Human dignity and the human personality: Developing an ideological basis for the constitutionalisation of the common law of personality

Abstract

This article examines the multi-faceted nature of human dignity as a constitutional value, together with its interplay with other constitutional values, to provide an ideological basis for the constitutional development of the common law of personality with reference to Kantian moral philosophy (and other intellectual traditions). This article argues that the interplay between the multi-faceted nature of human dignity and other constitutional values such as equality, freedom and ubuntu create a constitutional objective normative value system that gives rise to certain ideals (read as interpretative norms) in respect of the human dignity and the attendant development of the common law of personality. These ideals are the universal, individualistic and collectivist ideals of the aforementioned objective normative value system (as cogent variations of Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative as applied to the law of personality). These ideals considers the possibility of the human personality as a legal interest to promote constitutional imperatives related to the human image in the common law (as a universal ideal), the delineation of the unique characteristics of the human image (as an individualistic constitutional imperative), and the shared humanity and attendant solidarity contained in the human image (as a collectivist constitutional imperative).

Keywords:

• Law of delict
• law of personality
• human dignity
• constitutional values
• transformative constitutionalism

Disclosure statement

No conflict of interest was declared by the author.

Acknowledgements

This article forms part of the third chapter (‘Ideology and human dignity’) of my PhD at the School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand conferred in December 2020. Thank you to my supervisor, Deeksha Bhana, for her helpful input on this article. Thank you also to Emile Zitzke who provided insightful comments.

Notes

1 H Botha ‘Human dignity in comparative perspective’ (2009) 20 Stellenbosch Law Review 201.

2 Le Roux v Dey (3) SA 274 (CC). Arguably, this judgment sets the stage for the post-constitutional development of the common law of personality as it is one of the most authoritative judgments to date that engaged with the ostensible alignment between the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and this branch of law. See CJ Visser ‘Revisiting the constitutionalisation of the common law of personality: Transformative constitutionalism and Le Roux v Dey’ (2020) 36 South African Journal on Human Rights 242–243.

3 Visser (ibid) 252–253, 255–256. See also Le Roux (ibid) paras 141–142. In another writing, I found that condensing the human personality into subjective feelings of self-worth are constitutionally untenable as the doctrine of subjective rights, which provides for the recognition of various personality rights, and the Constitution doctrinally converge to acknowledge the full articulation of the various personality rights recognised at common law, namely bodily integrity, bodily freedom, reputation, dignity, privacy, identity and feelings. Generally see CJ Visser ‘The doctrine of subjective rights, the actio iniuriarum and the Constitution: A convergent doctrinal basis for the law of personality’ (2021) 32 Stellenbosch Law Review 272.

4 Visser (note 2 above) 247.

5 Ibid 255.

6 Ibid 256.

7 Ibid.

8 Important to note, this article does not seek to interrogate the constitutional development of the common law of personality in terms of its doctrine and framework. For the doctrinal development of the common law of personality, generally see Visser (note 3 above). The development of the framework of the common law of personality, that is the manner in which it conceives and adjudicate personality infringement requires further study and does not form part of this article’s scope on inquiry.

9 Visser (ibid) 247–249.

10 S Woolman ‘Dignity’ in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2008 Revision Service 4, 2012) Chapter 36, 3–4. To date, there has not been an undertaking to give content to human dignity in the context of the law of personality that ought to permeate the positive law understanding of the human personality as the latter are traditionally conceived in terms of the various personality rights recognised at common law.

11 As a discreet composite interest consisting of various personality rights in terms of the law of personality as a sub-discipline of the law of delict. See WA Joubert Grondslae van die Persoonlikheidsreg (1953) 124–129; J Neethling, JM Potgieter & A Roos Neethling on Personality Rights 3 ed (2019) 24–38.

12 Visser (note 2 above) 248–249.

13 Ibid 249–251.

14 Ibid.

15 This will require further study and falls beyond the scope of this article. See Visser (ibid).

16 Woolman (note 10 above) 3–4.

17 This alludes to the understanding that various meanings and usages can be ascribed to human dignity highlighting its normative and contextual nature. See C McCrudden ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 19 The European Journal of International Law 655, 680–681; S Riley ‘Human dignity and the rule of law’ (2015) 11 Utrecht Law Review 91, 98–100; AC Steinmann ‘The core meaning of human dignity’ (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1, 24.

18 Woolman (note 10 above) 1.

19 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC).

20 Ibid para 35.

21 Ibid. See also E Daly Dignity Rights: Courts, Constitutions, and the Worth of the Human Person (2012) 25.

22 L Ackermann Human Dignity: Lodestar for Equality in South Africa (2012) 2; Steinmann (note 17 above) 3–5.

23 These would, for example, include the Constitution and all other laws subject to the former.

24 See the discussion that follows directly below on the parameters of analysing human dignity.

25 Dawood (note 19 above) para 35; Ackermann (note 22 above) 2. Also generally see D Bhana ‘The horizontal application of the Bill of Rights: A reconciliation of sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution’ (2013) 29 South African Journal on Human Rights 351.

26 Ackermann (note 22 above) 26; A Hughes Human Dignity and Fundamental Rights in South Africa and Ireland (2014) 6, 25, 29.

27 G Green ‘Human dignity and the law’ in J Malpas & N Lickiss (eds) Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation (2007) 151.

28 Woolman (note 10 above) 3–4.

29 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 26; S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) para 38; South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 (6) SA 123 (CC) para 172; Joubert (note 11 above) 14; S Liebenberg ‘The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 1, 6; Botha (note 1 above) 207; Woolman (note 10 above) 3; Ackermann (note 22 above) 60; J Waldron ‘Reply’ in J Waldron and M Dan-Cohen (eds) Dignity, Rank, & Rights: The Berkeley Tanner Lectures (2016) 133, 135.

30 However, it must be noted that there are various ways to interpret human dignity with the result that they can point in opposite directions. Universally, there is no formal account on how to interpret human dignity as this is mainly dependent on a particular context with a particular interpreter. See generally R Brownsword & D Byleveld Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (2001).

31 Botha (note 1 above) 207–209.

32 AW Wood Kant’s Ethical Thought (1996) 6; I Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) (trans MJ Gregor, 2006) 107; Hughes (note 26 above) 36–37.

33 Ibid.

34 Kant (trans MJ Gregor) (note 32 above) 557.

35 Ibid. See also LWH Ackermann ‘The legal nature of the South African constitutional revolution’ (2004) New Zealand Law Review 633, 651; A Wood ‘Human dignity, rights and the realm of ends’ in AJ Barnard-Naudé, D Cornell & F du Bois (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order (2009) 47, 53; Woolman (note 10 above) 7–17.

36 Dawood (note 19 above) para 35; Dodo (note 29 above) para 35; Kant (trans McGregor) (note 32 above) 557; McCrudden (note 17 above) 679; Ackermann (note 22 above) 55.

37 McCrudden (ibid) 680–681. See also Botha (note 1 above) 183; Ackermann (ibid) 23–24; Hughes (note 26 above) 38, 45–46.

38 R Dworkin Life’s Dominion; An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia (1993) 25, 82; McCrudden (ibid) 680–681; Botha (ibid) 188–189; Ackermann (ibid) 23–24.

39 N Rao ‘On the use and abuse of dignity in Constitutional law’ (2008) 14 Columbia Journal of European Law 201, 222–223; Botha (ibid) 180; McCrudden (ibid) 680–681; J Waldron ‘Lecture 2: Law, dignity, and self-control’ in J Waldron and M Dan-Cohen (eds) Dignity, Rank, & Rights: The Berkeley Tanner Lectures (2016) 50–51.

40 Ibid.

41 Dawood (note 19 above) para 35.

42 Visser (note 2 above) 248–249.

43 Ackermann (note 22 above) 2; Steinmann (note 17 above) 3–5.

44 Ibid. See also Woolman (note 10 above) 5–7.

45 For a voluminous and detailed discussion of modern human dignity discourse, see generally Ackermann (note 22 above); Daly (note 21 above); M Rosen Dignity: Its History and Meaning (2012); C McCrudden Understanding Human Dignity (2013); Hughes (note 26 above); A Barak Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right (2015) (trans D Kayros).

46 Ackermann (note 22 above) 4, 55; Botha (note 1 above) 217; Wood (note 35 above) 49; Hughes (note 26 above) 38.

47 Kant (trans McGregor) (note 32 above) 106–107.

48 Ibid 115, 120. See also Botha (note 1 above) 217–220; Hughes (note 26 above) 45.

49 Makwanyane (note 29 above).

50 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC).

51 Makwanyane (note 29 above) para 328; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (ibid) para 42. See also Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2002 (1) SACR 431 (CC) para 49; S v Jordan 2002 (2) SACR 499 (CC) para 74; S v EN 2014 (1) SACR 198 (SCA) para 15; TE Hill Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory (1992) 48; Ackermann (note 22 above) 4.

52 I use the term ‘the axiomatic claim’ interchangeably with the concepts of absolute inner human worth and the subsequent reprieve from objectification.

53 Dodo (note 29 above) para 38; Kant (trans McGregor) (note 32 above) 115, 120; Botha (note 1 above) 217–220; Hughes (note 26 above) 45.

54 Makwanyane (note 29 above) para 328; E Bloch Natural Law and Human Dignity (1961) (trans DJ Schmidt, 1986) xv, xxix; E Schockenhoff Natural Law & Human Dignity: Universal Ethics in an Historical World (2003) 172–173.

55 R Sullivan Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory (1989) 197; Botha (note 1 above) 217–220; R Bayefsky ‘Dignity, honour, and human rights: Kant’s perspective’ (2013) 41 Political Theory 809, 818–819.

56 O Schachter ‘Human dignity as a normative concept’ (1983) 77 American Journal of International Law 848, 851; Ackermann (note 22 above) 21–26; J Barrett ‘Dignatio and the human body’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 525, 530; Botha (note 1 above) 217–220; A Gewirth Self-Fulfilment (2009) 164; Hughes (note 26 above) 45.

57 Ibid. See also Qwelane v South African Human Rights Commission 2021 (6) SA 579 (CC) para 66.

58 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) para 116; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) para 150. See also J Malpas ‘Human dignity and human being’ in J Malpas & N Lickiss Perspective on Human Dignity: A Conversation (2007) 19, 20.

59 Makwanyane (note 29 above) para 328; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (note 50 above) para 42; Qwelane (note 57 above) para 62; Gewirth (note 56 above) 164; Botha (note 1 above) 217; Ackermann (note 22 above) 23.

60 R Dworkin Justice for Hedgehogs (2011) 209, 419; Hughes (note 26 above) 38; Barak (note 45 above) 29; SM Liao ‘Human rights as fundamental conditions for a good life’ in R Cruft, SM Liao & M Renzo (eds) The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (2015) 79, 85, 92.

61 Ibid.

62 Ferreira v Levin 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) para 49; Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development 2014 (1) SACR 327 (CC) para 52; Dworkin (note 60 above) 195, 209; J Marshall Human Rights Law and Personal Identity (2014) 33; Liao (note 60 above) 79.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 Ferreira (note 62 above) paras 49, 51, 250–251.

67 McCrudden (note 17 above) 680–681; Botha (note 1 above) 171, 183; Ackermann (note 22 above) 23–24; G Kateb Human Dignity (2011) 18; DP Sulmasy ‘The varieties of human dignity: A logical and conceptual analysis’ (2013) 16 Medicine Health Care and Philosophy 937, 938.

68 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC).

69 Ibid paras 56–58; Kant (trans McGregor) (note 32 above) 37–38.

70 Ibid. See also Malpas (note 58 above) 19; McCrudden (note 17 above) 659–660; Liebenberg (note 29 above) 7; Hughes (note 26 above) 42; LM Henry ‘The jurisprudence of dignity’ (2011) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 169, 206–208; O Sensen ‘Introduction’ in O Sensen (ed) Kant on Moral Autonomy (2013) 1. However, it must be noted that autonomous moral human agency can also be construed as a freedom as opposed to a distinctively unique human attribute. See A Sen Inequality Re-Examined (1992) who advances a freedom-enriched conception of human autonomy and dignity. For purposes of this article, I intend to view autonomous human moral agency as an inherent human quality as this resonates more with the concept of the human personality which will be discussed directly below.

71 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (note 50 above) para 23; Dawood (note 19 above) para 37; TE Hill Autonomy and Self-Respect (1991) 51; Botha (note 1 above) 189; Liebenberg (note 29 above) 7; Hughes (note 26 above) 42.

72 Kateb (note 67 above) 18; Ackermann (note 22 above) 227–228.

73 The concept of a ‘basic human predisposition’ refers to a basic element or component of the human image. Furthermore, in terms of Kantian moral philosophy, human personality and autonomous moral human agency are closely related. With reference to Hegelian rights discourse, the human personality serves as a ‘substantive end’ to the individualistic realisation of absolute inner worth through autonomous moral human agency. See Wood (note 35 above) 53–54; GWF Hegal The Philosophy of Right (1820) § 45 (trans A White, 2015); C Swack ‘Safeguarding artistic creation and the cultural heritage: A comparison of droit moral between France and the United States’ Columbia-VLA Journal of Law and Arts 22 (1998) 361, 365–366; Ackermann (note 22 above) 23–24.

74 P O’Callaghan Refining Privacy in Tort Law (2012) 32–34.

75 Ibid. See also J Marshall Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law? Autonomy, Identity and Integrity under the European Convention on Human Rights (2009) 29.

76 Moral rights theorists developed Kantian moral philosophy further in relation to the human personality as a substantive end to autonomous moral human agency.

77 Joubert (note 11 above) 131; NC Suhl ‘Moral rights protection in the United States under the Berne Convention: A fictional work?’ (2002) 12 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 1203, 1208–1209; Neethling et al (note 11 above) 24; O’Callaghan (note 75 above) 32–33; Ackermann (note 22 above) 89. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court on various occasions confirmed this understanding of the human personality, see Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 27; Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) para 59; Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) para 64.

78 Ibid. In other words, from a legal perspective, human beings, as living beings, form part of the natural world but their attendant legal subjectivity (that is the bearers of rights and duties) endows and enables them to control and shape the natural world. See also M Dan-Cohen ‘Dignity in its (dis)content’ in J Waldron and M Dan-Cohen (eds) Dignity, Rank, & Rights: The Berkeley Tanner Lectures (2016) 1, 8–9.

79 Khumalo (ibid) para 27; Dawood (note 19 above) para 35. A plethora of frameworks exist for the division of the human personality, see Joubert (note 11 above) 41–43. This particular framework was chosen as it builds upon Kantian moral philosophy and provides a holistic view of the human image.

80 Joubert (ibid) 131. See also Ackermann (note 22 above) 151–152.

81 Neethling et al (note 11 above) 25.

82 That is, the mind forms part of the physical body. See Joubert (note 11 above) 131; Neethling et al (note 11 above) 25.

83 Ibid.

84 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (note 50 above) para 22; Teddy Bear Clinic (note 62 above) para 52.

85 Joubert (note 11 above) 131–132; Neethling et al (note 11 above) 27.

86 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (note 50 above) para 23; Dawood (note 19 above) para 37; C Cernuschi Re/casting Kokoschka: Ethics and Aesthetics, Epistemology and Politics in Fin-de-siècle Vienna (2002) 162; S Rosenbaum Recovering Integrity: Moral Thought in American Pragmatism (2015) 27. See also Ackermann (note 22 above) 152.

87 Dawood (note 19 above) para 35; Joubert (note 11 above) 41–43; Neethling et al (note 11 above) 27; Henry (note 70 above) 214–215; Ackermann (note 22 above) 152–155.

88 See generally O’Keefe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244 (C).

89 Khumalo (note 77 above) para 27; Wood (note 35 above) 49; Ackermann (note 22 above) 152; Hughes (note 26 above) 45–46; Kateb (note 67 above) 175.

90 Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) para 69; EJ Eberle Dignity and Liberty: Constitutional Visions in Germany and the United States (2002) 61; Ackermann (note 22 above) 153.

91 Within this delineation of the dignitarian characteristics to the human personality under the individualistic dimension of the axiomatic claim, it seems likely that these have a close resemblance to the personality rights as originating from the common law. This apparent resemblance will be outlined here for clarification. First, the personality right to bodily integrity appears to be closely associated with the dignitarian characteristic of the physical human body which houses the human mind and physical-mental health. Secondly, the personality right to physical liberty seems to be related to the dignitarian characteristic of an individual’s spatial freedom. Thirdly, the personality right to reputation finds association with the dignitarian characteristic of public esteem. Fourthly, the personality right to (common law) dignity finds resemblance with the dignitarian characteristic of self-esteem. Fifthly, the personality right to privacy shares a resemblance with the dignitarian characteristic of informational autonomy over one’s private life. Sixthly, the personality right to identity denotes a linkage to the dignitarian characteristic of autonomy over one’s likeness. Lastly, the personality right to feelings bears resemblance with the dignitarian characteristic of sentiments towards one’s own moral integrity. See Neethling et al (note 11 above) 25–38. In turn, these resemblances arguably foreshadow a doctrinal convergence between the Constitution and the common law in terms of the scope of personality interests that ought to be recognised in positive law. See Visser (note 3 above) 283–286.

92 Henry (note 70 above) 215.

93 Ibid 215–216.

94 Ibid.

95 Khumalo (note 77 above) para 27; Dawood (note 19 above) para 35; PA Pagan Aguiar & T Auer The Human Person and a Culture of Freedom (2009) 4; AR Monteiro Ethics of Human Rights (2014) 312. It must be noted that this is because the human personality can be regarded as a substantive or material end to autonomous moral human agency.

96 Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC).

97 Ibid para 74. See also Bernstein (note 90 above) para 67; Eberle (note 90 above) 50–51; Botha (note 1 above) 187; Henry (note 70 above) 220–221; Ackermann (note 22 above) 150–151.

98 Botha (note 1 above) 193.

99 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) paras 60, 78; Botha (note 1 above) 193; Henry (note 70 above) 221.

100 Wood (note 35 above) 58, explains this realm of ends as follows:

By a “realm” (Reich) Kant means ‘a systematic combination of various rational beings through communal laws”, or again, “a whole of all ends in systematic connection”. The term “realm of ends” refers to an ideal community with all rational beings as its members; one involving a systematic harmony among the ends of all the members of the community […] A collection of ends constitutes a “realm” if these ends are not in conflict or competition with one another, but are combined into a mutually supporting system. The laws of a realm of ends are those which, if followed, would combine all the rational beings, as ends in themselves, and all the ends they set, into a mutually supporting system of shared collective ends. Kant’s Formula of the Realm of Ends commands us to follow maxims involving ends that belong to this system, and it forbids us to adopt ends that would stand in the way of rational beings sharing a system of ends. Ends that are neither required for nor incompatible with the system are permissible (original emphasis retained).

See also Khosa (note 96 above) para 74.

101 MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) para 53; Botha (note 1 above) 189–190.

102 N Rao ‘Three concepts of dignity in constitutional law’ (2011) 86 Notre Dame Law Review 183, 243. See also Liebenberg (note 29 above) 11; J Nedelsky Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (2011) 4.

103 That is their integrated physical and spiritual-moral characteristics deriving from autonomous moral human agency as a primary indicator of individual absolute inner worth. See L Henkin ‘Human dignity and constitutional rights’ in MJ Meyer & WA Parent (eds) The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values (1992) 210–211; Botha (note 1 above) 190; Ackermann (note 22 above) 74; Bayefsky (note 55 above) 823.

104 Bernstein (note 90 above) para 67; Khosa (note 96 above) para 74; Fourie (note 99 above) paras 60, 78.

105 This, among others, requires individuals to recognise the human personality of others and not to treat them as objects. See also Ackermann (note 22 above) 147.

106 Makwanyane (note 29 above) para 328; Dodo (note 29 above) para 38; Rao (note 102 above) 246; Hughes (note 26 above) 43.

107 Henry (note 70 above) 220–221. This also implies that the individual is required to respect the absolute inner worth of others as well as the collective community.

108 Botha (note 1 above) 187; Liebenberg (note 29 above) 9; T Metz ‘Ubuntu as a moral theory and human right in South Africa’ (2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 532, 538; Rao (note 102 above) 243–244, 248.

109 Ibid.

110 A Laitinen and AB Pessi define this concept as follows (A Laitinen & AB Pessi ‘An introduction’ in A Laitinen & AB Pessi (eds) Solidarity: Theory and Practice (2014) Chapter 1, 2:

As a concept, solidarity is both descriptive and normative. Solidarity in its different descriptive senses refers today to a kind of connection to other people, to other members of a group, large or small […] “Solidarity” may be used to describe and explain the normal order and normative social integration in societies or communities, as opposed to chaos and conflict, and as opposed to order based on coercion or maximization of self-interest.

111 Makwanyane (note 29 above) para 308; Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) para 51; Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) para 113; Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC) para 71; C Wellman ‘Solidarity, the individual and human rights’ (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 639, 642; Botha (note 1 above) 187; Hughes (note 26 above) 39.

112 Pillay (note 101 above) para 53; Metz (note 108 above) 536; Rao (note 102 above) 243.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid. See also Eberle (note 90 above) 50-52; Botha (note 1 above) 187–188; Ackermann (note 22 above) 109. Also generally see R Forst ‘How not to speak about identity: The concept of the person in a theory of justice’ (1992) 18 Philosophy and Social Criticism 293.

115 Pillay (note 101 above) para 53; Botha (note 1 above) 187–189; Ackermann (note 22 above) 109. This coincides with the idea that human dignity, in general, can be conceptualised as both ‘empowerment’ and ‘constraint’. See D Bhana & M Pieterse ‘Towards a reconciliation of contract law and constitutional values: Brisley and Afrox revisited’ (2005) 122 The South African Law Journal 865, 880–881.

116 Botha (note 1 above) 187.

117 Dikoko (note 111 above) para 113; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. Furthermore, the well-known term ‘ubuntu’ is a contraction of the African maxim umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, meaning ‘a person is a person because of other people’. This expression articulates that ubuntu, as a rule of conduct, promotes basic respect and compassion between members of a community. See DJ Louw & A Spijker ‘Family conferencing: Notes’ (2007) 28 Obiter 101, 106.

118 CJ Visser ‘The revival of the amende honorable as applied to defamation by the media’ (2011) 128 The South African Law Journal 327, 334–336; C Himonga, M Taylor & A Pope ‘Reflections on judicial views on ubuntu’ (2013) 16 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 370, 418. See also Langa J (as he then was) in Makwanyane (note 29 above) para 224 where he elucidated these relational tenets of ubuntu as follows:

[Ubuntu] recognises a person’s status as a human being, entitled to unconditional respect, dignity, value and acceptance from the members of the community such person happens to be part of. It also entails the converse, however. The person has a corresponding duty to give the same respect, dignity, value and acceptance to each member of that community. More importantly, it regulates the exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and co-responsibility and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all. See paras 223–227 of this judgment for a more detailed explanation of the value of ubuntu. See also D Cornell & K van Marle ‘Exploring ubuntu: Tentative reflections’ (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Journal 195.

119 Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC) para 24. See also Visser (ibid) 335; D Bhana & CJ Visser ‘The concurrence of breach of contract and delict in a constitutional context’ (2019) 35 South African Journal on Human Rights 94, 110.

120 Himonga et al (note 118 above) 378–379; S Benhabib Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (2013) 164.

121 Bhana & Visser (note 119 above) 110.

122 Ibid. See also Himonga et al (note 118 above) 379–382.

123 RC Post ‘The social foundations of defamation law: Reputation and the Constitution’ (1986) 74 California Law Review 691, 711, 716.

124 Ibid 716.

125 Ibid 711, 716.

126 See generally Visser (note 2 above).

127 MYK Lee Equality, Dignity, and Same-Sex Marriage: A Rights Disagreement in Democratic Societies (2010) 157; Malpas (note 58 above) 1.

128 Rao (note 39 above) 222; McCrudden (note 17 above) 680–681.

129 Schachter (note 56 above) 849–850; Rao (ibid) 226; Riley (note 17 above) 105.

130 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt ‘Facing the challenge of transformation: Difficulties in the development of an indigenous jurisprudence of equality’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 248, 254. See also Bhana & Pieterse (note 115 above) 865, 880.

131 H Botha ‘Equality, plurality and structural power’ (2009) 25 South African Journal on Human Rights 1, 3.

132 Ibid 11.

133 Ibid. See also Qwelane (note 57 above) para 59; Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 130 above) 250; C Albertyn & J Kentridge ‘Introducing the right to equality in the interim Constitution’ (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 149, 153.

134 Albertyn & Kentridge (ibid) 152.

135 Ferreira (note 62 above).

136 Ibid para 49.

137 Ibid para 251.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid para 253.

140 Ibid para 254.

141 Dikoko (note 111 above).

142 Ibid para 113.

143 Ibid.

144 Bernstein (note 90 above) para 65; President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) para 36; EJ Eberle ‘Observations on the development of human dignity and personality in German constitutional law: An overview’ (2013) 33 Liverpool Law Review 201, 202; Hughes (note 26 above) 38–39; Botha (note 1 above) 204; O’Callaghan (note 74 above) 32–34.

145 Le Roux (note 2 above).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

C.J. Visser

Dr C.J. Visser, senior lecturer, school of law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa