Speaking the Right Language: Transnational Rule and Symbolic Power in Dialogue Forums

ABSTRACT

This article argues that the opening up of international organisations (IOs) to the participation of civil society organisations (CSOs) has not only failed to dismantle structures of rule. Rather, it should be understood as a perpetuation of rule, re-enacted in and through the everyday practices of IO-CSO interactions in dialogue forums. To make this argument, I build on Bourdieu's notion of symbolic power to conceptualise rule as a hierarchical relationship of mutual recognition, characterised by compliance and actualised through (discursive) practices. In dialogue forums, rule is enacted through the ability of dominant actors to impose meanings (classifications, categories, normative standards) as legitimate. By analysing the Civil Society Policy Forum, I show how the institutions have managed the criticism emanating from CSOs through discursive assimilation, i.e. by both opening up space for dialogue and delimiting the boundaries of political discourse, leading CSOs to accept the conditions for reproducing the institutional discourse.

Introduction

At the turn of the millennium, international economic institutions¹ such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) faced a wave of forceful and widespread protests, reflecting deep-seated discontent with the prevailing global economic order. Events such as the protests in Seattle in 1999 against a WTO ministerial conference, in Prague in 2000 against the annual meetings of the World Bank and the IMF, or in Genoa in 2001 against the G8 summit became not only a symbol of resistance to international institutions and their widely perceived crisis of legitimacy, but also catalysts for profound changes in the nature of global economic governance (O’Brien et al. 2000; Rauh and Zürn 2020; Gregoratti and Uhlin 2022; Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012; Anderl et al. 2019).

International economic institutions have responded to the protests by increasing access to a wide range of civil society organisations (CSOs)², and social movements – a phenomenon that came to be known as the “opening up” of international organisations (IOs) (Tallberg et al. 2013).³ Within the shift towards CSO participation, the global economic institutions have been among the most reluctant to “open up”.⁴ The WTO has hesitated, but its secretariat has taken several steps to increase the institutions’ transparency and has created public forums for dialogue with CSOs (Tucker 2014; Hopewell 2015; Hack 2020; Hannah, Ryan, and Scott 2017). Even the IMF – the most exclusive of the institutions – now regularly consults with CSOs at its Annual Meetings in the Civil Society Policy Forum (CSPF) (Tallberg and Uhlin 2011, 215).

The World Bank, in contrast, has been described as a “trendsetter” in civil society engagement (Pallas and Uhlin 2014, 193). This trend can largely be attributed to the presidency of James Wolfensohn (1995–2005), who explicitly wanted to engage with his critics (Gregoratti and Uhlin 2022, 107). During his tenure, various mechanisms involving CSOs in almost all stages of the policy-making process were implemented (Pallas 2013). Moreover, Wolfensohn sought to change the Bank’s organisational culture by hiring people who would promote CSO involvement (Sondarjee 2021), such as social scientists and people who had previously worked for NGOs. Under the leadership of the Civil Society Team established in 2002, the World Bank and the IMF launched the CSPF. The forum was established to address calls for democratic engagement by opening a channel of communication that would allow critical voices to be heard within institutions (Hack 2020; Coni-Zimmer, Deitelhoff, and Schumann 2023). Some 20 years after their inception, dialogue forums have become a well-established practice in global economic governance and are part of the routine interaction between many CSO representatives and institutional staff.

Existing scholarship in International Relations (IR) has assessed the inclusion of CSOs primarily in terms of whether CSO participation in dialogue forums can enhance the legitimacy of the institutions and global governance in general (Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012; Uhlin and Kalm 2015; Gronau and Schmidtke 2016). In addition, several scholars have argued that increased CSO participation could have a democratising effect, anticipating a remedy for the democratic deficit in global governance (Bexell, Tallberg, and Uhlin 2010; Nanz and Steffek 2004; Steffek, Kissling, and Nanz 2008; Scholte 2011). Empirical studies, however, yielded disappointing results. To date, there is broad agreement that dialogue forums are unsuccessful in facilitating genuine and meaningful exchanges (O’Brien et al. 2000; Hack 2020; Coni-Zimmer, Deitelhoff, and Schumann 2023; Steffek and Ehling 2008). Rather, CSOs engaging with IOs encounter a social realm that is highly stratified and marked by persistent inequalities and power structures that benefit some CSOs more than others. This has led scholars to conclude that IOs offer only “shallow forms of participation” (Tallberg et al. 2013, 20).

In this article, I argue that opening up to CSO participation has not only fallen short of delivering on the promise of democratisation and to increase the legitimacy of the institutions, and thus failed to dismantle structures of rule. Instead, it has led to a perpetuation of rule, re-enacted in and through the everyday practices of IO-CSO interactions in dialogue forums. To make this argument, I build on Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power to conceptualise rule as a relation that is actualised through practices, i.e. through patterns of routinised informal everyday interactions. In dialogue forums, rule is enacted through the capacity of dominant actors to impose meanings (classifications, categories, normative standards) as legitimate (Swartz 2019, 13), which is manifested in the fact that CSOs adapt to the discursive conditions set by the institutions.

I develop the argument in three steps. First, I argue for understanding the institutionalised participation of CSOs in global economic governance as a relation of rule. Here, I distinguish between justificatory and revealing approaches to studying relations of rule in the inclusion of CSOs in global economic governance, pointing to an underexplored facet of rule that lies in its daily iteration. Second, I draw inspiration from practice theory in IR to conceptualise rule as an everyday interaction that is actualised in and through practice. By conceiving of global governance as constituted by practices (that are socially situated but enacted by individuals and groups), practice theory offers a way to relate and translate repeated micro-level interactions to macro-level structures of rule (Best 2014; Pouliot and Thérien 2023; 2018; Adler et al. 2011). In conceptualising repeated micro-level interactions as the substance of global governance a practice approach can grasp its nature by “zooming in on IOs’ internal dynamics, daily practices, and performances of the practice of CSO inclusion” (Holthaus 2021, 1). Studying dialogue forums as an aggregated (social) practice in everyday global governance (consisting of multiple discursive and non-discursive practices) thus allows for the analysis of structural processes such as rule and domination.

In a third step, through an analysis of the CSPF, I show how the institutions have managed the criticism emanating from CSOs through assimilation into the institutional discourse. I trace this process and highlight the crucial and active role of the CSPF Working Group, which serves as an interlocutor and link between the institutions and the CSOs seeking to engage with the World Bank and the IMF. In short, I argue that the opening up of the World Bank and the IMF has occurred in a way that limits the repertoire of possible discursive actions for CSOs, i.e. the extent to which they can effectively challenge, contest, and influence the IOs’ positions. This shows that while IOs have opened up to the participation of CSOs, this opening takes place under specific conditions set (more or less explicitly) by the institutions, where successful CSO participation is defined by patterns of discursive assimilation.

CSO inclusion and relations of rule in global economic governance

In this section, I argue for understanding the institutionalised participation of CSOs in global economic governance as a relation of rule, highlighting an underexplored facet of rule that lies in its daily iteration. In what follows, I distinguish between justificatory and revealing approaches to (the study of) rule in global governance. I use this distinction as a heuristic device that allows to organise and situate IR scholarship on CSO inclusion in global economic governance as it relates to the question of rule. In general, justificatory approaches are concerned with the conditions under which relations of super- and subordination in global governance can be justified, while rule revealing approaches in the tradition of “critical” IR theories, such as post-Marxism and poststructuralism, are more sceptical about the possibility of legitimate rule. However, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but rather use different analytical lenses.

Justificatory approaches to rule: protests as politicisation

Justificatory approaches to rule view the protests against global economic institutions as processes of delegitimation and thus as an indicator of the legitimacy crisis of international institutions (Tallberg and Zürn 2019; Rauh and Zürn 2020). The argument is that as IOs become more authoritative, they also become more prone to contestation and protest. This process understood as politicisation, incentivises IOs to actively engage in legitimation strategies (Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). As legitimacy is widely regarded as crucial for the effective functioning of IOs, it is assumed that IOs would open up to civil society participation in order to secure their legitimacy and protect their authority (Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012, 69; Tallberg et al. 2013, 23). Accordingly, scholars have examined dialogue forums as an institutional legitimation strategy that addresses the lack of sufficient societal legitimation (Gronau 2015; Gronau and Schmidtke 2016; Coni-Zimmer, Deitelhoff, and Schumann 2023).

Based on a normative understanding of legitimacy, the inclusion of CSOs was not only assumed to be a legitimation strategy of IOs but also to have a potentially democratising effect (Steffek, Kissling, and Nanz 2008; Scholte 2011; Tallberg and Uhlin 2011; Bexell, Tallberg, and Uhlin 2010). In a seminal study, Steffek, Kissling, and Nanz (2008) explored the potential of CSOs to act as catalysts and a potential “cure for the democratic deficit” of global governance. Emerging from within a deliberative framework, the underlying rationale is that CSOs can act as a “transmission belt” between a “global citizenry” and the institutions of global governance (Nanz and Steffek 2004). CSOs could communicate new issues and voice criticism directly to IOs as intermediaries between the local and global level. Moreover, it is argued that CSOs can play an essential role in creating a transnational public sphere, which is often seen as a precondition for democratising global governance (Nanz and Steffek 2004, 324). Following this rationale, dialogue forums have been conceptualised as sites of idealised deliberative practice that can enhance democratic legitimacy (Hack 2017; 2020).

However, empirical studies have demonstrated that a number of problems compromise the democratising potential of deliberation, including asymmetries in power and status and high levels of technocratic expertise as a precondition for participation (Hack 2020; Kissling and Steffek 2008; Scholte 2011; 2012). Furthermore, the decisive role of factors such as gender, educational and professional background cannot be obviated by deliberation (Steffek 2018, 443). While CSO participation may be intended to give voice to diverse actors, especially marginalised groups that lack resources and coverage, it often tends to reproduce existing inequalities. This has led scholars to conclude that formal inclusiveness does not ensure (more) equal participation (Pouliot and Thérien 2018, 168; Scholte 2012; Dany 2012). Rather, CSOs engaging with IOs encounter a highly stratified social realm characterised by persistent inequalities and power structures that privilege some CSOs. In sum, justificatory approaches to rule in global governance view dialogue forums as a source of legitimacy, or more precisely, as a failed legitimation strategy, because they have not succeeded in enabling meaningful participation and therefore have not led to the dismantling of structures of rule.

Rule revealing approaches: protests as resistance

Rule revealing approaches have a different understanding of the protests against international economic institutions. Here, the protests are not interpreted as protests against specific policies or institutions, i.e. as processes of politicisation that could be addressed and potentially resolved through legitimation strategies, such as the inclusion of critical voices in dialogue forums, but as resistance against a global order of rule (Anderl et al. 2019; Anderl 2022; Daase and Deitelhoff 2019; Volk 2018). In short, they criticise justificatory approaches for neglecting institutionalised structures of super- and subordination in global governance by inscribing legitimacy in the process of politicisation (Daase and Deitelhoff 2019). Against the backdrop of institutionalised structures of super- and subordination, Daase and Deitelhoff (2019, 16) define rule as “an expression of asymmetric power relations that are of a certain duration and are reinforced by institutions” (Daase and Deitelhoff 2019, 16). The forms of power that constitute and secure relations of super- and subordination vary. They can rest on formal legal regulation, on informal discursive power or on the unequal distribution of resources (Daase and Deitelhoff 2019, 18). Because rule manifests itself in subtle ways and remains largely invisible, the authors argue that it can only be observed when it asserts itself against resistance. They therefore take practices of resistance as their empirical entry point for studying rule.

Beyond self-legitimation for IOs, rule revealing approaches emphasise that civil society participation contributes to the self-legitimation of an order of rule in global governance (Hopewell 2015; Tucker 2014; Bartelson 2006; Amoore and Langley 2004; Sending and Neumann 2006). In the case of civil society participation at the WTO, for example, Hopewell (2015) shows that “global civil society” is not independent or autonomous but is shaped and influenced by the institutions it targets. Similarly, Tucker (2014, 385) demonstrates how the regular interaction between NGO representatives and WTO staff relies on the production of specific processes of NGO subjectification and subjectivation. In the same vein, Lipschutz (2005, 230) suggests that “global civil society” is a central and vital element in an expanding global regime of governmentality. The inclusion of CSOs in global governance is seen as a mechanism of co-optation and/or the workings of global capitalism that imprint “the meaning and function of global civil society such that it helps to reproduce a politics that is congenial to the class interests of the dominant classes” (Barnett and Duvall 2005a, 20; Amoore and Langley 2004). Collectively, these studies show how the reproduction of dominant neoliberal discourses “blunt[s] the teeth of resistance movements” (Hannah, Ryan, and Scott 2017, 746) in global economic governance.

Through the analysis of dialogue forums, these approaches analyse how global economic institutions have managed to overcome the resistance of the alter-globalisation movement. Following the work of O’Brien et al. (2000), Deitelhoff (2012, 73) presumes that global economic institutions have deliberately used dialogue forums to divide and disperse the growing opposition and ensure the smooth functioning of the institutions. Along the same lines, Anderl (2022, 5) shows how the alter-globalisation movement fragmented in its interactions with the World Bank because of internal conflicts over how to deal with the opening up. Using the case of the CSPF, he demonstrates not only how dialogue forums were used to divide the protests into inside and outside groups but also how resistance was demobilised and can now only be found sporadically in individual practices of critique (Anderl 2022, chap. 9). On the one hand, this shows that moderate critique is included while more radical critique is dismissed. And on the other hand, it points to the fact that most actors have adopted a compliant behaviour during their time of interaction with the institutions in dialogue forums. Moreover, by stating that “the movement co-constitutes this relationship [of rule]” (Anderl 2022, 8), he draws attention to the fact that CSOs participate in the ongoing reproduction of rule through their interactions with IOs in dialogue forums.

Practices of resistance offer a helpful starting point for theorising and analysing rule. However, the demobilisation of resistance should not be taken as an indication of the decline of rule. Some forms of rule, especially subtle forms such as discursive power, do not necessarily provoke resistance. On the contrary, these forms of rule typically lack moments of contestation. This leaves us with the question of how to identify and analyse relations of rule that lack resistance and contestation. In order to provide a possible answer to this question, I reformulate the relationship between IOs and CSOs through Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power as one characterised by mutual recognition and compliance that is re-enacted in and through the everyday practices of IO-CSO interaction. The reference to symbolic power suggests that rule in dialogue forums is an ongoing process that is articulated through adaptation to the dominant (discursive) logic of “how things are done” within the space of the CSPF.

A practice approach to rule in global economic governance

How do relations of rule manifest in dialogue forums? At the theoretical level, this raises the question of how to identify and analyse relations of rule that lack resistance. In this section, I develop the argument that rule is exercised in and through the everyday interactions of IOs and CSOs in dialogue forums and make it applicable to the empirical analysis of the CSPF. To this end, I first introduce what I identify as the characteristic features of Bourdieu’s notion of rule, that is, symbolic domination to construct a theoretical framework that understands rule as a hierarchical relationship between IOs and CSOs that is characterised by recognition and actualised through practice. Drawing on Bourdieu’s metaphor of the linguistic market, I then develop an understanding of rule as the ability of dominant actors to impose meanings, i.e. classifications, categories, and normative standards, as legitimate (Swartz 2019, 13). In dialogue forums, rule is actualised through discursive practices: CSOs adjust and align their concerns, standards, and categories to the discursive space of dialogue forums, which is delimited by conforming to what is perceived as legitimate and therefore recognised by the institutions.

Analysing rule through the lens of symbolic power

Bourdieu never produced a coherent theory of symbolic domination. But the overarching question that guided his work was why social orders – which for Bourdieu are always orders of domination – tend to be stable. He, therefore, analysed the myriad practices and mechanisms by which relations of domination and inequality are maintained. In short, he argued that relations of rule/domination are stable because they pass as misrecognised. Consequently, rule/domination is not based on the recognition of an asymmetrical relationship but on its misrecognition (Bourdieu 1992), which refers to the ability of the dominant to “naturalize or universalize their particular interests” (Sending 2017, 316). This is reflected in the fact that dominant norms, worldviews, and practices reflect the preferences of dominant groups but are perceived as impartial and, therefore, as legitimate. Because these principles are misrecognised, they do not lead to resistance, but rather to adaptation to existing social structures.

It should be noted, however, that there is an over-polarisation in Bourdieusian thinking between recognition and misrecognition. When importing Bourdieusian theorising into IR, and applying it to dialogue forums, it is therefore crucial to acknowledge that in practice, this distinction is not quite as clear-cut as my research shows: On the one hand, rule/domination is rooted in and operates through adaptation to existing social structures that coincide with the interests of the dominant. On the other hand, it is important to distinguish between conscious adaptation and adaptation due to internalisation. At its core, misrecognition refers to the internalisation of previously external structures through regimes of socialisation, such as the family or the education system. In contrast, the conscious adoption of the language and terminology by CSOs in dialogue forums allows for a certain critical distance on the vocabulary of the institutions. Even though participation in dialogue forums may, over time, lead to a certain socialisation of participants into the norms, practices, and terminology of the institutions, participants maintain degrees of autonomous agency: CSOs adapt to the language of the institutions in order to be recognised as competent within the space of dialogue forums but this adaptation is not synonymous with internalisation. Therefore, when analysing IO-CSO relations in dialogue forums, I would rather speak of and expect to find different degrees of recognition, i.e. the extent to which certain norms are accepted, and practices of discursive assimilation can be observed.

By invoking the notion of the complicity of the dominated, who participate in their domination (Bourdieu 1992, 50–51), a Bourdieusian approach to rule/domination follows a different logic of justification than justificatory approaches, which also conceptualise rule in terms of the compliance it enforces. In justificatory approaches, for example, in Michael Zürn’s (2017; 2018) account of reflexive authority, the recognition of dominant actors/authorities “is based on the knowledge about the limitations of one’s own rationality and information base” (Zürn 2018, 46). Consequently, actors defer to authorities because they “offer either a superior or an impartial perspective, or both” (Zürn 2018, 46). At the same time, reflexive authority is under permanent observation (Zürn 2017, 267). In contrast, a more structural perspective, such as Bourdieu’s, emphasises the external constraints that actors may experience. Hence, it stresses that compliant behaviour follows a more habitualised “practical” logic that is actualised in and through practices, i.e. through patterns of routinised informal everyday interactions (Pouliot 2008; Adler et al. 2011; Reckwitz 2002).

It is precisely for this reason that Bourdieusian practice theory has been celebrated in IR: it introduces a fourth logic of political action that cannot be derived from instrumental rationality (logic of consequences), norm-following (logic of appropriateness), or communicative action as reflected in the “logic of arguing” (Pouliot 2008). As Bourdieu (1992, 50–51) puts it: “The distinctiveness of symbolic domination lies precisely in the fact that it assumes, of those who submit to it, an attitude which challenges the usual dichotomy of freedom and constraint.” Political action is guided by inarticulate, tacit forms of knowledge: implicit criteria by which actors create an individual but also a shared perception of social reality and accordingly assess appropriate and acceptable behaviour in a given situation (Reckwitz 2003, 292). This “sense of acceptability” may also include or lead to forms of self-censorship – “the concessions one makes to a social world by accepting to make oneself acceptable in it” (Bourdieu 1992, 77). Consequently, relations of rule are maintained and potentially perpetuated by a “practical sense”, an implicit knowledge that makes any political action seem “self-evident” and “commonsensical” (Pouliot 2008, 258).

However, this does not mean that rule is entirely internalised. Instead, it emphasises that actors feel incentivised to privilege certain actions because the social space is structured to reward these practices. As a result, practices tend to be stable but still contain the possibility of change (Reckwitz 2003, 294). A practice approach to rule points to interactions being structured by simultaneously including and excluding actions and strategies that are perceived as more advantageous for CSOs in a given situation. For example, Cooper and Pouliot (2015) analyse the diplomatic practices that sustain the G20 process and reproduce the existing order. In the context of CSO-IO relations, Eagleton-Pierce (2018) uses Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic capital to examine the relationship between NGOs and the WTO, demonstrating how this interaction has transformed NGOs from “radical outsiders’ to “reformist insiders’. Although practices are routinised, this does not preclude deviation, subversion, or contestation but rather “defines the scope of agency” (Cooper and Pouliot 2015, 336). Consequently, rule can be present in varying degrees in dialogue forums: Rule (as symbolic domination) is less pronounced when CSOs feel incentivised to act in a certain way or to use a specific “legitimised language” than in the case of the acceptance and adoption of certain (external) norms.

Dialogue forums as a linguistic market

In IR, most practice scholars primarily engage with Bourdieu’s analytic tools of field and habitus, which underscore the embodied, affective, and other non-linguistic modes of social reproduction. Less emphasis has been placed on the notion of symbolic power and how language as a key symbolic system reflects and constitutes power (Bourdieu 1989; 1992). As Thompson (1992, 2) points out, Bourdieu “portrays everyday linguistic exchanges as situated encounters between agents endowed with socially structured resources and competencies, in such a way that every linguistic interaction, however personal and insignificant it may seem, bears the traces of the social structure that it both expresses and helps to reproduce”. Following Bourdieu (1992, 37) linguistic exchanges are not only relations of communication but also “relations of symbolic power in which the power relations between speakers or their respective groups are actualized”.

In this sense, symbolic power is similar to what Barnett and Duvall (2005b, 52) have called “structural power” as the direct and mutual constitution of the capacities of actors and their identities. However, it also shares similarities with their notion of “productive power” as the production of subjects through diffuse social relations, i.e. through discourse and “systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced and transformed” (Barnett and Duvall 2005b, 55). Along these lines, Barnett and Finnemore (2004, 31) have suggested that IOs exercise a kind of productive power in classifying the world by creating categories of problems, actors, and actions, as well as fixing meanings and articulating and disseminating norms and rules. In the same vein, Best (2014, 128) notes that IOs such as the IMF and the World Bank have always relied on different forms of power, from the more coercive power of traditional conditional lending to the more informal and subtle power of advice and assistance. In contrast to and complementary to this Focauldian-inspired research which focuses on processes of subjectivation through discourse, the analysis of dialogue forums through the lens of symbolic power centres on the practices that (re)produce and organise the discourse in dialogue forums through the conditional recognition of participants/CSOs.

A conceptualisation of rule as actualised through practice is linked to language in two ways. First, while practices can be discursive or non-discursive, without the mediation of language, we could not distinguish a practice in the sense of a “socially meaningful” pattern of action or “competent” performance from mere behaviour (Adler et al. 2011, 14). Put simply, language facilitates intersubjective understandings of practices. Second, the use of language is also an enactment or doing. Discursive practices are socially meaningful speech acts, i.e. enactments or doings in the form of language that can be evaluated according to a shared standard (Adler et al. 2011, 14). In essence, as “routine performances’ (Hansen 2011, 293) discursive practices “embrace different forms in which the world is meaningfully constructed in language” (Reckwitz 2002, 254). In a seminal study, Eagleton-Pierce (2013) examines how symbolic power shapes international trade relations in the WTO, linking the exercise of symbolic power to practices of legitimation and justification. As he (2013, 49) explains, “[t]he struggle over political language shapes the fundamental definitions of issues, the organization of agendas, and the mobilization capabilities of agents”.

By making an implicit claim about “how things are done” discursive practices also establish a standard of competence (Adler et al. 2011, 8). As Duvall and Chowdhury (2011, 338) explain, a practice is “competent” when it resonates with existing understandings, background knowledge, against which it becomes socially meaningful. Similarly, Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014, 893) highlight “the negotiation of competence as the fundamental social process of power emergence”. However, what is considered to be “competent” at any given moment and in any given context is a normative judgement (Gross Stein 2011, 90). In short, from a Bourdieusian standpoint, the link between knowledge production and power structures manifests itself in language through symbolic struggles for competence, that is, legitimised interpretations of social reality (Bourdieu 1989, 22).

Analysing discursive practices in the interactions between CSOs and IOs in dialogue forums – the role of classifications, the organisation of arguments, the definition of normative standards, and the social valuation of speakers through discourse – sheds light on how certain political interests become recognised as “acceptable” or “universal” rather than “arbitrary” or “particular” (Eagleton-Pierce 2013, 49). Bourdieu employs the metaphor of a linguistic market to scrutinise the central aspect of a sociological approach to discourse: it must be socially acceptable. Speakers need specific competencies not only “to be understood” but also “to be listened to” (Bourdieu 2017, 161). As argued above, this kind of competence is acquired through practice. Through exposure to a particular linguistic market, such as in dialogue forums, actors develop a practical sense of acceptability through which they evaluate their arguments and concerns in anticipation of the audience’s reception. This is why Bourdieu argues that the linguistic market operates through the anticipation of profits (Bourdieu 1992, 66–89). In this sense, discursive practices are like a compromise between what CSOs would like to argue and the anticipation of what is likely to be rewarded, such as the acceptance of a panel in the CSPF or continued collaboration which may then translate into more opportunities to push for change.

Briefly summarising the above, the approach to rule developed here is characterised by four attributes: First, rule is relational. It cannot be exercised without the consent of those involved. Because rule operates through (mis)recognition, it enforces behaviour that conforms to dominant norms and practices. Second, rule is actualised through practices, following a practical logic derived from inarticulate and tacit forms of knowledge. Third, practices are mediated by language in order to be considered as “socially meaningful”, thereby establishing a standard of competence. Specifically, I understand discursive practices as practices that shape and define what is acceptable based on specific categories, classifications and arguments through which reality is interpreted. Consequently, discursive practices through which rule is actualised are qualified by the adoption of the classifications, categories and normative standards of the institutions by CSOs in dialogue forums. Fourth, rule can be present in varying degrees. It defines the scope of agency understood as the discursive repertoire of possible actions: Actors are incentivised to use a specific “legitimised language” in order to be perceived as a “credible interlocutor” in dialogue forums. In sum, I understand rule as the ability of dominant actors to impose meanings as legitimate, which is manifested in the way CSOs adapt their discursive practices to the institutional discourse.

Relations of rule in the civil society policy forum

Justificatory approaches to rule have shown that dialogue forums offer only superficial forms of participation and tend to reproduce inequalities among CSOs, while rule revealing approaches have analysed how the forums have been used to fragment the opposition by including moderate critique and excluding more radical positions. In this section, I build on these insights to show how moderate critique was not only included but managed by the IOs through discursive assimilation. This comprised both opening up space for dialogue and delimiting the boundaries of political discourse. The IMF and the World Bank define the parameters of the discourse in the CSPF through the conditional recognition of CSOs, which orients them to align themselves with the language and terminology of the institutions, as this is essential for CSOs to be recognised as competent in the forum.

In what follows, I trace this process of adaptation and highlight the crucial and active role of the CSPF Working Group, which serves as an interlocutor and link between the institutions and the CSOs seeking to engage with the World Bank and the IMF. In collaboration, the CSO teams at the IMF and the World Bank, and the Working Group have strived to structure the CSPF as a discursive space catering to the institutions and to a specific group of CSOs that are willing and able to adapt to the institutional discourse. I then illustrate how rule is enacted in the CSPF by highlighting three discursive practices: the reproduction of classifications, the framing of arguments and the valorisation of technical knowledge.

The empirical analysis primarily draws on participant observation and interviews conducted between February 2022 and April 2023 with CSO representatives with long-standing relationships with the IMF or the World Bank and a history of participation in the CSPF. During the interview process, I privileged key staff involved in the implementation and configuration of the CSPF, such as members of the CSPF Working Group.⁵ I conducted participant observation at six forums between 2019 and 2023.⁶ Access to the CSPF was engineered through the formal accreditation procedure.⁷ While formal access to the CSPF is largely guaranteed, many CSO representatives still face de facto exclusion in the form of visa restrictions, flight and accommodation costs, and language barriers.

As Kuus (2015, 372) aptly notes, an “empirical analysis of the daily work of symbolic power is rarely attempted because it is a difficult task methodologically”, akin to the analysis of fleeting social alchemies. To analyse relations of rule in the CSPF, I combined participant observation and interviews in an iterative process to gain an in-depth understanding of the interactions between CSOs and World Bank/IMF staff. Participant observation is useful for analysing processes rather than outcomes, in particular for understanding how the everyday of world politics is “produced and performed” (Nair 2021, 1305). It allows us to directly observe how the institutions construct worldviews and enact practices in a particular context, especially those that seem “mundane and ordinary” (Müller 2013, 4).

In contrast, interviews provide detailed verbal accounts of participants’ experiences, actions, strategies, and tactics. They are essential for understanding subjective meanings, i.e. how interviewees interpret their actions which I observed in the CSPF. Interviews also allowed me to understand the logics that guide certain actions and helped to contextualise the participant observations by illuminating which actions and practices were not considered or enacted. In addition, I used websites, reports, public relations materials, and guidelines on the relationship between the institutions and CSOs to gather background information and to further contextualise and interpret the data obtained from the interviews and participant observation.

Jointly organised by the World Bank and the IMF, the CSPF serves as the institutions’ main outreach event, and central platform for civil society engagement.⁸ Yet, it lacks any decision-making power and is not binding on the institutions. Rather, it is a space to voice concerns, share ideas and experiences, and engage with staff on various issues and development topics.⁹ Held twice a year since 2002 to coincide with the Spring and Annual Meetings of the Bank and the IMF, the week-long event usually takes place in Washington, DC, within the Bank and IMF buildings.¹⁰

The CSPF covers a variety of issues related to the mandates of the institutions, including education, agriculture, debt, gender, accountability and environmental standards. While some panels are “CSO only”, most include staff from either IO to facilitate direct exchanges, usually invited by the CSO organising the panel. Typically, panels follow a pattern in which CSO representatives present their research, raise issues and ask questions, after which Bank/Fund staff explain and justify their course of action and policies. The panels then open to questions and comments from the audience. The highlight and highest-profile event of the CSPF is the Townhall meeting with the World Bank President and the IMF Managing Director, where CSOs can put questions directly to the two highest-ranking officials of the institutions.¹¹

Tracing the process of discursive assimilation

In this section, I delineate the process of discursive assimilation since the inception of the CSPF, in order to show that the opening up to CSO participation takes place under specific conditions set by the institutions. This phase is not yet characterised by the adoption of the language and terminology of the institutions but rather by a first approximation between CSOs and institutions. However, this rapprochement is one-sided in favour of the institutions as they begin to define and establish what counts as “proper” participation in the CSPF.

When CSOs entered the CSPF, they had to force their recognition through protest and struggle “simply for the right to exist” (Hopewell 2015, 1136). Although having succeeded in establishing the CSPF, the early stages were marked by “mostly CSOs talking to CSOs’. Some IMF and World Bank managers stated that they were afraid to participate because of the hostile history of interaction with the alter-globalisation movement.¹² The CSPF was deemed a “ticking time bomb” with “zero criteria for access and accreditation”.¹³ In 2014, the CSPF underwent a significant transformation when Edith Jibonuh became the head of the World Bank’s Civil Society Team. In short, her mission was to bring CSOs in “not to complain but to engage”. As a prerequisite for rapprochement, she introduced an accreditation process and a verification mechanism, requiring CSOs to prove their affiliation to NGOs or faith-based organisations, in order to build trust and position them as professional and potentially legitimate interlocutors vis-à-vis Bank and Fund staff.

The process of discursive assimilation was then set in motion when Edith Jibonuh offered some CSOs a bargain: If they would refrain from more radical criticism in the panels and instead “offer a session that is constructive”, she would, in return, persuade Bank and IMF managers to attend and participate in the panel sessions. As a result, some Bank and IMF managers slowly realised that “some of the big CSOs have changed their tune” and began to see the World Bank and the IMF as “collaborating institutions”.¹⁴ This shift of perception prompted managers to see the CSPF not merely as a space where they had to justify themselves in front of their critics but as an opportunity to receive tailored feedback from CSOs.¹⁵ A CSO representative working on IMF accountability recalls that “after a period of treating us as simply an irritation, a source of reputational risk and something to be managed”, Bank and IMF managers were beginning to realise that (some) CSOs actually had highly technical knowledge.¹⁶

As a result, the institutions increasingly saw the CSPF as an opportunity to improve their knowledge through engagement with (some) CSOs. However, in order to get the feedback, they wanted, CSOs needed to “understand how the institutions work”. When the CSPF was first established, as one former World Bank manager recalls, it was like a “free fall, [with] no thematic substance to the deliberations [and] we didn’t feel we get real feedback”.¹⁷ Both institutions then began to participate actively in the CSPF, holding regular panel sessions to introduce and present their work.¹⁸ For example, the IMF provides regular updates on its work on corruption,¹⁹ and the World Bank provides updates on its Environmental and Social Framework.²⁰ In addition, both institutions have introduced “orientation sessions’ at the beginning of each CSPF, during which World Bank and IMF managers introduce the work of their respective institution to the CSO community and share specifics on how CSOs can “effectively” engage with the institutions.²¹

The process of rapprochement between CSOs and the institutions gained momentum after the Annual Meetings in Lima in 2015 with the creation of the Civil Society Policy Forum Working Group. In Peru, a group of CSO representatives criticised the CSPF as a side-lining space that lacked any meaningful engagement with CSO concerns, prompting them to push for more influence.²² As one CSO representative from a large US NGO recalled, the lack of prioritisation of a space for civil society that was integrated into the forum was not unique to the Peru events, but “Peru was a very stark example of how civil society was not being prioritised in those spaces [and that] kind of came to a head”,²³ where dissatisfaction reached a critical point. Subsequently, the NGO Bank Information Centre, together with civil society partners, sent a letter to the then President of the World Bank and the head of the IMF, raising several concerns and recommendations for reform of the CSPF, such as more CSOs leadership in decision-making about the forum, better integration between the physical spaces of the main events and the CSPF and a better digital integration.²⁴

In response to these complaints, Edith Jibonuh and her team established an interim Working Group comprised of elected CSO representatives from different regions of the world. They were to assist in the planning and organisation of the forum to ensure the inclusion of CSO concerns, and help delineate the role of the Working Group.²⁵ When the Working Group was set up, some of the former members expressed that they had a very divergent perspective on their role compared to that of the institutions. They sought greater autonomy and independence in interacting with the CSO community, whereas the institutions had envisaged a more passive role.²⁶ One former member of the group recalled feeling a mixture of satisfaction and constraint: On the one hand, they appreciated the opportunity to engage with the institutions and the CSO community. On the other hand, they felt restricted. In his words, “we didn't have any kind of independence, independence of name, independence of communication, independence to improve the channels with the rest of the NGOs. [However,] there was no other chance than accepting or refusing the position. So, we all accepted it.”²⁷

Defining discursive standards: the civil society policy forum working group

In the previous section, I have attempted to illuminate how the process of discursive assimilation has unfolded since the inception of the CSPF, demonstrating how the institutions have shifted from viewing CSOs as critics to actively engaging with them while at the same time beginning to shape what counts as “appropriate” interaction. This section zooms in on the role of the Working Group to show how the CSO teams of the World Bank and the IMF, together with the Working Group, shape the discourse in the CSPF. While the Working Group represents a concession to CSOs as a result of the Lima events, it has actually served to accelerate the process of discursive assimilation by actively contributing to the structuring of the CSPF as a discursive space that serves the institutions and a specific group of CSOs.

To date, the Working Group acts as a “link” and the “civil society interlocutor” with the World Bank and IMF civil society teams to ensure the smooth operation of the CSPF.²⁸ Its main task is to share the responsibility for panel selection with the World Bank and the IMF civil society teams. The panel selection process is crucial because it shapes the discourse, including its limits, both in terms of the diversity of topics covered and in terms of how “critical” the discussions are expected to be. Furthermore, many CSO representatives stated that presenting a paper or organising a panel at the Forum is essential for many smaller organisations as it helps their donors secure funding.²⁹ In order to give smaller CSOs a better chance of success, the Working Group is therefore providing a guide on how to present a panel at the CSPF where they share their knowledge with the CSO community. In an attempt to achieve (more) equal representation, they have also revised the panel selection process and established a review and feedback process to ensure regional representation of topics on the CSPF agenda, as well as gender balance and participation of vulnerable groups.

The shift towards CSO inclusion and increased transparency brought about by the involvement of the Working Group in the selection process has led to the fact that most panels now follow a specific structure that has been established as a standard. This standard is disseminated through formal and informal practices This is most evident in the fact that the Civil Society Engagement Units at the World Bank and the IMF now regularly hold virtual “office hours’ for CSOs prior to the selection process to “help answer queries on the best practices to submit a strong proposal, the processes followed during selection, and other frequently asked questions”.³⁰

This standard is also disseminated when CSOs that have successfully got their panel approved share their “best practices’ with other CSOs. Typically, these are large, mostly Western CSOs with large resources, whose representatives either have close links to the Working Group or are part of it, as is the case with CSOs such as the Bank Information Centre or the Bretton Woods Project. As one CSO representative explains, these CSOs have a lot of experience with the CSPF, are familiar with the process and are therefore “more likely to get their proposal approved because they've written it in a way that they know is more likely to be approved. They know all of the tricks and sort of the guidelines.”³¹ These CSOs also have closer contacts with the institutions, which increases the likelihood of Bank/Fund staff attending and thus, that the panel will be accepted. Large and transnationally organised CSOs, who often get panels accepted, represent and embody knowledge and experience for smaller CSOs, who usually need to find co-sponsors from larger CSOs to increase the chances of their proposal being accepted.

Sometimes, panels are co-organised by the World Bank/IMF and CSOs. This tends to be the case for large CSOs with long-standing relationships with the institutions such as Oxfam, Transparency International, the Bank Information Centre or the Bretton Woods Project. Some of the CSO representatives interviewed stated that they had the impression that the institutions preferred to work with large CSOs because they thought they worked “more seriously” and that local CSOs without close contacts with the institutions were often discarded.³² In the words of one CSO representative from a large Western NGO:

You know, you often see like an organisation, let's say, from - theoretically - from Uganda, putting together a proposal. And the proposal is really a really cool idea. And let's say it's about the influence of the IMF on tech systems in Uganda, just theoretically. But that proposal, and let's say that proposal has an NGO from Uganda, an academic from Uganda, a government representative, and has invited an IMF person. That proposal is very interesting but would not get approved because it doesn't meet the criteria. But those organisations may not understand that or know that because they don't have a lot of the experience. So, there's also a sort of this cycle of more groups with more capacity, with more networks to have organisations from around the world sign onto their proposal. You know, there's just like it's easier for groups like Oxfam to have their proposal approved, frankly.³³

In this section, I have tried to show how, by simultaneously opening and closing the discursive space, i.e. by making concessions to the autonomy of CSOs through the creation of the Working Group, the institutions have used formalisation and professionalisation to establish discursive standards, which have been further enforced through the Working Group’s activities. In this way, the formal attempt to achieve a more equal representation tends informally to favour certain CSOs that are able to adapt and thus benefit from the CSPF. On the side of the CSOs, this shift is most evident in the case of Oxfam. Prior to the creation of the CSPF, Oxfam was the most vocal critic of the World Bank and the CSO, leading the external pressure.³⁴ To this day, however, Oxfam is the CSO most frequently represented in the CSPF.³⁵

Enacting practices of discursive assimilation

The previous sections have addressed how the World Bank and the IMF have managed the critique from CSOs both by opening up space for dialogue and by defining the boundaries of political discourse. In other words, I have focused on the process by which the institutions (with the help of the Working Group) have imposed their vision of what counts as appropriate participation in the CSPF – an ability that I have proposed to understand as the enactment of rule. This section shifts the focus to the effect of this rule: the adaption of discursive practices by CSOs. Specifically, I look at three discursive practices to illustrate how rule is actualised in the CSPF: the reproduction of classifications, the framing of arguments and the valorisation of technical knowledge.

Engaging in dialogue under the conditions set by the institutions often means reproducing their classification systems to increase the chances of being listened to. Specifically, this requires a “willingness to subordinate to the terminology and concepts of the IOs”.³⁶ A notable example that illustrates the adoption of the classification of the institutions is the choice between framing an issue as one of “human rights’ or “structural violence”, versus adhering to the terms set by the institutions and phrasing it as one of “social standards’.³⁷ Another instance is the orientation towards transparency and accountability, as reflected in the debate on remedies for people affected by World Bank programmes or the choice to speak instead of “justice” for affected people.³⁸ These examples highlight that adopting the terminology and categories used by the institutions often involves a choice to “depoliticise” issues for tactical reasons. Often, these discursive choices are guided by a “practical” or rather “pragmatic logic”, navigating the tension between ideal conceptions and structural constraints, that arise from the motivation to be recognised as competent within the space of the CSPF.

The second discursive practice concerns the framing of arguments. Many CSOs stated that they need to frame their causes and concerns in a way that does not affect the “institutional framework” and adapt to the institutional discourse of what is “realisable” or “manageable”.³⁹ This not only requires a deep knowledge of the mandate and policies of the institutions. It also flattens the critique, incentivising CSOs to withhold more radical proposals and narrowing the scope of arguments. This effect is reinforced by the fact that CSOs also “use” the CSPF to learn how Bank/Fund staff frame their arguments to adapt their argumentation. The CSPF provides an opportunity to “hear their responses to our work” because “if you don’t do that, I think you’re not very successful in the long run”.⁴⁰ For example, CSOs cannot voice fundamental critique and challenge the IMF’s basic lending programme, i.e. the institution’s business model or argue for slowing down the lending process. Instead, they temper their criticism and emphasise accountability mechanisms and the need to build in checks and balances. CSOs tailor their arguments to increase the chances of institutional uptake but also to position themselves as “credible interlocutors’ and maximise the chances of continued cooperation.⁴¹

The third adjustment strategy to the institutional discourse is the privileging of technical knowledge often equated with “expertise”. “Speaking the IMF language”,⁴² as one CSO representative explains, is imperative, and many others have confirmed the importance of signalling a depth of knowledge.⁴³ In a similar vein, Hopewell (2015, 1139) has shown for the WTO that the ability to communicate in the language of the field is considered an important part of “expertise”. In the case of the IMF, for example, staff often have a background in macroeconomics and consist mainly of experts in highly technical fields (Chwieroth 2010). Along the same lines, Best (2014, 24) argues that managers working at the World Bank and the IMF typically share a “hierarchy of economics over other forms of intellectual capital”. Several managers stated that they would be more inclined to listen to CSOs with a similar background or those who “at least display profound background knowledge”⁴⁴ and thus are able “to talk from a position of being informed and aware”.⁴⁵ This would increase their willingness to follow up on specific issues. Similarly, Tucker (2014, 385) points out that NGOs need to be considered as “trustworthy” to participate in debates at the WTO.

The recognition granted to CSOs is contingent on their willingness and ability to conform to the terminology that valorises technical knowledge as expertise, thereby restricting the range of possible discursive actions. My main point here is that the institutions not only favour NGOs with similar technocratic and neoliberal orientations, as Sondarjee (2021), for example, has shown for the World Bank, but also actively encourage them to use this “legitimised language” in order to be perceived as a “credible” in the CSPF. Crucially, this credibility is shaped by the background and biases of Bank/Fund staff. The staff thus acts as a filter, allowing only specific expertise to be recognised. Criticism that “appears’ inaccurate is quickly deemed illegitimate. In other words, expertise needs to be presented in a way that resonates with Bank/Fund staff. In this way, they can “universalise” a certain type of knowledge, which in turn sets the standard that CSOs must meet in order to be perceived as credible and trustworthy.

The specific kind of knowledge valued by the institutions also influences how CSOs perceive and relate to their knowledge production, specifically their research. While some CSOs refer to the standards set by the institutions for strategic reasons or because they feel they cannot “afford” to do otherwise, others are willing to adopt the language of the institutions because they see it as the “appropriate professional standard”. This suggests that a certain socialisation of the participants into the normative standards of the institutions is taking place. However, it also shows that CSOs embrace this standard to varying degrees. If they adopt this standard for tactical reasons, there is still a critical reflection and distance on the vocabulary. This is different, for example, when CSOs apply the standard to the knowledge production of other CSOs. This is the case when CSO representatives emphasise the “quality” of their research – often based on statistical data – and at the same time devalue other CSOs that focus on more emotional and anecdotal evidence (see also Hack 2020, 216). In short, Bank/Fund staff may not be fully able to impose a “legitimate vision of the social world” (Bourdieu 1989, 22). But by “recognising” a certain kind of expertise and the type of CSO willing and able to provide that kind of knowledge, they can discursively impose standards through the recognition of what is considered as competent in the space of the CSPF.

Conclusion

Compared to the protests around the turn of the millennium, the relationship between IOs and CSOs to date is characterised by smoothness rather than resistance. Civil society participation in global economic governance has become the norm and part of the daily routine of many CSO representatives and institutional staff, who interact regularly with each other through conferences, meetings, emails, and phone calls. In this article, I have tried to argue that the everyday interactions of IOs and CSOs in dialogue forums can be understood as a practice of exercising rule in global economic governance. My main argument is that the institutions have managed the criticism emanating from CSOs through a process of approximation that has ultimately led CSOs to assimilating into the institutional discourse. This occurred through simultaneously opening up space for dialogue and delimiting the boundaries of the political discourse in dialogue forums, which is enabled, structured and regulated by the institutions. More specifically, I have argued that the IMF and the World Bank define the parameters of the discourse in the CSPF through the conditional recognition of CSOs, which directs them to align themselves with the language and terminology of the institutions, as this is essential for CSOs to be recognised as competent in the space of the CSPF and potentially beyond. As a result, it leads them to accept the conditions for reproducing the institutional discourse.

The discursive structure that has evolved in the CSPF since its inception contributes to the stabilisation of the discourse in dialogue forums by limiting the repertoire of possible discursive actions, i.e. the extent to which CSOs can effectively challenge, contest, and influence the positions of the institutions. The adoption of classifications, the framing of arguments, and the valorisation of technical knowledge become strategies used by CSOs under which “effective” participation becomes possible. Not only is the discourse narrowed by the exclusion of alternative, that is to say, more radical perspectives, but the inclusion of moderate perspectives comes at the cost of conforming to the institutional discourse. On the one hand, this adaptation allows CSOs to participate in a way that is recognised, and thus potentially increases their opportunities to push for change. On the other hand, it raises questions about the potential depoliticisation and homogenisation of issues to fit into the institutional discourse. This, in turn, raises questions about the autonomy of CSOs in global governance and their potential to be diverted from their goal to induce societal change. Furthermore, the discursive structure of the CSPF affects CSOs differently. It benefits a specific group of CSOs with the capacity, expertise, and social capital necessary to engage “meaningfully” with the institutions. The opening up of the World Bank and the IMF to civil society participation in dialogue forums has thus occurred in a specific way that further contributes to the production of hierarchies among CSOs.

Conceptually, I have argued for analysing rule through compliance and adaptation with existing structures rather than in terms of resistance. While justificatory approaches to rule see dialogue forums as a failed attempt to increase the legitimacy of institutions and thus as having broken the promise of meaningful participation, rule revealing approaches have analysed dialogue forums as a means of overcoming the resistance of the alter-globalisation movement. These approaches view dialogue forums as a potential for resistance that has been prevented from unfolding. In contrast, the notion of rule conceptualised as symbolic power is exercised through recognition rather than oppression. The analysis of dialogue forums through the lens of symbolic power has focused on the practices that (re)produce and organise the discourse in dialogue forums through the conditional recognition of the participants/CSOs. Zooming in on the practices through which rule is enacted in dialogue forums, the CSPF served as a microcosm to illuminate how micro-level interactions in dialogue forums help reproduce macro-structures of rule. Complementing justificatory and rule revealing approaches, this research shows that dialogue forums do not only offer superficial forms of participation that do not contribute to the dismantling of structures of rule in global governance but that participation in dialogue forums leads to a certain socialisation into the norms and practices of the institutions which I have proposed to understand as a perpetuation of rule in dialogue forums.

It should be noted, however, that discursive practices in dialogue forums simultaneously entail dynamics of domination, co-optation, and forms of agency. My intention in this article was not to capture the diversity of IO-CSO interactions in dialogue forums. Instead, I have taken a more structural approach, focusing on practices of discursive assimilation to the dominant discourse. Nevertheless, discursive practices in dialogue forums also involve contestation, deviation, and subversion, which may lead to change. For example, some CSOs use different strategies to challenge hierarchies of access. Larger and transnationally organised CSOs such as Oxfam and Transparency International, who are more likely to get a panel accepted, play brokerage roles, bringing in smaller CSOs, who then can voice their concerns within the institutions. Shifting the focus to these practices of contestation and subversion in further research and analysing the strategies and tactics used by CSOs would highlight the agency that CSOs have in shaping the spaces in which they interact.

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this article were presented at a workshop on “Democracy and Practices of Global Order” at Humboldt University, Berlin, the Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin, the 15th EISA Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Athens, and the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication, Washington, D.C. I would like to thank Christian Volk, Anna Holzscheiter, Maryam Z. Deloffre, Silvio Waisbord, William Youmans, Ben O’Loughlin and Jürgen Neyer for their careful reviews of this research. I would also like to thank all the participants in the workshops and the research colloquia at the European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) and Humboldt University, Berlin. Finally, I am very grateful for the insightful comments of the two anonymous reviewers, which greatly improved the manuscript.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This publication is part of a project that has received funding by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation), under the project “Participation and inequality “beyond the state”. An explorative study on the opportunities for participation of transnational civil society actors based on the example of institutions of global economic governance” (project number 405222790).

Notes

1 I use the term international economic governance “institutions” rather than “organisations” because not all actors in global economic governance that regularly attract(ed) public criticism are formal organisations. Although I study formal organisations, i.e., the World Bank and the IMF, I would expect my arguments to be equally applicable to the interaction between CSOs and, for example, the G7 or the G20.

2 I use the term CSO to refer to a set of non-state, non-profit actors or networks that are actively engaged in promoting various social issues. Unlike the more commonly used term “NGO”, “CSO” encompasses a broader category of actors, including trade unions and faith-based organisations (Risse 2002). In contrast to the term “transnational actors” that includes for-profit actors, “CSO” implies a normative commitment on the part of the actors involved. This normative commitment inherent in the concept of civil society is based on the notion of a global common good, which refers to values and goals that are considered part of a common public interest.

3 Civil society engagement with IOs is not a new phenomenon. However, there is evidence that the trend of IOs opening up to civil society participation has accelerated since the 1990s (Tallberg et al. 2013; Jönsson and Tallberg 2010).

4 The shift is generally explained by a combination of norm socialisation, functional demand, and strategic legitimation (Tallberg et al. 2013, chap. 2).

5 In total, I conducted 20 in-depth semi-structured interviews that lasted between one and two hours. As the interviewees are located around the world, most of the interviews were conducted online. The interviews were recorded and transcribed, and all interviewees were guaranteed anonymity.

6 Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the CSPF was held online in 2019–2022 (spring meeting) and in-person in Washington, DC in autumn 2022 and spring 2023.

7 Registration for the CSPF is possible for five different groups: CSOs, delegates (governmental officials of the member countries of the IMF and the World Bank), observer institutions (representatives of international, regional, and economic organisations), press, and guests (representatives of government bodies, private sector, or academia), https://www.worldbank.org/en/meetings/splash/annual/registration (accessed 1 July 2023).

8 The World Bank and IMF's definition of CSOs, which also defines their criteria for institutional access, include “non-governmental organizations, community groups, labor unions, indigenous people's movements, faith-based organizations, professional associations, foundations, think tanks, charitable organizations, and other not-for-profit organizations”, https://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2022/06/16/civil-society-policy-forum-annual-meetings-2022#1 (accessed 14 August 2023).

9 https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/partners/civil-society/civil-society-policy-forum (accessed 14 July 2023).

10 Every third year, the annual meetings of the World Bank and the IMF – and therefore also the CSPF – take place in a member country and not in Washington DC.

11 In the years of my participant observation (2019–2023), Kristalina Georgieva was the Managing Director of the IMF, and David Malpass was the President of the World Bank.

12 Interview 12, 10 February 2023; Interview 16, 12 April 2023; Interview 18, 13 April 2023.

13 Interview 19, 18 April 2023.

14 Interview 12, 10 February 2023.

15 Interview 14, 17 March 2023; Interview 15, 12 April 2023.

16 Interview 11, 10 May 2022.

17 Interview 19, 18 April 2023.

18 This is reflected in panels such as the World Bank Group's “lunch session” “Get to Know CAO” [the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman at the World Bank Group], organised by the World Bank in October 2016

19 CSPF April 2018; CSPF April 2019.

20 CSPF April 2019.

21 Participant observation: “An overview of the World Bank and IFC, followed by question and answers with World Bank's new Managing Director of Operations, Anna Bjerde,” 11 April 2023.

22 Interview 2, 18 March 2022; Interview 3, 31 March 2022; Interview 8, 2 May 2022; Interview 9, 6 May 2023.

23 Interview 9, 6 May 2023.

24 Interview 3, 31 March 2022; Interview 11, 10 May 2022.

25 Interview 3, 31 March 2022; Interview 19, 18 April 2023. For the Terms of Reference and Biographies of Members of the Working Group, see https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/partners/civil-society/civil-society-policy-forum (accessed 31 July 2023).

26 Interview 6, 8 April 2022; Interview 9, 6 May 2023.

27 Interview 8, 2 May 2022.

28 Civil Society Policy Forum Working Group, Terms of Reference, https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/partners/civil-society/working-group-elections (accessed 31 July 2023).

29 Interview 2, 18 March 2022; Interview 10, 9 May 2022.

30 World Bank CSO Newsletter, 24 July 2023.

31 Interview 5, 8 April 2022.

32 Interview 1, 21 February 2022; Interview 4, 5 April 2022.

33 Interview 9, 6 May 2022.

34 Interview 13, 24 February 2023; Interview 15, 12 April 2023; Interview 18, 13 April 2023.

35 Each CSPF typically consists of 45–50 panel sessions, of which Oxfam usually takes part in 4–8 panel sessions, more than any other CSO.

36 Interview 7, 11 April 2022.

37 Interview 1, 21 February 2022; Interview 2, 10 March 2023.

38 Interview 7, 11 April 2022.

39 Interview 5, 8 April 2022; Interview 7, 11 April 2022.

40 Interview 1 21 February 2022.

41 Interview 7, 11 April 2022; Interview 10 9 May 2022.

42 Interview 4, 5 April 2022.

43 Interview 7, 11 April 2022; Interview 9, 5 May 2022; Interview 11, 10 May 2022.

44 Interview 16, 12 April 2023.

45 Interview 17, 12 April 2023.