The Enduring Sino–Russian Strategic Relations of Mutual Dependence—The Attribute of Military Cooperation

ABSTRACT

Beijing’s relatively ambiguous response to the Ukraine War has tested how firm the Sino—Russian strategic partnership is. This article aims to decipher the endurance and complexity of Sino-Russian strategic relations by evaluating the nature and dynamics of Sino-Russian defense cooperation amid the worsening international environment against both countries. By examining two Sino-Russian Joint Exercises and analyzing their joint military patrols, exercises, and technological projects, this article argues that the general Sino-Russian military collaboration has been enhanced. Beijing and Moscow have gradually strengthened the combat orientation of their military cooperation to deter the perceived third-party threat, solidify their strategic partnership and against the challenges posed by conflicting interests in the overall bilateral interaction. Both Beijing and Moscow consistently remain vigilant against the risks of abandonment and entrapment, emphasizing the importance of maintaining strategic autonomy and refraining from formal alliances. However, they confront the worst-case scenario of being simultaneously dragged into two separate armed conflicts by a shared adversary. Therefore, align with their own national interests, the ability of Beijing and Moscow to achieve a delicate equilibrium between avoiding entrapment and preventing abandonment will determine the vitality and long-term trajectory of their strategic partnership.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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² China’s de facto Deputy-Commander-in-Chief Zhang Youxia visited Moscow in November 2023 to co-chair the annual meeting of the Joint China–Russia Military R&D Programs. When Putin received him on 8 November, he particularly named a few high-end collaborative projects, such as high-orbit groupings, joint research of military space technology and so on. ‘Putin calls for more joint Russia-China military technological cooperation’, Lianhezaobao, November 19, 2023; The New China News Agency, November 9, 2023, and Sputnik, 9 November 2023. Accessed November 13, 2023. https://sputniknews.cn.

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²⁵ In his Valdai speech on October 27, 2022, Putin revealed that he did not inform Xi of his plan of invasion at their Beijing summit in February; Greater China Live, Shenzhen TV, October 28, 2022.

²⁶ See Chris Buckley, ‘“Abrupt Changes”: China Caught in a Bind Over Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine’, The New York Times, February 25, 2022; Victoria Cavaliere, ‘US Sees China in “Awkward” International Position on Ukraine’, Bloomberg, February 27, 2023.

²⁷ Jack Levy, ‘Preventive War and Democratic Politics’, International Studies Quarterly, 2008. The PLA’s Western War Zone Commander Wang Jianghai linked China’s state survival to such situations. Wang Jianghai (汪江海), ‘The War Zone Must Lift its War Fighting Capability Through the Nation’s Integrated Strategic Mobilization System (依托一体化国家战略体系和能力提高战区备战打赢能力)’, Study Times (学习时报), May 15, 2023.

²⁸ General Milley, ex-chair of the Joint Chief of Staff, made it clear that ‘fighting China and Russia simultaneously would be very difficult for the U.S. Melley’s testimony to the House Armed Service Committee hearing on March 29, 2024. David Vergun, ‘Milley Says War with China and Russia Not Inevitable’, DoD News, March 29, 2023.

²⁹ M.K. Bhadrakumar, ‘US-Russia-China Triangle in Flux, Again’, The Indian Punchline, July 24, 2018.

³⁰ Fact Sheet: US Assistance to Ukraine, Institute for the Study of War, ISW Press, February 8, 2024.

³¹ Miaojung Lin and Debby Wu, ‘Delay in US Arms Shipment to Taiwan Improving, Official Says’, Bloomberg, November 7, 2023. Accessed November 15, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-07.

³² Comments by Senior Colonel Li Li, Ret. (李莉) of the PLA National Defense University, News in Focus Today (今日关注), CCTV-4, April 13, 2013.

³³ Li Yuanpeng (李元鹏), ‘The Late-Qing Debate on National Defence Priority: Coastal Line Defense or Land Border Defense (晚清关于战略重点的海防与塞防之争)’, China Military Science, (2), (2002), p. 57.

³⁴ Liselotte Odgaard, ‘Chinese Perspectives on Alliance and Alignment: Entrapment Concerns in China’s Foreign Relations’, Asian Affairs 54(3), (2023), pp. 432–452.

³⁵ Bobo Lo, The Sino-Russian Partnership: Assumptions, Myths and Realities, Russie.Nei.Report, No. 42, Ifri, March 2023.

³⁶ Former Chinese foreign minister Fu Ying (傅莹), ‘Sino-Russian Relations: Alliance or Partnership (中俄关系: 是盟友还是伙伴)’, Contemporary International Relations (现代国际关系), (4), (2016), p. 10.

³⁷ Gauri Marain Mathur, ‘Return of the Old Giant to the Indo-Pacific’, Journal of Defense Studies 16(2), (2022), pp. 93–99.

³⁸ Francine Frankel and Harry Harding (eds.), The India–China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004).

³⁹ ‘Fight tonight’ is a quotation of Admiral Harris, former commander of the U.S. Pacific Command. Now it has become the buzzword of U.S. military getting combat ready vis-a-vis China and Russia.

⁴⁰ Milley, M., Interview with Defense One, March 31, 2023.

⁴¹ Suisheng Zhao, The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy, (Stanford University Press, 2023); Gompert, D., War with China: Thinking through the Unthinkable, RAND, 2016.

⁴² Beijing repeatedly adjusts the 3-Nos principles. For instance, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi conveyed his 3-Nos version when visiting Russia in 2023: No change in Beijing’s position on the Ukraine War (supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty) no matter how good Sino-Russian relations are; No change of China’s position on normal trade relations with Russia, no matter how powerful the West’s sanction pressure is; and No change in China’s position on military cooperation with Russia with no compromise on Western demand and no self-constraints over the way of cooperation because this is China’s sovereign right.

⁴³ Dmitry Gorenburg, Paul Schwartz, Brian Waidelich and Elizabeth Wishnick, Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation: An Increasingly Unequal Partnership, CNA Research Memorandum, March 2023, p. 68.

⁴⁴ The author’s interview with a senior PLA officer during the 9^th Xiangshan Forum in Beijing, October 21, 2019.

⁴⁵ Alexander Korolev, ‘How closely aligned are China and Russia’, International Politics 57(5), (2019), pp. 760–789.

⁴⁶ The agreement was arrived in an online conference between China’s new defense minister Dong Jun and his Russian counterpart on 31 January 2024. A joint forum would be created for the effort. South China Morning Herald, 4 February 2024.

⁴⁷ Liu Huaqing (刘华清), The memoirs of Liu Huqing (刘华清回忆录), Beijing: The PLA Publishing House (解放军出版社), 2004, p. 594.

⁴⁸ Michael Chase, et al, Russia-China Relations: Assessing Common Ground and Strategic Fault Lines, NBR Special Report, No. 66 July 2017, p. 12.

⁴⁹ You Ji, ‘Friends in Needs or Comrades in Arms: Sino-Russo Military Cooperation’, in The Global Arms Trade, ed. Andrew Tan (Routledge, 2010), pp. 52–64

⁵⁰ Pieter D. Wezeman, Justine Gadon And Siemon T. Wezeman, Trends In International Arms Transfers, 2022, Sipri Fact Sheet, March 2023.

⁵¹ Sino-Russian military cooperation enters a new phase (中俄军事合作进入新阶段)”, People Digest (人民文摘) (5), (2013), p. 45.

⁵² Putin’s remarks to Li Shangfu on April 16, 2023. New China News Agency, April 17, 2023. ‘Sino-Russian military cooperation enters a new phase’, People Digest (5), (2013), p. 45.

⁵³ ‘The New Honey-Moon Period for Sino-Russian Arms Trade and Joint R&D of High-End Weapons Systems’, China News Week, No. 3, 15 January 2012, p. 56. China-Russia Information Net, January 17, 2013. Accessed July 15, 2023 www.chinaru.info.

⁵⁴ Senior Colonel Shen Jijun, the PLA Air Force spokesman, announced this development at the 2022 Zhuhai Airshow. See Global Times, November 10, 2022, p. 7.

⁵⁵ Comments by Major general Fu Qianshao, Ret. To Dajiatan (Military Talk), CCTV Military Channel, December 5, 2023.

⁵⁶ ‘China-Russia in a Nuclear Sub Counter to AUKUS’, Asian Times, October 23, 2023.

⁵⁷ “China Shows its Advanced Military Equipment in the Moscow Defense Industrial Fair (中国参展莫斯科国防工业博览会), The Military Intelligence Live (军情直播间), Shenzhen TV, July 30, 2017.

⁵⁸ Lima Guanhua, ‘Li Shangfu’s Russian Visit Shows that the Graver the Strategic Situation in the Region is, the Harder China and Russia Need to Cooperate’, Tenant News and Comments, August 11, 2023.

⁵⁹ Wu Dahui, ‘Sino-Russian Military Exercises Convey Peace Signal’, Global Times, July 24, 2023, p. 8.

⁶⁰ ‘The Expansion of Sino-Russian Cooperation on Military Technologies’, The Morning News, Phoenix TV, August 16, 2023.

⁶¹ Dmitry Gorenburg, An Emerging Strategic Partnership: Trends in Russia-China Military Cooperation, George Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, No. 54, April 2020.

⁶² According to Senior Colonel Ma Qinghua, one of the Chinese negotiators, Russia demanded US$50 million apiece as the aircraft was equivalent to the U.S. F-15s, which had a market price of US$50 million. Through hard bargaining, the PLA won the lowest price that it originally planned. Ma Qinghua (马庆华), “20 Years of Sino-Russian Military-Technological Cooperation: Personal Experience (亲历中俄军事技术合作20年), Naval and Merchant Ships (舰船知识) (1), (2014), p. 18.

⁶³ Paradorn Rangsimaporn, ‘Russia’s Debate on Military-Technological Cooperation with China: From Yeltsin to Putin’, Asian Survey 46(3), (2006), p. 479.

⁶⁴ For instance, the Chinese MBT VT1A won Morocco’s contract over Russia’s T-90S in 2010. China Defense Blog. Accessed August 8, 2023. https://china-defense.blogspot.com.

⁶⁵ ‘The Evolution of the Aviation Wing of the PLA Army’, Chat on military affairs (茶话会), No. 71; Chinese online forum for professionals to discuss military matters, February 2, 2022.

⁶⁶ Senior Colonel Du Wenlong (杜文龙) comments, Military Intelligence Live (军情直播间), Shenzhen TV, July 30, 2017.

⁶⁷ Dmitry Gorenburg, et al, 2023, p. 52.

⁶⁸ Fu’s media contacts during the Sino—EU business forum, Brussels, June 15, 2023; The South China Morning Herald, June 17, 2023.

⁶⁹ Vasily Kashin, ‘Russia—China Cooperation: A Russian Perspective’, in Sino-Russian Relations: Perspectives from Russia, China and Japan, National Bureau of Asian Research, Special Report, No. 79, May 2019, pp. 17–27.

⁷⁰ Wang Zixian, ‘The Frequency of China—Russia Exchanges is Proportional to the Level of Tensions in the Region’, Global Times, August 15, 2023, p. 4.

⁷¹ Chat on military affairs (茶话会), No. 155, December 1, 2022.

⁷² Michael Gardon and Nancy Yousseff, ‘China and Russia Sent Large Naval Patrol Near Alaska’, Washington Post, August 5, 2023.

⁷³ Li Jie and Liu Weixing (李杰，刘卫星), ‘The Strategic Status of the Island Chains and Their Impact (岛链的战略地位及影响)’, Journal of the PLA National Defence University (12), (2000), p. 24.

⁷⁴ Matthew Ludlow, ‘Losing the Initiative in the First Island Chain’, Journal of Advanced Military Studies 11(2), (2020).

⁷⁵ Camilla Sorensen, ‘The Polar Regions as New Strategic Frontiers for China’, Asia on Tap, The National Bureau of Asian Research, January 25, 2024, https://strategicspace.nbr.org/the-polar-regions-as-new-strategic-frontiers-for-china/; Humpert, The Future of Arctic Shipping: A New Silk Road for China? The Arctic Institute, 2013.

⁷⁶ China’s concept of overseas development interests has now become a key mission of the PLA’s external expansion to protect Xi’s Belt-and-Road Initiative. Wu Xiangning and You Ji, ‘The Geo-strategic and Military Drivers of China’s Belt-and-Road Endeavour’, The China Review 20(4), (2020), pp. 223–244.

⁷⁷ Yang Yifan (杨一帆), ‘The Huge Strategic Significance of Sino-Russian Naval Exercises(中俄海上军演战略意义重大)’ Xinmin Evening Daily (新民晚报), July 23, 2023，p. 4.

⁷⁸ Chen Xi (陈曦), ‘How should China Break U.S. Underwater Blockade (中国如何打破美国的水下封锁)’, Naval and Merchant Ships (舰船知识), (11), (2014), p. 23.

⁷⁹ News in Focus Today, CCTV-4, September 15, 2017.

⁸⁰ Li Dapeng of the PLAN Engineering University, ‘Further, harder, and more comparative: the features of Sino-Russian Joint Naval Exercise 2017’, The Chinese Youth Daily, October 12, 2017, p. 6.

⁸¹ The news brief by the spokesman of the Russian Pacific Fleet. Sputnik September 19, 2017. Accessed November 17, 2023 https://sputniknews.cn/20231226/1055977377.html; Wei Xiangjing and Hong Yiyi, ‘The Chinese and Russian Navies Conducted ASW for the First Time in the Sea of Okhotsk’, Nanfang Daily, September 19, 2017, p. A12.

⁸² Chen Yanming (陈彦名), ‘On the Strategic Implications of Sino-Russian Joint Naval Exercise-2017 (对中俄海上联合-2017军演战略意涵的研究)’, Naval Research Bi-Monthly (海军学术双月刊) 53(3), (2019).

⁸³ Comment by Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo (尹卓), in Focus Today(今日关注), CCTV-4, September 15, 2017.

⁸⁴ ‘Behind Russia’s largest post-Cold War military drills and China’s participation of 3000 soldiers’, BBC, August 29, 2018.

⁸⁵ The Dictionary of PLA Terminologies (中国军语辞典), Beijing: The PLA Publishing House (解放军出版社), p. 256.

⁸⁶ The second Ukraine war has exposed the flaws of such a model and presented the PLA with an opportunity to rethink not only the suitability of the brigade-battalion army structure in a major war but also the nature of any future war it may fight: it may be an all-out war that requires a heavier army structure. Du Haibo (杜海波), ‘More on the Debate on Suitability of Division or Brigade Army Structure (再论师旅之争)’, Global Military Affairs (世界军事) (10), (2023), p. 46.

⁸⁷ Wen Min (闻敏), The Oriantal-2018 Enters Climax (东方-2018战略演习进入高潮), The PLA Website (中国军网), September 14, 2018. Accessed November 20, 2023. www.81.cn.

⁸⁸ Fan Yongqian, ‘The Sino—Russian Oriental Land—Air Exercise 2018 Starts’, The Xinhua News Agency, 11 September, 2018, p. 11.

⁸⁹ Major General Ou Jianping (欧建平), Building an Elite PLA: Reconstructing China’s Modern Military System (精锐之师: 构建现代军事力量体系), Beijing: The Long Watch Publishing House(长征出版社), 2014, p. 121.

⁹⁰ Graham Allison, Destined to War: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides Trap, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017. Russia is at war with possibility of direct NATO involvement.

⁹¹ Brandon Yoder, ‘Power Shift, Third-Party Threats, and Credible Signals: Explaining China’s Successful Reassurance of Russia’, International Politics 57, (2020), pp. 885–917.

⁹² Alexander Korolev, ‘On the Verge of an Alliance: Contemporary China–Russia Military Cooperation’, Asian Security 15(3), (2019), pp. 233–252.

⁹³ For instance, despite state restrictions, the world’s largest UVA firm DJI (Dajiang) continues to sell products to the world market accessed by Russia. It is hard to think that the government would not know about it. Information also sourced through the interview by the author in Shenzhen, December 2023.

⁹⁴ China has increased its import of Russian energy products by 40% over 2021 levels, providing a great financial boost to the war-time Russia. Xinhua News Agency, October 25, 2022.

⁹⁵ Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and New Geopolitics, Brookings, 2008.

⁹⁶ Yoriko Watanabe, ‘The Future of the Asia-Pacific Region’, Asia-Pacific Review 20(2), (2013), pp. 116–121.