Ban Ki-moon was secretary-general to the United Nations for ten years, from January 2007 to December 2016. There had been warnings before then that the free-market model of globalisation was causing unsustainable increases in inequality of income, wealth and geography. Those calls grew during Dan Ki-moon’s tenure, most particularly following the international financial crisis of 2007–2008 and consequent global recession of 2009, when for the first time since the Great Depression of the 1930, total world output and income actually fell. Likewise, while there had been warnings before 2007 of the increasingly urgent need for radical action to tackle climate change, both the seriousness of the danger and the calls for action grew during these ten years.
In terms of getting the need to reign in the free-market form of globalisation recognised and accepted, and then making it happen, the international battlefield is more the IMF, World Bank and G20 (and other such groupings) than the UN. However, the United Nations did play an important role in achieving global consensus in favour of the Sustainable Development Goals. As for the climate crisis, Ban Ki-moon aimed from the beginning of his ten-year term as UN secretary-general to prioritise action to tackle the climate crisis. Thus, Ban Ki-moon writes that in 2015, ‘the United Nations delivered two of the most ambitious visions for the world’s people: the Paris Climate Agreement and the 2030 Agenda with seventeen Sustainable Development Goals’. (p. 2)
However, he goes on, in a mixture of despair and anger, to warn that:
Some countries are balking at their commitments under UN-sponsored accords such as the Paris Climate Agreement, while others struggle with human rights. (p. 2)
And that:
But five years later, it’s clear that we need to redouble our efforts with input from business, civil society, and ordinary citizens to make progress on both goals. I watched in sadness as the global recession and the coronavirus reversed much of our progress against poverty. Every region of the world is suffering from the irrefutable evidence of the climate crisis, yet we are not slashing carbon emissions with an urgency equal to the threat. (pp. 2–3)
This book thus provides a useful addition to the calls for urgent and radical action on climate change, as well as to deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals. I should declare an interest, in that Ban Ki-moon is a Fellow of the Oxford College of which I am President. However, I do not write here of his positive contribution because he is a member of my College, but on the contrary, he was elected to be a member of the College because of his positive contribution – which he has continued since completing his ten-year term as UN secretary-general in a number of roles including being Vice-Chair of the Elders.
1. Becoming secretary-general
Reading this book is an interesting reminder of just how recent some history is. Thus, in January 2000, South Korea’s President Kim Dae-jung appointed Ban Ki-moon as vice foreign minister, and Kim ‘had been imprisoned, tortured, and sentenced to death by South Korea’s military regime, but freed under international pressure’ (p. 25) before being elected president in 1997.Footnote1
Indeed, South Korea was only admitted to be a member of the United Nations in 1991.
Ban Ki-moon provides an interesting account of how someone comes to be elected to that position. It is of course a very ‘political’ process, in the sense of different regions of the world wanting a say, and representation. Then within the regions, the different countries will have an interest – both in the sense of wishing the appointment to be from their own country, and failing that then from a country with which they feel aligned. And then there is the question of who that country’s chosen nominee would be. In the case of Ban Ki-moon, he had been a successful diplomat and public servant for South Korea, so was an obvious nominee from their side. There was a feeling that it was in some sense Asian’s turn. And while there were various candidates in the running, the result depended upon a mixture of good campaigning by both the candidate and by the South Korean government.
2. Being secretary-general
The book includes an interesting account of the practicalities of taking on such roles. One relates to the physical danger, and the concomitant need for security guards and the rest, which in turn has an impact on the personal and family life of the incumbent. Reading the detail, one can’t help feeling that for some, being in the public eye, and with this degree of pressure, would be a real burden, while for others – Bill Clinton comes to mind – one can’t help thinking they relish it.
Another interesting aspect is the important role of negotiations in most UN processes, and the importance of good negotiation techniques for achieving successful outcomes. For Ban Ki-moon, this had been his professional training as a diplomat. A general point about the book is that for every story told, one imagines more could have been said, which it would be fascinating to hear. But on negotiation skills, he is at least prepared to say that both the Clintons – Bill and Hilary – were good, while Donald Trump less so (p. 59).
Ban Ki-moon gives a fascinating and first-hand account of the problems in Sudan, the creation of South Sudan, and the continued problems regarding both (Chapter 9). Again, there’s a reminder of how recent much of this history is, with South Sudan only having gained independence on July 9th 2011 (and being admitted five days later as the UN’s 193rd member state). However, tensions soon re-ignited between Sudan and South Sudan, with rebel factions also back at war, and by 2014 nearly 100,000 South Sudanese were sheltering inside UN bases (p. 132).
Ban Ki-moon discusses the issue of UN peace keeping forces failing to protect civilians. I have to declare an interest, as our son and his then girlfriend (now wife) were working in South Sudan for the government during 2015 and 2016 as part of the UK’s aid programme, as ODI Fellows.Footnote2 When the fighting entered the capital city of Juba, there was violence against non-combatants including non-Sudanese working for the government or NGOs. Our son and his partner managed to escape, but in terrifying circumstances. There were claims that the UN forces had failed to intervene to protect civilians from this violence. Indeed, in August 2016 Ban Ki-moon appointed Major General Cammaert of the Netherlands to lead an investigation into the July 2016 violence in South Sudan and the response of the United Nations Mission.Footnote3
That investigation concluded that ‘a lack of leadership on the part of key senior Mission personnel had culminated in a chaotic and ineffective response to the violence’, in response to which the UN did take action to enhance training and accountability, ‘including working with Member States to bolster the protection of civilians by uniformed personnel in future peacekeeping operations’.Footnote4
Thus, Ban Ki-moon reports that:
… the Security Council, sensitive to criticism, renewed the UNMISS [United Nations Mission in Sudan] mandate putting the protection of civilians at its core. For years, most missions were permitted to shoot only in self-defence, but not to protect local populations. Stories of peacekeepers ‘allowing’ harm to come to civilians almost destroyed our credibility. Updating the rules of engagement finally met the needs of individual conflicts, but it was also a recognition that in armed conflicts thousands of civilians have nowhere to go. (p. 133)
Chapter 10 on Gaza reports on Ban Ki-moon’s work to end the 2008–2009 fighting between Hamas and Israel. On January 6th 2009:
… the Israeli army escalated its assault, firing two shells that exploded just outside the UN-run al Fakhura Elementary School, where thirteen hundred people from the nearby Jabaliya neighbourhood had sought refuge. Israel claimed that it was returning fire but later acknowledged that this was a mistake. At least forty-eight people, including children, died in the attack, which was described in detail by the UNRWA office and the few local journalists inside the territory. …
Two days later, on January 8, the Security Council, acting after long private consultations and escalating public outrage, finally passed a resolution calling for both sides to respect an immediate, durable cease-fire. Although the Americans had helped draft the legally binding two-page document, the outgoing Bush administration abstained after pressure from the Israelis. (p. 138)
Ban Ki-moon reports having worked relentlessly in trying to get both sides to abandon violence, ‘but I was prevented from talking directly with Hamas because the United States, the European Union, and many other nations classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation’ (p. 140). ‘I explained that this was impossible to avoid because the Islamist government ruled the enclave’ (p. 139). This reflects a well-known pattern with such conflicts, where the government of the day insists that they cannot talk with terrorists, but invariably the history books reveal that they were talking with them all along, and that it was such talks that brought peace about – whether Northern Ireland, or indeed the middle east.
During the 2008–2009 conflict between Hamas and Israel, Ban Ki-moon recalls:
I learned that the Israeli Defence Forces had just shelled the UN’s main warehouse, the central supply point for all of Gaza’s humanitarian aid. Within minutes the attack had incinerated thousands of tons of food, medicine, blankets, soap, and clothing. None of our staff was killed in the explosion, but I felt a moment of plummeting horror. UNRWA had learned from experience to clearly mark all UN buildings in the Gaza Strip and to give GPS coordinates to the Israeli army. Israel cannot deny that its soldiers knew this was a UN compound, and they knew what was inside.
I assumed that the artillery was a response to a Hamas rocket fired from our shadows, but I quickly learned the truth. There had been no shooter; the attack was just a ‘grave mistake’ by the Israelis. I appreciated the Israeli government taking immediate responsibility for such a terrible loss, but I was disturbed that officials could not explain why they had struck the warehouse and adjacent UNRWA headquarters. Information was coming in quickly from UNRWA staff. Three shells had hit the warehouse, immediately filling it with a noxious smoke that burst into leaping flames. Our people battled the blaze, but it burned out of control until every bag of rice, bottle of disinfectant, and package of diapers was destroyed. Israel had fired white phosphorus, a World War I-era chemical weapon that ignites in oxygen and cannot be extinguished by water alone. There was not enough sand or loose dirt near our Gaza City compound to smother the flames, so the damage was complete. The depot and its precious freight would burn for a day and smoulder for a week. (pp. 141–42)
There then follows a personal story. Once a ceasefire had been achieved, Ban Ki-moon visited the Gaza Strip, including the UN warehouse that had been destroyed by the Israeli attack using white phosphorus:
I had to shout over the sound, gulping in the poisoned air for more than half an hour. ‘This is an outrageous and totally unacceptable attack against the United Nations’, I said. While speaking, I became aware of small spots moving through my vision. I didn’t realise that I was standing on cement that had been sprayed by the phosphorus. …
By the next morning, I had lost my voice and could barely whisper to my advisors. I am sure it was the phosphorus. By the time I got back to New York, I still could not talk. … Five years of injections were required to keep my vocal cords from freezing up. (pp. 148–49)
This is prescient given the 2023 repeat, on an even bloodier and more tragic scale. The obvious question is, why were the lessons not learned, to avoid a repetition? If anything, actions were taken subsequent to the 2008–2009 conflict to exacerbate the situation rather than alleviate:
The United States stirred up new territorial bitterness in 2017 by moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, which undermined the Arab’s insistence that East Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine. In 2018, the Trump administration pulled out of UNRWA in order to pressure Palestinian leaders to loosen their demands. I find this abuse of humanitarian assistance to be among the most cynical and indefensible of political actions. And in January 2020, President Trump introduced another initiative to marginalize the Palestinians. Standing beside the smiling Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the president announced his own so-called Middle East peace plan, which effectively kills the two-state solution by allowing Israel to keep the settlements it illegally built in the West Bank. (p. 150)
Chapter 12 reports on Ban Ki-moon’s attempts to resolve the conflict with Iran, including visiting the country to try to prevent them developing nuclear weapons. Ban Ki-moon was invited to address the August 2012 summit of the Non-Aligned Movement which was being held in Iran. He accepted, because his remarks ‘would directly address two-thirds of the UN’s membership, but it would also give me cover to meet face-to-face with Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei’ – in other words, it provided an opportunity to visit Iran without accepting an official invitation to visit the country, but rather a summit of the Non-Aligned Movement that was being held there. Nonetheless:
I was, of course, pilloried by the international media, especially those sympathetic to Jewish and Israeli positions. Many news outlets tried to amplify the pressure by criticizing me through editorials and articles. I had already advised the United States and Israel about the trip, but they were furious that my visit would ‘legitimise’ the Iranian regime. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton both said they wanted to see Iran isolated, not embraced. …
… Netanyahu was angry with me and opposed my visit using undiplomatic language such as ‘shocked’, ‘bad judgement’, ‘big mistake’, ‘wrong decision’, and ‘annihilation of Israel’. He was never an amicable person, but it was unacceptable for him to speak so rudely to a secretary-general. (p. 178)
During his discussion with Ayatollah Khamenei, Ban Ki-moon suggested that the United Nations could be used as a back channel to Washington, since the UN often facilitated communication between countries when for political reasons they cannot be seen to be talking:
I was visibly surprised when the supreme leader said that such a channel would not be necessary because he was already in touch with President Barack Obama – and they had traded letters! It was hard for me to believe that the U.S. government, which so strongly objected to my visit to Iran even for an international gathering like the Non-Aligned Movement summit, had been secretly communicating with Tehran behind the scenes! The Iranian leader said that Washington had initiated the exchange and that he had responded. (p. 180)
Ban Ki-moon concludes his discussion by reporting how he continues to seek to promote such dialogue, and the opportunities to promote peace, through being Deputy Chair of the Elders – an organisation founded by Mandela in 2007.
3. Human rights and development
Part I of the book covers Ban-ki Moon’s early life, and his first reflections on becoming Secretary General, including as referred to above regarding the personal security, and the nature of negotiations. Part II contains the various national crises that he had to deal with, as described above. Part III then turns to ‘Human Rights and Development – Supporting Our People and Our Planet’, with five chapters covering human rights, women, the Sustainable Development Goals, the climate crisis, and global health. In terms of Ban Ki-moon’s personal ambitions for the role of secretary-general, the Sustainable Development Goals, and the need to tackle climate change have been referred to above. He also made human rights a priority, and was involved in the creation of the UN Women’s organisation.
In September 2000, world leaders adopted the Millennium Declaration Development Goals at a special summit ‘to celebrate the dawn of the new era’ (p.251). The mandate for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) expired in 2015, so Ban Ki-moon led the creation of the Sustainable Development Goals to succeed the MDGs:
… a seventeen-item to-do list to challenge climate change and poverty while enhancing human rights and global cooperation. If these goals are met by 2030, extreme poverty would end; damage from climate change would be reduced; and human rights, health care, and development would be expanded to hundreds of millions of people around the world. (pp. 251–252)
The concept of ‘sustainable development’ had been developed by Harlem Brundtland, the former prime minister of Norway, in her landmark 1987 report to the United Nations which laid out the philosophy of sustainable development in which improvements are made to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to do the same (Brundtland Citation1987). Ban Ki-moon had got her to lead a panel to work up the idea of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), looking at environmental degradation, as well as other such panels which culminated in the first SDG conference on June 20–22 2012 in Rio, Brazil which approved them, subsequently adopted formally by the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015 with the 2030 Agenda.
On climate change, Ban Ki-moon states that:
My proudest accomplishment in ten years of public service at the United Nations is the international accord to slow the global havoc of man-made global warming. I championed what would become the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement long before anyone thought the world’s governments could agree to limit greenhouse gas emissions. (p. 265)
On the process – and difficulties – involved, he writes ‘Greta Thunberg and the Rainforest Foundation are doing their best. Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro did their worst’. (p. 265)
The concluding Part IV of the book focuses on ‘Our Future’, firstly discussing the need for accountability in order to both avoid human rights abuses and also ensure that justice can prevail (Chapter 21). Next, Ban Ki-moon considers the need for the UN itself to modernise and reform, reporting both what he achieved and what remains to be done (Chapter 22). In the final chapter 23, Mission Impossible, Ban Ki-moon reflects on the future:
I have noticed a profound and encouraging shift in global attitudes since 2007. Many more people, particularly the young, are taking responsibility and fighting for global good. Forceful and eloquent, Malala Yousafzai and Greta Thunberg are motivating us to build a better world, one that values education and confronts the climate crisis. I am overjoyed that these young women are claiming their place in the conversation and providing such powerful role models. The youth-driven response to the climate crisis is the most powerful movement I have ever witnessed, and it gives me hope for our own future as well as the planet. (p. 330)
4. Whatever happened to world government?
It is ironic that in the past, science fiction and other writers assumed that by now we would have achieved some degree of world governance, and yet for all of today’s talk of globalisation and the end of the nation state, we seem to be further away from achieving world governance than when H.G. Wells was envisaging it a hundred years ago.Footnote5
Added to which, many of our leaders have presented globalisation as having replaced the power of individual governments, but usually without admitting what national control has been replaced with – being perhaps embarrassed to admit that it has not been pooled sovereignty to a greater collective, but surrendered sovereignty to multinational firms.
The United Nations appears to have no greater power and authority today than it did fifty years ago. Power has been passed by national governments not to international governance but to the likes of Rupert Murdoch and Elon Musk.
We do need to ‘take back control’, as the successful Brexit slogan put it during the UK’s referendum on leaving the European Union, but not from international institutions such as the EU, but from the unaccountable corporations. Governance needs to be conducted through democratic institutions, at national and international levels, including the United Nations and its agencies.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author, other than as reported in the text above.
Notes
1. Kim won the 2000 Nobel Prize for his Sunshine Policy to engage North Korea.
2. On which, see https://odi.org/en/fellowship-scheme/
5. See for example Partington (Citation2003).