Rare Earth and Resource Nationalism: What Happened Before and After China’s Embargo on Japan?

ABSTRACT

The ban on the export of rare earth elements (REE) to Japan following the 2010 Senkaku boat collision is a salient case of economic sanctions. Chinese state media’s recent consideration of REE as a weapon in the trade war with the United States has brought China’s rare earth policy back into the limelight. This article discusses China’s REE policy from a theoretical perspective of resource nationalism. After examining how China adopted resource nationalism on REE before 2010, it continued to examine how Japan’s response to the ban on REE exports had an impact on China’s rare earth policy and thus, China’s rare earth resource nationalism has grown more thorough since 2010. On the one hand, Beijing has taken countermeasures against Tokyo’s bid to decrease its dependency on China’s REE supply and deter Beijing from placing export restrictions. On the other hand, lessons from its failure to control REE prices have led to the continuation and acceleration of China’s resource nationalism concerning its REEs.

Acknowledgments

The author is grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. The author thanks Professor MARUKAWA Tomoo and HIRANUMA Hikaru for accepting her interview and offering an abundance of information on the rare earth.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ FLORENCE W. YANG (楊雯婷) is an Assistant Professor at the NCCU Program in Japan Studies at the College of International Affairs, National Chengchi University, Taiwan. Her research interests include Northeast Asian international relations, Sino-Japanese relations, and Japanese and Chinese foreign and security policy. She can be reached at <[email protected]>.

² Several studies have indicated that China has intentionally used its economic capabilities to compel other states to change their policies. William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016); James Reilly, ‘China’s Unilateral Sanctions’, The Washington Quarterly 35(4), (2012), pp. 121–133; James Reilly, ‘A Wave to Worry About? Public opinion, foreign policy and China’s anti-Japan protests’, Journal of Contemporary China 23(86), (2014), pp. 197–215; Audrye Wong, ‘Crafting Payoffs: Strategies and Effectiveness of China’s Economic Statecraft’, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, 2018; Stan Hok-wui Wong and Nicole Wu, ‘Can Beijing Buy Taiwan? An empirical assessment of Beijing’s agricultural trade concessions to Taiwan’, Journal of Contemporary China 25(99), (2016), pp. 353–371; Christina Lai, ‘Acting One Way and Talking Another: China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy in East Asia and Beyond’, The Pacific Review 31(2), (2018), pp. 169–187; Darren J. Lim, Victor A. Ferguson, and Rosa Bishop, ‘Chinese Outbound Tourism as an Instrument of Economic Statecraft’, Journal of Contemporary China 29(126), (2020), pp. 916–933. However, others argue that though China has used economic statecraft intentionally, it has been difficult for it to achieve its goals due to various restrictive variables. Daniel W. Drezner, ‘Bad Debts: Accessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics’, International Security 34(2), (2009), pp. 7–45; Scott L. Kastner, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); Scott L. Kastner and Margaret M. Pearson, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds? On the Sources and Efficacy of Economic Engagement Policies in US-China and China-Taiwan Relations’, in The Political Economy of Regional Peacemaking, eds Steven E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016), pp. 144–168; Darren J. Lim and Rohan Mukherjee, ‘What Money Can’t Buy: The Security Externalities of Chinese Economic Statecraft in Post-War Sri Lanka’, Asian Security 15(2), (2019), pp. 73–92; Murray S. Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to Use (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007).

³ Scott L. Kastner, ‘Buying Influence? Assessing the Political Effects of China’s International Trade’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 60(6), (2016), pp. 980–1007; Jonathan Kirshner, ‘The Consequences of China’s Economic Rise for Sino-US Relations: Rivalry, Political Conflict, and (Not) War’, in China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics eds. Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2008), pp. 238–259; Gustavo A. Flores-Macías and Sarah E. Kreps, ‘The Foreign Policy Consequences of Trade: China’s Commercial Relations with Africa and Latin America, 1992–2006’, The Journal of Politics 75(2), (2013), pp. 357–371. Robert S. Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia’, Security Studies 15(3), (2006), pp. 355–395; Robert S. Ross, ‘On the Fungibility of Economic Power: China’s Economic Rise and the East Asian Security Order’, European Journal of International Relations 25(1), (2019), pp. 302–327; Florence W. Yang, ‘Asymmetrical Interdependence and Sanction: China’s Economic Retaliation Over South Korea’s THAAD Deployment’, Issue and Studies 55(4), (2019), pp. 1940008-1-3.

⁴ Mitsuya Hirokawa [廣川満哉], ‘Recent trends in resource nationalism’ [‘最近の資源ナショナリズムの動向’], Metal Resources Report [金属資源レポート] 42(4), (2012), pp. 69–74 and Hikaru Hiranuma [平沼光], ‘Complete elimination of rare earths from dependence on China: the end of resource nationalism that reduces resource value’ [‘目前に迫ったレアアースの中国依存からの完全解消 ～資源価値を低下させる資源ナショナリズムの顛末’], The Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research, September 1, 2016. available at: https://www.tkfd.or.jp/research/detail.php?id=993.

⁵ Wǔyuèhé [五月荷], ‘The U.S. should not underestimate China’s countermeasures’ [‘美方不要低估中方反制能力’]. People’s Daily [人民日報], May 29, 2019. available at: http://world.people.com.cn/n1/

2019/0529/c1002–31,107,670html and Shigeo Nakamura [中村繁夫], ‘Is Rare Earth Really the Trump Card of China in the US-China Trade War?’ [‘米中貿易戦争、レアアースは本当に中国の切り札か？’]. WEDGE Infinity, May 31, 2019. available at: https://wedge.ismedia.jp/articles/-/16332.

⁶ Shunsuke Tabeta, ‘China weighs export ban for rare-earth magnet tech’, NikkeAsia, April 6, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Supply-Chain/China-weighs-export-ban-for-rare-earth-magnet-tech.

⁷ Ekim Arbatli, ‘Resource Nationalism Revisited: A New Conceptualization in Light of Changing Actors and Strategies in the Oil Industry’, Energy Research & Social Science 40 (2018), p. 102. Why says ‘once again’? It is because it was not a new term. Pryke found that the term ‘resource nationalism’ in academic writing can be tracked back in Itagaki’s 1973 article. Pryke also indicates that a large strand of the literature in 1970s is devoted to oil nationalizations and resource control policies. Sam Pryke, ‘Explaining Resource Nationalism’, Global Policy 8(4), (Nov 2017), pp. 474–482. Yoichi Itagaki, ‘Economic nationalism and the problem of natural resources’, The Developing Economies 11(3), (1973), pp. 219–230.

⁸ Paul Domjan and Matt Stone, ‘A Comparative Study of Resource Nationalism in Russia and Kazakhstan 2004–2008’, Europe-Asia Studies 62(1), (2010), p. 38.

⁹ John Childs, ‘Geography and Resource Nationalism: A Critical Review and Reframing’, The Extractive Industries and Society 3(2), (2016), p. 539. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2016.02.006

¹⁰ Arbatli, ‘Resource Nationalism Revisited’, p. 102.

¹¹ Halina Ward, ‘Resource Nationalism and Sustainable Development: A Primer and Key Issues’, IIED Discussion Paper, 2009, pp. 8–9. available at: https://pubs.iied.org/g02507:

¹² Natalie Koch and Tom Perreault, ‘Resource nationalism’, Progress in Human Geography 43(4), (June 2019), p. 616 and Pryke, ‘Explaining Resource Nationalism’, p. 477.

¹³ Please refer to Francisco J. Monaldi, 2021. ‘The Cyclical Phenomenon of Resource Nationalism in Latin America’, in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Latin American Politics, eds. Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost (Oxford University Press, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1523.

¹⁴ Sergei Guriev, Anton Kolotilin, and Konstantin Sonin, ‘Determinants of Nationalization in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data’, Journal of Law Economics and Organizations, 27 (2), (2011), pp. 301–323; Osmel Manzano and Francisco Monaldi, ‘The Political Economy of Oil Production in Latin America’, Economia, 9(1), (2008), pp. 59–98.

¹⁵ Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty At Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (New York: Basic Books, 1971); Vlado Vivoda, The Return of the Obsolescing Bargain and the Decline of Big Oil: A Study of Bargaining in the Contemporary Oil Industry (Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM Verlag, 2008); Roberto Chang, Constantino Hevia, and Norman Loayza, ‘Privatization and Nationalization Cycles’, Macroeconomic Dynamics, 22(2), (2018), pp. 331–361.

¹⁶ Ruben Berrios, Andrae Marak, and Scott Morgenstern, ‘Explaining Hydrocarbon Nationalization in Latin America: Economics and Political Ideology’, Review of International Political Economy, 18(5) (2011), pp. 673–697; Francisco Monaldi, ‘Is resource nationalism fading in Latin America? The case of the oil industry’, Issue Brief no. 09.03.14 (2014, March 9). Houston, TX: Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

¹⁷ Naazneen Barma, Kai Kaiser, Tuan Minh Le,and Lorena Vinuela, Rents To Riches: The Political Economy Of Natural Resource Wealth Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012); Osmel Manzano and Francisco Monaldi, ‘The Political Economy of Oil Production in Latin America’, Economia, 9(1), (2008), pp. 59–98.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 11; Sanusha Naidu and Martyn Davies, ‘China Fuels its Future with Africa’s Riches’, South African Journal of International Affairs 13(2), (2006), pp. 69–83.

¹⁹ Ward, ‘Resource Nationalism’, p.12. On the other hand, Wilson argues that Australian protective policy against China was not ‘resource nationalism’ but was ‘resource liberalism’, which intends to ensure that the governance of Australia’s minerals trade and investment with China remain market-based processes. Jeffrey D. Wilson, ‘Resource nationalism or resource liberalism? Explaining Australia’s approach to Chinese investment in its minerals sector’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 65(3), (2011), pp. 283–304.

²⁰ For example, Wilson argues that China’s pattern of resource nationalism is conditioned by national development strategies and accordingly, he classifies China’s pattern as ‘developmental resource nationalism’. Although Wilson’s research provides a survey of 12 major resource-producing countries reveals that contemporary resource nationalism takes a range of distinct forms, it neither focuses on China’s resource policy over specific resources, nor discuss China’s pattern of resource nationalism in detail. Jeffrey D. Wilson, ‘Understanding resource nationalism: economic dynamics and political institutions’, Contemporary Politics 21(4), (Oct. 2015), pp. 399–416.

²¹ Serina Ng and Ian Mitchell, ‘Resource Nationalism’, Civil Service Quarterly, (July 15, 2014), https://quarterly.blog.gov.uk/2014/07/15/resource-nationalism/.

²² Polina Klossek, Jakob Kullik, Karl Gerald van den Boogaart, ‘A Systemic Approach to the Problems of the Rare Earth Market’, Resources Policy 50 (2016), pp. 131–140.

²³ Joseph A. Stanislaw, ‘Power Play: Resource Nationalism, The Global Scramble For Energy, And The Need For Mutual Interdependence’, Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions, 2008; Ian Bremmer, ‘The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?’ European View 9(2), (2010), Doi: 10.1007/s12290-010-0129-z, pp. 249–252; Ruben Berrios, Andrae Marak, and Scott Morgenstern, ‘Explaining Hydrocarbon Nationalization in Latin America: Economics and Political Ideology’, Review of International Political Economy 18(5), (2011), pp. 673–697 https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2010.493733; Ernest J. Wilson III, ‘The Petro-Political Cycle in World oil Markets’, in Energy Resource Development: Politics and Policies, eds. Richard L. Ender and John Choom Kim (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 1–20; Vlado Vivoda, ‘Resource nationalism, bargaining and international oil companies: challenges and change in the new millennium’, New Political Economy 14, (2009), pp. 517–534.

²⁴ Pavel K. Baev, Russian Energy Policy and Military Power: Putin’s Quest for Greatness (London: Routledge, 2008).

²⁵ Kristin Vekasi, ‘Politics, markets, and rare commodities: responses to Chinese rare earth policy’, Japanese Journal of Political Science 20, (2019), pp. 2–20. This article also discussed ‘resource nationalism’ that Vekasi argued that China’s rare earth policy have three potential aims and one of which was resource nationalism; however, the focus of the article was to examine another aim, economic statecraft.

²⁶ One of three domestic factors was ‘the belief system implied by resource nationalism’ and Duan indicated that China’s dominant the Rare Earth Policy Advocacy Coalition indeed embraces resource-nationalism ideas. Nonetheless, the focus was on the belief system and mainly examined the domestic discussion on the necessity of resource nationalism. Xiaolin Duan, ‘Steering A Middle Course: The Domestic Sources of China’s Rare Earth Strategy’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 15 (March 2022), pp. 47–68, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poac002.

²⁷ Joseph Gambogi, ‘Rare Earths’, U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2019 (February 28, 2019), p.133.

²⁸ Joseph Gambogi, ‘Rare Earths’, U.S. Geological Survey, Minerals Yearbook 2011 (U.S. Geological Survey, 2013), p. 60.11.

²⁹ Gambogi, ‘Rare Earths’, 2019, p.133; Joseph Gambogi, ‘Rare Earths’, U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2020 (Jan. 2020), p.133; Joseph Gambogi, ‘Rare Earths’, U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2021 (Jan. 2021), p.133; Joseph Gambogi, ‘Rare Earths’, U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2022 (Jan. 2022), p.135.

³⁰ Dou Xuehong [窦学宏], ‘Comrade Xiaoping attaches great importance to the rare earth industry—commemorating the 20th anniversary of Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s important rare earth instructions’ [小平同志高度重视稀土产业—纪念邓小平同志重要稀土指示发表20周年], CRENet [中国稀土网站], May 31, 2012, https://www.cre.net/show.php?contentid=102662.

³¹ The meeting also pointed out it is important to emphasize on ‘How to make full use of our resource advantages, how to play this card well, how to make our country’s rare earth industry develop healthily and orderly, and occupy the international market. (emphasis added)’. Zhang Hongjiang [张宏江], ‘We should Bear in mind regarding Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s concerns for the rare earth industry in our country’ [铭记小平同志对我国稀土事业的关怀], CRENet [中国稀土网站], August, 2004. https://www.cre.net/show.php?contentid=21269.

³² The METI [経済産業省], ‘Investigation on advanced distribution management of important minerals in Japan 2019’ [我が国における重要鉱物の流通管理高度化調査] (Written by Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting), March 31, 2020, https://www.meti.go.jp/meti_lib/report/2019FY/000562.pdf, pp. 29–30. For the detail of how China dominate the rare earth merket, refer to Sophia Kalantzakos, China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 117–164.

³³ Also refer to Lu Zhang, Guo, Qing, Zhang, JunBiao, and Huang, Yong, and Xiong, Tao, ‘Did China’s Rare Earth Export Policies Work?—Empirical Evidence from USA and Japan’, Resource Policy 43 (2015), pp. 82–90; Yufeng Chen and Biao Zheng, ‘What Happens after the Rare Earth Crisis: A Systematic Literature Review’, Sustainability 11(5), (2019), pp. 1–26.

³⁴ Lu Zhang, et al, ‘Did China’s Rare Earth’, p. 83.

³⁵ The State Council of PRC [国务院], ‘Notice of the State Council on Listing Tungsten, Tin, Antimony and Ionic Rare Earth Minerals as National Specified Minerals Under Protective Mining’ [国务院关于将钨、锡、锑、离子型稀土矿产列为国家实行保护性开采特定矿种的通知], January 15, 1991.

³⁶ National Development and Reform Commission of PRC [中華人民共和國國家發展和改革委員會], ‘Notice of the State Development Planning Commission on Printing and Distributing “Interim Provisions on the Administration of Foreign-Funded Rare-Earth Industry’ [國家計委關於印發《外商投資稀土行業管理暫行規定》的通知], August 1, 2002, https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/lywzjw/zcfg/200507/t20050715_1046897.html.

³⁷ Also refer to Nánpíng Qiū [邱南平], Hǎishēn Xú [徐海申], Yǐng Lǐ [李穎], and Yànjīng Zhōu [周豔晶], ‘The change of China’s rare earth policy and its impact on the rare earth industry’ [中國稀土政策的變遷及對稀土產業的影響], Natural Resource Economics of China [中國國土資源經濟], 27(10) (2014), pp. 41–44 and Lǐ, Shàofēi [李紹飛], ‘Historical evolution of China’s rare earth policy’ [中國稀土政策歷史沿革], Outlook Weekly [瞭望], July 25, 2011, http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2011/07–25/3206978.shtml.

³⁸ Rénmín rìbào (People’s Daily) [人民日報], ‘Why China’s “rare earths” are being sold cheaply’ [中國「稀土」為何被賤賣], July 28, 2010.

³⁹ The Information Office of the State Council of PRC, ‘Situation and Policies of China’s Rare Earth Industry’, June 2012, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012–06/20/content_15514823.htm.

⁴⁰ Rénmín rìbào, ‘Why China’s ‘rare earths’ are being sold cheaply’.

⁴¹ Will Rogers, ‘The Role of Natural Resources in the South China Sea’, in Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea, ed. Patrick M. Cronin (Center for a New American Security 2012), p. 91. Joel Wuthnow, ‘U.S. “Minilateralism” in Asia and China’s Responses: A New Security Dilemma?’ Journal of Contemporary China 28(115), (January 2019), p. 138. Koga argues that Japan made an incremental shift to explicit balancing began after the 2010 Senkaku Boat Collision Incident. Kei Koga, ‘The Rise of China and Japan’s Balancing Strategy: Critical Junctures And Policy Shifts in the 2010s’, Journal of Contemporary China 25(101)., (April 2016), p. 784.

⁴² ‘China Lifts Rare Earth Export Ban to Japan: Trader’, Reuters, September 29, 2010, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-china-export-idUSTRE68S0BT20100929.

⁴³ Regarding the 2010 cases, refer to Eugene Gholz and Llewelyn Hughes, ‘Market Structure and Economic Sanctions: The 2010 REE Elements Episode as a Pathway Case of Market Adjustment’, Review of International Political Economy 28(3), (November 2019), pp. 611–634; Kristin Vekasi, ‘Politics, markets, and rare commodities: responses to Chinese rare earth policy’; Jeffrey D. Wilson, ‘Whatever happened to the rare earths weapon? Critical materials and international security in Asia’, Asian Security 14(3), (2018), pp. 358–373.

⁴⁴ Tomoo Marukawa [丸川知雄], ‘Is China the cause of the crisis? Macro, rare earth, saury resource crisis’ [危機の元凶は中国？マクロ、レアアース、サンマの資源危機], in Yūji Genda [玄田有史] and Takashi Iida [飯田高] eds., Crisis Response Social Sciences (I): Beyond Unexpected [危機対応の社会科学 上: 想定外を超えて] (University of Tokyo Press [東京大学出版会], 2019), pp. 100–101.

⁴⁵ Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security [JOGMEC, 独立行政法人 石油天然ガス.金属鉱物資源機構], ‘Rare Earth (RE)’ [レアアース（RE）], Mineral Resources Material Flow 2017 [鉱物資源マテリアルフロー2017], pp. 80. Please refer to Figure 2 in Taniguchi’s article. Yoshitaka Taniguchi [谷口能敬] ‘China’s strategy for rare earths and Japan’s response’ [レアアースをめぐる中国の戦略と日本の対応]. Journal of Society of Automotive Engineers of Japan [自動車技術]. Nov., 2013, p.6.

⁴⁶ JOGMEC [独立行政法人 石油天然ガス.金属鉱物資源機構], ‘Rare Earth (RE)’ [レアアース（RE）], Mineral Resources Material Flow 2019 [鉱物資源マテリアルフロー2019], p. 106.

⁴⁷ Also see Charles Kilby, ‘China’s Rare Earth Trade: Health and the Environment’, The China Quarterly 218 (June 2014), pp. 540–550.

⁴⁸ Antulio Rosales, ‘Structural constraints in times of resource nationalism: oil policy and state capacity in post-neoliberal Ecuador’, Globalizations 17(1), (January 2020), pp.77–92.

⁴⁹ Marukawa, ‘Is China the cause of the crisis?’, pp. 103–4.

⁵⁰ A new tax rate was set in September 2020 with tax rates for light REE in the range of 7%~12% the specific amount of which can be decided by local governments. The tax rate for medium and heavy REE is 20%. JOGMEC, ‘Rare Earth (RE)’, Mineral Resources Material Flow 2019, pp. 106–7.

⁵¹ ‘Heavy Rare Earths Supply Chain Risks: Illicit minerals from Myanmar are the world’s largest source of supply’, GLOBAL WITNESS, August 2022, https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/20381/Heavy

_rare_earths_supply_chain_risks_EN_-_August_2022.pdf.

⁵² ‘MP Materials Corp. (MP)”, Market Screener, Annecy, France: Surperperformance’, https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/MP-MATERIALS-CORP-108730348/company/.

⁵³ Xie Wei [谢玮], ‘Export disputes reflect the five major disadvantages of our country’s rare earth industry’[出口争端折射我国稀土产业五大积弊], China Mining News [中国矿业报], April 24, 2014, https://www.mnr.gov.cn/dt/ywbb/201810/t20181030_2273628.html.

⁵⁴ Association Of China Rare Earth Industry [ACREI, 中国稀土行业协会], ‘“Made in China 2025”—rare goods industry opportunity’ [‘中国制造2025’——稀土产业的机遇], September 29, 2015, http://www.xmirem.ac.cn/xwdt/cyxw/201510/t20151008_311008.html.

⁵⁵ National Development and Reform Commission [中华人民共和国国家发展和改革委员会], Rare Earth Industry Development Plan (2016–2020) [稀土行业发展规划 (2016– 2020年), June 21, 2017, https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/fzzlgh/gjjzxgh/201706/t20170621_1196819_ext.html.

⁵⁶ ‘Only China has a complete production line of ‘“Rare earth magnet” from mining to manufacturing… readiness to take the lead in decarbonization’[「レアア—ス磁石」採鉱から製造まで完結、 世界で唯—中国?だけ…脱炭素の主導権握る構え], Yomiuri Shimbun Online [読売新聞オンライン], April 5, 2023, https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/world/20230404-OYT1T50313/.

⁵⁷ ‘China Taking on Hitachi as 17-Year-Old Rare Earth Patent Lapses’, Bloomberg News, July 28, 2014, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-28/china-taking-on-hitachi-as-17-year-old-rare-earth-patent-lapses.

⁵⁸ METI [経済産業省], ‘Priorities for Securing Stable Supply of Permanent Magnets’ [永久磁石に係る安定供給確保を図るための取組方針], 2023年1月、https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/economic_security/magnet/magnet_hoshin.pdf; Seima Oki, ‘China Plans to Ban Exports of Rare Earth Magnet Tech’, Yomiuri Shimbun [読売新聞オンライン], April 5, 2023, https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/world/asia-pacific/20230405–101753/.

⁵⁹ ‘ISO/TC 298 Rare earth’ International Organization for Standardization (ISO), https://www.iso.org/committee/5902483.html; ‘China Northern Rare Earth Led Chinese standard to the world’ [北方稀土领衔推动中国标准‘走出去’], China High-tech Industry Herald [中国高新技术产业导报], November 22, 2017, http://www.chinamining.org.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid

⁶⁰  = 6&id = 23706.

The MIIT [中華人民共和國工業和信息化部], The MIIT and the Ministry of Natural Resources issued the first batch of rare earth total target control plan in 2021 [工業和信息化部自然資源部關於下達2021年第一批稀土開采、冶煉分離總量控制指標的通知], Feb 19, 2021, https://wap.miit.gov.cn/jgsj/ycls/wjfb/art/2021/art_33e0ee3ae1c048ee8b616dbf121f1d40.html and The MIIT, The MIIT and the Ministry of Natural Resources issued the first batch of rare earth total target control plan in 2022 [工業和信息化部 自然資源部關於下達2022年第一批稀土開采、冶煉分離總量控制指標的通知], February 7, 2022, https://wap.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/tz/art/2022/art_7a9152dc74024c0ea9406ac9a9628d09.html.

⁶¹ The MIIT, Regulatory conditions for the rare earth industry [稀土行业规范条件(2016年本)] and Rare Earth Industry Regulatory Conditions Announcement Management Law [稀土行业规范条件公告管理办法], June 24, 2016. http://gdii.gd.gov.cn/protect/P0201607/P020160706/P020160706396625784824.pdf.

⁶² The State Council [国务院], Opinion of the State Council’s General Office for Accelerating the Construction of the Traceability System for Key Commodities [国务院办公厅关于加快推进重要产品追溯体系建设的意见], December 30, 2015. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016–01/12/content_10584.htm.

⁶³ The Ministry of Commerce [商务部], Guidelines for the Construction of Important Product Traceability Management Platforms (Trial) [重要产品追溯管理平台建设指南（试 行）), June 22, 2018. http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/sczxs/201807/20180703103830082.docx.

⁶⁴ The METI, ‘Investigation on advanced’, p. 55.

⁶⁵ The MLR, ‘National Plan for Mineral Resources (2016–2020)’ [全国矿产资源规划（2016－2020年）], November 15, 2016. http://www.mnr.gov.cn/gk/ghjh/201811/P020181101641019499236.doc.

⁶⁶ MIIT, ‘The Rare Earth Industry Development Plan (2016–2020)’ [稀土行业发展规划（2016－2020年）], October 18, 2016, https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/fzzlgh/gjjzxgh/201706/W020191104624314530620.doc.

⁶⁷ The METI, ‘Investigation on advanced’, p. 31.

⁶⁸ National People’s Congress of PRC [中華人民共和國全國人民代表大會], Export Control Law of PRC [中华人民共和国出口管制法], October 17, 2020, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202010/cf4e0455f6424a38b5aecf8001712c43.shtml.

⁶⁹ The Ministry of Commerce [商务部], Export Control Law of the PRC (Draft for Comment) [中华人民共和国出口管制法（草案征求意见稿）], June 16, 2017, http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/as/201706/20170602594467.shtml.

⁷⁰ The Center for Information on Security Trade Control [CISTEC, 安全保障貿易情報センター], ‘Trends in trade-related regulations between the United States and China (Overview)’ [米中の貿易関連等の諸規制の動向について（全体概観）], September 13, 2019, https://www.cistec.or.jp/service/uschina/15-kiseidoko.pdf,

⁷¹ ‘China to establish national technological security management list system’, Xinhua, June 8, 2019, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1153504.shtml; ‘China will establish a national technology safety management list system and specific measures will be introduced in the near future’ [中国将建国家技术安全管理清单制度 具体措施近期出台], Reuters (Chinese version), June 10, 2019, p. 15. https://www.reuters.com/article/china-national-tech-security-list-0610-idCNKCS1TB059.

⁷² The CISTEC, ‘Trends in trade-related regulations’, p. 14.

⁷³ Seima Oki, ‘China Plans to Ban Exports of Rare Earth Magnet Tech’, Yomiuri Shimbun, April 5, 2023, https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/world/asia-pacific/20230405–101753/.