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American Foreign Policy Interests
The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Volume 37, 2015 - Issue 4
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From the Archives

The United States and Europe in the Twenty-First Century: Reasons Why They Should Work Together, Reasons Why They May Not

Pages 194-208 | Published online: 07 Apr 2016
 

Notes

George Washington, Farewell Address.

President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 2003.

The United Kingdom was prepared to act on Kosovo without the United States and with ground forces.

More than 10 years ago, Samuel Huntington wrote that a cohesive Europe would have the population resources, the economic strength, the technology, and the actual and potential strength to be the preeminent power of the twenty-first century.

2000 GDP U.S. $9,896 billion, EU $7,836 billion at July 2001 prices and exchange rates; U.S. $9,077 billion, EU $9,758 billion at 1995 prices and exchange rates. OECD statistics online.

EU population: 378 million; U.S.: 276 million.

Consisting of EU heads of government.

NATO will be similarly affected by its own enlargement.

See Robert Cooper, The Post-Modern State and the World Order (London, 2000).

John Winthrop described his intended settlement in what was to be the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as “a city upon a hill.”

This view is not shared by all European states. Smaller ones in the East and the North still see great attraction in U.S. engagement, not least to prevent the domination of larger European neighbors.

2001 $329 billion; 2003 Request $397 billion; 2005 Plan $427 billion; 2007 Plan $470 billion. IISS Military Balance, 2002–2003.

Germany is not yet ready, militarily or diplomatically; European defense with the United Kingdom, Europe's leading military power, is not feasible.

Conventional here as in the sense of usual military, naval, and air formations and weapons, not or as opposed to nuclear.

The U.S. engagement in World War I, for example, although important, was small and late. Only from its entry into World War II, more than two years after its commencement, did it become a major player in European affairs, and even then it was by no means always a supporter of the interests or policies of European states.

Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power (London and New York, 2002).

National Security Strategy of the USA, Chapter IX, 30.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

William Hopkinson

William Hopkinson is a former member of the National Committee's Roundtable on Transatlantic Relations, and served as an associate fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Royal United Services Institute, London.

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