Militarisation and State Capacity in Zimbabwe: The Limits of the Human Security Paradigm

ABSTRACT

This article uses the case of Zimbabwe to explore the interface between militarisation and state capacity, and through that critique the emancipatory potential of the human security concept. It argues that militarisation undermines state capacity to provide emancipatory security as envisioned in the human security concept. A militarised state is severely incapacitated and challenged to deliver emancipatory security because it lacks the functional capacity and legitimacy of a state that is capable of safeguarding the security of the individual. The Zimbabwean case shows how the nature of the struggle for the country's independence conditioned the political elite's siege mentality and concomitant predisposition to use militarisation to safeguard their interests while ignoring those of the broader citizenry. By underscoring the adverse effects of militarisation on state capacity and legitimacy, the Zimbabwean case reinforces critiques of the state-centric approach of the human security concept, which severely constraints the latter's emancipatory potential.

KEYWORDS:

• Human security
• state capacity
• militarisation
• Zimbabwe
• emancipation

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Since 1999 when it was formed, the MDC split many times (2005, 2014 and 2018). The term MDC is used in this article for the sake of consistency with reference to the main formation that continued with Morgan Tsvangirai as its leader up to his death in February 2018. Nelson Chamisa succeeded Tsvangirai and participated in the 2018 elections using the name MDC Alliance.

2 M (Former MDC senior official and minister during the Government of National Unity) in discussion with one of the authors, 17 October 2019, via WhatsApp call.

3 The operations were a key expression of the militarisation of Zimbabwean politics and the state in that they were conceived, planned and executed by the Joint Operations Command (JOC). The JOC began as an ad hoc institution specially set up to spearhead the Rhodesian regime's execution of counterinsurgency. It comprised representatives from all the security services, namely the army, police, intelligence services and air force and was presided over by the Rhodesian Army Commander. The JOC was revived in the early years of independence to coordinate the government's fight against internal and external security threats. Since the early 2000s, JOC's role was to direct swift responses to national security threats as determined by ZANU-PF. As a result, the JOC brought together the heads of the armed forces, prisons, intelligence and police, a lot of whom are ex-ZANLA combatants and the range of the threats were expanded to include those emerging from the economy, elections and politics. The JOC also encompassed the war veterans under the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), the Ministry of Defence and the central bank governor, in order to expedite the financing of its activities and programmes. See Bratton and Masunungure (2008, 48).

4 H (Senior University of Zimbabwe academic) in discussion with one of the authors, 4 September 2019, Groombridge, Harare.

5 DMat (a male civil society official) in discussion with one of the authors, 20 August 2019, via Skype; E (a male former senior police officer) in discussion with one of the authors, 27 August 2019, Mount Pleasant, Harare.

6 “Mugabe's food production project flops”, ZimOnline, 24 May 2006, https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/old/may24_2006.html (accessed 22 June 2021).

7 “Price controls devastating rural economy”, The New Humanitarian, 24 July 2007, http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2007/07/24/price-controls-devastating-rural-economy (accessed 2 June 2021).

8 AM (a male citizen) in discussion with one of the authors, 23 August 2019. Harare Central Business District, Harare; TP (a male citizen) in discussion with one of the authors, 7 September 2019, Kuwadzana, Harare.