ABSTRACT
The historic agreement that Canada and the United States signed to set up a single, integrated command of their continental air defense forces in 1958 as a direct response to the new threat posed by Soviet nuclear bombers was an unprecedented experiment for both. The headquarters of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) in Colorado Springs is under the command of a US Air Force general with direct operational control of US and Canadian continental air defense forces. Despite persistent doubts and concerns about NORAD since its inception, it has somehow survived in response to changing threats, or perceived threats, to the continent, often owing more to political inertia than to strategic logic. This article argues that NORAD is not the best structure through which Canada and the United States should pursue their strategic interests. Both countries would do better to cooperate militarily outside of NORAD.
Acknowledgments
The author expresses his gratitude to the editors and anonymous reviewers of this article for providing constructive feedback and suggestions on earlier drafts.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.