Chapter III: Russian and NATO Surface Capabilities in the High North

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Notes

1 Thomas Nilsen, ‘Russian Coast Guard Receives New Ice Strengthened Patrol Vessel’, Barents Observer, 30 December 2019.

2 Naval Technology, ‘Ivan Papanin (Project 23550) Class Arctic Patrol Vessels’. The vessels, which are Arctic rated, will be armed with the Kalibr-NK.

3 Christopher Woody, ‘As US Tries to Close “Icebreaker Gap” With Russia, Its Only Working Icebreaker Is Making a Rare Trip North’, Business Insider, 9 November 2020.

4 Identified by authors using open-source imagery.

5 Charles Bartles, ‘Improvements to the Onyx Coastal Defence Missile’, OE Watch, December 2019, <https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/345363.29/11/2021>, accessed 12 May 2021.

6 Aleksey Ramm and Bogdan Stepovoy, ‘S korablya na «Bastion»: ataka beregovykh batarey stanet vnezapnoy’ [‘From Ship to “Bastion”: Shore Batteries Attack Will Be Sudden’], Izvestiya, 22 October 2019, <https://iz.ru/930452/aleksei-rammbogdan-stepovoi/s-korablia-na-bastion-ataka-beregovykh-batarei-stanet-vnezapnoi>, accessed 29 November 2021.

7 On China see Bryan Clark, Mark Gunzinger and Jesse Sloman, ‘Winning in the Gray Zone: Using Electromagnetic Warfare to Regain Escalation Dominance’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017, p. 18.

8 Militarywatch Magazine, ‘Russia’s Lethal New Kinzhal “Carrier Killer” Hypersonic Missile Set to Bring Renewed Foreign Interest in MiG-31 and Tu-22M as Launch Platforms for Maritime Strike Roles’, 3 August 2018.

9 H I Sutton, ‘Powerful Russian Submarine Seen Entering Baltic Sea’, Forbes, 10 July 2020.; Ryan White, ‘The 1st Launch of the Hypersonic “Zircon” from a Sub to be Performed Not Earlier Than June’, Naval Post, 4 March 2021.

10 Kofman, speech given at RUSI Sea Power Conference.

11 Office of Naval Intelligence, ‘The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition’, December 2015, p. 3; Johnson, ‘Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds’, p. 33.

12 Johnson, ‘Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds’, p. 33.

13 Analogue radars are in general more vulnerable to jamming, see Justin Bronk, ‘Modern Russian and Chinese Integrated Air Defence Systems: The Nature of the Threat, Growth Trajectory and Western Options’, RUSI Occasional Papers (April 2021).

14 Norman Friedman, The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems, 5th ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006).

15 Naval Technology, ‘Admiral Gorshkov Class Frigates’, ≤https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/admiral-gorshkov/>, accessed 13 November 2021.

16 Based on the ground-based version of the Monolit radar, the 3K41 is the sea version. See Michael Petersen, ‘Russia’s Naval Renewal’, ≤https://mscconference.com/wp-content/uploads/MSC18-presentations/NATO-3-Petersen-Russian-Navy.pdf>, accessed 13 November 2021.

17 Paul Schwartz, Russia’s Contribution to China’s Surface Warfare Capabilities: Feeding The Dragon (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2015), pp. 15.

18 Rosoborronexport, ‘Club-K Container Missile’, <http://roe.ru/esp/catalog/marina-de-guerra/armas-de-la-nave/klab-k/>, accessed 20 May 2021.

19 Rossobornexport, ‘3TS-25E’, <http://roe.ru/eng/catalog/naval-systems/shipborne-electronic-systems/3ts-25e/>, accessed 20 May 2021. Note that Rossobornexport may well publish overly optimistic estimates, meaning that real numbers may be even lower.

20 The 9M-100 can be quad-packed. The exact mix of capabilities is unknown.

21 Authors’ OSINT analysis.

22 Thomas Nilsen, ‘Russia Deploys Missile System 70 km from Norway’s Vardø Radar’, Barents Observer, 7 August 2019.

23 Alexey Ramm, ‘Kak aviatsiya zashchishchayet rossiyskoye Zapolyar'ye’ [‘How Aviation Protects the Russian Arctic’], Wings of the Arctic, 18 June 2021, <https://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2021-02-18/5_1129_aviation.html>, accessed 29 November 2021.

24 TASS, ‘Ten MIG-31 Fighter Jets Fitted with Kinzhal Air-Launched Missile on Test Combat Duty’, 5 May 2018.

25 Ben Brimelow, ‘Russia Is Desperately Trying to Save its Only Aircraft Carrier – That's Outdated and Plagued With Problems’, Business Insider, 17 April 2018.

26 Mark Episkopos, ‘Why Russia’s SU-33 Fighter Was a Failure’, National Interest, 3 November 2020.

27 In scenarios short of war, commanders cannot engage aircraft, meaning that they have to allow them to get in range and risk consequences if there is an escalation. This tends to take a psychological toll on operators, see Geoff Ziezulewicz, ‘Russian Jet Buzzes US Warship in the Black Sea’, Navy Times, 1 February 2021.

28 Robert Dalsjö, Christopher Berglund and Michael Jonsson, Bursting the Bubble: Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications (Stockholm: FOI, 2018), p. 29.

29 H I Sutton, ‘Pr885 Severodvinsk Class’, Covert Shores, 13 April 2019, <http://www.hisutton.com/Pr885_Severodvinsk_Class.html>, accessed 13 November 2021.

30 H I Sutton, ‘Oscar II SSGN’, Covert Shores, 29 June 2019, <http://www.hisutton.com/OSCAR-II_SSGN.html>, accessed 13 November 2021.

31 Naval Recognition, ‘Kolpino Russian Submarine Trains Kalibr Anti-Ship Missile Fire’, September 2020; Vavasseur, ‘Russia’s Akula-Class Submarines to Fire Kalibr Cruise Missile Following Upgrade’.

32 The authors assume that SU-33s and SU-24s will be used against an already attritted force as, should this not be the case, they would suffer heavy attrition themselves given their short ranges.

33 A Monolit-B on Yuzhny Island can track targets out to 450 km and if placed on Yuzhny – itself at some distance from the mainland – could track targets further out. A Gorshkov frigate or a Soveremenny equipped with an OTH system can track targets to a similar distance but can transit further from Russian shores to do so.

34 Sidharth Kaushal, ‘Persistent Engagement and Strategic Raiding: Leveraging the UK’s Future Carrier Strike Capability to Effect’, RUSI Occasional Papers (April 2020).

35 Bart Hendrickx, ‘The Status of Russia’s Signals Intelligence Satellites’, Space Review, 5 April 2021.

36 Bart Hendrickx, ‘Upgrading Russia’s Fleet of Optical Reconnaissance Satellites’, Space Review, 10 August 2020.

37 V Bychkov and V Cherkashin, ‘K voprosu o sisteme morskoy kosmicheskoy razvedki i tseleukazaniya’ [‘On the Issue of the Maritime Space Reconnaissance and Target Designation System’], Nautical Collection (Vol. 2, 2021), pp. 53-61.

38 Hendrickx, ‘The Status of Russia’s Signal Intelligence Satellites’.

39 S Chandrashekar and Soma Perumal, ‘China’s Constellation of Yaogan Satellites & the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: May 2016 Update’, International Strategic and Security Studies Programme, National Institute of Advanced Studies, May 2016, p. 13.

40 Ibid.

41 The Pion and Lotos can reach altitudes of 700–900 km. See GolbalSecurity, ‘Lotus-S’, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/russia/lotos-c.htm>, accessed 10 May 2021; on ELINT and SIGINT satellite sensor geometries, see A Andronov, ‘American Geosynchronous SIGINT Satellites’, translated by Allen Thompson, Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] (No. 12, 1993), <https://fas.org/spp/military/program/sigint/androart.htm>, accessed 13 November 2021.

42 Hendrickx, ‘Upgrading Russia’s Fleet of Optical Reconnaissance Satellites’.

43 The Kondor has a resolution of 6 m and a swath width of 20 km. See SpaceFlight101, ‘Kondor Spacecraft Overview’, <https://spaceflight101.com/spacecraft/kondor/>, accessed 13 November 2021.

44 Roscocmos, ‘The Russian Space Remote Sensing Systems’ presentation, Brussels, 17–18 October 2018.

45 Carlo Kopp, ‘Tupolev TU-95 and TU-142 Bear’, Air Power Australia, Technical Report APA-TR-2007-0706, April 2012, <http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Bear.html#mozTocId258676>, accessed 13 November 2021.

46 The unit had this asset during the Cold War. On current basing, see Russian Forces, ‘Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces’, <http://russianforces.org/aviation/>, accessed 9 April 2021. Although a blog is an unsatisfactory source, the contributors are members of the Russian academy and uniformed military, justifying its use in this case. Also, the authors conducted satellite imaging of at least one TU-95 at Severomorsk-1.

47 Dennis Gormley, Andrew Erickson and Jingdong Yuan, ‘A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions’, Strategic Studies Quarterly (Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 2014), p. 52.

48 Roger McDermott, ‘Tracing Russia’s Path to a Network-Centric Military Capability’, The Jamestown Foundation, 4 December 2020.

49 Ibid.

50 Roger McDermott, ‘The Revolution in Russian Military Decision-Making’, The Jamestown Foundation, 12 March 2021.

51 On recent exercises, see Jim Garamone, ‘US–British Arctic Exercise Shows US Concern for Region’, Department of Defense News, 7 May 2020; on the Second Fleet, see Maritime Executive, ‘US Reactivates 2nd Fleet to Counter Russian Navy’, 31 December 2019.

52 Paul C Avey, ‘The Icebreaker Gap Doesn’t Mean America Is Losing in the Arctic’, War on the Rocks, 28 November 2019.

53 Navy Times, ‘Congress Oks New Icebreakers for the Coastguard’, 15 December 2020, <https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2020/12/15/congress-oks-new-arctic-icebreakers-for-coast-guard/>, accessed 28 November 2021.

54 Mark Lanteigne, ‘The Changing Shape of Arctic Security’, NATO Review, 28 June 2019.

55 Hagstöm Frisell and Pallin (eds), Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2020, p. 87; the UK CSG has effectively been committed to NATO, see UK Ministry of Defence, CP411 Defence Command Paper: Defence in a Competitive Age (London: The Stationery Office, p. 40).

56 NATO, ‘STRIKFORNATO Exercises Integration of Carrier Strike Group Eight’, 2018, <https://sfn.nato.int/trje18-8>, accessed 13 November 2021.

57 Hagstöm Frisell and Pallin (eds), Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2020, p. 90; Barrie et al., ‘Defending Europe: Scenario-Based Capability Requirements for NATO’s European Members’.

58 NATO, ‘NATO Ships Start Missile Defence Drill Off Scotland’, 8 May 2019.

59 Assuming a 50% readiness level for the UK's six Type-45 DDGs.

60 Based on the assumption that two of the four Arleigh Burkes at Rota are available and that a further two can be expedited to Europe. Over the course of a conflict, the authors assume that, at a readiness level of 50% and with the imperative to focus on Asia, the 90-ship fleet of DDG-51s and CG-47s can generate a further 15 vessels for European operations, which are evenly split between the Mediterranean, the Baltic and the High North.

61 Stephen Losey, ‘USAF B1-B Lancers Practiced Anti-Ship Missile Strikes in Black Sea,’ AirForceTimes, 1 June 2020, accessed 21 December 2021.

62 Naval Technology, ‘The Naval Strike Missile’, <https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/naval-strike-missile-nsm/>, accessed 15 May 2021.

63 Michael J Armstrong and Michael B Powell, ‘A Stochastic Salvo Model Analysis of the Battle of the Coral Sea’, Military Operations Research (Vol. 10, No. 4, 2005), pp. 27–37.

64 Kaushal, ‘Persistent Engagement and Strategic Raiding’, pp. 20–30.

65 The standard deviations were 0.64 and 0.24 for NATO and Russian losses, respectively.

66 On IAMD, see Sidharth Kaushal, Archer Macy and Alexandra Stickings, ‘The Future of NATO’s Air and Missile Defence’, RUSI Occasional Papers (July 2021).

67 NATO, ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations’, AJP-3.3, April 2016, paras 1–9. Notably, NATO doctrine could benefit from clarity on this issue, see Ibid., p. 12.

68 Nathan Gain, ‘JSM Anti-Ship and Land-Attack Missile Successfully Tested from F-35A’, NavalNews, 22 March 2021.

69 US Naval Institute, ‘Report to Congress on Joint All Domain Command and Control’, USNI, 17 August 2021, <https://news.usni.org/2021/08/17/report-to-congress-on-joint-all-domain-command-and-control-3>, accessed 28 November 2021.