Why Did China’s Zero-COVID Policy Persist? Decision Urgency, Regime Type, and Political Opportunity Structures

ABSTRACT

Despite soaring social costs, opposed professional opinions, and divergent foreign experiences, China still persisted with its Zero-COVID policy. Preexisting theories of policy change are unable to explain the continuation of China’s COVID policy. Corresponding to the three stages of policy making, implementation and adjustment, the authors propose a framework of three decision-making constraints: (1) decision urgency, (2) regime type, and (3) political opportunity structures, which are believed to jointly shape China’s policy against Omicron and obstruct Chinese decision-makers from adjusting it. This intensive case study enriches understanding of China’s COVID policy specifically and the policy process in China more generally.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

¹ For an updated review of the outbreak and spread of COVID-19, see Sarah Moore, ‘History of COVID-19’ (News Medical, 28 September 2021) <https://www.news-medical.net/health/History-of-COVID-19.aspx&gt; accessed 7 June 2022. For the Chinese case, see Aishwarya Tendolkar, ‘As China Struggles to Control Outbreak, Experts Question Zero-COVID Strategy’ (Health Policy Watch, 6 April 2022) <https://healthpolicy-watch.news/as-china-struggles-to-control-covid-19-outbreak-experts-question-zero-covid- strategy-to-stop-omicron/> accessed 7 June 2022.

² Tianlei Huang, ‘“Zero-COVID” in Shanghai Comes at High Social and Economic Costs’ (PIIE, 15 April 2022) <https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/zero-covid-shangh-aicomes-high-social-and-economic-costs&gt; accessed 7 June 2022.

³ ‘WHO: Omicron Makes China’s “Zero-COVID” Policy Unsustainable’ (ABC News, 18 May 2022) <https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/chinas-covid-plan-unsustainable-due-omicron-84778790> accessed 7 June 2022.

⁴ Anthony Fauci, ‘China’s COVID-19 Situation a “Disaster”’’ (Nepal Chronicles, 3 February 2022) <https://www.nepalchronicles.com/2022/05/18/fauci-chinas-covid-19-situation-a-disaster/>; accessed 7 June 2022.

⁵ Regarding the variants of Covid-19, see ‘Variants of the Virus’ (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 11 August 2021) <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/variants/index.html> accessed 7 June 2022.

⁶ Tendolkar (n 1).

⁷ Dennis Normile, ‘An Undebatable Political Decision: Why China Refuses to End its Harsh Lockdowns’ (Science, 15 April 2022) <https://www.science.org/content/article/undebatable-political-decision-why-china-refuses-end-its-harsh-lockdown> accessed 7 June 2022.

⁸ Paul A. Sabatier (ed), Theories of the Policy Process (Westview, 2007), pp. 19–126; Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (3rd ed, Pearson Education, 2017), pp. 9–24.

⁹ For example, Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (Yale University Press, 1982); Jeffrey Berry, and Clyde Wilcox, The Interest Group Society (Routledge, 2018).

¹⁰ Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry, ‘Embracing Uncertainty: Guerrilla Policy Style and Adaptive Governance in China’, in Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry (eds), Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China (Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 1–29. For the COVID case, see Kai Kupferschmidt and Jon Cohen, ‘Can China’s COVID-19 Strategy Work Elsewhere?’ Science, (2020), pp. 1061–1062; Xiangfeng Yang, ‘Domestic Contestation, International Backlash, and Authoritarian Resilience: How Did the Chinese Party-State Weather the COVID-19 Crisis?’ Journal of Contemporary China 30(132), (2021), pp. 915–929.

¹¹ Due to the varied nature of coronavirus strains, the authors treat China’s policies regarding the first four strains, as its earlier-stage response, and policies tackling Omicron its later-stage response. This article concerns the latter. Regarding China’s earlier-stage response, see the analyses of Guobin Yang, The Wuhan Lockdown (Columbia University Press, 2022).

¹² WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard <https://covid19.who.int/&gt;, accessed 10 June 2022.

¹³ ‘WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19’ (WHO, 11 March 2020) <https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media.

-briefing-on-covid-19–11-march-2020> accessed 7 June 2022. For its impacts on people’s everyday life, see Meghan O’Rourke, A World Out of Reach Dispatches from Life under Lockdown (Yale University Press, 2020); Clara Champagne and others, Pandemic Societies (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2021).

¹⁴ China’s National Health Commission’s ‘General Situation of Notifiable Infectious Diseases in China in 2020’ (12 March 2021) <http://www.nhc.gov.cn/jkj/s3578/202103/f1a448b7df7d4760976fea6d55834966.shtml&gt; ‘General Situation of Notifiable Infectious Diseases in China in 2021’ (22 April 2022) <http://www.nhc.gov.cn/jkj/s3578/202204/4fd88a291d914abf8f7a91f6333567e1.shtml&gt;. Both accessed 28 June 2022.

¹⁵ For the report, see Bernd Salzberger, Thomas Glück, and Boris Ehrenstein, ‘Successful Containment of COVID-19: The WHO-Report on the COVID-19 Outbreak in China’, Infection 48(2), (2020), pp. 151–53. For the broader implications of China’s success, see Cary Wu and others, ‘Chinese Citizen Satisfaction with Government Performance during COVID-19’, Journal of Contemporary China 30(132), (2021), pp. 930–944; Suisheng Zhao, ‘Rhetoric and Reality of China’s Global Leadership in the Context of COVID-19: Implications for the US-Led World Order and Liberal Globalization’, Journal of Contemporary China 30(128), (2021), pp. 233–248.

¹⁶ The cases, like EU, New Zealand, Singapore and South Korea, which first adopted closure/partial closure but later give them up during February to April 2022, thus provide a stark contrast with China. For EU and Singapore, after lifting closure/partial closure, their Case Fatality Rate (CFR) has actually decreased: in the case of EU, it decreased from 0.2703% to 0.2153% and Singapore’s decreased from 0.0655% to 0.0395%. New Zealand and South Korea’s CFR increased in a very limited way: New Zealand’s increased from 0.0387% to 0.0942 and South Korea’s increased from 0.1105% to 0.11272. In contrast, even with full lockdown, Shanghai achieved only a CFR of 0.0938%. This result barely differs from the CFR of New Zealand (0.0942%) and is much higher than the CFR of Singapore (0.0395%) after its acceptance of the principle of ‘community immunity’. Data source: Our World in data< https://ourworldindata.or&gt; Shanghai data from Caixin Wang, see Yutong Peng, ‘June 1 Shanghai xinzeng ganranzhe 10 li, wei sanyue sanri yilai xindi’ [‘There are 10 New Cases in Shanghai on June 1, which are the Lowest since March 3’] (Caixin Wang, 2 June 2022) <https://datanews.caixin.com/2022-06-02/101893680. html>, accessed 15 June 2022.

¹⁷ See Ibid, and Wanyuan Song, ‘China: Why is the WHO Concerned About its Zero-Covid Strategy?’ (BBC News, 17 May 2022) <https://www.bbc.com/news/59882774> accessed 7 June, 2022.

¹⁸ From Our World in Data <https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus#explore-the-global-situation&gt;, 1 March 2022, accessed 15 June 2022.

¹⁹ For the economic costs of lockdown, see Xuefei Ren, ‘Pandemic and Lockdown: A Territorial Approach to COVID-19 in China, Italy and the United States’, Eurasian Geography and Economics 61(4–5), (2020), pp. 423–434; for social costs, see Sheena C. Greitens, ‘Surveillance, Security, and Liberal Democracy in the Post-COVID World’, International Organization 74(S1), (2020), pp. E169-E190.

²⁰ Jingjing Chen and others, ‘The Economic Cost of Lockdown in China: Evidence from City-to-City Truck Flows’ (2022)<https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/ernestliu/files/truck_flow_and_covid19_220315.pdf&gt; accessed 22 June 2022.

²¹ National Bureau of Statistics of China <http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022–05/17/content_5690866.htm&gt;, accessed 15 June 2022.

²² Evelyn Cheng, ‘China’s Covid Lockdowns are Hitting More Than Just Shanghai and Beijing (CNBC, 5 May 2022) <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/06/chinas-covid-lockdowns-hit-more-of-the-country-beyond-shanghai-beijing.html> accessed 7 June 2022.

²³ Tom Hancock and Chris Anstey, ‘US Growth Seen Outpacing China’s for First Time Since 1976’ (Bloomberg, 20 May 2022) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-20/us-growth-seen-outpacing-china-s-for-first-time-since-1976> accessed 7 June 2022.

²⁴ Lily Kuo and others, ‘Shanghai’s Covid Siege: Food Shortages, Talking Tobots, Starving Animals’ (Washington Post, 15 April 2022) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/china-shanghai-covid-lockdown-food-shortage> accessed 7 June 2022.

²⁵ Huang (n 2); Vivian Wang, ‘“Very Fragile”: Shanghai Wrestles with Psychological Scars of Lockdown’ (The New York Times, 29 June 2022) <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/29/world/asia/shanghai-lockdown-china.html> accessed 3 January 2023.

²⁶ According to a survey conducted in later April by Hong Kong’s Focus Media, 48% of the foreign residents from Shanghai plan to leave the country forever within a year, see ‘Zuixin diaocha: yiqing jieshuhou, Shanghai 48% de waiguoren huo zai yiniannei likai’ [‘New Survey: 48% of Foreigners in Shanghai May Leave within A Year After the Pandemic Ends’] (Wangyi, 27 April 2022) <https://view.inews.qq.com/a/20220427A04QPZ00?startextras= 0_0ccc216ca301b&from=ampzkqw> accessed 25 May 2022. Vincent Ni, ‘“Run Philosophy”: the Chinese Citizens Seeking to Leave Amid Covid Uncertainty’ (The Guardian, 20 July 2022) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/20/run-philosophy-the-chinese-citizens-seeking-to-leave-amid-covid-uncertainty> accessed 3 October 2022.

²⁷ In early April, the web searches for ‘qualifications of migrating to Canada’ or ‘what is the best place to immigrate’ on China’s major search engines have increased 2,846% (March 28th—April 3), see ‘Yimin sousuoliang baozeng, yiqing zhihou youhui xianqi xinyilun yiminchao ma?’ [‘The Number of Searches for ‘Immigration’ Has Soared. Will There Be a New Wave of Immigration After the Pandemic?] (Tencent News, 10 May 2022) <https://xw.qq.com/cmsid/20220510A0CN5Y06&gt; accessed 22 June 2022.

²⁸ Jonathan Bendor and Terry M. Moe, ‘An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics’, American Political Science Review 79(3), (1985), pp. 755–774; Sabatier (n 8); Dye (n 8).

²⁹ Graham Scott, ‘The Learning Government’, OECD Journal on Budgeting 3(2), (2003), pp. 55–69; Frans L. Leeuw, Can Governments Learn? Comparative Perspectives on Evaluation and Organizational Learning (Routledge, 2020).

³⁰ For reflections of the application of the rationalist perspective to the understanding of the pandemic case, see Christopher M. Weible and others, ‘COVID-19 and the Policy Sciences: Initial Reactions and Perspectives’, Policy Sciences 53(2), (2020), pp. 225–241.

³¹ James L. True, Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner, ‘Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policymaking’, in Paul A. Sabatier (ed), Theories of the Policy Process (Routledge, 2007), pp. 155–187; Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner, ‘From There to Here: Punctuated Equilibrium to the General Punctuation Thesis to a Theory of Government Information Processing’, Policy Studies Journal 40(1), (2012), pp. 1–20.

³² Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 173–251.

³³ Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China (Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 35–62; Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (W. W. Norton, 2nd ed, 2003), pp. 173–186.

³⁴ The authors accept the significance of President Xi’s role in the making of China’s COVID policy. Yet, faced with the costs of Zero-COVID, Xi could still propose adjustments to his earlier decisions. Why didn’t he? In asking this question, the article ‘problematizes’ Xi’s rationale and focuses on political constraints to help clarify this rationale. We appreciate the anonymous reviewer of the Journal for reminding us of the ‘Xi factor’..

³⁵ We develop this analytical framework in light of the ‘policy process’, model popular in the field of policy studies. For discussions of the model, see Charles Jones, An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy (Wadsworth, 1970); James Anderson, Public Policy-Making (Praeger, 1975), and a critical review by Paul A. Sabatier, in ‘Introduction: The Need for Better Theories’, in Paul A. Sabatier (ed), Theories of the Policy Process (2nd ed. Westview Press, 2007), pp. 3–17. This model basically posits a ‘stage heuristic’, and divides the whole policy process into three stages: policy making, policy implementation, and, lastly, feedback and adjustments. When analyzing China’s COVID policy in terms of these stages, we find several constraints dominating different stages of the policy process. Specifically, the earliest formulation of China’s COVID policy was influenced by Chinese decision-makers’ decision urgency. Next, the implementation of the policy with an interventionist and campaign-like approach has to do with China’s regime type. Finally, it is primarily China’s political opportunity structures that obstruct decision-makers, particularly President Xi, from making even small concessions. These three constraints thus jointly contribute to and obstruct China from adjusting its Zero-COVID policy.

³⁶ For example, Boin uses three elements—threat, urgency, and uncertainty—to define the crisis situations governments confront, see Arjen Boin, ‘The New World of Crises and Crisis Management: Implications for Policymaking and Research’, Review of Policy Research 26(4), (2009), pp. 367–377. See also Uriel Rosenthal, Arjen Boin, and Louise K. Comfort, Managing Crises: Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities (Thomas, 2001); Chris Ansell and Arjen Boin, ‘Taming Deep Uncertainty: The Potential of Pragmatist Principles for Understanding and Improving Strategic Crisis Management’, Administration & Society 51(7), (2019), pp. 1079–1112.

³⁷ Regarding the relationship between public policy and political system, see Peter May, ‘Implementation Failures Revisited: Policy Regime Perspectives’, Public Policy and Administration 30(3–4), (2015), pp. 277–299; and Tom Christensen, Peter Lægreid, and Lise Rykkja, ‘Organizing for Crisis Management: Building Governance Capacity and Legitimacy’, Public Administration Review 76(6), (2016), pp. 887–897.

³⁸ Charles Tilly, ‘Social Movements as Historically Specific Clusters of Political Performances’, Berkeley Journal of Sociology 38, (1993), pp. 1–30; Gary Marks and Doug McAdam, ‘On the Relationship of Political Opportunities to the Form of Collective Action: The Case of the European Union’, in Donatella della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Dieter Rucht (eds), Social Movements in a Globalizing World (Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), pp. 97–111.

³⁹ Similar case studies related to COVID-19 include Bo Yan and others, ‘Why Do Countries Respond Differently to COVID-19? A Comparative Study of Sweden, China, France, and Japan’, American Review of Public Administration 50(6–7), (2020), pp. 762–769; Benjamin Bratton, The Revenge of the Real Politics for a Post-Pandemic World (Verso, 2021); Nico Steytler, Comparative Federalism and COVID-19 Combating the Pandemic (Routledge, 2022).

⁴⁰ Hai Guo, ‘Human Security and the Party-State-Society Triangle: Rethinking the CCP’s Legitimacy Management in COVID-19’, in Chi Zhang (ed), Human Security in China: A Post-Pandemic State (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), pp. 47–75.

⁴¹ For the COVID case, see Loïc Berger and others, ‘Uncertainty and Decision-Making During a Crisis: How to Make Policy Decisions in the COVID-19 Context?’ (2020) University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02907328v1/document&gt; accessed 6 June 2022; Xueguang Zhou, ‘Organizational Response to COVID-19 Crisis: Reflections on the Chinese Bureaucracy and its Resilience’, Management and Organization Review 16(3), (2020), pp. 473–484; Weible and others, (n 30).

⁴² For literature related to policy making under uncertainty and urgency, see Charles F. Hermann, ‘Some Consequences of Crises Which Limit the Viability of Organizations’, Administrative Science Quarterly 8, (1963), pp. 61–82; Carolyne Smart and Ilan Vertinsky, ‘Designs for Crisis Decision Units’, Administrative Science Quarterly, (1977), pp. 640–657; Les Coleman, ‘The Frequency and Cost of Corporate Crises’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 12(1), (2004), pp. 1–13.

⁴³ The former refers to the situation that human beings tend to remember the most recent items while the latter ignores those contradicting decision-makers’ beliefs. See Arthur Glenberg and others, ‘Studies of the Long-Term Recency Effect: Support for a Contextually Guided Retrieval Hypothesis’, Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition 9(2), (1983), pp. 231–255; Raymond R. Nickerson, ‘Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises’, Review of General Psychology 2(2), (1998), pp. 175–220.

⁴⁴ See Bratton (n 39, Chapter 3). According to Bratton, not just China but many other East Asian polities benefited from their SARS experiences. For a similar argument, see Jonathan Schwartz and R. Gregory Evans, ‘Causes of Effective Policy Implementation: China’s Public Health Response to SARS’, Journal of Contemporary China 16(51), (2007), pp. 195–213.

⁴⁵ For the analysis of China’s response to SARS, see Patricia M. Thornton, ‘Crisis and Governance: SARS and the Resilience of the Chinese Body Politic’, The China Journal 61, (2009), pp. 23–48; 耿曙, 胡玉松[Keng Shu and Hu Yusong], ‘突发事件中的国家-社会关系——上海基层社区“抗非”考察’ [‘The State-Society Relations in a Crisis: An Investigation of the Combat against SARS by Local Communities in Shanghai’], 社会[Chinese Journal of Sociology] 31(6), (2011) pp. 41–73.

⁴⁶ There was even a widespread belief in China at the time that, ‘when summer comes, the COVID will soon be gone [just like SARS]’..

⁴⁷ ‘Shanghai’s Precise COVID-19 Prevention and Control Measures Ensure Megacity’s Safety’ (Global Times, 26 Jan 2021) <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213974.shtml> accessed 2 June 2022.

⁴⁸ The city began its two-stage lockdown on March 28, initially in Shanghai’s eastern districts, and later on April 1 expanded to cover the whole city.

⁴⁹ China’s decision-makers have learned from the Wuhan experience, which, according to Victor Shih, is ‘The initial hesitation by the party center led to a horrendous spike in infection and death in Hubei province and in other parts of China, which was reversed only after the January 25, 2020, Politburo Standing Committee meeting ordered a containment mobilization’, (p. 82), in Shih, ‘China’s Leninist Response to COVID-19: From Information Repression to Total Mobilization’, in Scott L. Greer and others (eds), Coronavirus Politics: The Comparative Politics and Policy of COVID-19 (University of Michigan Press, 2021), pp. 67–85.

⁵⁰ ‘Xi Moves to Silence Covid Zero Critics in Sign of Brewing Tumult’ (Bloomberg, 6 May 2022) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-05/china-s-top-leaders-reiterate-support-for-covid-zero-cctv#xj4y7vzkg> accessed 20 June 2022.

⁵¹ Ciqi Mei, ‘Policy Style, Consistency and the Effectiveness of the Policy Mix in China’s Fight Against COVID-19’, Policy and Society 39(3), (2020), pp. 309–325; Changkun Cai, Weiqi Jiang, and Na Tang, ‘Campaign-Style Crisis Regime: How China Responded to the Shock of COVID-19’, Policy Studies 43(3), (2022), pp. 599–619; Kupferschmidt and Cohen (n 10); Shih (n 49).

⁵² Tilly (n 38); Marks and McAdam (n 38).

⁵³ Shih (n 49); Mei (n 51); Cai and others (n 51).

⁵⁴ For examples, Elizabeth Perry, ‘From Mass Campaigns to Managed Campaigns: “Constructing a New Socialist Countryside”’, in Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth Perry (eds), Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China (Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 30–61.

⁵⁵ For comparative case studies, see Gerard Delanty, Pandemics, Politics, and Society Critical Perspectives on the COVID-19 Crisis (de Gruyter, 2021) and, on East Asian cases, see Bratton (n 39), Chapter 3.

⁵⁶ Wei-Ting Yen and others, ‘The Imperative of State Capacity in Public Health Crisis: Asia’s Early COVID-19 Policy Responses’, Governance 35(3), (2022), pp. 777–798.

⁵⁷ Rajib Shaw, Yong-kyun Kim, and Jinling Hua, ‘Governance, Technology and Citizen Behavior in Pandemic: Lessons from COVID-19 in East Asia’, Progress in Disaster Science 6, (2020), pp. 1–11; Jun Jie Woo, ‘Policy Capacity and Singapore’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic’, Policy and Society 39(3), (2020), pp. 345–362; Yves Tiberghien, The East Asian COVID-19 Paradox (Cambridge University Press, 2021); Betty Hou, ‘Taiwan Faces Tough Choices as Covid Cases Hit Record Levels’ (Bloomberg, 19 April 2022) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-18/taiwan-faces-tough-choices-as-covid-cases-hit-record-levels#xj4y7vzkg>

accessed 7 June 2022.

⁵⁸ Bratton (n 39), Chapter 3.

⁵⁹ For policy changes in Singapore, see Aradhana Aravindan and Chen Lin, ‘Singapore Extends Quarantine-Free Entry as Asia Shifts to “Living with COVID”’ (Reuters, 24 March 2022) <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/singapore-relax-more-covid-curbs-including-overseas-arrivals-2022-03-24/> accessed 11 June 2022.

⁶⁰ The population size of Shanghai is 24.89 million while Taiwan 23.87 million in 2022.

⁶¹ In the week before Shanghai and Taiwan announced their Omicron policies, the former reported 1845 new cases and the latter 262, or increases of 38.36% and 20.10% respectively.

⁶² Chad de Guzman, ‘Taiwan Is Abandoning Its Zero-COVID Strategy in Favor of a “New Model” of Coronavirus Containment’ (Time, 5 May 2022) <https://time.com/6174132/taiwan-covid-strategy/&gt; accessed 7 June 2022.

⁶³ Tyrene White, ‘Postrevolutionary Mobilization in China: The One-Child Policy Reconsidered’, World Politics 43(1), (1990), pp. 53–76; John James Kennedy and Dan Chen, ‘State Capacity and Cadre Mobilization in China: The Elasticity of Policy Implementation’, Journal of Contemporary China 27(111), (2018), pp. 393–405; Heilmann and Perry (n 10).

⁶⁴ Andrew J. Nathan, ‘Policy Oscillations in the People’s Republic of China: A Critique’, The China Quarterly 68, (1976), pp. 720–733; Nicole Ning Liu and others, ‘Campaign-Style Enforcement and Regulatory Compliance’, Public Administration Review 75(1), (2015), 85–95; Zhou (n 41).

⁶⁵ For the COVID case, see Zhou (n 41), which considers the country’s unique response to the pandemic as inherent to the Chinese-style political system. For similar analyses, see Shih (n 49); Mei (n 51); Cai and others (n 51).

⁶⁶ Zhou (n 41), pp. 480–81.

⁶⁷ For detailed studies, see Qingjie Zeng, ‘Managed Campaign and Bureaucratic Institutions in China: Evidence from the Targeted Poverty Alleviation Program’, Journal of Contemporary China 29(123), 2020, pp. 400–415; Thornton (n 45); Keng and Hu (n 45); White (n 63).

⁶⁸ Guo (n 40).

⁶⁹ Ibid. We can also contrast the political rhetoric of different countries, see Darren Lilleker and others, Political Communication and COVID-19 Governance and Rhetoric in Times of Crisis (Routledge, 2021); Delanty (n 55). For a contrast with the SARS case, see Thornton (n 45); Keng and Hu (n 45).

⁷⁰ Yang (n 11), pp. 41–67; Guo (n 40), pp. 65–66.

⁷¹ We appreciate the anonymous reviewer of the Journal for reminding us of the legitimacy perspective on COVID policy making.

⁷² Guo (n 40), pp. 47–75.

⁷³ Yuchao Zhu, ‘“Performance Legitimacy” and China’s Political Adaptation Strategy’, Journal of Chinese Political Science 16(2), (2011), pp. 123–140; Hongxing Yang and Dingxin Zhao, ‘Performance Legitimacy, State Autonomy and China’s Economic Miracle’, Journal of Contemporary China 24(91), (2015), pp. 64–82.

⁷⁴ The two challenges to the CCP’s legitimacy did not appear immediately in this case. When Omicron first attacked, given its formidable transmissibility, decision urgency forced Chinese decision-makers to take active but costly measures. Only later, as the lessened virulence of Omicron became publicly known along with the rising and considerable costs of the Zero-COVID policy, could Chinese decision-makers have made adjustments.

⁷⁵ Suisheng Zhao, ‘The Feeble Political Capacity of a Strong One Party Regime: an Institutional Approach Toward the Formulation and Implementation of Economic Policy in Post-Mao China’, Issues & Studies 26(1), (1990), pp. 47–80.

⁷⁶ Lucian W. Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981), Chapter 7; Victor Shih, ‘“Nauseating” Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain Through Ideological Campaigns in China’, Journal of Politics 70(4), (2008), pp. 1177–92.

⁷⁷ As Kerry Brown and Ruby Congjiang Wang analyze, ‘When all is well, he [Xi] can take all the credit. Conversely, when things go badly, the same logic should hold and he needs to take all the blame’ (p. 52). See Kerry Brown and Ruby Congjiang Wang, ‘Politics and Science: The Case of China and the Coronavirus’, Asian Affairs 51(2), (2020), pp. 247–264.

⁷⁸ Pye (n 76), Chapter 7.

⁷⁹ Yang (n 10); Brown and Wang (n 77).

⁸⁰ An article authored by Commentor of Xinhua News Agency describing the meeting as, ‘In this critical juncture, the central leading body of the Party (zhongyang 中央) had an “very unusual conference”(hen buxunchang de huiyi 很不寻常的会议)’, provoked widespread attention and suspicion, see ‘Guanjian shike, zhongyang kaile yici henbu xunchang de huiyi!’ [‘In the Critical Moment, the Central Opened a very Unusual Conference!’] (Xinhua News, 30 April 2022) <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1731500559822995112&wfr=spider&for=pc&gt; accessed 22 June 2022.

⁸¹ ‘Quick View: State Council Executive Meeting on May 11’ (The State Council, 12 May 2022) <http://english. www.gov.cn/policies/infographics/202205/12/content_WS627cd1bfc6d02e533532a986.html&gt; accessed 1 June 2022.

⁸² Menger Xu, ‘Li Keqiang Visited Yunnan University Without a Mask and was not Reported by Official Media’ (Epoch Times, 20 May 2022) <https://www.breakinglatest.news/news/li-keqiang-visited-yunnan-university-without-a-mask-and-was-not-report-ed-by-official-media-premier-of-the-communist-party-of-china-weibo-blocked/> Accessed 1 June 2022.

⁸³ James Palmer, ‘China’s Premier Steps Up to Issue Economic Warning’(Foreign Policy, 25 May 2022) <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/25/china-li-keqiang-economy-warning/&gt; accessed 12 June 2022.

⁸⁴ Lily Kuo, ‘Top Chinese Official Sounds Alarm Over Economy’(Washington Post, 26 May 2022) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/26/china-economy-covid-li-keqiang/>; accessed 12 June 2022.

⁸⁵ ‘Premier Stresses Need to Implement Policies to Stabilize Economy’ (The State Council, 25 May 2022) <http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/news/202205/25/content_WS628e364ec6d02e533532b526.htm> accessed 12 June 2022.

⁸⁶ ‘China Will Surely Win Anti-COVID War in Shanghai, With Time-Tested Epidemic Control Policy: Top Leadership’(The State Council, 6 May 2022) <https://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/202205/06/content_WS62747913c6d02e533532a4de.html > accessed 8 May 2022.

⁸⁷ ‘Haobu dongyao jianchi “dongtaiqingling” zongfangzhen, jianjue gongguzhu laizhibuyi de yiqing fangkong chengguo’[‘Unswervingly Adhere to the General Principle of “Dynamic Zero-COVID” and Consolidate the Hard-Won Achievements in Epidemic Prevention’] (People’s Daily Online, 10 May 2022) <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1732385210797375778&wfr=spider&for=pc&gt; accessed 8 June 2022.

⁸⁸ We agree with the anonymous reviewer that when facing challenges from his colleagues, President Xi could make statements like, ‘he could be forced to step down’ as a way to mobilize political support. Such an open confrontation, however, would threaten the regime’s legitimacy and, as such, is likely to be avoided by Chinese leaders.

⁸⁹ ‘Zhonggongzhongyang zhengzhiju zhaokai huiyi fenxi yanjiu dangqian jingjixingshi he jingjigongzuo’ [‘The Politburo Held a Meeting to Analyze and Study the Current Economic Situation’] (Xinhua News, 28 July 2022) < http://news.cnr.cn/native/gd/sz/20220728/t20220728_525937082.shtml > accessed 28 July 2022.

⁹⁰ ‘Inspecting Sichuan, Xi Stresses Maintaining Stable Economic Development’ (The State Council, 10 June 2022) <http://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/202206/10/content_WS62a2a1c4c6d02e533532bef6.html> accessed 12 June 2022.

⁹¹ ‘China Likely to See Doubling International Flights as New Flight Season Approaches’ (Global Times, 26 October 2022) <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202210/1277999.shtml> accessed 3 January 2023; Evelyn Cheng, ‘Covid Cases, Controls Spread in China’ (CNBC, 28 October 2022) <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/28/covid-cases-controls-spread-in-china.html> accessed 28 January 2023.

⁹² Ryan Woo, ‘Chinese Cities Double Down on Zero-COVID as Outbreaks Widen’ (Reuters, 27 October 2022) <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinese-cities-tighten-curbs-against-widening-covid-outbreaks-2022-10-27/> accessed 24 January 2023.

⁹³ John Ruwitch, ‘China Eases Its Zero COVID Policy with Shorter Quarantines and Fewer Restrictions’ (NPR, 11 November 2022) <https://www.npr.org/2022/11/11/1135981149/china-eases-its-zero-covid-policy-with-shorter-quarantines-and-less-restrictions> accessed 3 January 2023.

⁹⁴ Jerry Zhang, ‘Chinese Government’s New COVID Policy Causes Public Concern as Infections Rise’ (WSWS, 22 November 2022) <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2022/11/23/unpk-n23.html> accessed 3 January 2023.

⁹⁵ Tessa Wong, ‘China Covid Protests: Fury and Fear of Virus Puts Xi Jinping in a Bind’ (BBC News, 28 November 2022) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china -63,779,250> accessed 24 January 2023.

⁹⁶ ‘China Return to Normal to Take at Least a Year, Analysts Say’ (Bloomberg, 11 November 2022) <https://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-10/china-return-to-normal-will-take-at-least-a-year-economists-say?leadSource=uverify%20wall&gt; accessed 3 January 2023.

⁹⁷ Echo Wong, ‘China Stocks Rally on Signs of Beijing COVID Shift (Nikkei Asia, 1 December 2022) <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/China-stocks-rally-on-signs-of-Beijing-COVID-shift&gt; accessed 27 January 2023.

⁹⁸ Martin Quin Pollard and David Kirton, ‘Relief and Worry as Major Chinese Cities Ease COVID Curbs’ (Reuters, 2 December 2022) <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/scattered-easing-covid-curbs-across-china-after-week-unrest-2022-12-02/> accessed 24 January 2023.

⁹⁹ ‘Wu zunyou yuce, quanguo xinguan ganranlv dadao 80%’ [‘According to Wu Zunyou’s estimate, there has been about 80% of the Chinese being infected’] (Wangyi News, 23 January 2023) <https://www.163.com/dy/article/HRQ3KA2J0553CUX2.html> accessed 14 February 2023.

¹⁰⁰ Wanyuan Song, ‘China Covid: How Many Cases and Deaths are There?’ (BBC News, 16 January 2023) <https://www.bbc.com/news/59882774> accessed 27 January 2023; Elizabeth Palmer, ‘China’s COVID Surge Cast Shadow over Lunar New Year Travel Rush, But There Are Signs of Hope’ (CBS News, 23 January 2023) <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-covid-cases-lunar-new-year-travel-rush-signs-of-hope/> accessed 27 January 2023.

¹⁰¹ Christian Shepherd and Lyric Li, ‘China Eases Covid Testing and Health-Pass Rules in Wake of Protests’ (The Washington Post, 7 December 2022) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/07/china-covid-easing-restrictions/> accessed 3 January 2023.

¹⁰² Michael M. Atkinson, ‘Lindblom’s Lament: Incrementalism and the Persistent Pull of the Status Quo’, Policy and Society 30(1), (2011), pp. 9–18.

¹⁰³ Yvette Tan, ‘Omicron vs Zero-Covid: How long can China hold on?’ (BBC News, 21 March 2022) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-60762032>;, accessed 12 June 2022; See also the interview with Steve Tsang, ‘Zero-Covid is not just a Party policy, but … a Xi policy … As such it cannot be wrong and cannot be abandoned—at least not until Xi sees its continuation will harm himself or his hold on power’, see ‘Shanghai Social Media Unpicks China’s Virus Lockdown Story’ (France24, 7 April 2020) <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220407-shanghai-social-media-unpicks-china-s-virus-lockdown-story> accessed 7 June 2022.

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by the China’s National Social Science Foundation [Grant 20CGL044].