Iran’s changing naval strategy in the Persian Gulf: motives and features

ABSTRACT

Beginning in 2016 Iran’s naval posture in the Persian Gulf changed from a defensive-offensive strategy, which had been in effect since 2001, to an offensive one. This was reinforced in 2019–2020, when, in response to the Trump administration, Iranian military strategists determined that any potential confrontation with the country’s adversaries is likely to take place at sea rather than on land or in the air. After the end of the Iran–Iraq war, Iran’s naval strategies can be divided into three, each coinciding with different periods: defensive (1988–2001), defensive-offensive (2001–2016) and offensive (since 2016). The intensification of the US military presence in the Persian Gulf and issuing threats against Iran have played a central role Tehran’s adoption of an offensive naval strategy. Features of this new strategy include the development of ballistic and cruise missile programmes; development and deployment of drones in naval manoeuvres; the use of air defence in supporting naval operations; deepening Iran’s military presence in Persian Gulf islands; ensuring the ability to disrupt the flow of energy; conducting naval manoeuvres in collaboration with trans-regional powers and continued use of proxy warfare. Tehran believes the new strategy will help it better prepare for international threats.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ For more on what the US Navy codenamed Operations Praying Mantis see, T. Aaron Finley, ‘America’s First Clash with Iran: The Tanker War, 1987–88’, Army Lawyer 3, (2015), pp. 31–34.

² Martin S. Navias and E.R. Hooton, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping during the Iran-Iraq Conflict, 1980–1988, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996).

³ Michael Wolgelenter, ‘British-Flagged Tanker Leaves Iran, Two Months after It Was Seized’, The New York Times, (27 September 2019), https://nyti.ms/3brMYXr.

⁴ See, for example, Ariane Tabatabai, Nathan Chandler, Bryan Frederick, and Jennifer Kavanagh, ‘Iran’s Military Interventions: Pattern, Drivers, and Signposts’, Research Report, Rand Corporation, 2021, https://bit.ly/3pzTNhL; Afshon Ostovar, ‘The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran’s Way of War’, Security Studies 28, no. 1 (2019): 159–188; Gawdat Bahgat and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Defending Iran: From Revolutionary Guards to Ballistic Missiles, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021); and, Abdolrasool Divsallar, ‘Shifting Threats and Strategic Adjustment in Iran’s Foreign Policy: The Case of Strait of Hormuz’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, (2021), DOI:10.1080/13530194.2021.1874873.

⁵ An exception is Farzin Nadimi’s ‘policy analysis’ report, ‘Iran’s Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Naval Warfare: Strategy and Capabilities to the Persian Gulf’, Washington Institute for New East Policy, April 2020, especially pp. 29–47, available at https://bit.ly/39lTa5F.

⁶ Mehran Kamrava, Troubled Waters: Insecurity in the Persian Gulf, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 86–87.

⁷ Anthony Cordesman, Iran and the Changing Military Balance in the Gulf, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019), 52.

⁸ Habibollah Sayari, ‘93 Darsad az Saderat Keshvar az Marzhaye Abi Surat Migirad’ (93 Percentage of the Country’s Exports Occur Through Water Borders), ISNA Agency, February, 18, 2014, https://bit.ly/2ZsBsZ6.

⁹ On America’s naval presence in the Persian Gulf, as far back as 1975 an American official said the following: ‘It is perhaps one of the longest-lived examples of Naval Presence in a non-combatant role in our recent history’. P. DeForth, ‘US Naval Presence in the Persian Gulf: The Middle East Force since World War II’, Naval War College Review 28, no. 1, (1975): 28.

¹⁰ David C. Gompert, Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2013), 158–159.

¹¹ Author’s confidential interview with active duty IRGC official, Bushehr, Iran, 7 May 2021.

¹² Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘The Foreign Policy of Iran’, in The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 2^nd ed., Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds., (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2014), 274–275.

¹³ Hossein Minaee ‘Niroye Daryaee Rahbord-i Va Amaliyat-i Sazi-e Amaliyat-3 Ravani Strategic’ (Navy Strategic and Operational Planning, Strategic Psychological Operations), Quarterly Journal of Military Science and Tactics 7, no. 19 (2011): 110.

¹⁴ Hossein Ghorbani, ‘Ayinnamehaye Razmie Niruye Daryaei-e Sepah-e Pasdarn-e Enghelab-e Eslami’ (Combat Regulations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Navy), (Tehran: IRGCN Defense Studies and Research Center, 2006).

¹⁵ Ali Amiri, ‘Tabyine Naghshe Niroye Daryaee Dar Ghodrate Jomhuri Slami’ (Explaining the Role of the Navy in Exercising the Maritime Power of the Islamic Republic of Iran), International Geopolitics Quarterly 16, no. 57 (2020): 154. See, also, Farzin Nadimi, ‘Iran’s National Army Reorganizes’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, (14 August 2017), https://bit.ly/3MD4Uy7.

¹⁶ Sabahat Khan, ‘Saudi Defence Modernisation Focuses on Naval Prowess’, The Arab Weekly, (25 November 2018), https://bit.ly/3Qbp3yv; and, Bob Nugent, ‘The Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf’, Maritime Defence Monitor, (7 April 2021), https://bit.ly/3O5XfcT; According to one military expert, ‘Saudi Arabia is … the clear leader in realizing its naval plans among Gulf countries, with some 92% of programs in progress’. Quoted in, Daniel J. Samet, ‘To Deter Iran; the Gulf States Need Stronger Navies, Atlantic Council’, (20 February 2020), https://bit.ly/39eP2oc.

¹⁷ Fatiha Dazi-Héni, ‘The Gulf States and Israel after the Abraham Accords’, The Arab Reform Initiative, (16 November 2020), https://bit.ly/39oXvoB.

¹⁸ Mostafa Ghaderi Hajat, Hossein Joudi, and Sajjad Heydarian, ‘Geopolitical Explanation of the Reconstruction of the Rimland within the Abraham Accords Framework’, Political Spatial Planning 3, no. 1, (2021): 1–10.

¹⁹ Hassan Hanizadeh, ‘Goals of US & Allies Naval Drills in Persian Gulf’, Strategic Council on Foreign Relations (Tehran), (27 October 2019), https://bit.ly/3O65hCx.

²⁰ J. Matthew McInnis, ‘Building the Iranian Army’, American Enterprise Institute, (April 2017), 89. https://bit.ly/3MyqZOw.

²¹ Frederic Wehrey, et al. ‘Dangerous but Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East’. Rand Corporation, (2009), https://bit.ly/3mzjKev, pp. 11, 31–38, 39–42.

²² The term has also been used in the Sixth Development Plan, 2016–2021. See below.

²³ Ali Bagheri Dolatabadi, ‘Naghsh-e Onsore Bazdarandegi Dar Rahborde Nezami Iran’ (The Role of Deterrence in Iran’s Military Strategy), Scientific Journal of Defense Policy 22, no. 85, (2013): 44–45.

²⁴ Guy Freedman, ‘Iranian Approach to Deterrence: Theory and Practice’, Comparative Strategy 36, no. 5, (2017): 403.

²⁵ Mohammad Hosein Ghanbari Jahromi, ‘Farayande Tar’rahi Rahname Bazdarandegi Hamejanebe Jomhuri Eslami Iran dar Cheshmandaze Bist Sale Keshvar’ (The process of designing the comprehensive deterrence doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran twenty-year vision document of the country), Defense Strategy Quarterly 13, no. 50 (2015): 32.

²⁶ Ibid, 33.

²⁷ The full Text of Iran’s Sixth Development Plan is available Online at https://bit.ly/3mhuuPp. See especially pp. 101–102.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ ‘Afzayeshe Budje Nezami Iran Bad Az Chahar Sal’ (Increase Iran’s Military Budget after Four Years), ILNA Agency, (25 April 2022), https://bit.ly/3xG6E5O.

³⁰ Eghtesad Online, ‘Budget for the year 2021 of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran’, (2 January 2021), https://bit.ly/3Ocbzkl; Robert P. Ashley Jr, ‘Iran Military Power’, Defense Intelligence Agency, (August 2019), 11, https://bit.ly/3zvypzh. In 2021, Iran’s military budget reached $ 24.6 billion.

³¹ Author’s confidential interview with active duty IRGC official, 27 May 2022.

³² International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2019, (February 2019), https://bit.ly/3pIEgMC.

³³ Ali Bagheri Dolatabadi, ‘Understanding Iran’s Decision-Making in Defense Issues and Missile Programme’, India Quarterly 76, no. 2, (2020):1–17.

³⁴ Hossein Aryan, ‘The Artesh: Iran’s Marginalized and Under-Armed Conventional Military’, in The Artesh: Iran’s Marginalized Regular Military, (Washington, DC: The Middle East Institute, 2011), 49.

³⁵ R. K. Ramazani, ‘The Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf Crisis’, Current History 87, no. 526, (1988): 86.

³⁶ Saeid Golkar, ‘The Armed Forces in Post-Revolutionary Iran’, in The Routledge Handbook of Persian Gulf Politics, Mehran Kamrava, ed., (London: Routledge, 2020), 446.

³⁷ Author’s confidential interview with Iranian government official, Bushehr, 17 May 2021.

³⁸ Divsallar, ‘Shifting Threats and Strategic Adjustment in Iran’s Foreign Policy’, 22.

³⁹ Robin Mills, ‘Risky Routes: Energy Transit in the Middle East’, Brookings Doha Centre, No. 17, (2016), 22, https://brook.gs/3nuZTgJ.

⁴⁰ Author’s confidential interview with an Iranian government official, Tehran, 11 November 2020.

⁴¹ Author’s confidential interview with a former commander of the IRIN, Tehran, 14 February 2021.

⁴² Ghasem Eftekhari and Ali Bagheri Dolatabadi, ‘Tashdid-e Feshar-e Amrika Va Gerayesh-e Iran Be Estratezhi-e Bazdarandegi’ (Intensification of US Pressure and Iran’s Propensity to Deterrence Strategy), Politics Quarterly 40, no. 4 (2011), 7.

⁴³ Quoted in, Eftekhari and Bagheri Dolatabadi, Intensification of US Pressure and Iran’s Propensity to Deterrence Strategy, 16.

⁴⁴ Ali Khamenei, ‘Didar-e- Farmaneh Nadaja va Taghdime Tarhe Velayat’ (Meeting of the Commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic and the Submission of the Velayat Plan), Fars Agency, (30 December 2007), https://bit.ly/3H9gBvB.

⁴⁵ Ronald L. Burgess, Jr. ‘Iran’s Military Power, Statement before the Committee on Armed Service’, United States Senate, (14 April 2010), 2, https://bit.ly/3pHc4tq.

⁴⁶ Robert Czulda, ‘Defence Industry in Iran—between Needs and Real Capabilities’, Defense and Security Analysis 36, no. 2, (2020), 208.

⁴⁷ Fariborz Haghshenass, ‘Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare’, Policy Focus 746, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, (2008), https://bit.ly/3jCrrPV.

⁴⁸ ‘Roykard-e Rahbari Dar Tose’h Savahel-e Makran Ehya-ye Tamadone Daryaee Ast’ (The Leadership Approach to the Development of Makran Beaches is the Revival of Maritime Civilization), The Islamic Republic News Agency, (5 December 2019), https://bit.ly/3bh3bON.

⁴⁹ B. Kenneth Moss, ‘Defining Strategic Priorities: Ballistic Missile Defense, Iran, and Relations with Major Power’. Mediterranean Quarterly 20, no. 1, (2009): 34.

⁵⁰ Ali Khamenei, ‘Bayanat Dar Didar Dast Andarkaran Entekhabat’, (Speech among Election Officials), (20 January 2016), https://bit.ly/3nwLxwr.

⁵¹ Ali Khameni, ‘Bayanat Dar Daneshgah-e Afsari-e Emam Ali’ (Speeches at Imam Ali Military Academy), (10 November 2011), https://bit.ly/3vM8Shj.

⁵² Gawdat Bahgat, ‘Iran’s Regular Army: Its History and Capacities’, in The Artesh: Iran’s Marginalized Regular Military, (Washington, DC: The Middle East Institute, 2011), 21.

⁵³ Author’s confidential Interview with a commander of the IRGCN, Bushehr, 31 May 2022.

⁵⁴ Robert P. Ashley. Jr, ‘Iran Military Power’, Defense Intelligence Agency, (August 2019), 16.

⁵⁵ Ernesto Londono and Thomas Erdbrink, ‘Iran Hails Warships’ Mission in Mediterranean’, The Washington Post, (22 February 2011), https://wapo.st/3mllDwk.

⁵⁶ Author’s confidential interview with a former commander of the IRIN, Tehran, 14 February 2021.

⁵⁷ ‘Iran’s Navy to Keep Presence in Oceans: Commander’, Tasnim News Agency, (10 September 2021), https://bit.ly/3Cp6AXR.

⁵⁸ Mahmood Sariolghalam, ‘Prospects for Change in Iranian Foreign Policy’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (20 February 2018), https://bit.ly/3myjOLB.

⁵⁹ Ali Khamenei, ‘Iran Has Defeated All of US’s Vicious Plans for the Region’, Khamnenei.ir, (10 September 2018), https://bit.ly/3zuau33.

⁶⁰ Ali Khamenei, ‘Bazdid-e Farmandeh-e Koll-e Ghova az Namayeshgah-e San’at-e Defai va Didar Ba Mas’ulan va Motakhasesan Vezarat-e Defa’ (Visit of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces from the Defense Industry Exhibition and Met with Officials and Specialists of the Ministry of Defense), Khamnenei.ir, (31 August 2016), https://bit.ly/3jJdTCy.

⁶¹ ‘Iran’s Strategy is in Offensive Operations and Tactics’, Tasnim News Agency, (22 December 2018), https://bit.ly/3vPSxYL.

⁶² Ali Khamenei, ‘Bayanat Dar Didare Maj’Ma A’li Farmandehane Sepah’ (Statement at the Meeting of the Supreme Assembly of IRGC Commanders), Khamenei.ir, (2 October 2019), https://bit.ly/3QcmAns.

⁶³ Gholamreza Mohammadi, ‘Omghe Strategic-e Jomhuri Slami Iran ba Negah Be Cheshmandaze Bist Sale’ (Iran’s Strategic Depth based on 20 Year Vision), Khomeini.ir, (2019), https://bit.ly/3xDAbwR.

⁶⁴ ‘Ezharate Farmandehan-e Hazer Dar Razmayesh’ [Statement of the Commanders Present at the Exercise], Mizan News Agency, (22 December 2018), https://bit.ly/3xDAbwR.

⁶⁵ Author’s confidential with a commander of the IRGCN, Bushehr, 31 May 2022.

⁶⁶ ‘Sardar Bagheri: Momken Ast Dar Hefze Manafe Khodeman Rooykarde Afandi Dashte Bashim’ (Major General Bagheri: We may have an ‘offensive approach’ in protecting our own interests), Tasnim News Agency, (27 January 2019), https://bit.ly/3mywOko.

⁶⁷ ‘Sardar Heidari: Rooykarde Tahajomi Dastoore Kare Jadide Niroohaye Mosalah’ (Major General Heydari: Offensive Approach, New Agenda of the Armed Forces), Tasnim News Agency, (26 January 2019), https://bit.ly/3xnkg4r.

⁶⁸ Ali Khamenei, ‘Emam Khamenei: Nirooye Daryaee Dar Khatt-e Moghadam-e Defa‘ Az Keshvar Ast’ (The Navy is the Forefront Defense of the Country), Tasnim News Agency, (28 November 2017), https://bit.ly/3GrdU7W.

⁶⁹ Robert P. Ashley Jr, ‘Iran Military Power’, Defense Intelligence Agency, (August 2019), 56.

⁷⁰ Michael Eisenstadt, ‘The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Religion, Expediency, and Soft Power in an Era of Disruptive Change’, Middle East Studies Monographs, Marine Corps University 7 (2015), 8–9, https://bit.ly/3xd4tVK.

⁷¹ Habibullah Sayari, ‘Tajhiz-e Navshekan-haye Niroy-e Daryai-e Jomhuri-e Eslami be Mooshak-e Krooz 300 Kilumetri’ (Equipping Iranian Navy Destroyers with 300 km Cruise Missiles), Tasnim News Agency, (7 December 2015), https://bit.ly/3CkQEWF.

⁷² Author’s confidential interview with an Iranian government official, Bushehr, Iran 10 March 2021.

⁷³ Orkhan Jalilov, ‘Iran Test Launches New-Generation Cruise Missiles’, Caspian News, (18 June 2020), https://bit.ly/3nsZRWC.

⁷⁴ Farzin Nadimi, ‘Iran’s Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Naval Warfare’, 20.

⁷⁵ United States Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review, (2019), III, https://bit.ly/3nyhNiB.

⁷⁶ Saheb Sadeghi and Zakiyeh Yazdanshenas, ‘Why Iran’s Military Is So Focused on Missiles (Think History and a War with America)’, The National Interest, (9 November 2019), https://bit.ly/3pHM4OP.

⁷⁷ Author’s confidential interview with a former Iranian security official, Bushehr, Iran, 18 January 2021.

⁷⁸ Paul Iddon, ‘Tehran Flaunts New Domestically Built Fighter Jets, But Iran’s Air Force Remains Largely Antiquated’, Forbes, (28 June 2020), https://bit.ly/3jCBlRA.

⁷⁹ Author’s confidential interview with a former Iranian security official, Bushehr, Iran, 18 January 2021.

⁸⁰ Author’s confidential interview with an Iranian government official, Bushehr, 17 May 2021.

⁸¹ Michael Wahid Hanna and Dalia Dassa Kaye, ‘The Limits of Iranian Power’, Survival 57, no. 5, (2015):173–198; Kayhan Barzegar and Abdolrasool Divsallar, ‘Political Rationality in Iranian Foreign Policy’, The Washington Quarterly 40, no. 1, (2017): 39–53.

⁸² Ciara Nugent, ‘What to Know About the British-Flagged Oil Tanker Seized by Iran Amid Escalating Tensions’, The Time, 22 July 2019, https://bit.ly/3pM9z9h.

⁸³ Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz’, International Security 33, no. 1, (2008): 548–581; Sabahat Khan, ‘Iranian Mining of the Strait of Hormuz: Plausibility and Key Considerations’, Institute of Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA), Special Report 4, no. 1, (2010): 1–12.

⁸⁴ Divsallar, ‘Shifting Threats and Strategic Adjustment in Iran’s Foreign Policy’, 13.

⁸⁵ Wolgelenter, ‘British-Flagged Tanker Leaves Iran, Two Months After It Was Seized’.

⁸⁶ ‘China to Hold Maritime Drill with Iran, Russia on Friday: Spox’, Mehr News Agency, (26 December 2019), https://bit.ly/3vPahne.

⁸⁷ Author’s confidential interview with a former commander of the IRGCN, Tehran, 26 May 2022.

⁸⁸ Garrett Nada, ‘Timeline: US-Iran Naval Encounters’, The US Institute of Peace, (22 January 2018), https://bit.ly/3bds1PE.

⁸⁹ Ben Riley-Smith, ‘Trump Orders Navy to Attack Iranian Ships that Harass US Vessels’, The Telegraph, (22 April 2020), https://bit.ly/3CksoDT.

⁹⁰ Hossein Salami, ‘Mohaya-e Har Senario-i Hastim’ (We are Ready for Every Scenario), IRNA News Agency, (September, 21, 2019), https://bit.ly/3bfY1mh.

⁹¹ ‘Farmandeh-e Niru-ye Daryai-e Sepah: Har Kasi Pa-ye Israel ra beh Mantaqeh Baz Konad Dochar-e Na Amni Khahad Shod’ (Commander of IRGC Navy: Anyone Facilitating Israeli Entry into the Region Will Face Insecurity), Tasnim News Agency, 11 June 2022, https://tn.ai/2727105.