Fake leads, defamation and destabilization: how online disinformation continues to impact Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

ABSTRACT

This article looks back at Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine through the perspective of online disinformation in open-source spaces. The pre-invasion phase highlights the use of false videos and narratives to justify aggression and the role Open-source investigations play in debunking them. The tactics Russia employed in attempts to dehumanise Ukrainians and paint them as unsympathetic victims with a focus on leveraging the narratives of corruption and Nazism. The article also addresses the diversionary tactics employed by Russia to steer attention away from its presence in Ukraine, emphasising the exploitation of Western hypocrisy and polarisation. Finally, the growing role of AI in disinformation campaigns is discussed, stressing the need for policy development to counteract its misuse. Overall, this article emphasises the importance of updated, proactive and resilient policy to counter Russian disinformation, enhance the resilience of credible open-source investigations, and promote digital literacy.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• Ukraine
• fullscale invasion
• OSINT
• open source intelligence
• social media
• SOCMINT
• disinformation
• misinformation
• malinformation
• MDM
• strategies
• influence operations
• NATO
• digital literacy
• defamation

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Maria Popova and Oxana Shevel. Russia and Ukraine, 157–59.

2. Bellingcat Investigation Team. ”Documenting and Debunking Dubious Footage from Ukraine’s Frontlines.” https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2022/02/23/documenting-and-debunking-dubious-footage-from-ukraines-frontlines/.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Nick Waters. “‘Exploiting Cadavers’and ‘Faked IEDs’.” https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2022/02/28/exploiting-cadavers-and-faked-ieds-experts-debunk-staged-pre-war-provocation-in-the-donbas/.

6. Ibid.

7. Bellingcat Investigation Team. ”Documenting and Debunking Dubious Footage from Ukraine’s Frontlines.” bellingcat, February 23, 2022, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2022/02/23/documenting-and-debunking-dubious-footage-from-ukraines-frontlines/.

8. Sebastien Roblin. ”Russian Troops Just Built a Pontoon Bridge near Chernobyl.” Forbes, February 16, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2022/02/16/russian-troops-just-built-a-pontoon-bridge-near-chernobyl/?sh=a92e8b46639a.

9. Ulrike Franke and Jenny Söderström. ”Star Tech Enterprise: Emerging Technologies in Russia’s War on Ukraine.” ECFR, September 5, 2023, https://ecfr.eu/publication/star-tech-enterprise-emerging-technologies-in-russias-war-on-ukraine/.

10. Magdalene Karalis. ”Open-Source Intelligence in Ukraine: Asset or Liability?.” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, December 16, 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/12/open-source-intelligence-ukraine-asset-or-liability.

11. Watts, C. (2022, May 31). Microsoft Threat Brief. Tallinn: Cycon 2023.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Sebastien Roblin. ”Russian Troops Just Built a Pontoon Bridge near Chernobyl.” Forbes, February 16, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2022/02/16/russian-troops-just-built-a-pontoon-bridge-near-chernobyl/?sh=a92e8b46639a.

15. Ulrike Franke and Jenny Söderström. ”Star Tech Enterprise: Emerging Technologies in Russia’s War on Ukraine.” ECFR, September 5, 2023, https://ecfr.eu/publication/star-tech-enterprise-emerging-technologies-in-russias-war-on-ukraine/.

16. Government Communication Service (2021), RESIST 2 Counter-disinformation toolkit, https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/RESIST-2-counter-disinformation-toolkit.pdf.

17. Research interview with E. Higgins, regarding OSINT in practice, February 2023.

18. Ibid.

19. Schiff, D., and Jackson, K. (2020), The Liar’s Dividend: The Impact of Deepfakes and Fake News on Politician Support and Trust in Media, Atlanta: GVU Center, https ://gvu.gatech.edu/research/projects/liars-dividend-impact-deepfakes-and-fake-news-politician-support-and-trust-media.

20. Research interview with Waters, N. regarding fieldwork with Bellingcat, March 2023.

21. OSI fieldwork monitoring, via Twitter/X app, Summer 2023.

22. Ibid.

23. The Economist (2023). ”A leak of files is one of America’s worst intelligence breaches in a decade.” 10 April 2023, https://www.economist.com/united-states/2023/04/10/a-leak-of-files-is-one-of-americas-worst-intelligence-breaches-in-a-decade.

24. Ibid.

25. Research interview with N. Waters, regarding fieldwork with Bellingcat, March 2023.

26. Cristina M et al. Arribas et, ”Information Manipulation and Historical Revisionism: Russian Disinformation and Foreign Interference through Manipulated History-Based Narratives.” Open Research Europe 3 (July 27, 2023), https://doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.16087.1.

27. Maria Popova and Oxana Shevel, Russia and Ukraine: Entangled Histories, Diverging States (John Wiley & Sons, 2023), 157–59.

28. Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews. ”The Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda Model.” Rand.org (RAND Corporation, 2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html.

29. Jade McGlynn, Memory Makers (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2023), 121–27.

30. Magdalene Karalis. ‘Social Media Analysis Disrupts Russian Digital Narratives.” Chathamhouse.org (Chatham House, May 15, 2023), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/05/social-media-analysis-disrupts-russian-digital-narratives.

31. Sessa, M. G. (2022, March 14). Ukraine conflict disinformation: Worldwide narratives and trends. EU DisinfoLab; EU Disinfo Lab. https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/ukraine-conflict-disinformation-worldwide-narratives-and-trends/

32. Sadiq T Muhammed and Saji K. Mathew, ”The Disaster of Misinformation: A Review of Research in Social Media.” International Journal of Data Science and Analytics 13, no. 4 (February 15, 2022): 271–85, https://doi.org/10.1007/s41060-022-00311-6.

33. Stephanie Busari et al., ”Foreign Students Fleeing Ukraine Say They Face Segregation, Racism at Border.” CNN, March 4, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/28/europe/students-allege-racism-ukraine-cmd-intl/index.html.

34. Cristina M et al. Arribas et, ”Information Manipulation and Historical Revisionism: Russian Disinformation and Foreign Interference through Manipulated History-Based Narratives.” Open Research Europe 3 (July 27, 2023), https://doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.16087.1.

35. Lisa Mascaro. ”The Debate over Ukraine Aid Was Already Complicated. Then It Became Tangled up in US Border Security.” AP News, November 25, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/biden-ukraine-congress-zelenskyy-border-security-8592ddcb1627fc6d0b43349bac3fe329.

36. Brendan Cole. ”Fact Check: Did Zelensky’s Wife Go on $40K Shopping Spree in Paris?.” Newsweek, December 21, 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/zelenska-zelensky-ukraine-russia-paris-france-shopping-spree-1768736.

37. Scott G. Feinstein and Ellen B. Pirro. ”Testing the World Order: Strategic Realism in Russian Foreign Affairs.” International Politics 58, no. 6 (February 22, 2021): 817–34., https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00285-5.

38. Scott G. Feinstein and Ellen B. Pirro. ”Testing the World Order: Strategic Realism in Russian Foreign Affairs.” International Politics 58, no. 6 (February 22, 2021): 817–34., https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00285-5.

39. Magdalene Karalis. ”Russia-Ukraine War through the Eyes of Social Media | GJIA.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, February 2, 2024, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/02/02/russia-ukraine-through-the-eyes-of-social-media/.

40. Smagin, N. (2023, December 7). The Gaza War has convinced Russia it was right all along . The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91189

41. Scott G. Feinstein and Ellen B. Pirro. ”Testing the World Order: Strategic Realism in Russian Foreign Affairs.” International Politics 58, no. 6 (February 22, 2021): 817–34., https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00285-5.

42. Vitaly Chernetsky. ”Interview with Vitaly Chernetsky | Russia Selectively and Deceptively Manipulates Western Discourses.” Forum for Ukrainian Studies, October 7, 2023, https://ukrainian-studies.ca/2023/10/06/interview-with-vitaly-chernetsky-russia-selectively-and-deceptively-manipulates-western-discourses/.

43. Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews. ”The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model.” Rand.org (RAND Corporation, 2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html.

44. Magdalene Karalis. ”Russia-Ukraine War through the Eyes of Social Media | GJIA”, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, February 2, 2024, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/02/02/russia-ukraine-through-the-eyes-of-social-media/.

45. Tom Simonite. ”A Zelensky Deepfake Was Quickly Defeated. The next One Might Not Be.” Wired, March 17, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/zelensky-deepfake-facebook-twitter-playbook/.

46. Ibid.

47. Adam Satariano and Paul Mozur. ”The People Onscreen Are Fake. The Disinformation Is Real.” The New York Times, February 7, 2023, sec. Technology, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/07/technology/artificial-intelligence-training-deepfake.html.

48. Reuters Fact Check. ”Fact Check: Fake BBC Clip on Ukrainian Politician Selling Arms to Hamas.” Reuters.com (Reuters, December 23, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/fake-bbc-clip-ukrainian-politician-selling-arms-hamas-2023-12-12/.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Magdalene Karalis

Magdalene Karalis is an Open-Source Researcher and an Academy Associate with the Russia Eurasia Program at Chatham House. Her work, spanning across multiple organizations, focuses on Russian MDM (misinformation, disinformation and malinformation) strategies, foreign influence operations and the use of open source investigations in violent conflict.