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Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. The authors and managers of the project: L. Gudkov, H. Zorkaia, E. Kochergina, K. Piniia, and A. Ryseva.
2. These types of materials have been published by the Institute of Sociopolitical Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences. See: Ia. Okhan, Youth in Russia: A literature review [Molodezh’ v Rossii. Obzor literatury], Moscow, 2010, http://www.unrussia.ru/sites/default/files/doc/youth_in_Russia_Executive_Summary_rus.pdf. For some examples of a problematic context, see: I.M. Il’inskii, “On the youth policy of Russian political centrism” [O molodezhnoi politike rossiiskogo politicheskogo tsentrizma], Мoscow: Institut molodezhi, 1999; B.A. Ruchkin, E.A. Grishina, and N.A. Serikova, Russia youth: The ten main problems [Rossiiskaia molodezh’: desiat’ glavnykh problem], NITs pri Institute molodezhi, Мoscow: Sotsium, 1999; A.E. Kruglov, The integration of youth into Russian society: A social analysis [Integratsiia molodezhi v rossiiskoe obshchestvo: sotsial’nyi analiz], Moscow, 2000; Youth-97: Hopes and disappointments [Molodezh’-97: nadezhdy i razocharovaniia], NITs pri Institute molodezhi, Мoscow: Sotsium, 1997; “In which Russia would young people like to live. An analytical report” [V kakoi Rossii khotela by zhit’ molodezh’?,] RNISNP, Moscow, 1999; “The position of youth in the Russian Federation and state youth policy: A government report” [Polozhenie molodezhi v Rossiiskoi Federatsii i gosudarstvennaia molodezhnaia politika: gosudarstvennyi doklad], Moscow, 1998; V.I. Kuznetsov, “Trends in the value orientations of Russian youth” [Dinamika tsennostnykh orientatsii rossiiskoi molodezhi], Rostov-on-Don, 1999; “The problems of youth” [Problemy molodezhi],” FOM, special issue, July 2002; Youth in the new Russia: Value priorities [Molodezh’ novoi Rossii: tsenostnye prioritety], Мoscow: Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2007; A.O. Shashkina and K.O. Koniukhova, “Study of the values of modern Russian youth: [Issledovanie tsennostei sovremennoi rossiiskoi molodezhi], Molodoi uchenyi, 2015, no. 8, pp. 868–871, https://moluch.ru/archive/88/17375; “The value orientations of youth and the implementation of youth policy: Results of a study” [Tsennostnye orientatsii molodezhi i realizatsiia molodezhnoi politiki: rezul’taty issledovaniia], Мoscow: GUU, 2017; Russian high school students: Political, sexual, and career preferences [Rossiiskie shkol’niki: politicheskie, seksual’nye i kar’ernye predpochteniia], Mikhailov and Partners Sociological Research Agency (September 2019), https://mbk-news.appspot.com/suzhet/tolerantnaya-i-apolitichnaya-molodezh; “The image of the young entrepreneur: The new generation in business” [Obraz molodogo predprinimatelia: novoe pokolenie v biznese], “Expert IuG” Analytical Center (based on the results of a survey conducted between February and April, 2020),
https://expertsouth.ru/news/novoe-pokolenie-v-biznese-ponyat-imasshtabirovat, and other studies. Almost all studies note that young people are focused on material values. They express optimism, are mobile, possess communicative competences, prioritize self-actualization, etc.
3. V. Radaev, The Millennials: How Russian society is changing [Millenialy: Kak meniaetsia rossiiskoe obshchestvo], Мoscow: NIU VShE, 2019; E.L. Omel’chenko and G.A. Sabirova, “On the question of youth cultures in modern Russia” [K voprosu o molodezhnykh kul’turakh v sovremennoi Rossii], in XVII Aprel’skaia mezhdunarodnaia nauchnaia konferentsiia po problemam razvitiia ekonomiki i obshchestva, Мoscow: Izdatel’skii dom NIU VShE, 2017, pp. 183–191, and other studies.
4. “The simple Soviet person. Experience of a social portrait at the turn of the 1990s” [Prostoi sovetskii chelovek. Opyt sotsial’nogo portreta na rubezha 90-kh], Moscow, 1993; B. Dubin and N. Zorkaia, “Young people during a period of social change” [Molodezh’ v situatsii sotsial’nogo pereloma], in Ekonomicheskie i sotsial’nye peremeny: Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia, 1994, no. 2, pp. 16–21; B. Dubin, “Children of three generations” [Deti trekh pokolenii], in Ekonomicheskie i sotsial’nye peremeny: Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia, 1995, no. 2, pp. 30–33; Iu. Levada, “Three generations of Perestroika” [Tri pokoleniia perestroiki], Ekonomicheskie i sotsial’nye peremeny: Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia, 1995, no. 3; Iu. Levada, “The generations of the 20th century: Opportunities for study” [Pokoleniia XX veka: vozmozhnosti issledovaniia], Ibid., 2001, no. 5; Iu. Levada, “Notes on the ‘generational problem’” [Zametki o ‘probleme pokolenii’], Ibid., 2002, no. 2; N. Zorkaia, “Young people: Tips for adaptation, assessments of changes, and a mindset focused on social achievement” [Molodezh’: tipy adaptatsii, otsenki peremen, ustanovki na sotsial’noe dostizhenie], Ibid., 2001, no. 2, pp. 23–30; B. Dubin, “Generation: The sociological boundaries of a concept” [Pokolenie: sotsiologicheskie granitsy poniatiia], Ekonomicheskie i sotsial’nye peremeny: Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia, 2002, no. 2, pp. 42–50; N. Zor’kaia, “Modern young people: Concerning the problem of ‘deficient’ socialization” [Sovremennaia molodezh’: k probleme “defektnoi” sotsializatsii], 2008, no. 4, pp. 44–74; N. Zorkaia, “‘Nostalgia for the past,’ or what lessons youth can learn and has already learned” [“Nostal’giia po proshlomu”, ili Kakie uroki mogla usvoit’ i usvoila molodezh’], Ibid., 2007, no. 3, pp. 35–46; L. Gudkov, D. Dubin, and N. Zorkaia, “The youth of Russia,” Мoscow: MShPI, 2011; K. Pipiia, “On the generational problem in Russia (historical-symbolic and political mindsets)” [K probleme pokolenii v Rossii (istoriko-simvolicheskie i politicheskie ustanovki)], Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, 2019, no. 1–2, pp. 55–74; “They may be young, but their opinions are not new. Sociologists have studied the life goals of modern 20-year-old Russians” [Molodye, no vriad li novye. Sotsiologi issledovali zhiznennye orientiry segodniashnikh 20-letnikh rossiian], Nezavisimaia gazeta, 27 March 2012, p. 14, http://www.ng.ru/scenario/2012-03-27/14_young.html; “‘Generation Putin’ has come of age in Russia. It demands bread and circuses. The prime minister himself is fully perceived as a desirable role model” [“V Rossii podroslo «pokolenie Putina”. Ono trebuet khleba i zrelishch. Sam prem’er vosprinimaetsia, kak obraz polnoty realizatsii zhelaemogo], Svobodnaia pressa, 14 June 2011.
5. The published materials of previous studies can be found on the website of the Moscow office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Moscow: Ukr_Generation_eng_inet-3.pdf; http://projects.ff.uni-mb.si/%7Ecepso/web/cepss/data/kazakhstan/YouthStudyKazakhstanReport2016.pdf. In late April and May 2020, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Levada Center conducted three presentations of this project, which were followed by lively discussions by the participants. You can also find them on the foundation’s website: https://www.fes-russia.org/pokolenie-z; http://youth.institute/#about#!/tproduct/174582985-1590509867744; https://www.facebook.com/events/627520044468469/?active_tab=discussion. Discussions and roundtables with the participation of authoritative German historians and specialists in youth and generational issues were held in 2018, before the project implementation stage (U. Iurait et al.). Levada Center specialists did not take part in the development of the survey itself. Rather, they only translated the survey, adapting its language for Russian respondents.
6. The moderators are D. Volkov and S. Goncharov.
7. The average level of dissatisfaction with the level of obtained education in national samples is 35 percent (“Quality of Education” survey, 2009, N = 2000), and the average level of dissatisfaction with one’s job is 30 percent among the working population.
8. Here and in what follows, the table heading reproduces the wording of the survey question in an abbreviated form.
9. L. Gudkov, “Fear as an interpretative lens of reality” [Strakh kak ramka ponimaniia proiskhodiashchego], in Ekonomicheskie i sotsial’nye peremeny: monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia, 1999, no. 6, pp. 46–53. This understanding of the nature of anxiety in Russian society is also confirmed by later studies of the Levada Center as well as by the research (based on another body of evidence) of the well-known Russian economists V. Gimpel’son and V. Kapeliushnikov, among other specialists.
10. The statistical distribution of responses is similar to a distribution of equal thirds (with the last four positions ranked on a 3-point scale), indicating that there are no factors and forces that would influence the respondents. It is similar to the results if respondents had randomly chosen answer categories. In this regard, the fears of becoming the victim of a robbery, physical violence, social injustice, or corruption can be considered “low-intensity fears.” These are in contrast to war, the deteriorating environment, fear of destitution, and concerns about physical survival.
11. Yu. Levada, “The Problem of Trust in Russian Public Opinion,” in Trust and Democratic Transition in Post-Communist Europe. Proceedings of the British Academy, 2004, vol. 123, pp. 157–171; L. Gudkov, “‘Trust’ in Russia: Meaning, functions, and structure” [“Doverie” v Rossii: smysl, funktsii, struktura], Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, 2012, no. 2, pp. 8–47 (hereinafter abbreviated “NLO”), 2012, no. 117, pp. 249–280); L. Gudkov, “Features of institutional trust in Russia” [Osobennosti institutsional’nogo doveriia v Rossii], in Rossiia i Germaniia. Obshchestvo i gosudarstvo: istoricheskii opyt vzaimodeistviia, N. Kattser, R. Krumm, and M. Urnov (eds.), Мoscow: ROSSPEN, 2012, pp. 249–282.
12. The survey does not distinguish between the types of political leadership, whether official functionaries of the ruling party and the country’s top leaders or the informal leaders of the Russian opposition. In principle, these are attitudes and relations of “trust–distrust” that are different in nature.
13. These trends are typical not only for young people, but also for the entirety of Russian society. Here is a quote from the 2012 article mentioned above (L. Gudkov, “‘Trust’ in Russia: Meaning, functions, and structure” [“Doverie” v Rossii: smysl, funktsii, struktura]): “Indexes of institutional trust are distributed as follows: the degree of trust decreases as we move from the youngest respondents (as well as those who are poorly educated), who tend to demonstrate the greatest support for the authorities in general and Vladimir Putin in particular, to 30-year-old Russians, who are more mature and better educated, as we move from residents of medium-sized provincial cities (who demonstrate the maximum trust) to Muscovites (who have the most distrust of the authorities), and as we move from uninformed groups to the most informed citizens who utilize all channels for obtaining information and accessing the Internet. Although the range of fluctuations here is not too large, it is stable and statistically significant.”
14. The opinions falling in the middle of responses and as captured by the third response option on a 5-point scale for other questions express sociopolitical indifference, which is functionally equivalent to the responses “It is hard to answer,” which is chosen by the least educated or qualified categories of respondents (in regards to the raised topics). Therefore, these types of reactions of respondents as well as those who find it difficult to answer are analytically of little substance, in contrast to the opinions of those who give more polarized answers. In essence, the choice of the third position is simply a type of “polite” refusal to answer the question, which very often is a reaction to the fairly informal language of the survey, which became clear from the analysis of the audio recordings of interviews. Respondents may perceive that the questions do not seriously touch on the problems of their life world.
15. V. Radaev, The Millennial generation How Russian society is changing [Pokolenie millennialov: Kak meniaetsia rossiiskoe obshchestvo], Izd-vo NIU VShE, 2019.
16. Although in recent years the Levada Center has not asked questions concerning politics in the same methodological form that is used in this survey, nevertheless, it is possible to compare the obtained data with a survey that is conducted around the same time. Thus, only 3 percent of Russians took an active part in the activities of a particular political party and supported its program. Forty-one percent followed political events, though they did not take part in political life themselves; another 27 percent indicated that “they don’t like and don’t care about politics,” while 3 percent found it hard to answer (June 2019, N=1600).
17. For the classification of sociopolitical views used in this study that was developed by sociologists at the Levada Center and the working group led by E. Pain during the course of the project, see: G. Nikiporets-Takigav and E. Pain (eds.), The Internet and ideological movements in Russia [Internet i ideologicheskie dvizheniia v Rossii], Мoscow: Fond “Liberal’naia missiia”; NLO, 2016. This validity of the classification has been tested many times during regular surveys conducted by the center.
18. It is also worth remembering that party affiliation does not afford respondents with many advantages in choosing a workplace. According to an absolute majority of respondents (61 percent), there is no particular advantage afforded by membership in any particular political party (where it is clear that what is meant is one of the parties approved by the Kremlin, such as United Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, or LDPR) when applying for a new job. Only 16 percent of respondents, including mostly high school students or 18- to 20-year-olds who have not yet entered the workforce, believe that party membership can be important in setting themselves apart on the job market. It is characteristic that young people from less well-to-do families are more likely to express this opinion. It is possible that in the minds of these categories of young people, a civil service career or employment in the police is somehow associated with loyalty to the ruling political party. But it is possibly the case that this is only a holdover opinion from Soviet practices and ideas about what you need to do to advance your career. Respondents from Moscow were the least likely of all to assign any significance to this requirement.
19. These are not necessarily associations created along the lines of the Young Army Cadets National Movement [Iunarmiia] or the Young Guard [Molodaia gvardiia], Our Guys [Nashi], The Locals [Mestnye], Stop Rude Boors [StopKham], and the like. These could be organizations created as Cossack troop regimens, pioneers, “New Talents,” etc., imitating the forms of civil society or stylizing themselves as Soviet mass children’s and youth organizations.
20. National polls give a more definite picture of the attitude of the population toward the breakup of the Soviet Union: On average, over the past 10 years, 56 percent of Russians expressed regret about the collapse of the Soviet Union, 31 percent did not feel regret or nostalgia, and the rest stated that it was either difficult to answer or they did not have an opinion about the topic (the smallest number who expressed regret (49 percent) was recorded in 2012, during the period of mass protest demonstrations, while the largest (66 percent) occurred in 2018, when there was the greatest public outrage about the abandonment of the pension system, which was adopted in the Soviet era. While there were 34 percent of people between the ages of 18 and 24 who expressed regret (where 48 percent did not experience any such feelings and another 18 percent found it difficult to answer the question), among people who are 55 years of age or older, this percentage increases to 83 percent (where 14 percent did not experience any such feelings and only 3 percent found it difficult to answer, i.e., the prevailing group’s opinions were quite definite for these two groups).
21. In 1989, 31 percent of the country’s inhabitants identified themselves as “Soviet people,” whereas in 2016 only 7 percent of the whole sample did so (among 18- to 24-year-olds, the share was even less at 2 percent). For more information, see the yearbook “Social opinion for 2016” [Obshchestvennoe mnenie—2016], p. 31), https://www.levada.ru/cp/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/OM-2016.pdf.
22. See: https://ria.ru/20110826/424566241.html and https://mel.fm/mneniye_eksperta/6523071-corruption.
23. For more information, see: L. Gudkov, B. Dubin, and N. Zorkaia, “Emigration from Russia as a social diagnosis and life perspective” [Ot”ezd iz Rossii kak sotsial’nyi diagnoz i zhiznennaia perspektiva], Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, 2011, no. 4, pp. 46–80.
24. According to earlier surveys of young people by the Levada Center (2006, 2011), about two-fifths of the respondents expressed a desire to leave the country to study, work, or even permanently emigrate. Therefore, if you were to add up all those who in one way or another reported thinking about leaving for our survey, you would get about the same figure (42 percent).
25. For more information, see: L. Gudkov, B. Dubin, and N. Zorkaia, “Emigration from Russia as a social diagnosis and life outlook: Reasons, intentions, and actions” [Ot”ezd iz Rossii kak sotsial’nyi diagnoz i zhiznennaia perspektiva: prichiny, namereniia, deistviia], Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, 2011, no. 4 (110), pp. 46–80.
26. This reflects the fact that respondents likely dream about and hope that a better life exists somewhere else that is not here (which leads Russians to distance themselves from current events in the country, to avoid participating in social and political life, and to act apathetic). It confirms the fact that the desire to leave the country is more pronounced not among the wealthiest respondents (15 percent of those who “strongly” want to leave), who have a high socioeconomic status, but among the poorest (21 percent); i.e., for them it’s more of a dream to be able to escape from their real life. As our studies show, the same applies to the adult population.
27. The exact same picture emerges in surveys of the adult population.
28. The main host countries during the late 1980s and post-Soviet period were Germany, the United States, and Israel. Concerning this, see: L. Gudkov and N. Zorkaia, Two countries (the role of Germany and Israel in the structure of Russian identity) [Dve strany (Germaniia i Izrail’ v strukture identichnosti russkikh], Osteuropa, 2019.
29. The characteristics of this group were obtained by comparing answers to the question about the desire to emigrate from the country with a series of other important questions from the survey.
30. See: L. Gudkov, B. Dubin, and N. Zorkaia, “Emigration from Russia as a social diagnosis and life perspective” [Ot”ezd iz Rossii kak sotsial’nyi diagnoz i zhiznennaia perspektiva], Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, 2011, no. 4, p. 80.
31. Hereinafter we will provide the total of the categories “Probably important” and “Very important.”
35. V.D. Stel’makh, “The modern library and its users” [Sovremennaia biblioteka i ee pol’zovateli], Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, 2004, no. 1, pp. 56–63; V.D. Stel’makh, “Who needs libraries in modern Russia?” [Komu nuzhny biblioteki v sovremennoi Rossii?], Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, 2005, no. 5, pp. 30–38; B. Dubin and N. Zorkaia, “Books in today’s Russia: Publishing, distribution, and reading” [Knigi v segodniashnei Rossii: vypusk, rasprostranenie, chtenie], Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, 2005, no. 5, pp. 39–57; B. Dubin and N. Zorkaia, “Reading and society in Russia in the 2000s” [Chtenie i obshchestvo v Rossii v 2000-kh godakh], Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, 2008, no. 6, pp. 30–52; B. Dubin, “On reading and non-reading habits” [O chtenii i nechtenii], Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, 2010, no. 3, pp. 66–74).
36. It should be noted that, despite these measures, the birth of one child (to say nothing of multiple children) immediately reduces the standard of living of a family. This life event can often push the family into poverty.
37. According to the rough estimates of researchers, the share of the precariat is 27 percent of the Russian population. See: V.V. Semenova et al., Social mobility in an increasingly complex society: Objective and subjective aspects [Sotsial’naia mobil’nost’ v uslozhniaiushchemsia obshchestve: ob”ektivnye i sub”ektivnye aspekty], V.V. Semenova, M.F. Chernysh, and P.E. Sushko (eds.), Moscow: FNISTs RAN, 2019, p. 329.
38. “Disturbing issues” [Trevozhashhie problemy], https://www.levada.ru/2018/09/06/trevozhashhie-problemy.
39. “I was sent by Ivan Ivanych” [“Ia ot Ivan Ivanycha”]. For more information, see: A. Levinson, “Notes on bureaucracy in the social structure of modern Russian society” [Zametki o biurokratii v sotsial’noi strukture sovremennogo rossiskogo obshchestva], Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia. Dannye. Analiz. Diskussii, 2017, no. 3–4 (125), pp. 48–74.
40. A good example is the reaction of the population to major corruption cases involving the extortion of millions of dollars: The majority of respondents are in favor of the most severe punishment for those who take such bribes. See, for example: “The attitude of Russians to the sentencing of Vasil’eva in the Oboronservis case” [Otnoshenie zhitelei Rossii k prigovoru Vasil’evoi po “delu ‘Oboronservisa’”], https://www.levada.ru/2015/06/17/borba-s-korruptsiej-i-prigovor-e-vasilevoj.
41. At the same time, almost half of Russians condemn citizens who evade paying taxes (45 percent), https://www.levada.ru/2015/04/16/ uklonenie-ot-uplaty-nalogov.
42. See: N. Mitrokhin, “The current state and problems of the Russian Orthodox Church” [Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov’: sovremennoe sostoianie i aktual’nye problemy], Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, Мoscow, 2006.
43. We cannot say with certainty that all these young people are really churched in the sense that they physically attend services and participate in the liturgy, since the survey does not contain questions about the frequency of communion and confession (sacraments that parishioners must observe more or less regularly, although this requirement depends on the decision of the particular parish or priest).
45. Article 6.21 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation, “Propaganda of non-traditional sexual orientations among minors” [Propaganda netraditsionnykh seksual’nykh otnoshenii sredi nesovershennoletnikh].
47. Monitoring study of xenophobic views [Monitoring ksenofobskikh nastroenii], https://www.levada.ru/2018/08/27/monitoring-ksenofobskih-nastroenij.
49. “‘The conflicts were spurred on by homophobia.’ On the evening of July 21, the citizen activist Elena Grigor’eva was murdered” [“Konflikty imeli gomofobnuiu pochvu”. V noch’ na 21 iiulia v Peterburge ubili grazhdanskuiu aktivistku Elenu Grigor’evu], https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/07/23/81342-konflikty-imeli-gomofobnuyu-pochvu.Citation1-55