nations, 1997). Despite recent years’ successes, Table 1 shows adherence to global conventions remains limited in the South.

Table 1. Global South state members of an RBO and parties to the Watercourses and/or Water Convention – June 2023.

Continent or subcontinent	Country	Least developed country (LDC) status	Membership to RBO^3	Watercourses Convention^4	Water Convention^5
Africa	Benin	LDC	Niger Basin Authority, Volta Basin Authority	2012
	Burkina Faso	LDC	Niger Basin Authority, Volta Basin Authority	2011
	Cameroon	Non-LDC	International Commission for the Congo–Oubangui–Sangha Basin, Lake Chad Basin Commission, Niger Basin Authority		2022
	Chad	LDC	Lake Chad Basin Commission, Niger Basin Authority	2012	2018
	Côte d’Ivoire	Non-LDC	Niger Basin Authority, Volta Basin Authority	2014
	Ghana	Non-LDC	Volta Basin Authority	2020	2020
	Guinea-Bissau	LDC	Organization for the Development of the Gambia River	2010	2021
	Libya	Non-LDC	Lake Chad Basin Commission	2005
	Namibia	Non-LDC	(Kunene) Joint Water Commission, Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission, Orange-Senque River Commission, Zambezi Watercourse Commission	2001	2023
	Niger	LDC	Lake Chad Basin Commission, Niger Basin Authority, Nigeria–Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation	2013
	Nigeria	Non-LDC	Lake Chad Basin Commission, Niger Basin Authority, Nigeria–Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation	2010	2023
	Senegal	LDC	Organization for the Development of the Gambia River, Organization for the Development of Senegal river		2018
	Togo	LDC	Volta Basin Authority		2021
Central Asia	Kazakhstan	Non-LDC	International Commission for the Management of the Irtysch, Joint Russian Kazakhstan Commission for Utilization and Protection of Transboundary Waters, Aral Sea Basin Programme, Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas, Interstate Commission for Water Coordination in Central Asia		2001
	Turkmenistan	Non-LDC	Dostluk Commission, Aral Sea Basin Programme, Interstate Commission for Water Coordination in Central Asia		2012
	Uzbekistan	Non-LDC	Aral Sea Basin Programme, Interstate Commission for Water Coordination in Central Asia	2007	2007
Middle East	Iraq	Non-LDC	Joint Technical Committee on Regional Waters	2001	2023
	Jordan	Non-LDC	Joint Syrio-Jordanian Commission, Joint Water Committee between Jordan and Israel	1999
	State of Palestine	Non-LDC	Joint Water Committee between Israel and Palestine	2015
	Syrian Arab Republic	Non-LDC	Joint Syrio-Jordanian Commission	1998
South America	Paraguay	Non-LDC	Joint Commission of the Parana River, Permanent Intergovernmental Co-Ordination Committee, Trilateral Commission for the Development of the Riverbed of the Pilcomayo	1998
	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Non-LDC	Organization of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty	1997
Southeast Asia	Vietnam	Non-LDC	Mekong River Commission	2014

Sources: Watercourses Convention and Water Convention. Data compiled by the author.

Table 1 reveals that being prone to water scarcity, African States listed as LDCs (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, n.d.) and RBO members are eager to use international water law to support the implementation of measures within their basins, while South American and South-East Asian countries seem to be more reluctant. For the latter, it could be the consequence of the principle of non-intervention in nations’ affairs found in the preamble and article 2 of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Charter (Tay, 1998). Globally, it may also be explained by the recent shift of focus of international water law and investments from development to management of the water, while the Global South faces challenges more closely related to development issues. National water laws ‘have followed this global trend despite the very different challenges’ faced locally (Merrey, 2009). Legal scholars pointed to the difficult transposition of the principle of equitable and reasonable use in the international context as it was originally thought and applied to riparian States within Federations (Boisson de Chazournes et al., 2018). In an international context with development and geopolitical layers, determining the list of utilization that could be labelled as equitable and reasonable demands strong hydro-diplomacy and cooperation capacities, not always present in fast-developing basins.

Multi-level cooperation

If RBOs provide a cooperation platform for basin-scale water governance, the effective response to challenges hinges on national and subnational capacities, including communication, coherent implementation of norms, coordination and cooperation with RBOs and other members. However, Table 1 indicates that there are no southern RBOs whose members have all ratified one of the global conventions. Furthermore, although both Conventions are open to ratification by regional economic integration organizations (United Nations, 1997), with the exception of the European Union (EU) which was a founding Party to the Water Convention, neither the Watercourses Convention nor the Water Convention counts a regional economic integration organization as a Party.⁶ Issues related to the cohesion of capacity-building and adoption of homogenous norms emerge in the context of countries that are parties to multiple cooperation frameworks involving different stakeholders and partners with various programmes and scales of implementation. For instance, countries’ members of the Niger Basin Authority and the Organization pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal, Congo Basin Commission or the Mekong River Commission are also part, respectively, of the Economic Community of West African States, the Economic Community of Central African States and the Association of South-East Asian Nations, which all carry environmental agendas supporting or implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements.

Water resources and climate change programmes involving RBOs are linked to various competing economic sectors led by different national ministries or institutions that run partnerships and cooperation programmes as part of larger regional development strategies. The case of the MRC and Lao PDR shows how responding to the growing energy demand to support the regional socioeconomic development and the update of national legislation caused consequential impact to the transboundary water cooperation in the basin.

The Mekong River Commission and Lao PDR case

In 1995, Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam signed the Mekong Agreement establishing the Mekong River Commissions (MRC) to sustainably develop and protect the Mekong River basin. Over the past three decades, the region has experienced rapid and steady economic growth, stimulated by increases in population and urbanization (World Bank, n.d.-a, n.d.-b, n.d.-c, n.d.-d). These rapid economic and demographic changes have led an increase in energy consumption and demand (Tran & Suhardiman, 2020).

National interests embedded in the basin and larger regional socioeconomic development strategies

Regional and national policies now talk of energy security as a region’s priority to maintain socioeconomic development: transmission networks’ expansion projects are planned as part of wider regional cooperation like the ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation⁷ (ASEAN, 1996), ASEAN Integration Initiative, Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Programme⁸ (Asian Development Bank, 2011) and, more recently, the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (Hong, 2021). Host to 9 of the 11 mainstream dams planned in the Lower Mekong Basin, Lao PDR (one of the LDCs) has signed several Memoranda of Understanding with its neighbours for the supply of more than 23,148 MW of hydropower by 2030 (Greater Mekong Subregion, 2022; International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 2018). Hydropower is embedded in the Lao PDR 8th Five-year National Socioeconomic Development Plan 2016–2020 and the National Green Growth Strategy, in which it is presented as the key sector for national economic growth (Tran & Suhardiman, 2020). Since 2019 and the commissioning of the first hydropower dams, Xayaburi and Don Sahong, four projects underwent the MRC’s Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA), which is mandatory for mainstream projects according to Article 5 of the Mekong Agreement⁹ (Mekong River Commission Secretariat, 2001). However, since the submission of the first project in 2010, emerging gaps between the national and basin procedures framing the construction of mainstream dams caused disunity among the MRC members.

Fitting norms and mechanisms to the local context

For all six projects submitted to the PNPCA, the notified countries and the MRC Secretariat expert groups reviewing project information flagged the underestimation of their transboundary and cumulative impacts, which since 2016 triggered the strengthening of mechanisms and standards used during the procedures: To complete the recurrent shortcomings found in the Lao national legislation, the MRC produced the Guidelines for Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment in the Lower Mekong Basin (TbEIA; Mekong River Commission Secretariat, 2021). Singled out for the inadequacy of requirements under its national laws, independently from the MRC and with the support of capacity-building programmes and development partners such as the World Bank, Lao PDR amended its Law on Water and Water Resources, Environmental Protection Law and Decree on the Environmental Impact Assessment (Lao PDR Ministry of Planning and Investment, 2021). The country also confirmed its objectives to apply IWRM practices in national and subregional basins (International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 2013; Lao PDR Ministry of Planning and Investment, 2016). Regarding the development of mainstream dams, the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) imposed itself as the main interlocutor of the MRC to the detriment of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, which is the official supervisory ministry representing Lao PDR at the MRC. To respond to regional norms expectations, the MEM produced more specific regulations, such as the Ministerial Instruction on Implementation Procedures for Hydroelectric Dam Projects (No. 1506/MEM; Mekong River Commission Secretariat, 2020). These upgrades in policies and legislation prompted Lao PDR to declare its laws up to international standards and refuse to adhere to the TbEIA, adding such procedures are not binding (Interviewee 36, personal communication, 26 January 2022, p. 36).

Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam now question the reasonableness of the dam’s development due to the significant impacts it may have on the region’s food security (fisheries in Cambodia and rice culture in Vietnam) and overall socioeconomic and natural environments, whereas Lao PDR defends its position to supply sustainable hydropower to support regional economic growth while generating income to alleviate national poverty. Consequently, three years after the beginning of its consultation procedures, the Sanakham project, the latest Lao Mekong mainstream hydropower project, is at a standstill, with countries unable to reach a consensus for its development.

The MRC actively works on reviving trust and the ‘one Mekong one spirit’ mindset among members, using their common concerns regarding climate change and the drought during the 2018 and 2019 monsoon seasons to build a common vision for the basin and its sustainable development (Mekong River Commission Secretariat, 2021).

Building local capacity

The implementation of Xayaburi’s PNPCA displayed limited regional capacity with a small number of local experts to review the project’s design (Mekong River Commision Secretariat, 2011). Global stakeholders like World Bank, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, International Water Management Institute, and the International Union for Conservation of Nature are engaged in capacity-building programmes,¹⁰ promoting transboundary water cooperation and IWRM practices at both the basin and national levels (Mekong River Commission, n.d.-b). By the third project (Pak Beng) in 2016 and onwards, independently from the MRC Secretariat’s experts, one national expert from each notified country contributed to the project’s review on hydrology, sediment, fisheries, fish passage and aquatic ecosystem, socioeconomic, navigation and dam safety issues, confirming the growth of knowledge at the national level (Mekong River Commission Secretariat, n.d., 2019, 2020). The MRC Secretariat commits to knowledge transfer via the Junior Riparian Professionals Programme: member countries send one of their staff (under 35 years old) for 6–12 months within the MRC Secretariat to train on IWRM-related skills such as project cycle management, monitoring and evaluation, climate change adaptation and basin development planning (Mekong River Commission, n.d.-a). Countries propose a candidate for the programme based on their specific needs and knowledge gaps at the national level. Once the programme is over, they return to resume their duties in key positions within ministries or as staff for the National Mekong Committee Secretariat (Interviewee 24, 2022).

Whereas the MRC also collaborates with the ASEAN and Asian Development Banks, China has become a major development partner since the establishment of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation in 2016 and Lower Mekong Basin practitioners are often invited to receive training in Beijing (Interviewee 36, 2022). Climate change and transboundary watercourse management cooperation represent an opportunity for China to enhance its regional hegemon’s status, using its ‘soft power skills’ and ‘big brother’ approach when supporting education, knowledge transfer and investments in climate change adaptation and mitigation, green energies, infrastructures needed to boost the socioeconomic development of the Lower Mekong Basin countries (Wouters & Chen, 2013).

Discussion – Southern RBOs in heavily fragmented institutional environments

Global players such as UN agencies and development partners who are parties to the UN conventions play an important role in helping to fill the gaps in transboundary water cooperation within southern RBOs and their members. However, it should not be forgotten that the level of development and the needs of the RBOs’ members are not homogenous and that countries need diversified support for water-dependent sectors at multiple scales; aid also comes from regional and national institutions to assist specific and sometimes conflicting water-dependent sectors. Although adherence to international water law is an asset, the procedures established by regional and national institutions and their organizational structures should not be overlooked when adapting global practices for implementation by local stakeholders (Bolognesi & Bréthaut, 2018).

The Lower Mekong Basin case presented in this article shows that the MRC participates in building transboundary water cooperation and local capacity while supporting a regional development agenda. It strengthened its processes based on those promoted by global development partners and the Junior Riparian Professional demonstrates its proactive participation in growing its members’ capacity to face the basin’s most pressing challenges. Through this opportunity funded by the Integrated Capacity Building Programme, each year the MRC receives one junior riparian professional (under the age of 35) selected by the riparian members to be trained within the MRC Secretariat team and to disseminate the MRC-produced norms. However, the result of the involvement of the same global partners in governance and legal capacity-building at the Lao level has become a tool used by the country to evade the guidelines produced by the MRC. Indeed, despite receiving significant financial and technical assistance from UN agencies and development partners, the country chose the Chinese and Vietnamese Laws on Water and Water Resources as an inspiration for the amendments of its law, indicating the relevance of similarities between regimes when upgrading governance instruments (Interviewee 10, 2021). Additionally, aside from Vietnam, which is the Mekong’s downstream country, a geography that may be the motivation to become party to the Watercourses Convention, the Lower Mekong Basin countries may perceive the ASEAN’s non-interference principle as insuring more freedom to achieve their development targets than cooperation: For Lao PDR, hydropower exportation contributes to the national income growth and the country is now expected to graduate from the LDCs in 2026 (United Nations, 2021).

In the context of fast development and climate change weighing on the water–energy–food nexus, the MRC acknowledged the lack of alignment between the management of the regional water resources and energy sector plans. In 2021, it published the Sustainable Hydropower Development Strategy in the hope it would be adopted at national levels while declaring its willingness to also coordinate with ASEAN and Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) energy-related programmes (Mekong River Commission Secretariat, 2021).

Although it demonstrates an RBO’s ability to foster capacity growth and knowledge transfer between the basin and national scales, this case shows that the significant impacts of overall development, geopolitical context and countries’ political regimes and institutional setting should not be underestimated in the quest to enhance transboundary water cooperation: it can be transposed to other southern RBOs with different challenges in balancing the water–energy–food nexus. The multiple programmes and scales of cooperation in the Global South display a fragmented institutional environment, demanding cooperation stakeholders to have the capacity to monitor and coordinate various programmes and frameworks for coherent implementation of water governance cooperation in line with development strategies at different scales. Further research should investigate the dynamics between RBOs and other cooperation scales when receiving global assistance to look for optimal pathways and partners to support transboundary water cooperation and the regional socioeconomic growth essential to the achievement of sustainable development goals.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. The author does not subscribe to the ‘Global South’ appellation. The term is used here in the absence of an alternative that reflects its convictions about ‘development’. It may at times be shortened to ‘the South’ or ‘Southern countries’. This also applies to the ‘Global North’, ‘the North’ or ‘Northern countries’.

2. The ‘equitable and reasonable use’ and ‘no harm’ are water-sharing principles, although non-state actors are mentioned in article 32 of the Watercourses Convention.

3. The list of RBOs is non-exhaustive.

4. Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar and Tunisia acceded to the convention but are not members of an international RBO. Paraguay, Venezuela and Yemen (not members of an RBO) have signed but not acceded to the convention.

5. Azerbaijan is a party to the convention but not an RBO.

6. The Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation, the Economic Community of West African States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are among regional economic integration organizations whose member countries could benefit from the organizations’ adhesion to the global convention.

7. See paragraph 1 listing the three objectives of the framework.

8. The objective of GMS to develop power trade and all the necessary infrastructures is in line with its overall GMS corridor development strategy, taking into account the countries’ energy security and the impacts of climate change in the region.

9. According to article 5.A, projects on tributaries are ‘subject to the notification to the Joint Committee’, whereas article 5.B details several levels of regulations for the mainstream, depending on intra or inter-basin use and wet or dry season use. Mainstream hydropower plants fall in the category of inter-basin use and both wet and dry season use, ‘subject to prior consultation which aims at arriving at an agreement by the Joint Committee’.

10. The MRC Water Utilization Project also received funding from the Global Environment Fund via the World Bank.