Distributive justice and development: Toward an integrative understanding of reward and responsibility distributions

ABSTRACT

Studies on development and fairness judgments in resource allocations have mainly addressed the distribution of reward. However, the distribution of responsibility also requires exploration in the context of research on development and distributive justice. For an integrated understanding of reward and responsibility distributions, we briefly reviewed the studies on children’s fairness judgments in reward and responsibility distributions. We then discussed the theoretical basis and methodological framework to further our understanding. After reviewing a study which considered both reward and responsibility distributions in the same experiment, we also discussed the questions to be solved to understand children’s fairness judgments in both types of distributions. Individual developmental process of fairness judgments, (in)consistency of judgments in reward and responsibility distributions, and generous judgments in allocations were discussed by referring to theoretical discussions of culture and reciprocity.

KEYWORDS:

• Reward distribution
• responsibility distribution
• fairness judgments
• rule application
• children

Introduction

To establish a peaceful society without conflicts and their aftermath, considering how people allocate resource is significant. People generally share various resources such as food, energy to work, and care to sustain their lives. If people feel that the distribution of these resources is unfair, it can lead to conflict. Conflicts could be avoided, if they are satisfied with the outcome of the distribution. By tracing the developmental path of fairness judgments about resource allocation and understanding how people make fairness judgments from a developmental perspective, one could learn how people make fairness judgments regularly and continually renew them to ensure the realization of peace.

There are two types of resource distribution: reward distribution and responsibility distribution (Deutsch, 1985). In reward distribution, positive resources are distributed for work performed. On the other hand, in responsibility distribution, burdens and other responsibilities are distributed. Though fulfilment of responsibilities has no negative connotation, it often brings unwanted burdens to the parties involved. Thus, the study considers the distribution of responsibility as the distribution of burden.

A study that integrates the results of empirical research on the distribution of rewards and the distribution of responsibilities as well as their issues is not yet conducted. To ensure an elaborative understanding of fairness judgments in distributions that reflects the actual phenomena, understanding people’s fairness judgments for each type of distribution and obtaining an integrated view regarding them are necessary. The present paper focuses on studies that examine children’s development of fairness judgments regarding responsibility as well as reward distributions, and offers an integrated understanding of these two types of distribution. First, we review previous studies in this particular area. We then discuss theories and methodologies for understanding both reward distribution and responsibility distribution, focusing on previous studies that have examined both of these types of distribution together. This paper will then present the prospects for future research that attempts an integrated understanding of the distribution of reward and responsibility, after considering the shortcomings of similar previous studies.

Studies on fairness judgments and development in resource allocations

There are three major distributive justice principles: equality, equity, and need (Deutsch, 1975). The principle of equality guarantees fairness by dividing resources into equal amounts. The equity principle demands the allocation of more resources to recipients who contributed more. The principle of need ensures fairness by allocating more resources to recipients who need them. Previous studies on children’s fairness judgments have used some of these fairness principles, and participants are usually asked to allocate resources in some conditions or asked to answer questions on fair allocations based on the distributive justice principles (Damon, 1977; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991; Thomson, 2007; Watanabe, 1986, 1990).

Many studies on the development of fairness views have focused on changes in children with the increase in age. Previous studies have reported that a developmental trend exists in children’s allocation of resources (Damon, 1977; Enright et al., 1980; Hook & Cook, 1979; Keil & McClintock, 1983; Watanabe, 1986, 1990). Children aged 4–5 years are more likely to allocate resources based on their own interests, allocating more resources to themselves than other recipients. Children aged 5–6 years tend to support the equality principle, allocating resources equally to each group member. Children aged 8 years and above tend to follow the principles of equity and need, allocating rewards based on the contribution or personal needs of the recipients.

The aforementioned studies employed positive allocations, where recipients were given positive resources such as rewards for their work. However, there is also negative allocation or the allocation of negative resources such as responsibilities accompanied with work as a burden to the recipients (Deutsch, 1985). Many studies have investigated negative resource allocation among adults. For example, some addressed fairness issues in allocating household work to spouses (Blair & Johnson, 1992; Fuwa & Cohen, 2007; Nameda, 2013), while others examined the distribution of the cost of controlling greenhouse gas emissions among countries (Ringius et al., 2002). However, studies investigating negative resource allocation among children from the perspective of development are rare.

A study by Thomson (2007) is one of the few studies on negative resource allocation among children from a developmental perspective. The study examined which distributive justice principles (equality, equity, or need) were preferred by children. In the study, children at the ages of 8, 11, and 14 (third, sixth, and ninth graders) as participants read stories on allocating household chores with their siblings. Each story described different allocation options according to the principles of equality, equity, or need, and children as the participants were asked to judge how fair the allocation in each story was. Most participants in all age groups judged the equality allocation as fairer than the others. The study also found that 11-year-old participants were least likely to judge the need-based allocation as fair.

Other studies on negative resource allocation among children have examined children’s judgment toward responsibility. According to the study by Shure (1968), 4-year-old children deemed it fair when the person who played with the toys, cleaned them afterwards. In the study by Warton and Goodnow (1991), children aged 8, 11, and 14 who were participants judged whether the vignettes describing a distribution of work were fair or not. The vignettes included situations where only one child played but the other child who did not play was asked to clean up and two children played but only one child had to clean up because the other child had already left. The results showed that most of the participants judged the former situation as unfair, and most participants of 8 and 11 years of age expressed that the latter was unfair. However, some participants aged 14 did not deem it unfair as the uneven share of the burden would be compensated if the other child did more clean-up later.

Notably, the results from responsibility allocation studies seem to differ from those in reward allocation studies. Studies on the allocation of rewards have reported that children aged 8 years and above supported the need-based principle more. However, while a study of responsibility allocation (Thomson, 2007) has shown that the trend of the choice in distributive justice principles was similar between the age groups of 8 and 14 years, 11-year-old children were least likely to endorse need-based principles.

A study on young children’s views on sharing work responsibilities by Hashimoto et al. (2012) offers an additional finding on responsibility distribution among children. In the study, 5-year-old children in a kindergarten, as participants, were presented with a series of pictures describing situations of free-play time and clean-up time, and were asked who should clean up the toys after the free-play time. The situations included six scenes: 1) two children who had played with toys were present at the clean-up time; 2) only one of the two children who had played were present at the clean-up time because the other child left when the clean-up time started; 3) one child played during the free-play time and was also present when the clean-up time started, along with another child who did not play; 4) only one of the two children who had played were present at the clean-up time, and the other child had to leave due to a stomach ache (personal needs); 5) two children played during the free-play time, and one child used more toys than the other (benefits of playing) and 6) two children played during the free-play time, and one of them was older than the other (age difference). The results of the study revealed that most participants expressed that both children who had played with the toys should do clean-up in most of the scenes. More than half of the participants, however, responded otherwise only in the scene in which a child who had not played was present at the clean-up time (the third situation).

As the previous literature suggests, studies on children’s fairness judgment have shown its trend by different age groups. Additionally, some gaps can be seen between the results of studies on reward and responsibility distributions. However, the lack of extensive research on responsibility distribution among children has prevented us from gaining an integrative understanding of the development of fairness views on resource allocation. Therefore, one of the challenges that needs to be addressed in the studies of distributive justice among children is to accumulate research on children’s fairness judgment on responsibility distribution, and to gain an integrative understanding of children’s fairness views on reward and responsibility distributions. The integrative understanding does not exclusively seek to comprehend fairness views on reward and responsibility distributions, but also considers the relationships between them.

Theoretical basis and methodological framework in understanding reward and responsibility distributions

Theoretical basis

To gain an integrative understanding of reward and responsibility distributions, we establish a theoretical basis and methodological framework in this section. Under theoretical basis, we will discuss 1) the paradigm of two phases involved in fair resource distribution, 2) the process of rule application in making fairness judgments and 3) the position of decision-maker which influences rule application. First, we examine the characteristics of each type of distribution in detail. We then discuss how the rules for distribution are applied.

The method of investigating the reasoning and judgment in resource allocation adopted in most previous studies has been a survey or experiment in which respondents are asked to allocate resources or to choose an allocation option that they consider fair to them in a given distributive situation. This methodological paradigm consists of two phases: (1) a phase in which the person involved takes benefits or burdens and (2) a phase in which the unequal balance is rebalanced by their distribution of benefits or burdens (Figure 1). The first phase can be called ‘given conditions of taking,’ which imply given conditions to the participants in experimental or vignette settings in studies. The second phase can be referred to as ‘rebalancing policies,’ which are the participants’ responses to the conditions. In this paradigm, an experimental situation or vignette is presented first in which participants either take burdens or benefits and then they are asked to choose a policy responding to the situation.

Figure 1. The flow of reward/responsibility distributions and turn-taking of burdens/benefits and the relationship between those in a methodological paradigm on children’s fairness judgments in resource allocation.

If the participants take burdens first in the given situation and then rebalance the unequal assignment of burdens by gaining benefits from a selected policy, the cases will be called reward distribution patterns. If the participants take benefits first in a given scenario and then rebalance the unequal gain of benefits by bearing burdens from a selected policy, the cases will be described as responsibility distribution patterns. The latter two case settings (Figure 1) have not been named or conceptualized. We provisionally refer to the patterns here as ‘turn-taking of burdens/benefits’, in which participants continue to have the burden or benefit. In the study by Zeidler et al. (2016), when only one of the two children was able to play the game, one continued to play the game, underrating the benefits. Since little research has been conducted on this ‘turn taking’, it is suggested that future research be conducted regarding the continuing undertakings of burdens/benefits.

Although two other types of distribution patterns exist, the particular focus on the reward and responsibility distributions suggests a relationship between the given burdens and benefits that balance each other. Assuming that the reward and responsibility distributions have a corresponding relationship, we could potentially understand the rule application process of fairness judgments by observing the (in)consistencies in reward and responsibility distributions. As previous studies have shown, individuals use certain fairness rules, such as ‘equality,’ ‘equity,’ or ‘needs’ in making fairness judgments. These rules can be used in different situations based on the premise that the distributing rules are shared with others. For example, distribution based on ‘equality’ has been shown to be found in a variety of cultures from early childhood through adolescence in the task of sharing resources with others (Blake et al., 2015; Fehr et al., 2008). ‘Equity’ based distribution has also been found in a variety of tasks, especially among children aged 7–8 (Schmidt et al., 2016). The developmental change from ‘equality’ to ‘equity’-based distribution is common in many cultures (Huppert et al., 2019). However, some studies have shown that even 3–4 year-old children make ‘equity’-based distributions (Baumard et al., 2012), suggesting that in early childhood itself, the concept of ‘equity’ could be acquired. ‘Need’-based distributions have also been reported in a number of studies with preschoolers and elementary school children (Malti et al., 2016; Schmidt et al., 2016). From early childhood to childhood, distributions based on these principles have been observed in a variety of tasks and are widely shared. To understand the process of rule application, we can declare that individuals who make fairness judgments have ‘cross-sectional rules’ and ‘meta-rule’. Cross-sectional rules are independent of situations and are commonly used, but individuals may not promptly apply them to any situation. They rather decide which cross-sectional rule to apply to a given situation when making a fairness judgment. The presence of the meta-rule, or rule-application rule, must be considered in order to explain how individuals decide which cross-sectional rule should be applied to make a fairness judgment in a given situation. The relationship between cross-sectional rules (commonly shared rules) and meta-rule (rule-application rule) is illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2. The relationship between cross-sectional rules (commonly shared rules) and meta-rule (rule-application rule) in making a fairness judgment.

A person who makes fairness judgments has cross-sectional rules and meta-rule. The person decides which rule should be applied to a situation, using the meta-rule, just like pulling out a card from hand in a card game. Figure 2 illustrates a case where ‘equality’ is being applied to a distribution situation.

However, the decision-maker’s position in a given situation can influence the meta-rule’s operation in making fairness judgments. In other words, one’s various possible ways of being involved in a distribution situation could yield different fairness judgments. For example, the involvement in a given situation as a stakeholder (influenced by the decision in some ways) as opposed to the third person (not influenced by the decision) produces biases and thus different judgments. In some cases, stakeholders could benefit from their fairness judgment (e.g., a person paying an equal amount of fees receives better service than others), while they could also suffer a relatively bigger burden (e.g., a person receiving an equal amount of wage provides more labor than others).

Inequality aversion would be an exemplary case where different rules could be applied depending on one’s positions. There are two types of inequality aversion. One is the disadvantageous inequality aversion, where one avoids receiving greater benefits than others. The other is advantageous inequality aversion, where one avoids receiving fewer benefits than others. A study by Blake and McAuliffe (2011) showed that only disadvantageous aversion can be observed in 4- to 7-year-old children, and both types of aversion are expressed at the age of 8. Children aged 4–7 years applied the rule of avoiding non-equal consequences in distribution only when they were to receive less rewards and did not apply the same rule when they received greater rewards.

Assuming that individuals apply different rules when they are in different positions, another important aspect of the rule application process in distribution is found, that is, one’s autonomy in rule application decision. In other words, individuals can manage rule application decisions based on their own interests and convenience. For instance, one can be extremely harsh on somebody else’s unfairness or failure while being generous and lenient with one’s own. This is a premise of Bandura’s discussions on ‘selective moral disengagement’ (Bandura et al., 1996), which remains a relevant aspect in moral judgment. Hence, an understanding of autonomy and rule application biases influenced by one’s position would contribute to gaining a detailed, comprehensive picture of the moral judgment process.

What cognitive foundations might be necessary for children to be able to apply meta-rules? Although there is no empirical evidence for this question yet, it is assumed that some cognitive development functions may play an important role. One of them is executive function, which involves ‘cognitive shifting’ among others. In the ‘Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task’, a typical task measuring ‘cognitive shifting’, children are asked to change from ‘classification by shape’ or ‘classification by color’ to the opposite criteria. Performance on this task has been found to improve dramatically between the age group of 3 and 5 (Zelazo, 2006). In the application of the meta-rule in the distribution, the child is asked to select one rule from multiple ‘cross-sectional rules’ including ‘equality,’ ‘equity,’ and ‘need’ that are appropriate for their position and situation. This seems to be analogous to the rule-switching in classification required in the DCCS task.

The development of metacognition may also be related to the application of meta-rules. Unlike applying one principle to all situations, when applying a meta-rule, one needs to be aware of one’s multiple ‘cross-sectional rules’ and the thought process of what principles are used to select the one that best fits the situation. In other words, it is necessary to be aware of one’s multiple ‘cross-sectional rules’ and the thought process behind one’s choice of principles which suit the situation.

One of the ways to analyze the aforementioned aspects in moral judgment is to investigate which rule is applied when someone is a recipient/non-recipient of reward/responsibility. This method allows one to observe the rule applications in both contexts of reward and responsibility distributions, considering the positions of the respondents and to examine whether the consequences of rule applications correspond with our hypothesis. In the next section, we will show the result of the empirical study (Hashimoto & Toda, 2019) focusing on the judgments in two positions (recipient/non-recipient of gains) in both reward and responsibility distributions.

We focus on the study by Hashimoto and Toda (2019) for the following reasons. Firstly, the same participants are asked to make fairness judgments about the distribution of reward and the distribution of responsibility in the study. It allows us to examine whether they consistently apply the same rules to both situations or whether they apply different rules depending on the situation. If they consistently apply the same rules with age development, then the basis of the rules they seek to apply will also develop with age. If they do not apply the rules consistently, then other developmental mechanisms are assumed to be at play. In that case, it is possible that there is no process of meta-rule construction with development, and that they are simply reacting to the situation. The results of the study that ask the same participants to respond to multiple types of distributions are noteworthy as they provide more detailed insight into the mechanisms of children’s application of rules. Since no other study has done the same, we provide a more detailed overview of this study, considering the challenges for future research toward an integrated understanding of reward and responsibility distribution.

Methodological framework

Hashimoto and Toda (2019) conducted an empirical study that accumulated an integrative understanding of reward and responsibility distributions. The study examined the fairness views a child maintained on both reward and responsibility distributions. Children aged 4–5 and 5–6 years (in younger and older classrooms at preschool) participated in the study and were asked how reward should be allocated to the children who made decorations for a party (in the reward distribution condition) and how the children who played should clean up (in the responsibility distribution condition). Before those questions, the participants were presented with two scenarios in a sequentially randomized way: in one scenario, two children made decorations, but one of them contributed more; and in the other scenario, two children played, but only one of them used the toys that needed cleaning later. The participants were asked to answer four times (from the perspectives of the contributor/non-contributor and from the perspectives of the player/non-player). Thus, this study was able to examine the application of the rule in two different positions, party and third party, for two of the four distribution patterns shown in Figure 1, namely reward distribution and responsibility distribution.

The study identified four types of allocation views among the participants (Table 1): 1) equity—the participants answered that they should receive more rewards if their contributions were more and receive less if their contributions were less; and the participants themselves should clean up if they played with the toys, and the other should clean up if the person used the toys; 2) equality—the participants answered that they should share rewards evenly with the other even if they or the other made more contributions, and both they and the other should clean up even if one did not play with the toys; 3) selfish—the participants answered that they should receive more rewards if they made more contributions and should receive more or equal rewards even if the other contributed more; and the other should clean up if only the other played, and both of them or only the other should clean up even if only they themselves played with the toys; 4) generous—the participants answered that they should receive less rewards than or the same rewards as the other even if they made more contributions and should receive less rewards if they made less contributions; and only they should clean up if only they themselves played, and only they or both of them should clean up even if only the other played with the toys.

Table 1. Four allocation types in first-person situations (reward and responsibility; Hashimoto & Toda, 2019).

	Reward distribution		Responsibility distribution
	Self-contribution condition (The self-made more)	Other-contribution condition (The other made more)	Self-benefit condition (Only the self-played)	Other-benefit condition (Only the other played)
Equity	More to self	More to other	Self only	Other only
Equality	Equal	Equal	Both	Both
Selfish	More to self	More to self or equal	Other only or Both	Other only
Generous	More to other or Equal	More to other	Self only	Self only or Both

The results of the study by Hashimoto and Toda (2019) demonstrated that most participants expressed the view of equality in both reward and responsibility distributions, although some participants presented views of equity, selfish, or generous. This tendency was also observed in the participants aged 4–5 and 5–6 years. The difference in expressed distribution patterns between the two age groups was not statistically significant, and thus, the study could not identify a developmental trend in the types of fairness views in the participants’ different age groups regarding reward and responsibility distributions. About one-third of the 4–5 year-old participants and about half of the 5–6 year-old participants expressed consistent views on both distributions. However, the study found no statistically significant difference in either age group or developmental trend of maintaining consistencies across both types of distributions. To summarize, these findings implied that developmental changes do not necessarily occur in children’s fairness views in terms of types (i.e., which fairness views were endorsed) and consistency (i.e., if the views were consistent in reward and responsibility distributions). Another implication is that a certain number of children as the participants expressed consistent views in both reward and responsibility distributions, whereas others expressed inconsistent views in both distribution scenarios. The third implication was that some children presented the view of generosity, which has not received attention in previous studies on the development of fairness views. We address these three implications in the latter part of this paper.

Questions to be solved for understanding reward and responsibility distributions

Based on the three implications deduced in the previous study by Hashimoto and Toda (2019), three more questions can be raised to gain an integrative understanding of the relationship between reward and responsibility distributions, as follows.

1. Why were the differences between different age groups not found in this study? How can we explain individual development and diversity in fairness judgments without any developmental trends by age?

2. How can we explain some individuals making consistent judgments across reward and responsibility distributions, while others make inconsistent judgments?

3. Why did this study encounter generous fairness judgments in some cases? How can we understand and explain generous fairness judgments in reward and responsibility distributions?

Why do individual variations or diversity exist in fairness judgments about distribution?

The developmental trend corresponding to the age increase was not found in fairness judgments on reward and responsibility distributions in Hashimoto and Toda’s study (2019), considering the percentages of the contents and consistencies in fairness judgments. One possible reason is that the study did not include 8-year-old children as participants and only involved participants aged 4–6 years. If the study for other age groups had been conducted, we might have discovered certain trends along with some age groups. Although previous studies have illustrated the developmental trend with age increase from 4 to 8 years age groups (Damon, 1977; Enright et al., 1980; Hook & Cook, 1979; Keil & McClintock, 1983; Watanabe, 1990) concerning reward distribution, no statistically significant differences were observed between 4- and 6-year-old children (Hashimoto & Toda, 2019). This result merits further investigation involving a wider age range of children. On the other hand, one previous study on responsibility distribution showed no clear age differences in a wide age range (Thomson, 2007). This would be a challenge to address and an important aspect of discussion of the research on fairness views in reward and responsibility distributions.

If there is no developmental trend of distributive fairness views and consistencies among different age groups, it suggests that individuals' judgments regarding fairness rules may not necessarily develop as they grow. Then, we could interpret that children make fairness judgments spontaneously depending on the uniqueness of the situation. Nevertheless, some children consistently apply a rule to both reward and responsibility distributions, and other children apply different rules to the two presented distributive scenarios. Considering this, we can hypothesize that each child or person has an individual developmental trend, which necessitates the focus to be shifted to theories and methodologies that can grasp individual developmental trends and diversity of development. The theoretical discussion of cultural psychology by Valsiner (2007, 2014) explores an individual process of development that is not necessarily influenced by aging. In Valsiner’s discussion, culture plays an organizational role in the development of action and reasoning, and the idea’s major foundation is Vygotsky’s cultural-historical view (Valsiner, 1989). Such a notion leads to an argument that individual, socio-cultural-historical trajectories of experiences are the focus of development (Valsiner & Sato, 2006).

Valsiner (2007, 2014) argues that there are two perspectives of understanding culture: a person belongs to a culture, and a culture belongs to a person. He supports the latter, and one of his theoretical arguments is that when we live with culture in the world, we exchange the meanings with others and the social environment itself, and engage in constant dialogues with our past and future experiences, situated in the irreversible current of time.

The importance of involvement with the social environment was also discussed in Thomson’s (2007) study of the distribution of household responsibilities among siblings. Thomson’s (2007) study showed that the principle of ‘need’ was not increasingly adopted corresponding to age development, and the situation in which the person making the fairness judgment is placed is rather important. Valsiner’s discussion focused on the process of individual development in relation to the social environment, and on the process of ontogeny. To discuss the results in which two tendencies about fairness judgments were found for a given situation (Hashimoto & Toda, 2019), we draw on Valsiner’s theoretical argument.

A significant idea in Valsiner’s theoretical discussion is that conflicts play an important role in a person’s choices or acts in the social environment. According to Valsiner, even when making a small decision, a person confronts dilemmas or conflicts in terms of multiple and diverse options, constantly interacting with her/himself and with the changing social environment. Drawing on this theoretical argument in the discussion of the fairness judgment process, one can argue that children or individuals do not tangentially apply a rule but are pushed and pulled in a variety of directions when they select a rule (Figure 3). The investigation of what happens in the process, or the conflicts in decision-making, would be a task in future studies.

Figure 3. A model process of distributive rule application in an individual, drawing on Valsiner’s (2014) theoretical discussions on cultural psychology.

The study by Hashimoto and Toda (2019) only focused on participants’ final fairness judgments to examine the differences across different age groups, ignoring the process through which they make the final judgment. The results indicated no significant differences in the contents and consistencies of distributive fairness judgments by age. However, there is a possibility that some participants thought of applying a rule that they preferred initially but decided to choose another rule that other people may also follow after having internal conflicts about the appropriateness of its application. Others may apply a rule more intuitively without any conflicts in the process. Future studies should explore the reasons behind and processes involved in fairness judgments made by participants and how cross-sectional rule and/or meta-rule is going to be applied. This would allow us to understand the diverse trajectories of making a fairness judgment, leading to the discovery of new kinds and qualities of fairness views and their developmental processes.

Regarding capturing age differences and trends with age increase in fairness judgments, we propose to conduct a longitudinal study of children’s fairness judgment that draws on individual specific developmental pathways. The longitudinal study will enable a depiction of various developmental paths, such as those maintaining consistent support for a certain rule along the age range, those in which the supporting rule changes and those in which the supporting rule fluctuates instead of being fixed. It will also enable the examination of rule application consistency in various situations, as in Hashimoto and Toda (2019), and therefore, allow researchers to gain an integrated understanding of the developmental trends of rule application in various situations. If studies could be conducted in regions that are assumed to have different cultures and the results were compared, it would be possible to examine the extent to which these trends exist in common.

Why are there both consistent and inconsistent allocations in reward and responsibility distributions?

As noted earlier, if the reward and responsibility distributions are two sides of a coin, the allocation judgments would be consistent in both reward and responsibility distributions. However, the results of the study by Hashimoto and Toda (2019), showed consistent as well as inconsistent or contradictory judgments in reward and responsibility distributions. This result raises the question whether reward and responsibility distributions actually have corresponding characteristics?

There can be two interpretations for the question about the characteristics of or relationship between reward and responsibility distributions. One is that children randomly make judgments to reward and responsibility distributions because they are not aware of applying cross-sectional rules. The other is that children make (in)consistent judgments to reward and responsibility distributions because of their meta-rule for rule application. In other words, children prioritize one of their multiple cross-sectional rules following a meta-rule, which may result in inconsistent judgments in each distribution type.

If the meta-rule leads to varied applications of cross-sectional rules, the meta-rule may be influenced by situational factors including the characteristics or property of what is being distributed. For instance, material or monetary reward can be given to a work (i.e., making decorations) in reward distribution, whereas a work (i.e., cleaning up toys) is given in responsibility distribution in Hashimoto and Toda (2019). In cases where money is given to participants’ action in reward distribution, and, in turn, participants must pay money in a situation of responsibility distribution, the allocation patterns could be consistent. Therefore, it might be the inconsistencies in the characteristic or property of what is given and taken in distributions that cause the inconsistencies in participants’ fairness judgments.

Rizzo et al. (2016) examined the influences of properties on fairness judgments among children. In their study, children aged 6–8 were asked to allocate necessary or luxury resources as rewards. The children aged 6–8 distributed luxury resources more meritoriously than necessary resources. Shaw and Olson (2013) examined the distributional behavior of children aged 6–8 years toward others who originally had more and those who had less. The results showed that although children tended to make distributions that corrected the original difference, they did not do so while distributing high-value resources and tended to distribute them equally. Furthermore, Essler et al. (2020) examined the distribution of luxuries and necessities among 3-5-year-old children and found that although the distributional behavior itself did not differ between the two types of resources, there were differences while evaluating the behavior as a third party.

We could interpret these results by suggesting that the children who participated in the study had a meta-rule that prioritizes a cross-sectional rule, depending on the characteristics or property of resources to be allocated. In future studies, we should focus on the similarities and differences in reward and responsibility distributions, and even if they possess different characteristics, we should discuss the development of fairness judgments of allocation that integrates the differences.

Why were generous allocations made?

In Hashimoto and Toda (2019), many children chose to allocate generously despite the disadvantages it caused them. Why did they make generous judgments affecting their own interests?

The benefits of behaving altruistically for individuals can be explained by the theory of reciprocity. There are two types of reciprocity: direct and indirect (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). According to the theory of indirect reciprocity, it is beneficial for individuals to be considered good cooperative partners by others. Acting desirably when one is observed by others can improve their reputation. Such behavior is called ‘reputation management.’ Previous research has shown that reputation management appeared as early as the age of 5 years. Children aged 5 years give more resources and steal less when they are being observed by a peer compared to when they are not (Engelmann et al., 2012). The generous allocations observed in Hashimoto and Toda (2019) could be interpreted as the children attempting a generous, objectively desirable judgment, considering its positive impact on their reputation. We must note that children need not be conscious of potential future benefits when they do reputation management. Only a few studies have investigated the developmental relationship between reputation management and cognitive abilities, and it is still unclear whether children are conscious about the future benefits of reputation management.

‘Desirable judgment’ may differ across different cultures. Although we hypothesized that the generous allocation would be desirable, another way of allocation might be considered desirable in a different culture. The difference in children’s understanding of the ‘desirable way’ of allocation might have produced the difference between the results of Hashimoto and Toda (2019) and other previous studies.

Despite the possibility that reputation promotes generous judgments, the young children may find it difficult to do so at a great personal cost. Previous research has indicated that children’s judgments about allocations are different between hypothetical scenarios and real situations. For example, in Smith et al. (2013), children aged 3–8 years were asked to judge how they should allocate four stickers between themselves and another child in hypothetical scenarios and later were presented with a real situation following the same conditions. In hypothetical scenarios, most children answered they should give two stickers to the other child. However, most children give less than two stickers in a real situation. This result suggests that although preschoolers consider that they should allocate resources equally in hypothetical situations, they tend to avoid paying costs in a real situation. It is believed that this difference is due to the immature capacity for self-regulation in young children, which prevents them from controlling their desire to avoid paying costs in real situations (Blake, 2018). In Hashimoto and Toda (2019), it might have been easy for children to answer in a ‘desirable way’ because they were only asked to judge hypothetical scenarios. In this study, participants did not have to control their desire, which may have made age differences less impactful than in results of the studies in which control was necessary.

It might also be possible that generous allocation leads to emotional benefits for several children. In this paper, we have hypothesized that giving a lot to others or doing clean-up jobs are uncomfortable for children. From this perspective, making generous judgments is considered to require the acceptance of uncomfortable feelings. However, if resource provision or clean-up is not uncomfortable but rather satisfying for children, making generous judgments may become easier. Indeed, Aknin et al. (2012) showed that toddlers express happiness when sharing their resources with others. Paulus and Moore (2017) also suggested that preschoolers feel happy when they give their own resources to others. They showed that 3- to 6-year-old children expect that they will be happier when they give their balloon to the other child in a hypothetical scenario. Furthermore, children’s ratings in the scenario were correlated with their actual resource sharing. Children who expected happier feelings tended to share more with others. Although it is still unclear what children feel when they do clean-up, they might feel comfortable with giving resources and doing clean-up. To clarify this point, further research must examine children’s subjective values of making generous judgments in reward and responsibility distributions.

Conclusion

Studies on development and fairness judgments in resource allocations have mainly addressed the distribution of reward and not distribution of responsibility. The present paper focuses on both reward and responsibility distributions, and discusses the theoretical basis and methodological framework to understand these. Although the nature and characteristics of the things distributed differ between the two distribution tasks, they are the same in terms of understanding fairness judgments toward the distribution. Specifically, the form of the two tasks is the same (i.e., asking whether or not, or which, allocation is fair). Additionally, many of the response patterns are classified into particular categories (i.e., equality, equity, selfish and generous), while the other response patterns are rare (Hashimoto & Toda, 2019). Therefore, in this paper, we first considered these two tasks as two sides of the same coin and aimed to explain them in a single unified model. By considering the corresponding relationship of reward and responsibility distributions, an integrative understanding of reward and responsibility distributions has been pursued by viewing (in)consistency of participants’ rule applications in different positions in reward and responsibility distributions.

In many previous studies, it has been assumed that the principle adopted changes with development, for example, from ‘equality’ to ‘equity’ (Damon, 1977). However, that assumption alone does not prove that conflicting principles may apply, as in the case of discrepancies in outcomes between the distribution of reward and the distribution of responsibility. Introducing the ‘cross-sectional rule’ and ‘meta-rule’ models presented in this paper would allow us to understand how the distribution strategies are between reward distribution and responsibility distribution or between parties and third parties. We believe that a series of studies examining children’s distribution of different things and in different positions, as done in Hashimoto and Toda (2019), can clarify the content of the meta-rule and its developmental changes in a more concrete way. The results of the series of studies conducted (i.e., the findings on the mechanisms of rule applications in both distributions) will be the product of having and developing an integrated view of the two distributions—the reward and responsibility distributions.

Based on a review of an empirical study that examined children’s fairness judgments in both reward and responsibility distributions, we also discussed the questions to be solved for an integrative understanding of reward and responsibility distributions. Explorations of the diversity and individual developmental processes of fairness judgments, (in)consistency of judgments in reward and responsibility distributions, and generous judgments in allocations would provide a more integrative understanding of judgments in distributions.

The range of theoretical discussions on fairness judgments in allocations is extended to combinations of reward and responsibility distributions. Moreover, as we described the relations to the theoretical discussions of culture and reciprocity, developmental aspects of fairness judgments in allocations would be connected to theoretical discussions in other areas. We need further efforts to accumulate and integrate the findings in different contexts, overviewing various situations of distributions (e.g., focusing on both reward and responsibility distributions). The developmental mechanisms of fairness judgments in allocations would be revealed in future studies focusing on this topic. In this paper, we described theoretical basis, methodological framework, and questions to be solved. Further explorations are expected for an integrative understanding of reward and responsibility distributions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science KAKENHI [Grant number 19K03275].

Notes on contributors

Akinobu Nameda

Akinobu Nameda is a Lecturer in Education Development Center at Shizuoka University in Japan. His research interest is in sense of fairness and negotiation process in couples in performing family work. He particularly focuses on the diversity of the practices of family work and how the form of those are changed in interactions with social cultural environment.

Yuto Kumaki

Yuto Kumaki is a Lecturer of Fukuoka Kyoiku University (University of Teacher Education Fukuoka). He is interested in the development of altruistic behavior and its cognitive foundation in the preschool period. His research has particularly focused on the selectivity in resource sharing from the perspectives of reciprocity.

Yuko Hashimoto

Yuko Hashimoto is a Professor in the School of Education at Kwansei Gakuin University. Her research focuses on the development of children’s fairness judgments on distribution of positive and negative resources, and early childhood curriculum promoting moral development from a constructivist approach. She also has been serving as the curriculum/professional development adviser of Haruono Gakuen Educational Foundation and conducting collaborative research with early childhood teachers and administrators on constructivist curriculum and instruction.

Yuichi Toda

Yuichi Toda is a Professor of Osaka Kyoiku University (Osaka University of Education). He was a visiting fellow at Goldsmiths College, University of London during March 1998-January 1999, and a short time visiting professor of University of Vienna in summer time from 2007 till 2010. He has co-edited two English language books and has written about 20 English journal articles on ‘bullying/ijime’, ‘fair distribution among young children’, etc. His research with Dr Dagmar Strohmeier has received ‘den Hauptpreis des Bank Austria Preises zur Förderung innovativer Forschungsprojekte 2008’ [the Bank Austria Prize for promoting innovative research projects, 2008]. He is a member of the Editorial Board of European Journal of Developmental Psychology.