‘Profiles in intelligence’: an interview with 8th Mossad chief Danny Yatom

ABSTRACT

This article is based on an interview conducted in July 2023 with Danny Yatom, the eighth Mossad chief. He had a distinguished career in the Israeli Defense Force, joining the Mossad in 1996 after his military service. Yatom’s contributions were pivotal during the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in diplomatic engagements and peace negotiations between Israel and Jordan. With experience spanning elite military units, intelligence agencies, Prime Minister’s offices, and the Israeli Parliament, his insights offer a comprehensive understanding of intricate matters, making it the primary reason for my decision to interview Yatom. Among other topics, Yatom provided nuanced perspectives on Israel’s involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, its relations with Azerbaijan, the special ties between Israel and Germany, and the 1979 Islamic revolution. I also inquired about the impact of emotions on decision-making in national security, the historical trajectory of the Mossad, and Israel’s approach to Official Public Intelligence Disclosure.

KEYWORDS:

• Mossad
• elite interviews
• Danny Yatom
• Israel’s intelligence history
• official public intelligence disclosure

Introduction

Danny Yatom was born on 15 March 1945. He served as the eighth Mossad chief, from 1996 to 1998. Before joining the Mossad in 1996, Yatom had a distinguished career in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) as a Major General (Ret.), specializing in special forces and earning a Medal of Bravery during his service. Over his 30-year career in the IDF, Yatom held various significant positions within the Israeli security forces and the intelligence community.¹ He also served as the head of the IDF’s Planning Directorate, and military secretary to Defense Ministers Moshe Arens and to Prime Ministers (PM) Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres.² During the 1980s and 1990s, Yatom played a pivotal role in the Israeli military and intelligence community. Furthermore, he played a significant role in diplomatic initiatives and peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians, and in the signing of the peace agreement with Jordan in 1994.

Yatom has published a thorough autobiography in both Hebrew and English.³ His autobiography delves into his extensive military and intelligence career, with a particular focus on significant moments of the 1990s, including peace negotiations and the initial waves of Hamas terrorist attacks. Yatom’s autobiography highlights important milestones as well as moments of failure.⁴ His is profound understanding of Israel’s intelligence and national security realms stems from Yatom’s broad and varied background. He is part of an esteemed group of Israeli elite who have held positions in military units, intelligence agencies, PM’s offices, and the Israeli Parliament. This viewpoint provides a comprehensive understanding that enhances our grasp of these intricate matters, making it the primary reason for my decision to interview Yatom.

Interview context

This interview took place in Herzliya Pitu’ah, Israel, during the scorching summer of 2023. Since January 2023, Israeli society and the political landscape have become significantly polarized following the initiative by PM Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Justice Yariv Levin, who introduced a contested legislative package aimed at reshaping the judicial system. ⁵ While tension lingered, few anticipated that Israel would face a significantly graver crisis after the Hamas surprise attack on 7 October 2023.⁶

This attack led to significant casualties: more than 1,400 Israelis were killed, with thousands more injured, more than 230 Israeli men, women, and children were taken hostage. ⁷As of writing these lines (February 2024), the Israeli operation ‘Swords of Iron’ in Gaza remains ongoing, with no indication of a ceasefire in sight. As the conflict persists, it has prompted extensive international condemnation of Israel’s actions in the Gaza war. Accusations of civilian deaths and allegations of genocide and war crimes by Israel against Palestinians have been widely raised. On 29 December 2023, South Africa petitioned the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to investigate whether Israel is committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. ⁸ On 16 February 2023, the ICJ partially dismissed allegations of genocide and issued provisional measures. Nevertheless, the vigorous public and academic debate concerning the question of genocide and mass violence in the Gaza War continues.⁹

The intelligence debacle on 7 October 2023, occurring 50 years after the failure during the Yom Kippur War, appears to be Israel’s most severe since its establishment in 1948.¹⁰ Extensive research has been published about the failure of Israeli intelligence in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, some of it recently here in Intelligence and National Security (INS).¹¹ To be sure, the failure in October 2023 is bound to attract much more attention in future research. It also necessitates a series of interviews with individuals like Yatom and others, solely focused on analyzing the intelligence and military failure.

Two main limitations impacted the interview with Yatom. Clearly, discussing the intelligence failure of 7th October during that time was not feasible because the interview with Yatom had taken place three months earlier. Also, as the interview was limited to one hour, I did not want to squander valuable time with Yatom by asking about matters that can be thoroughly explored in his autobiography or not directly related to my research projects.

The interview with Yatom further contributes to the oral history project that I have been leading since 2015, with specific segments previously featured in INS.¹² This interview primarily focused on Israel’s foreign policy, intelligence history, and national security. These topics are intricately intertwined with several ongoing research projects I have recently undertaken, Israel’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict, Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan, the special ties between Israel and Germany, and the 1979 Islamic revolution.¹³ Additional questions directed at Yatom delved into current significant debates within the realms of intelligence and national security. One such topic explored the intersection of national security and democracy. For example, Yatom’s unique position as the first Mossad chief whose identity was revealed upon appointment sparked interest in understanding how this aspect influenced his role. Also, I explored Yatom’s viewpoints on Israel’s strategy regarding Official Public Intelligence Disclosure (OPID), often referred to as the ‘disclosure dilemma’.¹⁴ I inquired about his firsthand experiences with competition among Israeli security institutions and the diplomatic apparatus concerning influence and decision-making.¹⁵ Additionally, Yatom shared his insights on the role of emotions in decision-making within the realm of national security and intelligence, along with discussing the history of Mossad.

As shown in the image accompanying the interview text below, it took place in Yatom’s office. When interviewing the Israeli intelligence elite, I find the office space of the interview subject to be the most suitable venue.¹⁶ The office space serves as their professional environment, adorned with symbols of their career such as flags, professional photos, and books. This physical setting helps the interviewee feel comfortable and in control, facilitating the sharing of accounts and memories. This environment is crucial for establishing trust and maintaining a professional tone during the interview process.

Dr. Eldad Ben-Aharon (left) interviewing the 8th Mossad chief, Danny Yatom (right), in Herzliya Pitu’ah, Israel, on 19 July 2023.

Interview ¹⁷

Eldad Ben-Aharon (EBA):

A question you may already have answered on innumerable occasions, but can you tell me what made decide on a career in state security and intelligence? What made you decide this was your calling?

Danny Yatom (DY):

I was born in 1945, before the establishment of the State of Israel (1948). The atmosphere at home was very different from what it is today. You know, those who didn’t live then can’t really understand what that entailed. There was an atmosphere of friendship, camaraderie, and concern for one another. We lived a very simple life, but we knew we had to contribute to the development, success, and security of the State of Israel. We were exposed to all sorts of things related to security, through classes like Shelah¹⁸ and Gadna.¹⁹ In the early years, the country was small, within the [pre-]1967 borders, and there were countless security incidents. Security was always in the headlines and at the top of the agenda. It was therefore absolutely clear to me, from an early age, that I would volunteer for the paratroopers. We had no idea of the existence of Sayeret Matkal. (SM).²⁰ The unit was just a rumor, from mouth to ear. Really. It was made up of moshav and kibbutz members, and I was nothing like that; I was a city kid from Netanya. The reprisals carried out by the paratroopers fired up my imagination. It was just so clear to me that I would enlist in a combat unit, preferably the paratroopers. Because this was the atmosphere, it’s hardly surprising that not only I but many members of my generation felt the same, intuited the same thing. The result was that, without having put together any kind of strategy whatsoever and only because I ended up in SM – the kinds of things we did there, the people I met, and the fact that at if you’re a commander at such a young age you get tasked with missions beyond enemy lines, without going into any details – all of these tremendously boosted my maturity. This made me decide that this would be the direction of my career, that this was something I wanted to continue considering. And every year, I signed on for ‘just another year’ in the standing army. No more than that, so that I’d always have the option of leaving and entering civilian life. The way I was raised and the atmosphere around me tilted the scales. I remember how, at home, I was always told, ‘But Ben-Gurion said … ’ so therefore you had to obey.²¹ This is also the main reason that my siblings and I and all live in Israel and we all spent our careers working in the field of security. But this didn’t transmit to the next generation. And I never tried to convince anyone. Everyone chooses their own path.

EBA:

As someone who commanded the Mossad, can you sketch out the organization’s history?

DY:

Look, I think it’s very difficult to summarize it in a few sentences while also diving into any detail. I was familiar with the Mossad since the time I served as military secretary. The function of a military secretary is to be the link that connects the Mossad chief and the PM. I was appointed to serve as then-Defense Minister Moshe Arens’s military secretary in 1983. This was the first time I got to know the Mossad and this ‘getting-acquainted’ period lasted more than two years. The second time was when I ended my term as General Commanding Officer of the Central Command and Yitzhak Rabin asked me to become military secretary again. That’s how I got to know the Mossad. But it was only after I became Mossad chief and became part of it and got really and truly involved in the organization that I realized how much of it I was not familiar with and how much I didn’t yet know. So, to get back to your question: it’s a versatile organization with a lot of diverse capabilities with the intelligence to view things outside the box. The Mossad constantly teaches you to look for the unusual, for the non-standard. The people there are just fantastic. Their daring and ability to see the whole picture, as well as their persistence and single-mindedness and the courage they must demonstrate, day in day out, are extraordinary. Bottom line – since its establishment, the Mossad has been a rare jewel in the human landscape of the people and State of Israel, despite the mishaps, because there will always be mishaps. The human capital is this organization’s central quality.

EBA:

You were the first Mossad chief whose name was declassified and made available to the media, thereby demystifying the Mossad to a certain extent. What were your feelings about that?

DY:

Look, then-PM Yitzhak Rabin realized that he had no choice because the Supreme Court was going to rule contrary to his position, which was not to identify the Shin Bet and Mossad chiefs. Till then, the custom was that the identities of the security establishment leaders who got the jobs were made public only once they ended their tenure. I got to witness the whole process, the attempt to keep the Supreme Court’s pressure at bay. In the end, then-Attorney General Michael Ben-Yair (1993-1997) came to Rabin and told him, ‘Look, Mr. PM, we’re going to lose to battle. We’ve run out of arguments’.

Rabin decided to go along with this. It meant contacting one of the newspapers to publicize my identity. I have to tell you that when I served as Mossad chief, the fact that my identity was known to the public bothered me a great deal, especially when operating abroad. Every time I oversaw activity abroad, I had to get into costume. I had to make sure no one could identify me. But, look, that’s democracy. Even before I became Mossad chief, my identity was known. I was identified publicly; I was Rabin’s military secretary the entire period of the very intensive peace process. So that, in any case, I was hardly an anonymous figure in Israel.

EBA:

As we are already delving into the realm of national security and democracy,²² to your way of thinking and based on your experience, can an Member of Parliament (MP) affect national security decision making?²³ To what extent did you experience a sense of parliamentary paralysis²⁴ when you served as an MP, specifically in the context of national security-related matters? i.e., that the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) is incapable of carrying out its function of supervising the government and the security establishment.

DY:

The Knesset is a weak body and wields almost no influence. It’s as if it’s welded to the government, because the Knesset elects the government. The majority in the Knesset is also the majority in the government, so that they are a single entity. In Israel’s parliamentary democracy, there’s supposed to be a balance among three branches: the judiciary, which exerts judicial review of the executive branch and also the Knesset, because the legislative branch has no independent capacity to perform any kind of matter-of-fact oversight of the government. For example, right now, we have a situation in which Itamar Ben-Gvir, the national security minister, wants to control administrative detentions.²⁵ Ben-Gvir presents this as him being able to issue administrative detentions with regard to crime in Israeli Arab society. But because this might become completely arbitrary, it’s a slippery slope, and tomorrow he could decide to order anyone he doesn’t care for held under administrative detention. And, in this case, it makes absolutely no difference what the Knesset – as the body charged with oversight of the government on security issues – thinks. I’m also convinced that, at present, there are coalition MKs who understand that the judicial upheaval is a bad thing, but they don’t dare open their mouths because they’re worried about future jobs. They don’t want to oppose the sitting government because there’s no way they’ll get a cushy position in the future. Also, the Knesset cannot function as a counterweight to anything. The political culture and the considerations in the Knesset are entirely particularistic: for the good of a certain party, individual, or group. Not for the good of all, only for the good of particular sectors. The function of the Knesset is to pass laws and critique the work of the government. When it comes to legislation, even if there’s a good law – if the government doesn’t want it, it won’t pass.

EBA:

There is much academic, policy and public discussion surrounding the hostility between Israel and a nuclear Iran.²⁶ The enmity also makes it clear that, from the Iranian perspective, it’s necessary to destroy Israel and its Zionist identity, reflecting a hatred towards Judaism and everything it represents.²⁷ Can you go back a bit to the 1970s and the time when Israel still had relatively good relations with Iran under the Shah? As a formative moment in the Cold War, how did Israel’s security establishment experience the deterioration and fall of the Shah and Iran’s revolution in 1979?

DY:

Back then, I wasn’t involved in, or connected to, the relationship between Israel and Iran. Of course, I remember the stories told by the late Uri Lubrani, Israel’s last ambassador to Iran before the 1979 revolution, and others who managed to escape by the skin of their teeth before Khomeini took over. But when I came to the Mossad, and earlier, as Rabin’s military secretary, I had already dealt with the matter; because I will never forget that Rabin, whenever he met a world leader – a president or PM or the like – would always say, ‘It is imperative to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, because the moment Iran has the bomb, we’ll never be able to sign peace agreements with the Muslim nations, because Iran will threaten them. So, we have a window of opportunity to try to keep Iran from becoming nuclear’. I remember the time of the revolution, but in 1979, I had no real connection to the matter, and I wasn’t privy to intelligence. At first, I wasn’t worried. And then, slowly but surely this monster developed into becoming what is now the central threat to Israel. Then, nuclear bombs weren’t under discussion because Ayatollah Khomeini would in no way agree to any nuclear development, even though the Shah, his predecessor as Iran’s leader, had had such notions. It took time until this stance changed. As Mossad chief, I dealt with the matter to a highly significant degree. In general, the Mossad has two major missions: one, to keep enemy and hostile nations from arming themselves with unconventional weapons – chemical, biological, and atomic; and the second mission – to wage war on terrorism across the length and breadth of the globe. These are the two key missions and they informed me as well. Therefore, even back then, efforts and methods and so on were invested into derailing Iran’s attempts. Even then, Iran had a habit of engaging in all sorts of tricks, founding all sorts of straw companies and deceiving the whole world. And Iran has remained a large part of our activity to this day.

EBA:

How did the relationship with Iran, which collapsed in 1979, change the geopolitical distribution of power in the Middle East vis-à-vis the Cold War?²⁸ And the importance of Turkey – another huge Muslim nation in the region – for Israel?

DY:

Back then, Israel’s foreign policy was built on the circles theory, meaning construct a circle that surrounds your enemy with nations that are friendly towards you in order to hem the enemy in and prevent the enemy from harming you. ²⁹ That was and is the policy in place to date at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and other institutions. So, absent the two major components in the external circle (Iran and Turkey). The farther nations were more distant in Africa, especially the special relations with South Africa, which flourished at that time. To get out of that crisis, the direction was towards friendly nations in Europe and the Far East. Moreover, the United States was always our pillar of support ever since France abandoned that position in the early 1960s. Israel always built itself as part of coalitions surrounding the threat. You have to look for the rationale when you’re looking at the map and see Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt surrounding us. Now, look for the countries surrounding the countries surrounding us. Other than this strategy, there was a much more comprehensive strategy: be friends with anyone who wants to and can be your friend. And the more friends you have in the world, the better your national security.

Furthermore, in 1979, the peace treaty with Egypt was one of the important components of Iran and Turkey’s replacement. The peace agreement came into being at almost the same time. To a certain degree, the peace balances the fact that the Iranian factor was gone and that relations with Turkey were in flux. But there was peace with Egypt, so it was possible to start building something there. Afterwards came the improvement in the relationship with Morocco and other North African countries, which was still a secret and which the Mossad spearheaded. That was the solution. In the absence of the foundation with Iran, which had collapsed, you looked for replacements even if they weren’t of the same order, even if they weren’t as strong. But they were better than nothing.

EBA:

The 2010 flotilla incident ³⁰ – how did it affect Israel’s security approach? and the how a nation (Turkey), perceived as friendly with formal diplomatic ties, challenges Israeli borders and national security with such a provocation?

DY:

There is no doubt that, at least to my understanding, it makes sense to prepare emergency plans for a time when something like that happens, because then you’re really caught in a dilemma. Behind that flotilla, there was a state that was also saying ‘If you irritate the Palestinians in Gaza, I will dispatch warships’. I remember Erdoğan saying this.³¹ The way to handle it is, first of all, by building capacities to stop and cope even with a nation that wasn’t considered to be an enemy from a security perspective. To my own thinking, we wouldn’t have reached a breakdown [in relations] with Turkey at that time. ³² The flotilla was mainly an attempt to scare us into thinking that the Turkish navy would sail in the wake of the civilian flotilla. And that wouldn’t have happened, in my opinion. At that time, Turkey was not motivated to burn its bridges with Israel to the point of a clash between the respective armies. That wasn’t the intention. Absolutely not, given that Erdoğan kept jumping from policy X to policy Y each time anew. He found himself at odds with Egypt as a result of what happened in Gaza and the question of assuming responsibility for Gaza instead of the Egyptians, and so on. And that’s happening now as well (July 2023). Suddenly, Erdoğan eases relations between Israel and Turkey and supports them and then he suddenly gets in their way.

Beyond the fact that Israel has to be prepared for scenarios of that sort, it isn’t necessary to construct a new army or turn the Israeli Navy into something altogether different. But it is necessary that have such plans, for example, to seize control of the Marmara in 2010. Several tactical errors were made as a result of which members of Shayetet 13 were caught by people who beat them up and one was wounded and so on. ³³ The episode should have ended very differently. But that was our bad conduct and therefore it also became a balloon that blew up in our face. The other, more influential factor is the political side. It is crucial to make sure that, the moment there are signs of something like this happening, all of Europe and the United States and all democracies be prepared to come down hard on Turkey. Those nations must have a uniform response because one of these days it might happen to them too.

EBA:

You held several positions in the security establishment: military secretary, Mossad chief, head of former PM Ehud Barak’s political-security staff. Can you describe the tensions among these institutions? One often has the sense that there is real competition between the security institutions and the diplomatic system over influence and decision making. Obviously, it changes from one PM to another, but, still, there’s a sense that there is intense competition over influence on political and security matters.

DY:

First of all, the situation today is much better than it was when I was either military secretary or Mossad chief. Throughout the years, there’s been not just tension but actual hostility among some of the institutions. I’m mostly referring here to the intelligence and security institutions: Military Intelligence, the Shin Bet, the Mossad, and today there’s also the National Security Council.³⁴ And the MFA, which was always running to catch up but never had any clout. I remember quite a number of incidents where personal jealousy and hostility and someone’s desire to guard his own fiefdom actually damaged what was supposed to be cooperative or complementary work among the different institutions. There were many attempts to set a sort of ‘Magna Carta’ down in writing to delineate the ‘territory’ of each of the intel agencies. At the end of the day, it depends on the personalities of the people heading these organizations, which is why I say that today the situation is much better. Even in my time, the situation had improved compared to what it had been earlier – without mentioning any names – when the Mossad chief wasn’t even on speaking terms with the head of AMAN.³⁵ It was that bad. Nowadays there’s much greater openness. There’s a sort of ‘bucket’ where everyone ‘tosses’ the intel they collect, and everyone can make use of any of the intelligence items thrown in. There’s good intelligence and operational cooperation. And, of course, there are collaborations with other nations’ corresponding agencies.

There is no doubt that what changed the picture was [the realization] that openness and understanding are critical, that there’s no room for rivalry. On the contrary. Cooperation is needed; the need for it is acute – making sure that what you know is also known to the other guy even if you think he doesn’t need to know. Pass the information on because it’s possible that some other agency very much does need to know. Cooperation between the Shin Bet and the Mossad, cooperation between the Mossad and AMAN; nowadays, cooperative efforts are much smoother, and no one puts a spoke in the wheels. There might still be tensions that need to be resolved, but it’s important that the PM who sees such matters intervenes. There were PMs who saw the tensions and didn’t want to get involved, saying, ‘Work it out amongst yourselves’. That never fixed anything; it only perpetuated the problem.

EBA:

The ‘special relationship’ with Germany³⁶: can you please address the historic connection with Germany? Since the 1952 Reparations Agreement ,³⁷ the German scientists affair,³⁸ the eleven Israeli individuals killed in the 1972 Munich Olympics terrorist attack, and the fall of the Berlin Wall, as well as – of course – West Germany’s acceptance of responsibility for the Holocaust.

DY:

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, we’ve received some kind of support or another from Germany. Adenauer and Ben-Gurion formed the start of this relationship. And although there were also incidents, such as the scientists in Egypt and the fatal attack in Munich, followed by the Mossad’s revenge on all those involved in it, as a result of which the Lillehammer affair occurred, and so on, the relationship between Israel and Germany continues to be unique, in part because of the moral obligation of Germany, which accepted responsibility; we have excellent relations. Let me give you an example: in the First Gulf War, missiles were fired at Israel. At that time, the Defense Minister was Moshe Arens. I was his military secretary, and we had an excellent personal relationship. One day, he calls me and says, ‘You’re taking a delegation and flying to meet with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Please take the photos of the missiles that hit Ramat Gan and show him examples of the damage the missiles caused. Using this concrete method, you ask Chancellor Kohl not just for a FOX – a vehicle that locates and monitors radioactive materials – but you also ask the Germans for financing for two submarines’. I asked Arens, ‘How do I do that?’ He answered me, ‘You have to say that this is a strategic weapon and that the State of Israel needs it, both because it is necessary to issue a warning and to achieve a decision against the enemy in time of need’. I took a delegation that included some Ministry of Defense personnel. We met with Kohl. In the middle of the night, he assembled all the relevant ministers – finance, defense, and so on. That night ended with 880 million Deutsche mark and two submarines en route to Israel.

EBA:

Germany declared that safeguarding Israel’s security since the post-Cold War is part of its ‘Staatsräson’ (reason of state) as to the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset).³⁹ To your way of thinking, how is safeguarding Israel’s security manifested in Germany’s stance on Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians and also concern with the implications of Israel’s judicial upheaval and democratic balance?

DY:

First off, it’s very difficult to assess what may happen to future Israel-Germany relations. However, as long as the two countries maintain such relations, German support will not waver. What could happen is that relations might change gradually without anyone noticing, a gradual erosion of relations without us paying attention. Why? Because if we come out all right from the attempted judicial upheaval and once more become a full-fledged democracy, then relations with very many nations, which are currently starting to deteriorate, will be restored. That includes the United States. It seems to me that relations between Germany and Israel might run aground as a result of a different political landscape in Germany. That is to say, should the radical right or radical left suddenly come to power – and that could happen – there will be change with regard to us. There is no way of knowing when or if it might occur. In any case, we have no influence over the political system there, what we can do is to ‘turn back from our wicked ways’ and go back to what we were before the judicial upheaval and not lose these nations. As long as we remain in this political interim stage and it isn’t clear what is happening in Israel politically, the risk increases that our relations with Germany as well as other nations will go awry.

We have another problem, the elephant in the room: Israel’s presence in the West Bank and our relations with the Palestinians. Our presence there makes things very difficult for us in the international and regional arenas. I saw a lot of hope in the Abraham Accords (2020), but things are deteriorating as a result of very tense relations between us and the Palestinians. Abu Mazen’s era is drawing to a close and it is not at all clear who’ll replace him in the Palestinian Authority. There will be a fight over his succession. But this is where Israel must toss the whole judicial upheaval into the garbage can, certainly at this stage, and deal with the most important issues, which is that Iran already possesses 60 per cent nuclear enrichment. Iran is also developing long range missile that could one of these days carry a nuclear warhead. Iran is also very eager to poke its nose into every corner of the Middle East: Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, the Sinai Peninsula, and Gaza. This is an Iran that Israel must stop. But when our relations with the United States become strained, our ability to work cooperatively also with European nations shrinks. After all, the Europeans take their lead from the Americans. They follow in their footsteps quite often. President Biden has said so and even warned us: stop this legislation because it might lead to a situation in which the United States will no longer be able to help you.

EBA:

Iran, Turkey, Russia, and Israel are involved in the NK conflict.⁴⁰ To your way of thinking, what is Israel influence or involvement in this conflict?

DY:

Israel’s considerations were not the result of the conflict between the Armenians and Azeris. After all, the conflict in NK is first and foremost between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Rather, the considerations stemmed from the relations between Azerbaijan and Iran, and this is the main reason why Israel chose a side. Note that Israel did not choose a side in the war in Ukraine and is still not choosing a side in the Far East, in the struggle between China and the United States. We continue to buy tremendous quantities from China and China makes investments in Israel. They built ports, and they’ve bought Tnuva.⁴¹ In this instance, we probably haven’t picked a side because the Americans haven’t applied sufficient pressure. In general, Israel does not tend to pick sides in conflicts of this kind; it prefers to sit and wait things out. In the case of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Israel picked a side because it was sufficiently important.

EBA:

Relations with Azerbaijan are important to Israel mostly because of the confrontation with Iran and its geopolitical location. To your way of thinking, what is the significance of cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan for our national security?⁴²

DY:

To begin with, relations with Azerbaijan are very important to us. They’re important mostly because of the concept we spoke about earlier – the ‘circles’ concept.⁴³ Suddenly, Israel has a friend located in an extremely sensitive region, 100 kms from Tehran, with 20 million Azeris and a very tense relationship with Iran. It affords Israel many more options, from using Azeri airports to refuel and allow coalition plane to land there, to a closeness that makes it possible to gather intelligence more effectively.

EBA:

Is it conceivable for Israel and Azerbaijan to fight Iran together?

DY:

If and when war between Iran and Israel breaks out, Azerbaijan will be a significant logistical rear for us. The short distance between the Azeri airport and Tehran is therefore highly significant in such an attack. A green light from the superpowers is important for such a war. If Azerbaijan were to seek a green light, it would get it from the United States, and would for sure get it were Washington itself involved in such a war.⁴⁴ But legitimacy from leading European nations is important if they’re to participate in a belligerent policy vis-à-vis Iran, nations such as Germany, the United Kingdom., France – the leaders of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

EBA:

The world of espionage is a field, which, in popular culture as well as through academic and scientific lens, is thought of as being controlled by rational, emotion-less decision making. Can you describe an instance in which emotions and gut feelings⁴⁵ played a significant role in intelligence work?

DY:

Look, there is room for emotions and gut feelings. But I don’t think that they are ever the determinative factor in an intelligence assessment or situation report. That is to say, in the event of a clash between specific intelligence analysis and an emotional or gut feeling pointing in a different direction, the latter would not be adopted over the former. That would never happen. But it’s good to hear all the people who have intuitive reservations and try to get them to explain why, what is bothering them, and to what extent. And it may well be that some of that will be important enough to consider and integrate into the final assessment. Therefore, there’s room for gut feelings as well. For example, if you’ve followed someone or studied a field from 20 years, what you know and feel about him, or it, carries a certain weight. But to a limited extent. In general, in a broad situation assessment, there’s less room for intuitive leaps, period.

EBA:

What are your thoughts on the increasing trend over the last two decades where Israeli governments, including the current coalition, systematically disclose the operations of the Mossad?⁴⁶ Scholars commonly refer to it as the ‘disclosure dilemma’. There are several examples, for instance the revelation of the Iranian nuclear archive exposed by Netanyahu himself,⁴⁷ or Bennett’s revelation about a new operation concerning the fate of Ron Arad.⁴⁸ What’s the major reason for the change in Israel’s previous policy of vagueness in an attempt to shape the public discourse on security and state secret issues?

DY:

I think we should go back to vagueness. The Mossad and Shin Bet differ from the IDF, where parents send their children due to mandatory military service, thereby obligating the IDF to be accountable to both families and the public to a certain extent. Intelligence owes an accounting only to the PM, not the public. Therefore, it was a mistake to make these affairs public. Some of it was the result of arrogance and some was the result of wanting to generate deterrence. But take, for example, the Iranian archive: who needed that piece of theater when the Iranians knew it’s us? Heads of state and spy agency chiefs around the world knew it’s us because we informed them. So, who was that piece of theater for? For the Israeli public so they’d vote for you. The moment you start mixing in how they’re looking at you politically with security considerations … that’s not good. You don’t publicize stuff that is meant to be confidential. That stuff is much more potent when it stays in the dark. The public can think and imagine all sorts of things that never happened. It’s better to let the public think that James Bond did it.

EBA:

Thank you so much for your answers and the fascinating conversation.

DY:

Thank you for the interview.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the editors of INS, especially Mark Phythian. The author also extends gratitude to the 8th Mossad chief, Danny Yatom, for his kind cooperation with this interview and for facilitating permission to publish both the transcript and the image in INS.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Irish Research Council (IRC) Postdoctoral Fellowship 2023, grant number GOIPD/2023/1485.

Notes on contributors

Eldad Ben Aharon

Dr. Eldad Ben Aharon (PhD London, 2019) is an Irish Research Council (IRC) Postdoctoral Fellow in International Security at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University. He leads the research project titled “2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and Israel’s Foreign Policy: Securitization, Geopolitics, and Arms Trading.” Dr. Ben Aharon’s primary areas of interest include security and memory, securitization theory, foreign policy analysis, public and digital diplomacy, and elite interviews. His latest research has appeared in leading academic journals, including, among others, the European Journal of International Security, Intelligence and National Security, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Oral History Review, and Cold War History.

Notes

1. Hebrew acronym for IDF’s Anti-Terrorism Force.

2. Moshe Arens (1925–2019) served as Israel’s ambassador to the United States and as Defense and Foreign Minister. Yitzhak Rabin (1922–1995) had a distinguished military career before entering Israeli politics. He played a prominent role in the IDF throughout his career, eventually serving as IDF Chief of Staff during the Six-Day War in 1967. Subsequently, Rabin held positions as both Israeli Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. He was assassinated during a rally in Tel Aviv on 4 November 1995. Shimon Peres (1923–2016) was an Israeli President and PM, who, along with Rabin, was well known for their involvement in the 1993 Oslo Accords.

3. For the Hebrew version see: Yatom. The Confident; the English edition was in 2016: The Labyrinth of Power.

4. Yatom’s tenure as Mossad chief was relatively short (1996–1998). Yatom faced pressure to resign after two Mossad operatives failed in an attempt on the life of Hamas leader Khaled Mashal on 25 September 1997. Mishal’s life was in fact saved after Israel delivered the antidote. See Cowell, A”.The Daring Attack” Available online: https://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/15/world/the-daring-attack-that-blew-up-in-israel-s-face.html; taking full responsibility for the failed operation, Yatom resigned from his position in the Mossad in February 1998. The first chapter of Yatom’s autobiography is dedicated to his account of the aforementioned operation. Yatom, The Confident 13–25.

5. On the Israeli Judicial Overhaul, see e.g, BBC, 11 September 2023. Available online: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-65086871 also here by The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI). Available online: https://en.idi.org.il/tags-en/47383; see also, Roznai and Cohen, “Populist Constitutionalism”, 502–520.

6. About the 7 October 2023 massacre, see e.g., New York Times, 7 October 2023. Available online: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/07/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-war-hamas-palestinians.html

7. More data and numbers about the massacre can be found here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data

8. South Africa provided evidence to the ICJ indicating that Israel’s actions and inactions are being characterized as genocidal. Israel disputed these allegations. On 16 February 2024, the ICJ rejected South Africa’s request for urgent measures to limit Israeli actions in Rafah. Available online: https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203453

9. On this see the dedicated forum in the Journal of Genocide Research titled ‘Israel-Palestine: Atrocity Crimes and the Crisis of Holocaust and Genocide Studies’: https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cjgr20/0/0

10. Financial Times 23 November 2023. Available online: https://www.ft.com/content/277573ae-fbbc-4396-8faf-64b73ab8ed0a and The Conversation 7 December 2023. Available at: https://theconversation.com/why-israels-intelligence-chiefs-failed-to-listen-to-october-7-warnings-and-the-lessons-to-be-learned-219346

11. See e.g.: Bar-Joseph. Watchman Fell Asleep; Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski. “Intelligence Failure”; Sindawi and Kahana. “The Yom Kippur War”, And published in INS: Shapira, ‘The Yom Kippur Intelligence Failure’,; Shamir. “Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War.”

12. Ben Aharon, “Methodological and Epistemological Reflections.”

13. Ben Aharon, “Between Geopolitics and Identity Struggle”,; “Outlook on German-Israeli Relations”,; “Political Audience and Non-Linear Securitisation.”

14. Regarding the OPID debate, see e.g, Carnegie & Carson’s “The Disclosure Dilemma”, 269–285. For a broader discussion on the ‘disclosure dilemma’, see e.g., Lin-Greenberg and Milonopoulos “Private Eyes in The Sky.”

15. On previous exploration of this discussion see: Ben Aharon. “Doing Oral History”, 12–15.

16. For additional insights and ‘Lessons from the Field’ when interviewing Israeli intelligence and diplomatic elites, see Ben Aharon, ‘Methodological and Epistemological Reflections’, 118–119.

17. The interview subject has reviewed the transcript of the interview for accuracy and has provided his full consent to its publication in INS.

18. Hebrew acronym for sadeh, le’om, hevra (i.e., field, nation, society), a multiyear course commonly taught in Israeli middle and high schools.

19. Hebrew acronym for g’dudey no’ar (i.e., youth battalions), a pre-army military preparatory course under the auspices of the IDF.

20. The Hebrew acronym for the IDF’s Anti-Terrorism Force. Yatom is notably recognized for his service within the IDF in SM.

21. David Ben-Gurion (1886–1973) was the principal architect of the State of Israel’s foundation and held the position of the first Israeli PM and Defense Minister.

22. In the ongoing debate concerning the delicate balance between national security and democracy, considerable attention is directed towards ‘The Five Eyes’ - Anglosphere Intelligence Alliance. At its core, this discussion delves into how politicians and the civil service can effectively harness the intelligence community’s expertise to safeguard the democratic state, its institutions, and its citizens from existential threats, all while safeguarding against potential abuses of power. Nevertheless, there remains a risk of politicians exploiting their authority and leveraging intelligence resources for personal political gain. This potential risk necessitates a thorough examination of these complex issues, particularly within the context of small states and fragile democracies like Israel. See e.g, Leuprecht’s ‘Introduction: The Democratic-Intelligence Paradox’; Hatfield, ‘Intelligence under Democracy and Authoritarianism’, 903–919.

23. Yatom was a MP between 2003–2008 more details available online: https://main.knesset.gov.il/en/MK/APPS/mk/mk-personal-details/741

24. In relation to the instability and erosion of democracy in multiple parliamentary democracies, see e.g.: Bogaards. “De-democratization in Hungary”; for insights into Israel’s ‘parliamentary paralysis’, see, e.g., Roznai and Cohen. “Populist Constitutionalism”, 502–520; Gutman. “The Interrelationship Between the Knesset and the Government”; and Ben Aharon, ‘Coalition Politics’, 123–146.

25. Haaretz. “Far-Right Pushes Bill.” Available online: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-06-12/ty-article/.premium/far-right-pushes-bill-granting-ben-gvir-powers-to-put-israelis-in-detention-without-trial/00000188-aeeb-d807-a99d-feff20a40000

26. Lupovici. “Securitization climax.”

27. Iran’s leadership, particularly under the Islamic Republic of the post 1979 revolution, has made numerous statements denying the Holocaust, questioning the existence of Israel, and expressing hostility towards Jewish people. Holocaust denial and conspiracy theories about Jewish control over global affairs are not uncommon in Iranian official discourse, including from high-ranking government officials and state-controlled media. See e.g., among others: Litvak, “The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Holocaust”,; Jaspal. “Anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in Iran”, 231–258;

28. About Israel’s ties with Iran before 1979 Islamic revolution, see e.g., : Furlan. “Israeli-Iranian Relations”,; Shaoulian-Sopher. “Israeli Foreign Policy” and Ben Aharon. “Political Audience and Non-Linear Securitisation.”

29. Here, Yatom refers to the notable “Periphery Doctrine”, a geopolitical concept formulated by David Ben-Gurion, the first PM of Israel. This doctrine aimed to establish strategic alliances with countries on the periphery of the Arab world, as Israel faced hostility and isolation from its immediate Arab neighbors. The ‘Periphery Doctrine’ included countries such as Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Moreover, recent studies indicate the existence of clandestine connections with specific African countries like Morocco, as well as with non-state actors such as the Kurdish minority in Iraq and the Maronite community in Lebanon. On this see: Podeh, From Mistress to Known Partner”,; there is an extensive literature on the “Periphery Doctrine”; see, e.g., Alpher, Periphery; Guzansky’s ‘Israel’s Periphery Doctrines: Then and Now’,; and Jones and Guzansky’s Fraternal Enemies.

30. On 31 May 2010, Israeli elite commandos raided the Turkish Flotilla, famously known as the Mavi Marmara. The organizers aimed to breach the Israeli blockade around the Gaza Strip and deliver humanitarian aid to Palestinians. The Israeli takeover led to the deaths of nine Turkish citizens and activists aboard the Mavi Marmara, with approximately sixty activists and ten Israeli soldiers sustaining injuries. Turkey promptly reacted to the incident by recalling its ambassador from Tel Aviv, as it had done on previous occasions. A reference to this incident can be found at: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/world/middleeast/12iht-M12-TURK-FLEET.html

31. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has held the position of President of Turkey since 2014. Before assuming the presidency, Erdoğan held the role of PM of Turkey from 2003 to 2014. He is the founder of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a conservative political party in Turkey. During the Mavi Marmara incident, Erdoğan held the position of PM.

32. Kushner, ”Turkish – Israeli Relations.” And specifically, about the Mavi Marmara period see the recent (2024) special issue in Israel Affairs titled: “Revisiting Turkish-Israeli Relations.” See e.g.: Muminov, ‘Cooperation and Conflict’; Gülseven, ‘Ontological Security-Seeking’.

33. Shayetet 13, a unit of the Israeli Navy and one of the primary reconnaissance units of the IDF.

34. Israel’s national intelligence apparatus comprises four key institutions. The Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations, known as Ha-Mossad in Hebrew, is tasked with gathering intelligence abroad. The Israeli General Security Service, also known as Shin Bet or Sherut Bitachon Klali in Hebrew, handles domestic intelligence. AMAN, a sub unit of the IDF, is responsible for military intelligence gathering. The National Security Council (NSC), established in 1999, is tasked with coordinating data collected by these various agencies. All of these institutions operate directly under the Israeli PM.

35. Hebrew acronym for agaf modi’in (i.e., intelligence division), the name by which the IDF’s intelligence department is known.

36. On the ‘special relations’ between Israel and Germany see e.g Gardner Feldman, The Special Relationship; Oppermann, and Hansel, ‘The Ontological Security of Special Relationships’;

37. The ‘1952 Reparations Agreement’, also referred to as the “Luxembourg Agreement”, stands as a pivotal accord between Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Israel and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany. Concluded on 10 September 1952, in Luxembourg City, this agreement emerged from exhaustive negotiations that took place in Wassenaar, the Netherlands, since March 1952. Its primary objective was to address the issue of financial reparations, specifically aimed at compensating Israel and the Jewish people for the losses and hardships suffered by Jewish victims of Nazi persecution during the Holocaust. See e.g.: Tovy, J. Israel and the Question of Reparations; De Vita. “Dutch Hospitality”, 4–29.

38. The ‘German Scientists Affair’, also known as ‘Operation Damocles’, was a clandestine initiative orchestrated by Mossad in July 1962. Its objective was to thwart and dissuade FRG scientists, particularly those involved in rocket development, from aiding Egypt’s missile program. Through a combination of threats, intimidation, and sporadic acts of violence directed at these scientists, the operation aimed to impede their collaboration with Egypt. As part of this effort, Mossad enlisted the help of former Nazi Otto Skorzeny (1908–1975). For further reading on this, see e.g., Orbach, Fugitives; and see also the autobiography of former Mossad deputy chief Rafi Eytan (1926–2019), where he shares his personal experiences as part of the covert operation on the German Scientists Affair: Eytan, The Confident, 239–250.

39. Angela Merkel, former Chancellor of Germany (2005–2021) used the term ‘Staatsräson’ in her famous 2008 speech at the Knesset. Available online: https://m.knesset.gov.il/EN/activity/Documents/SpeechPdf/merkel.pdf. In depth discussion of the origins of ‘Staatsräson’ can be found in Marwecki’s, Germany and Israel: Whitewashing and Statebuilding, 194–203.

40. On NK conflict see among many others: De Waal, Black Garden; Broers, Armenia and Azerbaijan;

41. Tnuva is Israel’s largest food manufacturer.

42. Bülent. “Post-Cold War Realities”,; Oğuzhan. “Beyond Countering Iran”, 655–675.

43. See note number 29.

44. For insights into the role of the United States as a political/moral audience that either accepts or rejects Israel’s securitization and national security decision-making, see the recent book by Wertman and Kaunert, Israel: National Security and Securitization, 13–23. The concept of the political audience encompasses various sources of legitimacy for the implementation of a securitization act.

45. Shamir, ‘Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War’.

46. Prior research on the ‘disclosure dilemma’ and OPID within the Israeli context includes works such as Riemer’s “Politics is not Everything”; and Riemer and Sobelman’s ‘Coercive Disclosure’.

47. Ahren, ”Netanyahu Reveals.” Available online: https://www.timesofisrael.com/pm-reveals-secret-site-where-iran-experimented-on-nuclear-weapons-development/

48. The Jerusalem Post, “Mossad Effort.” Available online: https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/bennett-reveals-mossad-operation-to-find-ron-arad-681014