Religion as a troublesome resource in Finnish abortion debates

ABSTRACT

Abortion is a highly contested issue and one where the fault lines are often drawn along religious lines. In the United States, the most famous and timely example, anti-abortion attitudes and activism are strongly identified with conservative Christian values. But what is the role of religion in abortion debates in a more secularised context? Does religion ‘work’ as a justification for opposing abortion rights in such contexts? We analyse debates in the Finnish parliament regarding two Citizen’s Initiatives concerning abortion. Using discourse analysis and descriptive statistics of speech patterns and voting behaviour, we draw three conclusions from the parliamentary material: (1) religious discourse is rarely used; (2) it is not effective, and its use is considered inappropriate; and (3) voting patterns in abortion cases are better explained by instrumental than religious concerns. Although the Finnish political system is not particularly secularist, the secularisation of political culture means that religion is marginalised as a source for justifying politics. In other words, religion is a troublesome resource for political legitimation in the Finnish context.

KEYWORDS:

• Abortion
• Finland
• politics
• religion
• secularisation

Introduction

Abortion rights have made headlines worldwide because of recent political and judicial developments in the United States. Famously, President Donald Trump named three conservative judges to the Supreme Court, overturning the landmark abortion decision Roe v. Wade from 1973. The case has been the essential reference in one of the country’s most divisive ‘culture war’ debates, with conservative US evangelicals rallying in opposition. In a seeming victory for religious conservatives, the 2022 decision enabled many anti-abortion state legislators to limit abortion access in many parts of the country.

However, the United States has been considered a special case among western countries regarding its religiosity, even if it is not exempt from secularisation as has sometimes been claimed (Voas and Chaves 2016). The American approach to human rights is also somewhat different from, for example, continental Europe (see e.g. Richardson 2007). This article examines recent abortion debates in the rather different political context of Finland. As a country, Finland is more secularised (Inglehart 2021, 24–29). It has a multi-party political system (Pekonen 2008), a continental legal system (David and Brierley 1978), and a society with a more homogenous population, higher social cohesion, and institutional trust (Kouvo et al. 2012). As such, it offers an illuminating case study regarding religion in a secular political context and concerning a subject – abortion – where conservative Christian interests are often at play.

Finland is best viewed as part of Northern Europe with a similar welfare-state model and religious makeup to its western neighbours (Sweden, Norway, and Denmark). Like most European countries, Finland has a ‘national church’ with a historical special position, reflected in legislation, demographics, and national culture. In 2023 roughly 65% of Finns were officially members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland (Suomen evankelis-luterilainen kirkko). However, participation rates in church services are very low (only about 7% of Finns participate in ecclesiastical services once a month or more), and only about 35% of Finns believe in God, for example (ISSP 2018). Finnish society is generally secularised, although the Lutheran Church is specifically mentioned in the Constitution and it has, alongside the much smaller Orthodox Church of Finland (Suomen ortodoksinen kirkko), the special right to collect church tax (Kääriäinen 2011; Kotiranta 2021). Cultural details reflecting the Lutheran Church’s unique and privileged place are too numerous to list. However, it is sufficient to say that in Finnish everyday speech, religious discourse itself is moulded by the Lutheran template for understanding religion (Moberg et al. 2015, 59–62). Immigration to Finland has always been relatively low and, for example, Muslims – the biggest non-Christian religious minority – compose approximately only 2% of the population.

Using a mixed methods approach, we investigate the role of religion in the abortion debates in the Finnish parliament from 2010 to 2022. We ask, first, which discourses are used to argue for or against abortion. We are especially interested in the use (or lack thereof) of religious discourse. Second, we ask whether religious discourse has any notable impact on the discussions. In other words: what is the political use-value of religion in an issue like abortion? Finally, we analyse the voting behaviour of the parties and MPs on two different issues relating to abortion. We conclude by observing that the expediency of religious legitimations of politics is very limited in the Finnish context. Although the Finnish political system is not particularly secularist (à la France’s laïcité), the secularisation of political culture means that religion is marginalised as a source for justifying politics.

Materials and methods

This study is part of a larger analysis of the role of religion in the Finnish parliament between 2010 and 2024 in the Academy of Finland funded LEGITREL project, led by Titus Hjelm.¹ We identified two major discussions concerning abortion. Both were introduced to the parliament through a Citizen’s Initiative (KAA 2/2015 and KAA 8/2020).² Our primary data consists of the transcripts of the plenary sessions where the initiatives were debated (PTK 47/2015, PTK 74–77/2015, PTK 66/2021, PTK 113/2022, PTK 115–116/2022). All materials are available digitally with the provided document identifiers via the parliament’s website.³ The choice of materials is informed by our discourse analytical approach that zooms in on the dialogical aspects of parliamentary debates and, particularly, on how political positions are legitimated.

Our approach combines qualitative discourse analysis with quantitatively comparing discourse use instances and voting results. We understand discourses broadly as ‘ways of referring to or constructing knowledge about a particular topic of practice’ (Hall 1997, 6). However, since we are not tracing institution-specific discourses, we look for discourses with general prominence and recognisability beyond the material at hand. In this view, a discourse is a linguistic practice with some history and established ways of constructing its objects. In the first part of the analysis, we identify distinctive ways of constructing abortion and the justifications for supporting or opposing abortion rights. Put differently, we analyse instances of discourses – in the plural – in the parliamentary debates.

Secondly, we follow Hjelm’s (2020) suggestion, drawing from David Silverman (2005) and others, that discourse use can be investigated as sequences or dialogue. The point is that we can analyse the variety in constructing the object of discussion by looking at instances. However, such discourse analytical approaches rarely say much about the efficacy of the studied discourses. Counting tells us something, but the numbers in isolation do not help us to gauge the discourses’ reception. We can mitigate this shortcoming by switching the view from instances to sequences – discourses as links in a chain of debate. The dialogical genre of parliamentary debate is a good match for this approach. We will trace systematically whether religious discourse gives rise to any responses from other MPs, and if it does, how these MPs react to it. This approach enables us to assess whether religious language is a practical resource for political legitimation.

We coded a mention of a particular discourse once per an individual MP’s speech on the parliament floor, but one speech could include several different discourses (see Table 1 below). We also coded the party the MP in question represented, thus enabling an easy crosstabulation of discourse uses per party. Importantly, the mere presence of discourse was not enough: we coded such a case only if it was unambiguously used to argue for or against broad abortion rights.⁴ After coding and crosstabulation, we used these results to gain a general picture of discourses used in the said debates and to compare different parties and party types.

Table 1. Main discourses in the abortion debates.

Discourse	Example (translation)	Occurrences*
Human rights (excluding freedom of religion)	‘As these things are weighted against each other, my conclusion is to place the basic right of all women to bodily autonomy as the highest possible value’. (Kristiina Salonen, Social Democrats, PTK 75/2015)	101
International comparison	‘Those considering abortion here in Finland will have to go thru a strict and needlessly complicated process compared to other European countries’. (Saara Hyrkkö, Green League. PTK 66/2021)	88
Medical	‘The human biological life starts at fertilisation. This initiative aims to enable abortion on any grounds up until 12 weeks of pregnancy. At that age, the foetus has a beating heart. The baby will suck its fingers and toes and roll in the uterus’. (Päivi Räsänen, Christian Democrats. PTK 66/2021).	70
Sociological	‘I want to emphasise that free and safe abortion is not in contradiction with aims to curb the number of unintended pregnancies. One cannot decrease the number of abortions by limiting the right to abortion, but with available health care, improved access to contraception, and increased sexual rights’. (Mai Kivelä, Left Alliance. PTK 66/2021)	64
Freedom of religion (including conscience)	‘We must remember that if a person feels, due to their confession, that they are about to end an unborn life, it is quite cold-hearted to say that you must do it regardless of your feelings. It is a human right to have this freedom to choose […]’. (Mika Niikko, Finns Party. PTK 47/2015)	55
Compassion	‘Perhaps my main concern [with the proposal] is whether the woman would have to face increased pressure and possibly judgmental thoughts in an already difficult situation’. (Sari Multala, National Coalition. PTK 47/2015)	47
Social change and progress	‘Our national legislation is very old in this case. The law, passed 50 years ago in 1970, requires detailed grounds for the abortion and separate statements from two doctors’. (Timo Heinonen, National Coalition. PTK 66/2021)	29
Economic	‘In my response, I inquired how we make sure – in Europe, where we have free movement – that people who have [health care] education from a country where freedom of conscience [to abstain from abortion on confessional grounds] is granted can enter the labour market in Finland, where this freedom does not exist’. (Päivi Räsänen, Christian Democrats. PTK 75/2015)	18
Religious	‘Every life is unmeasurably valuable and unique. Life is sacred and created by God’. (Mikko Kinnunen, Centre Party. PTK 66/2021)	13

*A discourse is counted only once per speech, but a speech can have multiple different discourses.

Since we focus on religious discourse, more clarification regarding its definition is in order. Based on our understanding of the prevalent religious discourse in Finland (Moberg et al. 2015, 59–62) and also as members of the linguistic community in question, we define religious discourse as a discourse that appeals to supernatural authority (e.g. God), to textual representations of such authority (e.g. the Bible), or to any institution, symbol, or practice concerned with such authority (e.g. church). A discourse is coded as religiously legitimated if it appeals to any of the above as a source of knowledge or political authority. This excludes secular-coded sources such as the law, budget, or academic expertise. It also excludes freedom of religion, which does refer to religion but only as an object of secular legislation.

In our comparison of party types, we utilise Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data averages regarding the LRGEN (general left versus right) and GALTAN (a multifaceted scale that can be interpreted as measuring liberal versus conservative values in the Finnish context) scales (Jolly et al. 2022). There are eight parties in total.⁵ Based on the scale averages from the period under investigation, Finland has five right-wing parties: National Coalition Party (Kokoomus), Swedish People’s Party (Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue), the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset), Christian Democrats (Kristillisdemokraatit), and the Centre Party (Keskusta). The first two are liberal, and the others are conservative parties. Although Finland’s Green League (Vihreät) does not identify as a left-wing party, on these comparative scales it sits with the other two left-wing and liberal parties, the Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto) and the Social Democrats (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue).

Abortion on the political agenda

The Finnish Act on Induced Abortions (Laki raskauden keskeyttämisestä) came into effect in 1970. No major legal changes occurred until November 2022 (see below). The 1970 law allowed abortion if certain conditions were met. If the woman was under 17 years old, over 40 years old, or had given birth to at least two children, and the pregnancy had not progressed past the twelfth week, the abortion could be performed with the permission of one doctor. Much more commonly, however, abortion has been requested on what has been referred to as ‘social’ grounds (e.g. the parents would be unable to take care of the child, the child would cause considerable strain on the woman, or there is a crime involved). In such a case, an agreement between two doctors was required.

Regardless of abortion grounds, if the pregnancy had progressed past the twelfth week, permission had to be requested from the National Supervisory Authority for Welfare and Health (Valvira), with the upper limit of 24 weeks. If there was a danger to the woman’s life or health, abortion could be performed with the consent of two doctors, regardless of the duration of the pregnancy. Permission from Valvira is always needed if the ground for abortion is a severe condition or malformation of the foetus. Although the 12-week upper limit is the most common one in Europe, Finland’s abortion practices have been tightly regulated compared to most European countries, where abortion can be granted upon request (Center for Reproductive Rights 2021; Exelgyn 2021).

About 8,300 abortions were performed in Finland (population 5.5 million) in 2020, with the annual number steadily declining since 2004 (THL 2021). In a European comparison, Finland has fewer abortions than the average. In 2019 the abortion rate in Finland (using the World Health Organization’s metric, abortions per 1,000 live births) was 191, while the Nordic average (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland) was 256, and the European Union average was 210 (WHO 2022).

However, Finland is among the minority of European countries that do not officially allow healthcare professionals to refuse to perform an abortion on confessional grounds (also called conscientious objection), which, in practice, usually involves religious reasons. Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic do not grant such a right, while 21 EU countries do (Heino et al. 2013). In such countries, if a doctor or nurse refuses on grounds of conscience to participate in abortions, workplace arrangements can be made by public and private healthcare employers. However, there are no legal obligations to do this in Finland.

The first Citizen’s Initiative (KAA 2/2015) we assess in this article tackled this precise issue. It was titled Omatunnonvapaus (‘Freedom of Conscience’) and written by Christian Democrat MP Sari Tanus and medical doctor Jemina Ahola. The initiative sought to enable healthcare personnel to refuse to perform an abortion on ‘confessional grounds’, which referred mainly to religious and especially Christian convictions. The right would also have been extended to medical studies so that future nurses and doctors could refuse to participate in abortions during their practical training. The initiative did garner some support from right-wing and conservative parties and created a relatively long debate, but eventually failed to pass in the vote.

The second Citizen’s Initiative (KAA 8/2020) analysed here aimed, instead, to renew the Finnish abortion law in a more liberal direction, easing access to abortion. It was titled Oma tahto 2020 (‘My Choice 2020’) and was authored by various active citizens and human rights NGO representatives. The initiative also created a lengthy debate, but this time the initiative passed in the parliamentary vote. However, the final proposal the vote addressed was slightly changed from the original by the parliamentary Social Affairs and Health Committee, although it maintained the core aspects of the Citizen’s Initiative. As of November 2022, the Finnish law on abortion requires a statement from only one doctor instead of two. Furthermore, until the twelfth week, no social or other grounds for abortion need to be established, as the patient’s request is now sufficient. Additionally, the renewal removed some archaic word choices from the law, including ‘feeble-minded’ (vajaamielinen) and ‘disturbed functioning of the soul’ (häiriintynyt sieluntoiminta).

It is notable, however, that these two initiatives with slightly different subject matters evolved into quite similar general abortion debates. In both cases, the speeches revolved around the general morality of abortion and the right to access it. Due to this similarity, we examine the debates together below.

Discourses in the abortion debates

After coding the discourses from the parliamentary debates, we disregarded the discourses with less than ten instances. Using this criterion, nine major discourses emerged from the material used to argue for or against broad abortion rights. The discourses are (in the order of prevalence): human rights, international comparison, medical, sociological, freedom of religion, compassion, societal change and progress, economic, and religious. Table 1 presents the number of occurrences and an example from the material.⁶

Notably, religious discourse was the least popular way to argue for or against broad abortion rights among these top discourses. Even conservative Christian MPs often opt for secular alternatives such as human rights discourse or medical discourse. This is in line with the linguistic aspect of secularisation: that religious language has lost most of its convincing power (Brown 2009). Hjelm (2015, 15) has used the term ‘internal secularisation of discourse’ to refer to a discursive shift where people still talk about religion, but do not use religious language.

Further details emerge by examining how discourses are used among different parties and party types. These are presented in Tables 2 and 3. In Table 3, we have separate columns for the conservative parties without the Finns Party, as the far-right Finns are a special case in many ways. By examining these different types of conservatives (far-right and non-far-right) separately, we aim to tease out their potential differences. When assessing the results below, we also consider the qualitative ways different actors utilised these discourses in the material.

Table 2. Percentage of speeches that contain a specific discourse. Per party.

Table 3. Percentages of speeches that contain a specific discourse. Per party type.

Some vital left versus right and liberal versus conservative differences are apparent, depending on the discourse. Two of the most popular discourses (human rights and international comparison) were used consistently by all. However, appeals to basic and human rights (other than freedom of religion) are more common on the left and among the liberal parties. In these debates, the left-leaning and liberal use of human rights discourse was primarily concerned with women’s right to bodily autonomy. The right-wing conservative uses of human rights discourse referred mainly to the right to life.

Medical discourse is an interesting case, as it was used prominently on the conservative side but, to a lesser extent, by some liberal MPs also. One way to use it was to appeal to one’s medical credentials. Sari Tanus and Päivi Räsänen are medical doctors, MPs of the conservative, right-wing, and Christian-identifying Christian Democrats Party, and among the most vocal opponents of broad abortion rights in the parliamentary debates. Mirka Soinikoski from the Green League (supporter of broad abortion rights) also referred to her medical background. Another instance of medical discourse was, on the conservative side, the argument regarding the origin point of human life. For example, Räsänen stated that ‘in the biological sense, the life of a human individual begins at fertilisation’ (PTK 66/2021). Most liberal instances of medical discourse use occurred together with the sociological discourse, where access to health care services and the related social impact was assessed.

Sociological discourse and compassion discourse were also used across the board, although sociological discourse was particularly prominent on the left. One could argue against abortion rights using sociological discourse by asserting, for example, that the state could better organise adoption services; a more moral way to engage the problem of unwanted newborns. Yet, other politicians used sociological discourse to point out that enabling conscientious objection to perform an abortion would lead to regional inequality, as abortion access would be in danger in rural Finland, where there are fewer doctors. Compassion discourse, in turn, emphasised the humanely challenging nature of abortion as a decision and process and was used similarly by different political actors.

Some discourses were more divisive. Importantly, only right-wing parties appealed to freedom of religion. More accurately, all parties using freedom of religion discourse were conservative parties. The same is true for religious discourse, and these are indeed connected, as some conservative MPs have religious motives for advancing limits on abortion rights or enabling conscientious objection to performing an abortion on confessional grounds.

Discourse on social change and progress, however, was emphasised among left-wing and liberal MPs. Instances of this discourse involve references to the age of the Finnish abortion law (dating from 1970) and the general direction of abortion rights in the rest of Europe. Finnish law was described as archaic. While religion is not usually explicitly mentioned here, the discourse on social progress can also be read as a reference to secularisation paired with liberalisation. What is conveyed, then, is that Finland was more religious in the 1970s and is now less so – this is empirically indeed the case – and legislation should reflect this change.

Finally, economic discourse played a minor role and was used similarly by different parties. It was used mainly in reference to the resources of the health care services. Arguments were made that by changing the legislation in a particular direction, healthcare could be organised more efficiently.

Religious discourse and its reception

As mentioned, all 13 instances of religious discourse were used by right-wing and conservative parties. Most of these were assertions that life is sacred or of divine origin, and thus, abortion rights should be limited, such as in these examples:

First, I must say that unborn life is sacred for many. A nurse or midwife, who desires freedom of conscience, does not want to refuse to treat a patient, as some have claimed here, but refuses to end an unborn life. These values may arise from the Bible as well as from the Quran. Why would we not want to respect their values and fear of God since this matter is so quickly organised in other ways? (Mika Niikko, Finns Party. PTK 47/2015.)

Every life is immeasurably valuable and unique. Life is sacred and created by God. (Mikko Kinnunen, Centre Party. PTK 66/2021.)

It is completely obvious to me that it [life] begins at fertilisation, and on these grounds, destroying life is wrong, against the sanctity of life and against the respect it commands. (Toimi Kankaanniemi, Finns Party. PTK 113/202.)

The second most common type of religious talk was Bible references or quotations. Some were quotations from Psalm 139, which, notably, is among the favourite Bible sections of the American anti-abortion movement. Journalist David Van Biema (2012) wrote in the Washington Post about the use of Psalm 139 in various pro-life contexts, including as a name (the ‘Psalm 139 Project’) for a programme by the Southern Baptist Convention aiming to fund ultrasounds in pregnancy centres. Its use in a similar context by a Finnish politician is a fine example of how discourse travels internationally, particularly among well-networked conservative Christians:

Currently, this issue is circumvented with practical means in Finland, which is good. I do not recall a doctor being fired due to refraining from, for example, writing a statement supporting a patient’s abortion. This is Pharisean. We have a particular view on the matter but still allow it in practice. (Timo Soini, Finns Party. PTK 47/2015.)

Here, I cannot but mention what the Bible says in Psalm 139 about human life before birth. These wise words are as follows: [cites Psalm 139:13–14, 16] ‘For thou hast possessed my reins: thou hast covered me in my mother’s womb. (…)’ Such wisdom about life has been written for a couple of thousands of years. (Mika Niikko, Finns Party. PTK 66/2021.)⁷

As mentioned, we wanted to move beyond instances of discourse and analyse religious discourse in sequences to assess its impact on the general debate. From this perspective, the analysis is clear: In most cases, there were no reactions to the religious content in MPs speeches. When religious discourse appeared on the parliament floor, it did not get a reaction, and if it did, the most likely was to disagree politely. The following two quotes are responses to Timo Soini’s speech, the one quoted above, mentioning the Pharisees:

This is the practical way of addressing the matter we have, and my view differs from [that of] the Minister of Foreign Affairs Soini, who just stated that this is somehow Pharisean. We have practices that work. (Tuula Haatainen, Social Democrats. PTK 47/2015.)

It is an entirely different matter that healthcare working communities and organisations can take care of the wellbeing of each other and can be flexible and supportive in a collegial spirit. I do not understand how it is Pharisean to organise work tasks in a practical manner so that everyone feels good about their work and gets the job done. (Ilkka Kantola, Social Democrats. PTK 47/2015.)

In a way, Soini – who famously converted to Catholicism in the 1980s and is well-known for his Bible references in the style exemplified above (Parkkinen 2017) – successfully employed religious discourse since the political opponents immediately recognised the reference and reacted to it, using the term ‘Pharisean’ chosen by Soini. However, both respondents were also unconvinced by the choice of metaphor.

The following quotation was a response to the speech by Mika Niikko quoted above, where Psalm 139 was mentioned:

The previous speech was quite familiar from my childhood, as my mother is a municipal councillor of the Christian Democrats in Äänekoski. I think that everyone has freedom of religion and all of us have the right to think what we want, but at the same time, I argue that one’s conviction cannot hinder and, in a sense, prevent other people’s choices regarding their bodies. I believe every person has the right to this choice from their perspective. (Bella Forsgren, Green League. PTK 66/2021.)

Forsgren (who supported broad abortion rights) responded calmly by telling a personal anecdote and conveying that she understands the value of freedom of religion while disagreeing about the proper emphasis on different human rights here.

As a final example, the following was a response to another reference to Psalm 139 by Finns Party MP Mika Niikko, a Pentecostal Christian. This was also simultaneously a response to another speech by Teuvo Hakkarainen (Finns Party) where the sanctity of life was mentioned:

It is challenging to speak neutrally here, especially now, when some have talked about taking a life and acting as an executioner and cited the Bible. I will strive for a neutral style, regardless. (Sari Multala, National Coalition. PTK 47/2015.)

Multala’s response is the most negative reaction in our material, showing mild contempt for strong religious language in a parliamentary setting, conveying that it is improper. Clearly, religious discourse did not function as a provocation either, as political opponents remained calm and collected.

Now, one could argue that the point of parliamentary discussions is not really to have a constructive dialogue in the ideal sense (where an MP could be expected to, for example, change their mind after being convinced by opposing arguments) but rather to demonstrate to the voter base that the MPs are doing the work expected of them, which is advancing particular political viewpoints (Pekonen 2008; see Hjelm 2014, 32). However, even if many of the speeches are prepared in advance, the style of the talk reveals that equally many are reactions to things heard on the floor. A discourse may be deemed powerful or impactful if it is repeated approvingly, in the extreme case becoming hegemonic – that is, becoming a discourse that is taken for granted (Fairclough 1992). In this sense, secular discourses had more effect than religious ones, as MPs reacted to them more, and specifically, repeated them, thus ‘solidifying’ their message.

The secularisation of parliamentary discourse is further demonstrated by the fact that religious discourse was always supported by other, non-religious discourses (e.g. medical or legal) within the same speech – as if the speaker knew that this type of language would not be sufficient here. Additionally, more religiously engaged language, such as Bible-quoting, could be preceded by almost apologetic language (‘I cannot but mention’). Often, religious language was also framed as a personal affair (‘I was touched by’, ‘As a Christian, I … ’). Although it may convince voters of the politician’s good character, in the broader context of parliamentary discourse, declaring this kind of personal stake in the matter weakens the facticity and appropriateness of the account (Potter 1996, 122). It seems, then, that the parliamentary setting restricts religious speech in several informal ways.

Voting behaviour changes

In the last part of the analysis, we looked at the parliamentary votes regarding abortion-related debates. The Finnish parliament consists of 200 MPs with one vote each. The 2015 vote concerned the right of healthcare personnel to refuse to perform an abortion on confessional grounds. The 2022 vote, concluding the discussion started by the Citizen’s Initiative in 2020, was about the general renewal of the law and allowing easier access to abortion. As mentioned, the issues at hand were slightly different but both debates evolved into similar general abortion debates in parliament. Therefore, we compare the two votes in this manner, where we trace pro-abortion and anti-abortion votes (or, more accurately: votes for or against broad abortion rights) per party and party type. These are presented in Table 4.

Table 4. Pro- and anti-abortion votes* in 2015 and 2022 among different parties and party types.

*‘Pro’ and ‘anti’ refer to either supporting or opposing broad abortion rights, including weighing them against the freedom of religion of healthcare personnel. Propagation of a complete abortion ban is a fringe position in the Finnish parliament; most MPs grouped as ‘anti-abortion’ here would allow abortion in special circumstances, such as when the mother’s life is in jeopardy, or they would allow it as per the more restrictive 1970 law.

Left-wing and liberal parties were consistently for broad abortion rights in both votes. Right-wing and conservative parties, as might be expected, opposed broad abortion rights more than other parties. Furthermore, more MPs from such parties voted against broad abortion rights in the 2022 vote. However, this only holds if the Finns Party is included: it is the Finns Party where the most dramatic shift in voting behaviour occurred (43% opposed in 2015, but 82% in 2022). In contrast, the fellow conservative right-wing Centre Party voted slightly more progressively in 2022. Right-wing and conservative Christian Democrats were consistently against broad abortion rights. We assess these details in the discussion section below.

Discussion

It is already quite telling that religious discourse scores the lowest out of the major discourses used to argue for or against abortion in our data. This connects with the previous observation by Mustonen et al. (2017), according to which ‘religious or magical thinking’ was relatively rare in Finnish and Irish parliamentary debates on abortion. This means that using religious discourse is more trouble than it is worth. Other discourses work better strategically regardless of the motivations behind their use. To return to comparisons between Finland and the United States, the sociologist Steve Bruce (2011, 171) has noted that even the US Christian Right must now fight its culture wars regarding abortion, creationism, and other topics using mainly secular language, demonstrating that secularised liberal democracy has removed any viability of theocracy. Similarly, we found that the most popular ways to argue both for and against broad abortion rights were human rights discourse, the discourse of international comparison, and medical discourse. In our assessment, these correspond with the prominent ways of discussing abortion among the Finnish general public as well.

Freedom of religion discourse and religious discourse were the most divisive discourses regarding party types, since these were the only discourses never used by left-wing or liberal parties. Indeed, freedom of religion discourse often amounts to – and in our case, clearly did amount to – a strategic masking of religious concerns, repackaging religious aims into a more palatable secular argument (see Cohen 2005). Using this strategy outside parliament, the most famous Finnish Christian MP Päivi Räsänen even went viral in the international media (albeit resonating particularly well with Christian outlets and audiences) from 2021 onwards. After her Bible-quoting social media post attacking sexual minorities was investigated by the police, she claimed that her freedom of religion and freedom of speech were now in jeopardy.

Unlike voting behaviour (see below), discourse use was not remarkably different in the Finns Party compared to other conservative or right-wing parties. There were only minor differences in general in the frequency of use of different discourses among different party types. All parties shared the secular nature of most language used and agreed on the most effective ways to discuss divisive issues.

The Finnish parliament, then, is not a good environment for religious language, but this is not because of secularism, or written rules about the separation of religion and state. Rather, it is about secularisation, a gradual decrease of religious language over the decades, where occasional Bible mentions now stand out like a sore thumb. In our case, legitimating politics with religion was mainly ignored or responded to with mild contempt, conveying that such language is improper in this setting. Furthermore, religious discourse always required support from other, more prominent discourses presented within the same speech. The expediency of religious discourse is thus negligible, even when religious interests are clearly at play. However, if we treat parliamentary speech as a performance to an audience outside the chamber itself, then the rare instances may be effective. Christian conservative voters do exist in Finland and favour conservative parties, albeit in relatively small numbers.⁸

Regarding the voting behaviour changes from 2015 and 2022, the left-leaning and liberal parties remained consistently in favour of broad abortion rights. In contrast, there were notable changes in the conservative voting patterns. In both votes (2015 and 2022), the conservative votes, in general, were split, but the three conservative parties making up these votes are each a different story. Christian Democrats, the only unambiguously Christian conservative party in the parliament, were consistently and unanimously against broad abortion rights in both votes. In contrast, the Centre Party, an agrarian but generalist centre-right party, voted slightly more progressively in 2022. The most remarkable change occurred within the far-right populist Finns Party, which, in contrast to the Centre Party, voted notably more strongly against broad abortion rights in 2022.

The reason for the Christian Democrats’ firm position is self-explanatory: abortion is one of their core issues. In contrast, the progressive development of the Centre Party in this question is most likely part of their general development in a generalist and more secular direction. The Centre Party, founded in 1906 as the Agrarian League, has its background partly in Christian revival movements and still maintains strong support in historical areas of the revival movements. This refers to the rural areas of Western and Northern Finland, where the population has historically been more religious and conservative. However, the party has gradually evolved into one that rarely refers to religion in politics today, distinguishing it from some of its voters (Äystö 2020).

The Centre Party was also in the Government in 2022. During the tenure of the Sanna Marin government (Social Democrat, Centre, Green, Left, and Swedish People’s Party, 2019–2023), the Centre Party was known as the dissenter, with several highly publicised disagreements with the governmental majority regarding the rural Centre Party’s core issues (e.g. crop farming, forestry, meat industry, fur farming, and peat production). In this context, perhaps abortion was not seen as a topic worth fighting over with the other coalition partners. Also, abortion is one of the topics in Finnish parliamentary culture – but not in any procedural rules – that are referred to as ‘matters of conscience’. In these questions involving deeply held moral convictions, parties renege on party discipline and let their MPs vote as they prefer, without fear of reprisals.

The Finns Party, in turn, was firmly split in the 2015 vote (35% pro, 43% anti, 22% abstaining or absent). At the time, they were part of the ruling coalition and led by Timo Soini, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and famous for his opposition to abortion. Soini commanded quite high respect in his party but did not appear to steer the votes of the party’s MPs on this issue, treating it as a ‘matter of conscience’. Presumably, this involved religious convictions among some MPs, particularly those who voiced them during the debates.

In the 2022 vote, however, the Finns Party took a remarkably clear stance against broad abortion rights in the voting (8% pro, 82% anti, 11% abstaining or absent). However, it is challenging to pinpoint religious reasons for this change, nor has abortion recently been on the party’s agenda as such. The amount of religious language preceding these two votes in parliament was similar, and there has not been any religious resurgence within the Finns Party. Indeed, the opposite is true regarding its chairs: Jussi Halla-aho and Riikka Purra, who followed the openly Christian Timo Soini as chair, have described themselves as non-religious. Abortion has not been mentioned in the Finns Party programmes since Soini departed as its chair in 2017, nor has the party actively campaigned against abortion. In sum, abortion was a minor agenda issue during the 2015 vote, and basically a non-issue during the 2022 vote. Why do the voting results then signal the opposite?

One important factor to consider is the political change within the Finns Party. The price former chair Timo Soini paid for the 2011 landslide victory was the entry of far-right activists into the party, who garnered much support with their anti-immigration views (Horsti and Saresma 2021). During the 2015 vote examined above, the Finns Party was still chaired by Timo Soini. In other words, the party was still transforming into a European-style far-right party, not unlike Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland) or The Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), which it is today. The transformation culminated in 2017 when immigration hardliners dethroned Soini. Since then, ‘culture war’ influences, imported primarily from the United States, have become increasingly common in the party: the politics of identity – especially in the form of opposing leftism, feminism, green politics, etc. – has become part of the Finns Party’s core themes (Ylä-Anttila, Eranti, and Hardwick 2020). In brief, the party changed internally between the two votes examined here.

However, we would argue that it was even more crucial that the Finns Party was not in government at the time of the 2022 vote, unlike during the 2015 vote. Their location in the opposition remains the most viable explanation of their voting shift: In 2022, it appears, they primarily wanted to oppose the government. It is contextually important – keeping in mind the previous point regarding the ‘culture war shift’ within the Finns Party – that the government explicitly identified as feminist and was led by a progressive Social Democrat. For the Finns Party, these were reasons enough to oppose anything the government proposed.

While Christian identification has shown its political expediency for the far-right parties of Europe (Peker and Laxer 2021, 318), it is mostly relevant to questions of national identity, where ‘Christian heritage’ is invoked in order to oppose Muslim immigration. Brubaker (2017) calls this instrumental use of Christianity among far-right parties ‘Christianism’. Because the abortion debates had few connections to national identity and because there was no sudden increase in religious MPs between the two votes, Christianity as the source of the Finns Party opposition to broader abortion rights seems untenable.

Conclusion

Zielińska et al. (2023) argue, in the context of Polish parliamentary abortion debates, that the viability of religion as a justification tool in various discursive battles can be seen as an indicator of the more general presence of religion in the public sphere. In the Finnish parliamentary context, this would seem to ring true: religion is both a B-grade tool in the rhetorical toolbox and a relatively rare encounter. Thus, we call religion a ‘troublesome resource’ in secular Finnish politics.

In general, Finnish voters tend to view religious influence in politics with suspicion (Lövheim et al. 2018, 151–153; Hjelm et al. 2023), and this is reflected both in the small number of openly religious MPs and in the limited use of explicit religious language in parliament. The secularisation of parliamentary discourse is best demonstrated by the fact that even religious MPs must resort to other discourses to advance their (conservative) politics, as we have shown in our analysis of the Finnish abortion debates of 2015 and 2021.

Abortion remains a highly contested issue and one where the fault lines are often drawn along religious lines, as in the United States. In Finland, only the very small Christian Democrats Party lives up to the image of religiously motivated opposition to abortion. But even they hardly ever legitimated their political position with reference to God, the Bible, or other religious sources of authority in these debates. Because of a secularised political culture, using secular discourse is more politically expedient in the Finnish context. Considering that speeches on the parliament floor are public performances and actually directed as much if not more to constituents than to fellow MPs, this cannot be explained simply as the political ‘elites’ being estranged from their voter base. Some argue that in the context of a North European welfare regime such as Finland, religion may be an enduring, even growing topic of discussion. However, our analysis shows that as a source of political legitimacy, it is much more troublesome.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This research is part of the LEGITREL (2020–2024) project, supported by the Academy of Finland, grant number [334157].

Notes on contributors

Tuomas Äystö

Tuomas Äystö is postdoctoral researcher in Study of Religion, University of Helsinki. Äystö has focused on societal topics such as politics, media, and law. His dissertation (2019) addressed the contemporary Nordic blasphemy law, and he has since studied religion in the Finnish parliament and various religion-related ‘culture war’ topics, such as abortion, freedom of religion, and secularisation.

Titus Hjelm

Titus Hjelm is a Professor in the Study of Religion, University of Helsinki. Previously he was Reader in Sociology at University College London. His research interests include religion and social change, religion and politics, social theory, and methodology of the social sciences. He is the PI of the Academy of Finland funded project LEGITREL (2020–2024), and the Kone Foundation funded project RELIACT (2023–2026). He is the Editor in Chief of Sociology of Religion and current President of the Finnish Society for the Study of Religion.

Notes

1. The research in question utilises only publicly available materials concerning policymaking (documents from the Parliament of Finland). The data does not contain any personal or sensitive information. As such, research utilising this data does not require a review and approval by an institutional ethics board or The Finnish National Board on Research Integrity TENK. Furthermore, our research is also in full compliance with the Research Ethics: Guidelines for arts, humanities, and social sciences journals of the publisher Taylor & Francis.

2. Citizen’s Initiatives were introduced in 2012 as new form of legislative proposal. In an online service hosted by the Ministry of Justice, a citizen of Finland may propose a change to legislation. The initiative has six months to gather a minimum of 50,000 signed statements of support from other Finnish citizens. If the limit is reached within this time, parliament has to consider the proposal. Thus far, six Citizen’s Initiatives have led to new legislation.

3. A practical way to trace the documents related to the investigated Citizen’s Initiatives is the page describing the parliamentary process for each initiative. For KAA 2/2015, see: https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/KasittelytiedotValtiopaivaasia/Sivut/KAA_2+2015.aspx. For KAA 8/2020, see: https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/KasittelytiedotValtiopaivaasia/Sivut/KAA_8+2020.aspx.

4. For example, an MP might mention freedom of religion as a passing remark without using freedom of religion discourse to actually argue for or against abortion. We employed this criterion, as we were specifically interested in the uses of discourses as political legitimation tools.

5. We have disregarded the minor parties with only one MP. During the investigative period, such parties were present only during the latter debate. They were (names in Finnish): Liike Nyt, Valta kuuluu kansalle, and Eduskuntaryhmä Wille Rydman.

6. We have translated these and all the other quotations from the Finnish-language materials. As discourse analysis is highly sensitive to context and particularities of language use, it is important to emphasise that Finnish was the language of the data, the language of the analysis, and the first language of the authors, while English is merely the language of reporting here. We have done our best to convey the cultural connotations and finer details in our translations and analysis.

7. Mika Niikko cited a relatively old Finnish Bible translation from 1938. Here, we present the King James version.

8. It is difficult to estimate the number of conservative Christians in Finland due to the fragmentary field and lack of research. Tallying up various revival movements (see Mantsinen 2018, 109; Nykänen and Linjakumpu 2020) points to about 200,000 conservative Christians in total, which is about 3.5% of the Finnish population. However, a recent survey (see Hjelm et al. 2023) suggested much higher numbers. According to the survey, 6.7% of Finns oppose the right to abortion, 10.4% of Finns would like the state authorities to declare Finland a Christian nation, and 20.8% oppose same-sex marriage (although this opposition is likely not all religiously motivated). Thus, the number of conservative Christians could be closer to 10% of Finns.