Subjective Well-Being, Willingness to Accept COVID Policies, and Vulnerability: Evidence from China

Abstract

China has experienced dramatic economic growth and poverty reduction over the last two decades, leading the country to declare victory in eradicating extreme poverty in 2021. While the country’s track record in poverty reduction is certainly respectable, income poverty is only one dimension of broader wellbeing. Increasingly, the notions of vulnerability and subjective well-being (SWB) have been noted by researchers and practitioners worldwide. However, the widespread outbreak of COVID-19 pressed hard on people’s livelihoods, potentially impacting SWB or tipping vulnerable households into a state of poverty. These states may impact households’ support for China’s strict measures to control the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus that causes COVID-19. To date, however, few studies have rigorously assessed household welfare and its relationship with SWB and subjective acceptance of aggressive COVID-related policies during the pandemic. Our results suggest that vulnerable households, on average, were less happy, experienced depression more frequently, and were subject to negative emotions impeding their ability to complete their work during the early period of the pandemic. Analysis also suggests that the vulnerable are less willing to accept the closure of work places, and became less confident in the government and the health system. The relationships between vulnerability, SWB, and acceptance of COVID-related policies are heterogenous and are conditional on the source of vulnerability. To enhance pre-pandemic progress in poverty elimination in China, the findings of this study suggest that interventions that can stabilize income variability also needs to be prioritized alongside raising income levels in the policy agenda.

Keywords:

• COVID-19 pandemic
• vulnerability
• COVID policies
• subjective well-being
• China

Acknowledgments

We appreciate Prof. Hung-Gay Fung (Editor) and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. The data of this study is from the research project “Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS)” of the National Survey Research Centre (NSRC), Renmin University of China. We thank the assistance in providing access to the data by NSRC for making this research possible.

Disclosure statement

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have influenced the work reported in this paper. The opinions expressed and arguments employed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position or opinions of the organization that the authors are affiliated with.

Data availability statement

The CGSS data used in this study can be accessed from the website of National Survey Research Center (NSRC), Renmin University of China.

Notes

1 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?iframe=true&locations=CN Last accessed 2024/01/30. The distinction between the “national poverty line” and an “international poverty line” is noteworthy. As of 2021, when China declared its victory over poverty, the government calculated per capita incomes relative to a threshold of $2.25 per day in 2011 prices and adjusting for purchasing power. This poverty line would be appropriate for a country transitioning from low- to lower-middle income, but based on China’s per capita GDP, the World Bank characterizes China as upper-middle income, and thus poverty headcount rates would more appropriately be calculated based on comparison of per capita incomes to a threshold of $5.50 per day in 2011 prices and adjusting for purchasing power ($6.85 in 2017 prices adjusting for purchasing power). According to Buchholz (2021), such a comparison would have suggested a poverty headcount rate of nearly 25 percent in 2016.

2 This is expressed as “Xiao Kang” in Chinese. https://language.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202109/30/WS61557c94a310cdd39bc6cb2e.html Last accessed 2024/01/30.

3 Note that the assessment of the vulnerability status depends crucially on the poverty threshold. As we adopt the $6.85 poverty line (in 2017 prices and adjusting for differences in purchasing power) as the cutoff in this study, the “vulnerability to poverty” here should not interpreted as “vulnerable to extreme poverty.” .

4 In theory, the consumption-based measures are usually preferred when assessing household poverty or vulnerability status. However, only the 2017 wave of the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) report detailed information on household consumption expenditure. We therefore resort to using an income-based measure of vulnerability in this study.

5 Reverse poverty is called “Fan Pin” in Chinese.

6 https://www.news-medical.net/health/History-of-COVID-19.aspx Last accessed 2024/01/30.

7 https://covid19.who.int/region/wpro/country/cn Last accessed 2024/01/30.

8 The term “hukou” refers to the national household registration system in mainland China.

9 The CGSS reports Hukou in 8 categories: Agricultural registered permanent residency, non-agricultural household, blue seal account, resident hukou (formerly agricultural hukou), resident hukou (formerly non-agricultural hukou), military, no account, and other.