The European Union’s leadership in the eyes of others at the UN Human Rights Council

ABSTRACT

The policy documents of the European Union underline its self-image as a leader in promoting and protecting human rights in multilateral fora. The leadership claims are based on the EU’s example in domestic human rights protection and willingness to promote externally the same set of values and norms. However, drawing on interactionist role theory, this article emphasises the extent to which the roles depend on recognition by others. Hence, leadership claims need acceptance from other stakeholders. The article studies external perceptions of EU’s leadership in the Human Rights Council framework using data from interviews of Geneva-based, non-EU diplomats and human rights experts. The findings present a variable picture; while structural and exemplary leadership is recognised, incoherencies diminish EU’s credibility. The EU has improved its cognitive leadership, but its agenda is contested by others. Finally, the EU has negotiation capacities, but its strategy does not always optimally support the leadership ambitions.

KEYWORDS:

• EU leadership
• external perceptions
• human rights
• role theory
• UN human rights council

Introduction

The universal promotion and protection of human rights is a key objective of the European Union (EU) in its external actions. The key human rights documents underline the EU’s dedication to acting as a leader in multilateral human rights diplomacy (EEAS 2012, 2020, 2022, 2023). However, defining what is human rights leadership, is rather challenging and often more specific definitions of such leadership are lacking (Hoddy and Gray 2023, 639). Furthermore, the EU’s own references to leadership ambitions in human rights remain rather ambiguous. Definitions of leadership usually entail reference to power and influence (Wurzel, Liefferink, and Connelly 2017b) – leaders have capabilities to set the agenda, make changes, as well as impact negotiations and achieved outcomes. Hence, leadership claims have different dimensions; it may refer to ambitions, diplomatic activities and achievements (Delreux and Pipert 2021). Human rights leaders, whether they are individuals, states or international organizations, usually have high ambitions, they play key roles in negotiations and are able to reach wanted outcomes. In practice, the leadership positions are often relational, context- and issue-bound. Hence, the same actor may play different roles in different human rights forums and even in issue or country specific negotiations. The study of the EU’s leadership ambitions in different institutional settings increases our understanding of which EU strategies are likely to succeed within the HRC and thus provide for a more realistic basis for policy expectations in this important multilateral decision-making arena.

The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (HRC) is the key UN body for human rights protection and promotion. Because of its essential relevance, it provides an important arena for researching the leadership claims of the EU. The HRC consists of 47 member states, and it deals with thematic and country-specific human rights issues. According to the Annual EU human rights report: ‘The EU continued to play a leading role at the HRC both by advancing thematic priorities and addressing country situations of concern through EU led resolutions and statements and by working cross-regionally and supporting action by others’ (EEAS 2023). Hence, the EU’s leadership at the HRC relates to its ambitions, diplomatic action and achievements. The EU promotes its priorities through statements, resolutions and cooperation, but also plays a key role in defending the multilateral rules-based order and its institutions and norms, including the HRC. In an era when human rights are attacked and many states disengage from international human rights system, this supporting and defending role is much needed. The HRC has suffered from politicisation, and the increasing level of contestation especially with respect to certain human rights norms (Smith 2017b; Voss 2022) and country cases. There are also constant efforts to weaken the mandate of the HRC. Consequently, it provides a demanding context for the EU’s leadership ambitions. The EU’s claims may be contested by other HRC participants and powerful states, such as China, Russia and the US compete for influence in the HRC.

The article approaches leadership from the perspective of role theory. Scholars are currently taking an increasing interest in studying the EU’s leadership of external action (e.g. Aggestam 2021; Aggestam and Bicchi 2019; Chaban and Holland 2015). However, this article contributes to leadership studies by addressing the external side and others’ expectations concerning the leadership role of the EU. Studying external perceptions enables overcoming perceptions of Eurocentrism in how the EU approaches its different roles (Keukeleire and Lecocq 2021). According to role theory, a role refers to specific patterns of expected or appropriate behaviour (Elgström and Smith 2006, 5). Interactionist interpretation sees roles as constructed through interactions between self-perceptions and external expectations, highlighting the social and relational dimension and focusing on the leader-follower relationship (Harnisch 2011, 11). Acknowledging the perceptions of followers is essential since the legitimacy of leadership is constructed through a continuous interactive process (Aggestam and Johansson 2017, 1206; Torney 2019). In a nutshell, to effectively exert a leadership role, the EU needs recognition for this role from other actors.

Against this background, the article examines the following question: How do other participants, such as state and UN representatives and human rights experts, perceive the EU’s leadership in the HRC? The article treats the EU as a collective actor, consisting of 27 member states and an EU delegation. However, the potential variation between member states’ views concerning the desirability of its leadership role is also acknowledged. EU agreement concerning externally promoted human rights norms is not self-evident (Jenichen 2022). Hence, role conflicts may exist, which are caused by incompatible internal role expectations (Breuning 2019; Costa 2019) or differences between internal and external perceptions (Chaban and Elgström 2021, 277). Based on previous studies (Chaban et al. 2013), it can be expected that not all states and actors are equally supportive of the EU’s leadership, and there is variation in external perceptions. To explore the subjective perceptions of leadership, interviews (N = 52) were conducted among different UN member states, representatives of human rights organisations and UN secretariat experts in Geneva in 2013–2014 and on zoom in 2021–2022. The article demonstrates how the perceptions differed and aims to give explanations for the variation. The lengthy timeframe of the dataset also enables to grasp potential changes in perceptions of the EU’s leadership in the HRC over time.

The article contributes to understanding of leadership ambitions of the EU in multilateral fora, especially by focusing on human rights diplomacy at the UN. Until now, little scholarly work has been devoted to leadership in the field of human rights, and this article addresses this shortcoming. The EU’s leadership role has been studied within the EU (Aggestam 2021; Aggestam and Johansson 2017) and in relation to climate politics, environmental questions and trade (Delreux and Pipert 2021; Torney 2019). The lack of focus on EU’s human rights leadership is surprising, however, as the EU has assumed a strong self-declared leadership role in this policy area. The study fills this gap in the existing literature. Studying leadership matters especially because of the current backlash against human rights and the consequent challenges it poses for would-be leaders. The study offers rich empirical data on Geneva-based diplomats’ perceptions of the aspects of the EU’s leadership. This article will provide new empirical data on and novel analytical insights into how the EU’s leadership ambitions play out in changing international relations and power realities within multilateral decision-making arena of the HRC.

The article is structured as follows. Section I introduces the framework for the EU’s role as a leader in human rights by applying a role theory framework and leadership literature. Section II discusses studies on external perceptions of the EU’s leadership and evaluates the others whose perceptions matter in the HRC. Section III presents the interview data, methods and framework for analysis. Section IV demonstrates the findings on perceptions by analysing different leadership modes. The final section discusses how the findings inform us about the prospects of the EU’s leadership in human rights.

EU role as a leader in human rights

Role theory is helpful for analysing the material and ideational aspects as well as the underlying structural and agential components of roles. It provides a useful starting point for studying the EU’s leadership in human rights. The constructivist, identity-based approach to roles emphasises the relevance of an actor’s identity, political culture, history and norms (Aggestam 2021, 42). In the case of the EU, the view underlines an actor’s normative identity, value basis and norm entrepreneurship. It combines high internal and external EU ambitions in the field of human rights, assigning it a substantive leadership potential and constructive pusher position (Wurzel, Liefferink, and Torney 2019, 7–8). A realist, more structural interpretation stresses the relevance of material factors and the political setting informing the role-taking position. The relevance of structural conditions is evident in institutions, which condition the range of roles available and their performance (Aggestam 2006, 15). The actor may have a strong self-declared role, but changes in its circumstances and expectations can lead to role adaptation, which Harnisch relates to adjusted role strategies and instruments (2011, 10). Thus, a leadership role is highly processual and dependent on the relationships between actors, especially between leaders and followers (Parker, Karlsson, and Hjerpe 2015, 435). A more specific issue area and institutional context always condition the potential of would-be leaders.

The key EU foreign policy documents underline the EU’s dedication to acting as a leader in multilateral human rights diplomacy (EEAS 2012, 2020, 2022, 2023), which raises the question of what it means to assume a leadership role. In general, leadership is about reaching agreements and succeeding in the institutional bargaining process (Young 1991). As Delreux and Pipert (2021) note, leadership claims have different dimensions; it may refer to ambitions, diplomatic activities and achievements. At the multilateral level, a leader’s role includes the capacity to secure agreement on a particular agenda and the ability to propose solutions for collective problems, models that can be imitated and norms that others can follow (Lucarelli 2014a, 47).

Since 2012, the EU has aimed to mainstream human rights considerations in all its external actions and to improve the overall effectiveness and coherence of its policies (EEAS 2012). Such a united and consistent EU approach is considered essential for credible leadership (Lucarelli 2014b, 430). Consequently, the EU aims to speak with one voice at the UN bodies to improve the effectiveness of its message. Since 2012, it has published annually a list of common priorities at the UN human rights fora. According to these priorities, the key focus of the EU is to support and strengthen the UN human rights system. The EU also aims to take a leading role in initiatives regarding several country cases, especially focusing on topical cases such as Russia, Afghanistan and Iran. The EU also supports the work of the human rights defenders (HRDs) and the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Thematically, the list of EU priorities is extensive, and it tries to be active in most of the issues considered at the HRC (see for example Council of the EU 2023). The collective approach is based on internal agreement, and its implementation benefits from the vast material and diplomatic resources of the EU and its member states. This article examines the collective role of the EU, and hence, it does not differentiate between potential leaders within the EU. The focus is on the process of leading, namely how leadership emerges and is recognised in diplomatic intercourse.

The extant literature highlights different types of leadership. Here, I follow the division between structural, entrepreneurial, cognitive and exemplary leadership suggested by Wurzel et al (2017b, 2019). Structural leadership refers to an actor’s material, economic, technical and diplomatic resources, while entrepreneurial leadership relates to diplomatic skills and the capability to form coalitions. Cognitive leadership strategies are associated with the agenda setting, (re-)definition of interests and framing and initiating ideas. Finally, exemplary leadership refers to leading by example, based on presented attractive models and practices. In human rights policy, good domestic records play a key role in the practice of exemplary leadership, as they provide legitimacy and credibility. Politicisation, times of uncertainty, contestation over human rights questions (Costa 2019; Jenichen 2022; Speyer, Chaban, and Niemann 2021) as well as difficulties by the EU in implementing human rights standards may lead to credibility gaps. The coherence between internal and external human rights policy as well as the coherence between different policy areas is highly relevant for leadership.

The leadership modes are related, as for example structural leadership enables the use of various instruments for persuading partners and forming coalitions (entrepreneurial leadership). Due to their extensive resources, great powers are often more capable of exerting leadership, even if such asymmetric power relations may also prove counterproductive in terms of a power achieving its aims. Capable actors may face difficulties in transforming their resources into successful leadership roles (Lucarelli 2014a, 56). Often, smaller and middle powers are in an advantageous position to perform the role of leader because they have a more neutral image. Framing and initiating ideas (cognitive leadership) is frequently associated with entrepreneurial leadership (Wurzel, Liefferink, and Connelly 2017a). Successful leaders often benefit from a combination of the different above-mentioned strategies and from both hard and soft power resources.

Studies on the EU’s leadership often associate it with leadership through ideas and norms and by example. For instance, the well-known idea of Normative Power Europe (Manners 2002) underlines entrepreneurial, cognitive and exemplary leadership strategies. However, the EU also assumes a strong structural leadership role through its collective capacities in comparison to many others. The specific mix of leadership types and the ways in which they interact vary across issues and contexts. Different multilateral forums make some of the types more relevant and create complex frameworks for would-be leaders. Assuming a leadership role in the UN is difficult because many human rights themes are controversial and UN bodies are normatively contested spaces (Smith 2017b; Tuominen 2022; Voss 2022). The EU human rights agenda is resisted, in particular with respect to country-specific scrutiny and culturally sensitive issues, such as sexual orientation and gender roles.

The EU’s leadership in the HRC and external expectations

Elgström and Smith see role-taking as a social process wherein self-conceptions confront others’ expectations (2006, 5). Expectations can be conceptualised as the experiences and beliefs of actors about the EU and its appropriate behaviour. Individual leaders and civil servants usually express their role claims and views through speeches, statements and documents. An actor’s public expressions of its roles raise expectations among various audiences, and the recognition of them depends on how well the audiences buy the argumentation. Role implementation, or role performance, especially influences how other actors react to an actor’s role claims and what kinds of perceptions they have. Consequently, a leader can only be an actor who is perceived to be a leader.

In this article, the focus is on external audiences and their perceptions and potential contestation of the EU’s leadership. Perceptions of the EU’s roles are likely to vary geographically, among different groups and between different issue areas (Elgström and Chaban 2015, 18). Hence, it makes a difference whose perceptions are studied. Previous studies have noted a gap between EU self-perceptions and external perceptions (Kilian and Elgström 2010). However, some researchers have also proved the opposite; Delreux and Pipert (2021) have demonstrated coherent perceptions of the EU as an environmental leader. Already in the 1990s Christopher Hill noted the dilemma between EU expectations and actual capabilities. According to him, there should be more realistic picture of what the Community is able to do in the world (Hill 1993, 306). It was assumed that the Lisbon treaty (2009) and the development of the common EU foreign and security policy would enhance the situation. In human rights issues the more strategic approach was adopted in 2012. However, changes in the international order and increasing contestations have set constraints on EU action and may have lowered its capabilities to practice leadership. Since the early 2000s, EU research on its roles has given increasing attention to the external environment and non-EU perceptions of its roles. Overall, external perceptions matter as they shape the conditions of adopting roles and influence the effectiveness of performing roles. Legitimate and coherent roles usually improve an actor’s effectiveness and help it and others understand and interpret the surrounding world (Chaban and Elgström 2021, 276; Torney 2014). Therefore, for example in 2015 the European Commission funded research¹ on external perceptions to achieve information on how others perceive it.

On the one hand, the research has consistently shown that the EU is able and expected to act as a leader, even if many processes may decrease its potential (Chaban and Holland 2014; Speyer, Chaban, and Niemann 2021). Studies have demonstrated that others recognise EU leadership due to its economic power and the aid it provides as well as its potential as a normative example and carrier of norms and values (Lucarelli 2014a). On the other hand, the EU is often perceived merely as a potential leader unable to achieve its full potential (Lucarelli 2014b). Chaban and Elgström (2022) differentiate between expectation-performance and hope-performance gaps and argue that critical cases for the EU are those where high expectations or hopes meet bad perceived performance. According to them, some of the alleged shortcomings in the EU’s human rights approach provide a prominent example.

Torney (2014) notes that context matters when the influence of external perceptions is being considered. The EU has demonstrated its willingness to support and contribute to the work of the HRC and co-operate with different partners. When the Council was founded, the EU was expected to assume leadership (Smith 2010, 228). The ambiguous relationship of the US to the Council’s work raised more expectations regarding the EU’s leadership.² While the EU currently claims a leadership role, the negotiation context is demanding. The EU is an observer since only member states can be elected to serve as HRC members. The article proceeds to study the collective presence of the EU and its member states. Previous studies have shown that the EU is perceived as united, even if there are differences between member states (Tuominen 2022). However, the Council consists of 47 states, of which less than twenty percent are EU states. In cases of disagreement, the EU can be confronted by the majority of the HRC membership.

When studying perceptions, it is important to acknowledge the diversity of the participants in the HRC. Prior studies have found that perceptions of the EU’s leadership often vary between different regional and political group members (Chaban et al. 2013; Kilian and Elgström 2010; Lucarelli 2014b). Hence, much depends on just whose perceptions are being studied. For the purposes of this article, relation-specific factors highlighting historic ties between the EU and its others are especially relevant, as are global factors reflecting more general trends in the international order (Chaban and Elgström 2022, 5). Consequently, it can be assumed that the colonial past is likely to influence perceptions of the EU among countries in the Global South (see Chaban et al. 2013), while actors with close and equal partnerships view the EU’s roles more positively. Secondly, states may perceive the EU as a competitor and are not eager to accept its roles. Instead, they promote different agenda and contest the influence of the EU. Finally, the views of state representatives likely differ from those of persons working in the HRC secretariat or various human rights organisations. The last-mentioned group is not bound by national interests, but the organisations may have higher hopes or expectations concerning the EU’s action in specific issue areas. To obtain a balanced picture of perceptions, it is essential to include various EU audiences at the HRC in the research setting.

Methods and data

The article is based on interview data collected during two periods: the first 40 semi-structured interviews were conducted face to face in Geneva in 2013–2014 and the later ones (12) on zoom in 2021–2022. The previous dataset was part of a wider project mapping perceptions of the EU at the HRC. The second set of interviews was conducted mainly among non-state respondents, who had a longer presence in Geneva, and hence, a better ability to evaluate potential changes in the EU’s roles. The studied perceptions are subjective and do not necessarily represent the official positions of states or organisations but rather the opinions of persons who have worked with the EU. The interviewees represented UN member states (N = 26), regional organisations (N = 2), human rights NGOs (N = 21) or the HRC secretariat (N = 3). The selected state diplomats represented differing groups of others, including EU allies, like-minded states, developing countries and opposing states. This division is based on support for and contestation of EU initiatives. However, the divisions are not always clear and changes in alliances can often occur depending on the topic or country case being considered. The interviewed organisational actors have worked closely with the EU delegation.

The dataset is unique, as no prior research has been done on external perceptions of the EU’s leadership roles, focusing especially on its human rights leadership. There are no studies considering diplomat’s substantive perceptions of the EU in this UN body in Geneva. Individual, substantive position may reveal unexpected or new views and attitudes behind the official positions. This makes the interview method indispensable way of finding out more about the EU perceptions. Due to the sensitivity of the topic and diplomatic practices, the interviews were conducted under the promise of anonymity. Therefore, I will refer to the interviewees only by numbers or by general actor category. The interviews disclosed views on EU unity and differences, its presence and engagement, and its potential leadership and its basis, as well as coalition-building capabilities. Careful attention was paid to contextualizing the views and to differences between the interviewed groups.

The data was analysed using qualitative content analysis, with the material being coded based on the leadership types presented in the theoretical section. The key codes were related to the leadership dimensions and included codes such as:”resources”, ‘example’, ‘agenda-setting’, ‘negotiation skills’ and ‘coalitions’. The perceptions are reported by following the categorisation of types of leadership. First, they shed light on how diverse others acknowledge the material and ideological resources and hence, potential structural leadership of the EU. Second, they suggest the extent to which others recognise the example set by the EU. Third, they reflect how others perceive the EU’s agenda-setting efforts. Finally, they help clarify how others perceive the EU’s negotiation skills and coalition-building objectives.

External perceptions of the EU’s leadership at the HRC

Leading with material and ideological resources

Structural interpretation of roles suggests that leadership is highly conditioned by the institutional framework, political setting and material factors (Aggestam 2006). Therefore, structural leadership reflects political, economic, diplomatic and ideological resources of an actor in specific institution. The interviewees generally regarded the EU as a prominent political actor since its positions represent the views of many European states, which together have huge diplomatic resources and foreign policy instruments at their disposal. For example, they mentioned the extensive global networks of EU member states and close bilateral relations as important instruments for exerting influence (12, 13, 18, 37, 38). Accordingly, the fact that the EU represents a large bloc of countries convinces others and many of them are, thus, willing to join the EU’s positions on various matters (19, 20, 37). With seven to nine votes in the HRC, the influence of the EU bloc was also perceived considerable (16).

The EU unity and cooperation was seen to provide diplomatic benefits, especially since many EU member state delegations were considered small (4). However, opinions also differed among the interviewees and not all of them thought unity as beneficial strategy for the EU. Especially many representatives of human rights organization characterised the EU as an inward-looking actor, which overvalues the achievement of unity (7, 9, 18). This often compromises the EU’s positions, and as such uniformity comes at a cost (6, 8, 28). According to many interviewees, the EU spends a lot of time in internal negotiations, and it may not have enough time to negotiate with third states. Often it also presents its already formed and inflexible common position to others, which is frustrating for potential EU allies (9, 18, 35). Consequently, according to some interviewees, negotiations with the individual states can be easier (9, 37). However, this was also contested by other interviewees as they preferred negotiations with the EU delegation (9, 20). EU delegation was also praised for its constructive positions in many issues (4). Sometimes the common EU position was also defined as the lowest common denominator approach (6, 17, 21). Furthermore, common positions may make some EU states rather passive followers of EU views. Interviewees thought for example that some of the EU states were not as active as the size of their diplomatic corps would suggest. Hence, bigger delegations do not always mean more active status in the HRC (24). Some EU member states, especially Eastern countries, were also seen as mere followers of the common position. Domestic factors may also lead to an inability to reach common consensus on a policy position (5, 9, 16, 49, 50).

Others praised the prominence and diplomatic resources of the EU. It can speak to every issue, deliver opinions and follow all negotiations. As one interviewee said: ‘you can always rely on the EU, they are always there and prepare well [for] issues’ (34). Other interviewees reported viewing the EU as quite active also outside of the negotiation rooms in organising side events and informal discussions on topical questions, facilitating communication between different actors (5, 31, 32). Even in these cases, though, some respondents thought that the EU should aim to diversify participation to break up bloc divisions (1, 33, 38). Human rights organisations especially expressed the wish that the EU would exert more influence given the number of member states and diplomatic resources and instruments at its disposal. Many of them accused the EU of lacking ambition, initiative and boldness (7, 47, 49). Interestingly, some thought that the EU could use its economic resources and conditionality more efficiently to pressure difficult partners (23, 25, 26, 38). These views support the findings of previous research, according to which the EU is not always able to fully transform its resources into actual leadership (Lucarelli 2014b, 436). They also demonstrate a certain gap between hopes and EU performance (Chaban and Elgström 2022)

Furthermore, some interviewees wished that the EU exerts even more influence through its economic power since it is the largest contributor to the UN budget (1, 11). According to some interviewees, though, the EU already seeks to dictate how the money is spent in the HRC initiatives and is not keen on supporting others’ initiatives (9, 15, 18). Some informants also referred to economic crisis and its consequences on prioritizing economic considerations in EU decisions (27). Here, while the EU’s economic power is recognised, it does not always use it to benefit others (see Chaban and Elgström 2021, 276). Developing countries especially emphasised the economic and political power that some states use in their relations with African and Asian countries. Interviewees mentioned for example the conditionality of EU aid and how this is benefitted to get support for EU views (6). Hence, the former colonial ties also co-constitute the EU’s role within the HRC framework (Aggestam 2006). However, opinions between and inside the interviewed groups differed.

Many interviewees referred to the ideational resources of the EU. One diplomat characterised the EU as a ‘superpower of values’ (24). Generally speaking, the respondents thought that the EU shares the same values as the US, the wider West and sometimes even the members of GRULAC group of nations.³ Interestingly, some also mentioned close cultural contacts with many African countries (5, 11). The EU is mainly considered a soft power in the HRC, especially in comparison to the US, which coerces others with its views (4, 6, 15, 21, 30, 35). This opinion was also mainly shared by interviewees; the EU was seen different from the US. The EU is not that eager to coerce others and aims for compromises and cooperation, which can sometimes also then be fatal for its human rights objectives. It was also stated that the EU has considerable discursive power at the HRC and a prominent position in interpreting and representing rights at the level of discourses (6). Here the EU, of course, continuously competes with other regional groups and powerful states, such as Russia and China.

At the HRC, the EU’s structural leadership is both enabled and constrained by the existing framework. The rapid pace and growing workload of the HRC pressures the EU to coordinate intensively and effectively before, during and after the Council sessions. One interviewee mentioned that the EU’s coordination efforts are beneficial in terms of managing the increasing HRC workload (29). However, the UN framework is primarily designed for intergovernmental negotiations. Hence, some interviewees thought that the EU’s scope of action is limited because it lacks HRC membership (11, 32) or that its members promote national positions (15, 18, 38). Member states may also promote their national agendas and sometimes this may succeed better without the EU dimension. In this sense, the Europeanization may remain ‘arrested’ in the HRC (Smith 2017a). The composition of the HRC also constraints potential EU leadership. Sometimes it is more difficult for the EU to operate if many countries often opposing the EU positions are members of the HRC (6, 30, 33, 34, 37, 50). There are also other actors with prominent and visible roles at the HRC. Various competitors for the leadership role include the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the US, China, Russia, South Africa and Cuba. Interestingly, some interviewees thought that a more active US role would decrease EU leadership ambitions (19, 25, 29). Some EU allies were frequently mentioned as competent issue-specific leaders able to play outside the EU framework (4, 8, 19, 30, 33). This group consists of states such as Norway and Switzerland.

Leadership through example

The EU’s normative power image underlines its leadership role through example (Manners 2002). Exemplary leadership requires high domestic standards and practices as well as policy coherence. The interviewees widely perceived the EU’s leadership as emerging through example because it has advanced a comprehensive human rights system and monitoring practices. According to one interviewee, the EU is ‘a paragon of virtue’, and others tend to see the EU as setting a positive example (29). Various human rights monitoring mechanisms, institutions and the Charter of Fundamental Rights were mentioned as good regional examples for others. One interviewee said that ‘the EU plays an important role in showing what a good human rights policy should be like’ (8). Other interviewees mentioned that the EU is skilled in applying its model elsewhere, mainly in Eastern Europe and the Balkans specifically (18). Human rights organisations and EU allies alike underlined the EU’s good human rights record, high standards and openness to NGOs and public opinion as important aspects of the EU’s image. EU support for the UN and its procedures as well as the ICC were appreciated by others. Consequently, one person succinctly claimed that ‘the EU can play moral leadership in the Council’ (13). The EU was also seen strong in its defence and creation of international norms and law (10, 12, 40). Due to high standards set by the EU, others have high expectations regarding its policy proposals (23), which may also lead to disappointments (Hill 1993).

However, not all respondents feel the need to accept and follow the EU’s exemplary leadership role. Especially representatives from developing countries view the EU’s example as ambivalent because of the colonial past. One interviewee noted that ‘the EU has committed the gravest human rights violations in history, and it should bear this in mind when it aims to lead others’ (13). However, still many interviewees within the group accepted the EU’s exemplary leadership role. While the EU’s opponents acknowledged its role in setting a positive example, they often still contest it. Several interviewees claimed that the EU’s expressed values and normative concerns are often compromised by other interests and political calculations (4, 6, 16, 36). In contrast, its allies mainly praised the example set by the EU. This demonstrates how important relation-specific factors are in shaping images of the EU (Chaban and Elgström 2022). Many human rights organisations feel that the EU’s positive example has become more evident in comparison to other HRC members. Even if they criticise the EU, they nonetheless perceive it as a counterforce to actors and states that aim to dilute human rights norms.

The EU example is diminished in the eyes of many others because of its double standards, selectivity in country-specific situations and inability to discuss its own human rights challenges. The EU underlines the importance of the HRC Universal Periodic Review, which monitors the human rights situation in all UN member states. It also calls on all states to fully engage with the UPR (EU Council 2023). However, some interviewees emphasised that EU states do not criticise other Western states or each other during the Universal Periodic Review (6, 16, 20, 30). According to some respondents, the EU member states target developing countries and weaker partners while strategic partners, such as China, can often escape their attention (8, 10, 13, 15, 27). The incoherence of the EU in Israel-Palestine conflict, noted also in the research literature (Galariotis and Gianniou 2022), was mentioned by many informants. The EU’s varying approach to different countries was also considered evident by some interviewees with respect to its country mandates (30, 36). This is in line with the findings of previous studies, according to which others often perceive the EU as being guilty of double standards (Lucarelli 2014b, 438). The importance of coherence was raised in many interviews, with some particularly addressed a lack of coherence regarding the EU’s leadership ambitions: incoherence between Geneva and capitals/Brussels, incoherence between various country cases and incoherence between EU rhetoric and action.

Many respondents also highlighted the incapability of the EU to discuss its own domestic human rights problems, such as the treatment of minorities and migrants (3, 11, 12, 17). One interviewee summarised it as follows: ‘human rights start at home, and this is something the EU should learn’ (15). Unsurprisingly, some EU member states, such as Hungary, were mentioned as spoilers of the EU’s reputation (8, 30, 32, 50). According to another respondent: ‘the EU seems pathologically incapable of having a proper discussion about anything to do with refugees or migrants. It directly becomes defensive … which makes the EU an easy target for others’ (16). Respondents from developing countries and EU opponents especially thought that the EU should be more open to criticism concerning anti-terrorism measures, racism, migration and the treatment of Roma people in Europe (3, 4, 19, 20, 26, 32, 50). This perspective supports previous findings suggesting that the EU’s failure to uphold its values affects external perceptions particularly negatively (Chaban and Elgström 2022, 8). However, it needs to be acknowledged that there were also contrary opinions, as some voiced the opinion that the EU member states have been rather willing to engage with the criticisms directed at them (7). Representatives of human rights organisations also noted that even if the EU’s failures at respecting human rights receive much publicity in the HRC, it does not have as serious problems as other regions of the world.

Cognitive leadership: agenda setting, new initiatives and framing issues

Cognitive leadership is based on ideas and the assumption that leaders can propose new initiatives and frame issues when setting the agenda. Many interviewees, especially in the first round of the interviews, did not perceive the EU as being extremely good at agenda setting. As one respondent noted, ‘action in the HRC is [very] much about agenda setting, and the EU has always been bad at this’ (28). Some human rights organisations especially criticised the EU for its lack of strategic vision and effective planning, which produces suboptimal results (7, 46, 50). Others also accused the EU of having overly generic priorities and presenting the same resolutions in every session (9, 15, 21, 28, 52). Many interviewees noted that individual EU member states often more actively promote new initiatives (8, 12, 13, 16, 38, 40). The increased level of member state activity at the HRC has also been reported by Smith (2017a, 641), partly due to member states’ burden-sharing responsibilities within the EU, but also because they have better possibilities to build successful cross-regional coalitions.

However, the 2021–22 interviews revealed that most believe that the EU’s agenda-setting role has improved of late. Several respondents noted that the EU has worked actively to initiate new country and thematic resolutions (45, 48, 51). The EU has been instrumental in addressing urgent country situations including Myanmar, Belarus, DPRK, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Afghanistan. Furthermore, a historic resolution establishing a mandate of a Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Russia, was presented in 2022 by 26 EU member states. Besides previous thematic initiatives, the interviewees (49, 50, 52) underlined the relevance of the EU-led successful Joint Statement on climate change, environment and human rights (2021). Overall, in 2022 the EU led more initiatives in the multilateral fora than ever before (see EEAS 2023). Interestingly, some mentioned that the EU is a stronger initiator than the US because it deals with all kinds of rights issues that are in the interests of the broader HRC membership (40).

Cognitive leaders should suggest innovative solutions or discover new openings for solving joint problems (Parker, Karlsson, and Hjerpe 2015, 438). Overall, perceptions of the EU’s problem-solving capabilities were seen as issue-specific in nature. Interviewees reportedly consider the EU quite proactive, progressive and engaging on some issues, but weak or passive on other issues. Many interviewees, especially from the developing countries, mentioned that the EU focuses too much on political and civil rights, whereas economic and social rights would be important for the Global South (3, 6, 11, 12). This basic disagreement was seen to diminish the EU’s capability to (re)define issues. Consequently, the EU has strengthened its approach concerning social and economic rights (EEAS 2020, 2023). Many respondents pointed also to difficult EU positions on culturally sensitive and divisive issues, such as the rights of sexual minorities, gender roles and family issues (4, 5, 9, 10, 12). Here the positions of different regional and political groups may contrast EU interpretations (6) and may lead to amendments to draft resolutions sponsored by EU states.⁴ The EU has countered the recent pushback against gender equality and women’s rights in the HRC. The EU has also defended the mandate of the Independent Expert on sexual orientation and gender identity, which has been strongly attacked by some states (EEAS 2023, 135). However, at least so far, most of the amendments that aim to weaken the texts of resolutions on these controversial themes, have been rejected in the HRC. Other difficult themes for the EU include the right to development, international debt, racism and Israel-Palestine conflict (7, 8, 11, 17, 22, 25, 26, 31).

These examples suggest that EU possibilities to successfully (re)define issues are restricted by the differing agendas of HRC participants and increasing contestation over human rights norms, country-specific scrutiny and thematic issues. Interviewees also referred to various potential explanations for EU challenges. First, there is not much room for new resolutions on the overburdened HRC agenda. This may partly explain the EU reluctance to raise too many new issues, as its priority is to make the HRC work effectively (46, 50). The EU is also unwilling to drive some thematic or country-specific topics as they are likely to lead to internal EU disagreements. Several respondents thought that internal EU disagreements or other political processes may sometimes prevent stronger EU action for example in country cases (15, 31, 49). The most evident example of EU disagreement and split concerns Israel-Palestine issues. Overall, the EU does not want to show disunity or lose cases (18, 32, 33, 38). As one interviewee said, the EU is not ready to face the political costs (49). However, it was also mentioned that the Ukraine war will make things different in the Council context (50). The HRC membership of Russia was suspended after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia’s effort to reclaim its seat in the HRC in 2023 GA elections was also blocked.

Entrepreneurial leadership: coalition building and diplomatic skills

Entrepreneurial leadership underlines the negotiation processes and associated skills needed to successfully intervene in controversial matters and produce attractive options for others (Laatikainen 2010, 483). Often, this kind of leadership means a willingness to make compromises. Interviewees mentioned several factors that influence the attractiveness of the EU as a negotiation partner. The diplomatic capacities of the ‘EU collective’ were acknowledged by many, who for example described the EU’s positions and resolutions texts as being well prepared and organised, which attracts others to join them (19, 34, 37). It was also recognised that the EU is ‘everywhere’ and that there will always be some EU states who serve as HRC members representing EU positions (20).

Others mentioned that the EU is the only regional actor that has enduring co-operation with civil society (24, 30) and engages in bilateral dialogues even with many difficult partners (18). However, the major problem for the EU is its practice of negotiating first internally and then having to formulate a common position. Many interviewees mentioned how the EU provides inflexible, ready positions, which others then must either accept or reject. According to one interviewee, ‘the EU kind of imposes its positions on others’ (14), making the EU less appealing as a likely compromiser. Others also complained that there is no transparency in how the EU’s common positions are reached (9, 28), which often leads to surprises that potential partners are not able to foresee (9). Due to its internal coordination and negotiations on common positions, the EU is often considered a rather slow and reactive force. In the HRC, faster action was considered essential in responding to urgent situations (7). Consequently, the need for internal co-operation and compromise can serve to diminish the EU’s entrepreneurial leadership role.

Others mentioned that the divided leadership of the EU, namely the division of competences and issue-specific leadership, can be difficult for outsiders to understand (9, 14, 50). This lack of clarity has caused frustration during negotiations especially among the EU’s potential allies and human rights organisations. The situation reflects a broader EU leadership paradox in foreign policy (Aggestam and Johansson 2017). The EU delegation is unable to adopt a stronger role if there is no internal agreement. According to Smith, the EU delegation role has not changed much in Geneva since the Lisbon Treaty (2017a). However, external actors have recognised the increased visibility of the EU delegation even if its leadership is conditioned by restricted resources. According to some respondents, the delegation ‘is rather a liaison office’ (6) or ‘secretariat’ (38). Despite this shortcoming, most interviewees reportedly feel that the delegation improves the unity of the EU bloc. One respondent also said that the delegation is a more honest negotiator (20). Even if many member states add their national views after the EU statement, not all of them do so. Many representatives of human rights organisations and EU allies expressed the belief that individual member states should deliver more statements because presenting only common statements undermines the EU’s influence (1, 21, 37). Several respondents also repeatedly mentioned that some EU states are rather passive and do not contribute to HRC work. According to one interviewee, individual country activities would be important especially in the case of controversial human rights issues (37).

The EU’s way of negotiating has raised concerns among others. One interviewee underlined a lack of communication as the main problem faced by the EU at the HRC (40). Generally speaking, though, many others expressed the desire for more reciprocity and a better capacity to listen to others and consolidate EU positions. Some interviewees even characterised the EU as ‘an arrogant actor’ (15) ‘showing no empathy’ (25). Such an image makes it difficult to find partners and build coalitions. The EU’s patronising negotiation style especially, detected also in other forums (Lucarelli 2014b), compromises the EU’s leadership potential among the developing countries (12, 22). However, also here opinions differed; some thought that the EU desires dialogue and can balance different views (4, 35, 37). Differences in EU member state negotiation styles were noted by many; some states are more interested in seeking compromise than others. Overall, most interviewees tended to view the EU as a negotiator more willing to make compromises in comparison to the US.

Conclusions

This article has added to the growing body of literature on external perceptions of the EU by focusing on one specific institutional framework, the Human Rights Council. The EU has claimed a leadership role in multilateral human rights diplomacy, but little information exists on how external others recognise this self-declared role. The article used unique interview data among external others and contributed to knowledge regarding perceptions of the EU’s leadership. The findings were reported by following the four dimensions of leadership. According to the findings, the EU can exert structural leadership at the HRC due to its political, economic, diplomatic and even ideational resources. The EU’s human rights model and domestic practices provide legitimacy for its exemplary leadership, even if its credibility is sometimes compromised by perceived double standards and incoherencies. The EU’s cognitive leadership divided opinions, and often the EU finds challenges in initiating or framing issues due to differing views on human rights priorities among the HRC members. Despite the recognised diplomatic skills and cooperation efforts, the entrepreneurial leadership is conditioned by its internal complexity, inability to provide compromises and less sensitive negotiation style.

There were interesting differences among the informants. Overall, all the groups acknowledged the remarkable resources of the EU and its potential to play structural leadership. Not surprisingly, developing and opponent states that often contest EU’s human rights interpretations were more critical concerning its economic and ideological resources. Hence, EU’s normative power is less recognized in this group. According to them, the EU uses its economic leverage to achieve change mainly among the weaker partners. However, the EU was still seen as a soft power in comparison to the US. Representatives of human rights organizations doubted whether the EU achieves as much as its resources and instruments would suggest. According to them, ambitious EU rhetoric sometimes lacks effective implementation. Hence, hopes and expectations regarding the EU remain high, and the findings demonstrate that the EU has not been able to fulfil all these expectations. Its leadership recognition in this respect is then merely potential (Lucarelli 2014b).

Even if EU allies, moderate states and human rights organizations praise the positive example the EU sets for others, among the developing countries this example is not self-evident. In line with previous studies (Chaban and Elgström 2022), also this case demonstrates how the colonial history and relation-specific factors may dim the reputation of the EU, as well as incoherences in EU action and the use of double standards. The confrontations and disagreements inside the EU are often considered harmful for the EU’s role, reputation and effectiveness. As Lucarelli notes (2014b), consistency is essential for credible leadership. However, especially diverse views among the HRC blocs hinder the potential leadership of the EU to define and frame human rights issues. Hence, the roles the EU can play are shaped by the context in which it needs to adapt its leadership role ambitions. Self-evidently, EU opponents are less willing to accept its cognitive leadership and human rights narratives and counter its influence through their alternative initiatives. Consequently, there is also competition over roles. However, the EU has improved its records lately with the launch of new country and thematic initiatives. These may also enable new partnerships. Individual EU states are also more eager to demonstrate their national priorities and work cross-regionally to build successful motions. Finally, the entrepreneurial leadership of the EU divided opinions. Overall, the EU role as a negotiator has potential, but its approach includes also flaws in the eyes of others.

If the two differing timeframes for collecting data are compared, there are similar tendencies in the HRC and in the external perceptions of the EU. The UN human rights bodies remain politicized (Smith 2017b; Voss 2022) and hence, the prospects for EU leadership are always conditional. However, there is also positive developments every now and then. Some actors, such as the EU, US, China and Russia compete for influence on specific issues, which makes it difficult to find agreement. Many developing states may consider cooperation with the EU difficult as they still often perceive it through colonial lenses. The EU does not appear too interested on the priorities of these states. Willingness to listen and the promotion of economic and social rights issues together with the developing states could improve the EU’s image. Second, the leadership potential of the EU depends on its ability to cooperate effectively, flexibly and skilfully with the potential partners. The negotiations need to be reciprocal even if the EU holds the initiative. Third, as the EU is an observer and political bloc, its leadership ambitions may not be so easily accepted. Despite the visible role of the EU delegation, many HRC member states still consider the UN primarily as a forum for national and intergovernmental diplomacy and regional or political organizations, such as the EU, have no legitimacy. Hence, individual EU member states may still have a more privileged and accepted position to lead in some situations, especially in sensitive questions. This may lead to adaptation of the EU’s leadership role strategies and instruments (Harnisch 2011), and hence, be reflected in its human rights approach. Considering the findings, a diversification of leadership may improve EU effectiveness in the longer run instead of always presenting a united EU front (see also Smith 2017a; Tuominen 2022).

However, considering the findings of this article, the case of the HRC is not one where so-called critical expectation gaps seemingly exist (Chaban and Elgström 2022). Instead, external others, including even EU opponents, recognise the EU’s obvious ambitions, investments in diplomatic activities and achievements. Despite sometimes fierce opposition, the EU has played a unique leadership role in supporting the HRC mandate and by focusing on various urgent country cases. This role is essential for the future of the international human rights regime. Its record is even improving in the eyes of human rights organizations with the launch of new country and thematic resolution initiatives. Hence, the gap between internal and external perceptions of leadership in human rights is not necessarily so vast as previously thought, or as wide as it may appear in other policy areas. Issue-specific expectations and evaluation of EU’s role performance are still likely to divide opinions. Especially those cases in which the EU is unable to achieve internal agreement, may disappoint its potential followers and cause expectation gaps.

As this article has demonstrated, there is still constant pressure and need to develop the EU’s potential and a willingness to implement more dedicated and nuanced leadership in the HRC. This role is always related to the wider EU human rights agenda, HRC power relations and external events. On the one hand, it is wise to remain context-sensitive and moderate with the future ambitions of the EU to avoid unrealistic expectations (Hill 1993). On the other hand, the EU needs to use effectively all the opportunities to perform its leadership role when these are on offer. The leadership potential in the HRC develops mainly through committed, constructive and credible action.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Supplemental data

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2024.2351968

Additional information

Funding

The author(s) reported there is no funding associated with the work featured in this article.

Notes

1. The study was requested by the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) and was implemented in January – November 2015, see European Commission: Analysis of the perception of the EU and of EU’s policies abroad, https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/stories/analysis-perception-eu-and-eus-policies-abroad_en.

2. The US did not join the HRC when it was founded in 2006, after which it reactivated its position and held memberships in 2010–2015 (2 terms) and in 2017–2018, during which time it withdrew its membership. The US re-joined the HRC to serve the term 2022–2024.

3. GRULAC refers to the UN regional group of Latin America and Caribbean states.

4. After tabling draft resolutions may be subject to changes. Amendments are proposed by other delegations, and they are not accepted by the main sponsors of resolutions. Amendments can be withdrawn if the sponsors agree to make some changes to resolution texts. If not, then amendments are voted upon and in most of the cases rejected.