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Notes
1 Nastassia Astrasheuskaya and Henry Foy, ‘Polar Powers: Russia’s Bid for Supremacy in the Arctic Ocean’, Financial Times, 27 April 2019; Michael Peck, ‘Russia Has a Plan to Dominate the Arctic’, National Interest, 7 January 2018.
2 Malte Humpert, ‘US Navy Plans to Send Naval Vessels Through the Arctic’, ArcticToday, 12 March 2019.
3 For a copy of the strategy, see USNI News, ‘New Navy, Marine Corps Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic’, 5 January 2021.
4 Boulègue, Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic.
5 For examples of each view, see Matthew Melino and Heather Conley, ‘The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence’, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Boulègue, Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic.
6 For examples of each view, see Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), p. 125; James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018).
7 The Reagan administration’s Maritime Strategy envisioned using NATO’s preponderance at sea to offset the USSR’s advantages on land in the event of a conflict. Had war broken out, the concept envisioned, among other things, NATO surface and subsurface assets threatening Soviet capabilities in and around the Kola Peninsula – thereby compelling the USSR to de-escalate before its ground forces could achieve a breakthrough. See John Hattendorf et al., The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy 1977–1986 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 2004).
8 The NATO readiness initiative commits the Alliance to generate 30 vessels, 30 squadrons of aircraft and 30 mechanised battalions within 30 days of conflict. See NATO, ‘Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers', 24 October 2019, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169936.htm>, accessed 28 November 2021.
9 Atle Staalsen, ‘Russia Sets Out Stringent New Rules for Foreign Ships on the Northern Sea Route’, Arctic Today, 8 March 2019, <https://www.arctictoday.com/russia-sets-out-stringent-new-rules-for-foreign-ships-on-the-northern-sea-route/>, accessed 28 November 2021.
10 Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky and Paul Stronski, ‘Russia in the Arctic – A Critical Examination’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2021.
11 Valery Pilyavsky, ‘The Arctic: Russia’s Economic and Geopolitical Interests’, Briefing Paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, March 2011.
12 Janis Kluge and Michael Paul, Russia’s Arctic Strategy Through to 2035: Grand Ambitions and Pragmatic Constraints (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2020); Emily Ferris, ‘Problems of Geography: Military and Economic Transport Logistics in Russia’s Far East’, RUSI Occasional Papers (October 2020).
13 Elias G Carayannis, Alina Ilinova and Alexey Cherepovitsyn, ‘The Future of Energy and the Case of the Arctic Offshore: The Role of Strategic Management’, Journal of Marine Science and Engineering (Vol. 9, No. 2, 2021).
14 Sergey Sukhankin, ‘Russia’s Energy Strategy 2035: A Breakthrough or Another Impasse?’ Eurasia Daily Monitor (Vol. 17, No. 78, 2020).
15 Vitaly Yermakov, ‘Russian Gas: The Year of Living Dangerously: Key Takeaways for 2020 and Beyond’, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, September 2020, <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Russian-Gas-the-year-of-living-dangerously.pdf>, accessed 7 November.
16 James Henderson and Vitaly Yermakov, ‘Russian LNG: Becoming a Global Force’, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, November 2019, <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Russian-LNG-Becoming-a-Global-Force-NG-154.pdf>, accessed 7 November 2021.
17 Michael Kofman, speech given at RUSI Seapower Conference, London, 25 February 2021.
18 Ibid.
19 Sergey Sukhankin, ‘The Military Pillar of Russia’s Arctic Policy’, Eurasia Daily Monitor (Vol. 17, No. 33, 2020).
20 Pavel Devyatkin, ‘Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Maritime Shipping (Part IV)’, Arctic Institute, 27 February 2018, <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-arctic-strategy-maritime-shipping-part-iv/>, accessed 1 April 2021.
21 Ernie Regehr, ‘Military Infrastructure and Strategic Capabilities: Russia’s Arctic Defense Posture’, in Daniel Hamilton, Kristina Spohr and Jason Moyer (eds), The Arctic and World Order (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2021), p. 196.
22 John Mearsheimer, ‘A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe’, International Security (Vol. 11, No. 2, Fall 1986), pp. 3–57.
23 Tomas Malmof and Johan Engvall, ‘Russia’s Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective’ in Frederik Westerlund and Susanna Oxenstierna (eds), Russian Military Capability in a Ten Year Perspective – 2019 (Stockholm: FOI, 2019), p. 191. Note that whether these missiles are mated to platforms like the Tu-22M3 is unknown at the time of writing.
24 The GUGI is a unique organisation that emphasises undersea intelligence gathering, as well as certain special operations such as disrupting sensor networks. See Globalsecurity, ‘Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research (Military Unit 40056)’, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/gugi.htm>, accessed 29 November 2021.
25 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, pp. 155–61.