Risks on the Belt and Road in Eurasia: Local Perspectives and Options

ABSTRACT

A binary, geopolitical narrative of a new “Great Game” for power in Central Asia may be too simplistic. It remains unclear what regionalisation trends will become embedded in Central Asia, with the apparent rise of China. The paper examines potential for China's Belt and Road Initiative to build new Eurasian economic interdependence through connectivity infrastructure and to reduce dependency for some actors on Russia. A political risk and grounded theory approach is taken, utilising in-depth interviews with local experts and stakeholders to develop a risk/opportunity framework. Conclusions from the research indicate China is unlikely in the foreseeable future to replace Russia as regional hegemon, but is likely to drive greater economic integration. Empirical investigation of dynamics on the ground - including the spectrum of options available to actors - is recommended for realist understanding of economic and other international connectivity trends across Central Asia.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• Belt and Road Initiative
• Central Asia
• geopolitics
• geo-economics
• political risk

Introduction

The rise of China is a phenomenon that is widely expected to alter the geopolitical as well as geo-economic environment of Central Asia and indeed the international order. China’s economic reform and opening was a key feature of the globalisation era of the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries, with China becoming the most significant contributor to global growth and taking a major role in global supply chains as the world’s largest trading nation and increasingly as a major source of international finance and investment. This shift in economic power has begun to change the international order, providing a wider range of partner choices for countries previously in “zones of influence” such as Central Asian nations that were previously dependent on Russia and indeed former states or tributaries of the Soviet Union. Increasingly, a new narrative of zero-sum geopolitical contest has emerged, imagining that countries must “take sides” or “submit” to major powers, and that China is seeking a new form of colonialism (McMaster 2020). This paper seeks to test the usefulness of this binary narrative in Central Asia, by investigating how experts and stakeholders on the ground across Eurasia perceive the unfolding new order, the risks and opportunities of economic interdependence with China. It finds the picture is more complex and uncertain than the binary geopolitical narrative suggests.

The vast post-Soviet geography described here as Central Asia, extending from countries of the Southern Caucasus such as Armenia and Georgia, as far east as Mongolia (not itself a former Soviet state, but Soviet-controlled), is a region that has long been considered to be dependent upon Russian power and economically dependent on the Russian economy. Whether these countries can diversify their international relations is a key question of interest to local populations as well as international scholars. Four of the regional economies joined Russia in forming the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015, ostensibly providing for coordination of economic and industrial policy, with leaders welcoming the initiative (Lagutina 2019). The United States (US) and European Union (EU) have also enhanced their political and economic engagement with these countries since the end of the Cold War and now China has emerged as a significant new player. Whether greater diversification of international partners, including China, can stabilise these countries and integrate them into more global supply chains or whether China will become a new regional hegemon will remain an important question to investigate over time.

The competition between Europe and Russia is often framed as zero-sum, with the European integration process expanding the geographic and normative reach of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and with Russia engaged in conflicts around the periphery of the former Soviet Union in the so-called “in between” states such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, and building a new Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) with Central Asian partners. Despite initial optimism about a new world order after the end of the Cold War, no new security order involving all stakeholders or comprehensive economic integration has yet stabilised Central Asia and the countries “in-between” (Charap et al. 2019). NATO expansion since 1997 has included Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria. This has left the countries in this study truly “in between”. In particular, it has placed Russia itself in between NATO and China, which underscores China’s interest in maintaining a strong and stable Russia (Sahakyan and Gärtner 2022), in turn generating European doubts about China’s long term aspirations.

China has no formal security alliances like other major powers but has sought to build new security cooperation and regional stability through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), including Russia and expanded to include India and Pakistan. The SCO process has helped China to resolve disputed land borders with its land neighbours, notably except India. It has an agenda including combatting terrorism, separatism and extremism, all of which are imperatives for China in particular because of Uyghur separatism and a population of 1.5 million Kazakhs in Xinjiang (Yau 2022). China has also established a military presence in Tajikistan, near the Afghanistan border, with stability in Afghanistan a significant security concern for China, as for other powers. Over time, China can be expected to secure its investments across Central Asia and is already training local police forces and providing digital surveillance technology, as well as promoting the services of its private security firms which however remain constrained because of local laws (Yau and van der Kley 2020).

Rather than focusing on new security architecture, however, rising China has instead made geo-economic connectivity its priority, demonstrating a confidence that greater economic interdependence and greater regional stability may go hand in hand. China has become an important source of investment, a major export market and supplier of goods and services to Central Asia. In turn, Central Asia is important to China as an energy supplier and economic corridor to Europe. Central Asia is particularly important as the major economic partner for the troubled regions of Western China such as Xinjiang. The inaugural China-Central Asia Summit in 2023 signalled a new maturity in China’s relations with five Central Asian nations, establishing mechanisms for ongoing leader and ministerial meetings and other platforms for multilateral cooperation. There is an increasing agenda of elite relationship building that might be expected to build Chinese influence over time.

Ten years earlier, in 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping, unveiled his grand vision of “One Belt One Road” connectivity across Eurasia on a visit to Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan. The later rebranded Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is envisaged by Chinese scholars to stabilise international security and enhance economic interdependence by reducing the vulnerabilities of maritime choke points in international trade and to more deeply integrate and diversify supply chains with Europe. It may inadvertently now, since the Russia-Ukraine war, also reduce the vulnerabilities of supply chains running through Russia.

As a new transregional mechanism designed with China as the hub, rather than as a network, the BRI can be interpreted as a challenge to the US-led, so-called liberal international order, just as the EEU was earlier perceived as a bid to consolidate Russian leadership in Central Asia. Meanwhile, until the Russia – Ukraine war, the BRI provided more of an opportunity than a threat for Russia, as it contributed to greater multipolarity in the global system, stimulated greater regulatory convergence and attracted important investment and infrastructure connectivity to Russia’s region including transit revenues (Nuriyev 2020). In a growing geopolitical contest, it is unclear whether the BRI will hasten or delay the fracturing of globalisation into a new regional world order (Voskressenski and Koller 2019). The BRI does not have some of the features of the EEU, such as shared cultural memory, common historical connections and established economic dependencies. Whether it empowers more agency on the part of regional actors is therefore a further question.

Many of the Central Asian economies are landlocked and all lack the transport infrastructure to become more regionally integrated. The new conditions may unlock opportunities. The new risks generated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, western sanctions and diversion of trade away from Russia present an opportunity to finally implement long-debated alternative trade routes in Eurasia, such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (or “middle corridor”). The Trans-Caspian Corridor extends from China through the Central Asian countries to the Middle East and Europe. While previously most trans-Eurasian connectivity investments had been to enhance the trade route from China across Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and to Europe through Poland, this route has now become a vulnerability. Even though Russia still has relatively under-developed transport connectivity to East Asia, in the foreseeable future investment appears more likely to be directed to routes avoiding Russia (Ferris and Connolly 2020). A new economic model for the alternative routes may realise so-far unfulfilled promise of unlocking Caspian Sea energy reserves for the China market. Indeed, cargo along the middle corridor grew from 350,000 tons to 530,000 tons between 2020 and 2021 and then surged to 3.2 million tons in 2022 as a result of the Russia – Ukraine war (Chang 2023). There may also be benefits for Europe from closer integration with Central Asia and the Caucasus. China remains the key driver of the new connectivity agenda.

Yet many questions remain about harmonising customs and tariffs, rules and standards across this multi-border route, as well as its two sea transfer hubs on the Caspian and Black Seas, which make it a less competitive option in normal times than the rail link across Russia. A World Bank study (World Bank 2023) found that if parties could agree better coordination and address infrastructure constraints on the Middle Corridor by 2030, it could triple freight volumes and halve transport times, in turn benefiting states on the route such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia, which can provide logistics, increase their production and exports to China and Europe, and beyond as a result of more efficient access to ports. China is expected to play a major role in financing and constructing the necessary ports, rail and digital connectivity infrastructure.

Observers of grand trends in Central Asia note Russia’s declining influence and the emergence of China as the “most consequential actor” (Pantucci and Petersen 2022). The research for this paper was an attempt to assess how local stakeholders view participation in the Belt and Road on the ground. From the sample of this research, it appears much of the geopolitical literature is over-reaching, at least to date, in conflating China’s growing economic engagement with over-arching geopolitical power in the region, from its finance, trade and economic infrastructure (see Frankopan 2015; Hillman 2019; Maçães 2019; Popkhadze 2021).

Methodology

The research for this paper was conducted pursuant to an Erasmus + Jean Monnet Research Network project on conflict, competition, convergence and cooperation between the EU and EEU. The specific role of the researcher was to investigate the dynamics, risks and opportunities of the Belt and Road Initiative, as understood by decision makers, stakeholders and experts along the Belt and Road, in the context of the larger project.

With the geopolitical contest degenerating rapidly during the course of the research, the literature has to some extent been unable to keep up with the pace of change. To date, geopolitical narratives have prevailed over studies grounded in case studies. Yet, there may also be other factors at play than geopolitics, including primarily geo-economic trends and indeed domestic political factors. This research therefore set out to be rooted in empirical observations of actors and other stakeholders of processes underway during a period of transformation across the region, rather than to focus on discussion of the literature. It took a grounded theory approach, therefore without a formal hypothesis, and sought to utilise stakeholder perspectives to develop a risk and opportunity framework to identify, analyse and proportionately assess scenarios in key representative case studies. Further, because of the high level of uncertainty in the evolving international system, and instead of relying on assumptions that one “side” will generate all the risks, this research sought to remain normatively sceptical. In taking a political risk approach, it sought to understand how international actors may develop proportionate risk management strategies, to avoid threats, minimise vulnerabilities and to position themselves to maximise opportunities, according to their circumstances and goals.

The methodology therefore sought to innovate. Innovation in thinking about new problems and finding solutions commonly involves risk analysis across many disciplines, including finance, engineering, medicine and public policy, but is underdeveloped in the field of international relations (Jarvis and Griffiths 2007).

A “risk” is defined here as the likelihood of an event or set of problems generating negative consequences that can be identified, understood and managed (Fägersten 2015). The complex risks examined here cannot meaningfully be measured quantitatively, as indeed risks will be interpreted subjectively by actors (Fitzpatrick 1983), with risk factors arising in complex process dynamics, and the political risk analysis undertaken is therefore qualitative.

At the time the research project was first designed, it was envisaged that fieldwork would be conducted across the northern corridor across Eurasia linking Europe to China, including Belarus and Russia. Just as the Covid-19 pandemic and then the Russia – Ukraine war disrupted trade, they also disrupted the research plan. The envisaged fieldwork in Belarus and Russia was therefore replaced with fieldwork in the South Caucasus, Armenia and Georgia. This generated four cases of which two were EEU members (Kazakhstan and Armenia) and two not (Georgia and Mongolia), each with likely different roles, risks and opportunities on the Belt and Road. Both Kazakhstan and Georgia represent states that have embraced the BRI, one a neighbour of China and key state in the heart of Central Asia, and one on a potential pathway to EU membership. Both Armenia and Mongolia represent outliers, Armenia to date isolated from the BRI and Mongolia as a state positioned between Russia and China.

Over the course of the research project, during the period 2022–2023, 76 interviews were conducted in Armenia, Austria, Belgium, China, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Poland, with a diverse range of experts and stakeholders drawn from government, academia, business and media. These were identified primarily utilising the researcher’s broad and diverse network of government, academic, media and business contacts developed through his PhD research and honorary role as (then) Vice Chair of the Sustainable Business Network of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). A set of generic opening questions was utilised to focus the discussion on risks of the BRI. Three widely used terms were used to stimulate the discussion: opportunities, risks and threats. It was expected these terms would be widely understood as having distinct meanings: opportunities offering benefits, risks including potential negative outcomes (if not mitigated, managed or avoided); and threats constituting challenges to an actor’s security. It was anticipated the discussion of these three terms would yield a richer source of inter-connected information about risk factors than restricting the questions to risk alone, which may have otherwise been interpreted either too narrowly or too broadly and/or out of context by some interviewees.

This paper draws in particular on the risk factors and risk propositions that arose from the interviews in the four cases of Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Mongolia. They should therefore be understood as time-bound, to the time frame of the interview programme, and further research is recommended in future to test how local perspectives evolve in future. In the following discussion of each case study, most of the observations are drawn from the interviews conducted during fieldwork visits and citations for further reading are added when such observations are reflected in the literature.

The case of Kazakhstan

As a resource-rich but sparsely populated middle power in a dangerous neighbourhood, and no longer dominated by Russia, Kazakhstan might be expected to be increasingly under the “influence” of its much more populous neighbour, China. Kazakhs have long feared a Chinese invasion or, at the least, a slow colonisation. A closer examination found that Kazakhstan is taking advantage of its strategic location to diversify its partners in pursuit of its national interests, if sometimes problematically. Kazakhstan occupies a strategic location on the Belt and Road and seeks to align the BRI with its own objectives to reduce dependency on Russia and to develop infrastructure connectivity to diversify its economic linkages across Eurasia, such as a dry port with western China and construction of new pipelines, road and rail connectivity to the Caspian Sea, connecting to Iran, Turkey and beyond to Europe. Kazakhstan is a case demonstrating national agency (Pieper 2021), with exercise of that agency confounding narratives about the BRI as a “debt trap” or Chinese “influence” (Louthan 2022). To be sure, however, there are domestic risk factors for actors, including Chinese project partners.

Geopolitical risk factors

As the world’s largest land-locked country, Kazakhstan was observed by all interviewees to have geopolitical (and geo-economic) imperatives to reduce dependency on Russia and seek to benefit from the rise of China (see also Hess 2023), while pursuing a diversity of connectivity opportunities to its east and west across Eurasia. Indeed, Kazakhstan’s former strongman leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, resisted Russian attempts to coerce Kazakhstan to its priorities (Vanderhill, Joireman, and Tulepbayeva 2020) and developed a “multi-vector” foreign policy, to engage and balance with multiple partners as a “pivot” country (Neafie 2022). Nazarbayev promoted greater Eurasian economic integration, through the EEU and BRI and indeed closer links to the EU in an “integration of integrations” (Lagutina 2019; Segre 2022). Kazakhstan also joined the Organisation of Turkic States and the NATO Partnership for Peace programme. Interviewees noted that Nazarbayev’s aspirations to position Kazakhstan to benefit from a new multipolar order have been continued by his successor, Kassim-Jomart Tokayev.

China has been cautious about playing a geopolitical role in a zone of traditional Russian influence. Yet on Xi Jinping’s visit to Kazakhstan in 2022, his first visit after the long isolation of the Covid-19 pandemic, he delivered a welcome pledge of support for Kazakhstan’s “independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Eurasianet 2022, September 14). Interviewees noted that Russia remains the major geopolitical concern and underlined that China is perceived by decision makers as a useful balancing partner, offering pragmatic benefits from infrastructure connectivity. Interviewees observed that in northern Kazakhstan, with its significant Russian-speaking population (around 15 per cent of the population, concentrated in the north), Russian narratives are mirroring those in Ukraine before Russia’s invasion, with claims about oppression of Russian speakers, bio labs and other misinformation that could later be used as an excuse for intervention. Kazakhstan must therefore carefully calibrate its language and actions in relation to Russia. Its factual language about the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Reuters 2022, November 17) angered Russia, but its hosting of 200,000 Russians fleeing the war is consistent with a Kazakh cultural tendency to offer refuge and to build long term relationships, which interviewees noted may be repaid later, as Russians will remember.

A former vice-minister interviewee (Shengelbayev) suggested that Kazakhstan may yet develop a neutral policy, but that would be a long-term project and would require the agreement of major powers, as did Switzerland in the nineteenth century. In the short term, its new president is an ex-diplomat who speaks Chinese and understands how to partner with China, so interviewees expressed confidence that he should be able to simultaneously win benefits and seek to protect Kazakhstan. But everything has changed since the optimistic time of 2017, when Kazakhstan hosted a World Expo and showcased its path to development, now replaced by a much gloomier global and regional situation generating new geopolitical risks in a contested region. The regional structures, the EEU and CSTO, previously supported by Kazakhstan have lost their integrationalist logic and are now being wielded for Russia’s geopolitical aims of maintaining a sphere of influence. Interviewees observed that this creates a dilemma for Kazakhstan that it benefits little, if at all, yet cannot anger Russia. It therefore seeks to play a middle power role with friendly relations with all.

Geo-economic risk factors

The World Bank assesses that Kazakhstan is well positioned to benefit from the BRI, given its low public debt, and that GDP could be boosted by as much as nine per cent if the government implements complementary reforms (World Bank 2020). Kazakhstan has well-developed infrastructure relative to its neighbours in Central Asia and new transport projects will improve the efficiency of its trade if it pursues trade facilitation, liberalisation, promotes its agricultural sector and removes inefficiencies of its border crossings. Further, Kazakhstan will benefit as its neighbours take advantage of the BRI to upgrade their own connectivity, improving trans-Eurasian logistics, especially if trade procedures can be harmonised, which has proved a high hurdle for previous regional cooperation initiatives. The growing rail networks to Europe, India, Iran, Turkey and other destinations are significantly expanding trade potential to diversify beyond oil exports and enabling greater exports of time-sensitive products such as agricultural commodities.

Interviewees noted that the BRI theoretically offers an opportunity for Kazakhstan to not only diversify its connectivity for traditional oil and gas exports, but also to transition to new industries and transform the economy to a more sustainable model, which has proved a challenge to date despite being the most open economy in the region. Exporting Kazakhstan’s oil resources through a growing network of pipelines has been central to the Eurasian connectivity concept, with the current sanctions against Russia underlining the potential for new pipelines avoiding Russia. China’s investments in building a network of pipelines has been the most tangible integration to date of Central Asian economies. Indeed, Kazakhstan offers China an important, stable supply of oil and gas and an alternative to supplies that rely on the geopolitical chokepoint of the Straits of Malacca. Chinese firms have invested heavily in subsidiaries of Kazakhstan’s national oil company (Pantucci and Petersen 2022). Yet 90 per cent of Kazakhstan oil exports continue to be transported through Russia and US firms remain the major players. In the medium term, a new route to Europe will be important to the business model for new green hydrogen gas supplies planned for the 2030s (Eurasianet 2022, October 28) and finance will need to be directed away from legacy industries towards green transition, perhaps offering an opportunity for greater Chinese finance in future (Fontan and Melecky 2022).

Kazakhstan has been a regional economic success story, outperforming its neighbours in Central Asia to reduce poverty and in achieving a relatively low level of inequality, at least until the last decade (World Bank 2022). It has since been shocked by its reliance on the oil price for its economic performance (after benefiting from booming oil prices earlier) and a severe impact from the Covid-19 pandemic. As a major fossil fuel-dependent economy, Kazakhstan faces a challenge to transition its economy to a more sustainable model. At the UNESCAP Multi-Stakeholder Forum on Implementation of the SDGs in 2022, National Economy Minister Alibek Kuantyrov reported that the national policy framework aligns with the SDGs and aims to achieve the Paris Agreement commitments by 2030 and net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2060. Kazakhstan has a mixed record however, with Askar Japparkulov, Director of the Macroeconomic Policy Department of the Eurasian Economic Commission noting at the same forum that Kazakhstan was making progress on SDGs 1, 10 and 12, was stagnant on SDGs 4, 5 and 11, and was underperforming against other goals.

Despite much talk about diversification of the economy, to reduce reliance on fossil fuels and to expand agricultural and other value-added exports, little progress has been made. This experience, according to interviewees, fostered cynicism about Chinese investments and in particular big projects such as rumoured movement of “obsolete” factories from China to Kazakhstan, which were interpreted more as invasion than innovation, as discussed below. There has nevertheless been a shift in Chinese investment trends towards capacity cooperation and industry development, such as a cement plant and a bus factory (Eurasianet 2020, November 23). Most Chinese investment, despite slowing in recent years due to the pandemic, has been in extractive industries rather than infrastructure or projects to diversify the economy. The leading investors in Kazakhstan are neither Russia nor China, but the Netherlands, the US and Switzerland. China has become the fourth largest investor, and is Kazakhstan’s leading export market, accounting for 16.4 per cent of exports, a proportion that does not indicate any dependency vulnerability (Gunter and Legarda 2022).

Academic interviewees were generally more optimistic about the opportunities of the BRI, mirroring government narratives about economic transformation through new trade routes for logistics services, agricultural and other exports, as well as more efficient imports. In the development of trade routes excluding Russia, interviewees expected risks could be reduced and diversification supported. The EEU, on the other hand, was uniformly considered to have failed to bring any benefits to Kazakhstan, despite Nazarbayev’s earlier enthusiasm. It was noted that imports from Russia have simply grown and there is no reciprocal market access, now all further complicated by the Russia – Ukraine war and international sanctions.

In the short term, interviewees expected Kazakhstan to seek to benefit from opportunities to increase the supply of fossil fuels, including the potential to export oil to Europe, which would require further investment in ports and tankers. Kazakhstan also has opportunities to develop metals in demand for the decarbonising global economy, such as copper, rare earths including lithium, all components for high technology in electric vehicles and other smart devices. It has attracted Chinese investment into copper exploration and mining (Yicai Global 2022). It has also attracted US investment in agriculture, from Tyson Foods, for example for meat processing to supply the Chinese market. The improved train infrastructure now provides much greater potential for trade, with interviewee Shaimergenov (Astana-based China Studies Centre) claiming that more than 50 trains were now returning to China per day (compared with one train every two weeks in 2015) and with border crossings now taking only 30 minutes (compared with eight hours in 2015).

Domestic risk factors

The research interviews underlined how domestic suspicion, entrenched elite interests and corruption all complicate how Kazakhstan can turn the BRI to its advantage. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan’s careful approach was observed as ensuring key BRI projects align with national priorities and are largely funded – and controlled – domestically. Kazakhstan has aligned its BRI partnerships with its domestic “Nurly Zhol” (“Bright Path”) infrastructure development plan, which seeks to develop new processing industries in oil and gas, minerals and manufacturing and production capacity in other sectors (Kireeva 2019). Risks and opportunities of such projects are shared as joint ventures. Kazakhstan has demanded local employment is generated by BRI projects. The Khorgos dry port was built by Kazakh workers and Chinese ownership is limited to 49 per cent, while the infrastructure is operated by a Dubai-based firm. The new hub reduced the travel time for trains from eastern China to Western Europe to around two weeks (Ruehl 2019).

Interviewees noted however Kazakhstan’s kleptocratic political culture has at the same time generated some emblematic cases of corruption that have generated risks for Chinese partners. An Astana light rail project stands uncompleted, despite being agreed between the leaders of China and Kazakhstan, after the project collapsed due to local corruption. The project was to be funded largely by China Development Bank but after transferring funds to a Kazakh partner (a highly unusual transaction for the BRI, which China may not repeat), hundreds of millions of dollars disappeared before the project could be completed and resulted in the departure of the Chinese partners (Bloomberg 2019; Koskina 2019; Neafie 2022).

The government has largely used domestic sources of finance for infrastructure projects, meaning its debt exposure to China is minimal. It has not needed to call upon finance from China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), except as a co-funder with other multilateral development banks of the Zhanatas wind power project. Kazakhstan has successfully implemented road projects and has fully funded all of its rail development, and is also likely to fully fund the proposed new third rail link announced during the Xi visit in 2022. Kazakhstan resisted 100 per cent control of an oil company by Chinese National Petroleum Company but negotiated a 33 per cent share for the Kazakh national oil company KazMunaiGas and shared control of the associated refinery with PetroKazakhstan (Neafie 2022).

Nevertheless, it was observed by interviewees that old habits of secrecy (and likely corruption) mean that there is little public information or engagement on BRI projects, which feeds community fears. As in other parts of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Kazakhstan’s experience of post-Soviet “democracy” has been mixed, with authoritarian Nazarbayev dominating for the first three decades, with systematic elite kleptocracy and corruption.

After an outbreak of unrest in January 2022, which observers believe was fuelled by warring elite interests (and was put down with the assistance of the CSTO, underscoring Russia’s continued security relevance), the new President has, for now, consolidated his position by promising further reforms, but some fear unrest could erupt again, just as it has in the past over existential issues such as energy prices. Civil society organisations and the population appear to be adopting a “wait and see” approach to give the new president an opportunity to restore domestic stability. Tokayev has vowed to take on the oligarchs who had made Kazakhstan a kleptocracy, and legal proceedings are underway against even relatives of former President Nazarbayev at Khorgos. Kaisha Atakhanova, Regional Programs’ Advisor of civil society development organisation ARGO told the UNESCAP Multi-Stakeholder Forum in 2022 that a survey of civil society organisations found a low level of confidence in consultation, transparency and accountability of governance, particularly at the local level.

In relation to China, a lack of government consultation and transparency was observed by interviewees to have combined with a lack of knowledge about China to have aggravated community fears and conspiracy theories about Chinese investment and BRI projects. Kazakhs express anger in their belief that Chinese contracts require Chinese companies and Chinese workers, when locals have the skills to build roads or even oil and gas projects. Other foreign projects face similar suspicion, but anti-Chinese sentiment in particular runs deep in some parts of the community, inherited from traditional historic fears of Kazakhstan’s giant neighbour, stoked by “yellow peril” rhetoric during the Soviet era. Huawei has addressed this risk by localising their Kazakhstan business, with 90 per cent Kazakh staff promoting its role as a potential wireless 5G network provider, telecommunications equipment and mobile device seller. Shaimergenov observed that Kazakhs had two distinct views of China, those who had been to China admire it, those who had never been to China imagined that every Chinese person was thinking about how to invade Kazakhstan.

Anti-Chinese protests broke out in 2019, after rumours that a list of Chinese factories were to be relocated in Kazakhstan, with locals fearing literal, physical relocation of factories together with a giant Chinese workforce. The government responded by eventually releasing information about the “55 projects”. It had earlier abandoned plans to liberalise the renting of agricultural land by foreigners and to allocate one million hectares of land for Chinese agricultural firms, following large popular protests (Louthan 2022; Pantucci and Petersen 2022).

Further, some disinformation from China has angered Kazakhs, such as alarmist social media narratives that Covid began in US sponsored labs in Kazakhstan or that people in eastern Kazakhstan want to be part of China. This gets confused with other wildly ignorant local narratives fearing Chinese will marry Kazakh women to access land (for which there is no evidence) or opposition to Chinese cultural appropriation of Kazakh culture. Neafie, who has researched such anti-Chinese sentiment and its causes, noted that Chinese attempts at soft power have been singularly ineffective, such as a Kazakh version of the People’s Daily launched in 2021 using archaic language that indicates a lack of understanding of contemporary Kazakhstan readers.

In conclusion, Kazakhstan was observed by interviewees to be a beneficiary from the BRI over time, as it seeks to exercise agency to balance risks with opportunities, to ensure greater infrastructure connectivity with China and to the west, if it can stabilise security, support national (and sustainable) development including diversification away from oil and gas towards new industries. The crisis generated by the Russia – Ukraine war appears to have reinforced Kazakhstan’s imperative to build closer relations with China as a partner, but Kazakhstan can be expected to double down on its multi-vector foreign policy and indeed to continue seeking economic integration with a broader set of international partners from its improved trade connectivity over time.

The case of Armenia

Armenia stands as the only case in this study of a state oriented towards Russia, both in its foreign policy and its economic dependence. As a small country with a large neighbour, it chooses – unlike Kazakhstan – to submit rather than to exert agency. Nevertheless, there have been voices seeking diversification of economic engagement since at least the early 2000s, when Russia began raising the price of its gas supplies and, in 2006, closed Armenia’s only road connection with Russia, the checkpoint on the Russia-Georgian border (Ismailov and Papava 2010). Yet Armenia’s ongoing disputes and conflicts with its neighbours, Turkey and Azerbaijan, restrict its short-term options to build its connectivity infrastructure and to realise its potential as an east–west trade corridor. It also has unrealised potential as a transit point on north-west trade between Russia, through Georgia, and to Iran.

Geopolitical risk factors

Interviewees were uniformly pessimistic about Armenia’s geopolitical condition. Armenia exhibits all of the characteristics of a post-Soviet “in-between” country as described in a Rand report as “to varying degrees, unstable, unreformed, and rife with conflict” (Charap et al. 2019). This makes it vulnerable and dependent on Russia and therefore a prime example of the ascendancy of geopolitical risk factors. Interviewees noted Armenia is surrounded by unfriendly countries and must not antagonise Russia. Unlike its neighbour Georgia, Armenia has not pursued an Association Agreement with the EU. Neither the EU nor the US played a role in the (Russian-brokered) uneasy peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Popkhadze 2021). Neither has it actively pursued China and the BRI, cautious about antagonising both Russia and the West.

Geo-economic risk factors

Armenia’s closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey and ongoing disputes and conflicts severely limit its potential to benefit from the east–west connectivity agenda of the BRI and interviewees noted that Armenia therefore misses out on the opportunities of the “middle corridor”. Nevertheless, it was noted that there are opportunities in north–south connectivity, which mean there remains potential for Armenia to be a part of the broader BRI plans for Georgia and Iran. A new highway linking north to south, and therefore connecting Georgia to Iran, is under construction with multilateral development funding, not under the BRI, but Chinese firms are actively building associated infrastructure (Devonshire-Ellis 2018). An Iran-Russia rail link through Armenia is mooted, although its viability is complicated by competing infrastructure under development in Azerbaijan (Rahimov 2021; Eurasianet 2021, March 31).

Despite narratives of Chinese “influence” (Popkhadze 2021), China’s economic role in Armenia is modest. Nevertheless, China has become Armenia’s second ranked trading partner, after years of strong growth from a low base (Aliyev 2020). Chinese firms such as Huawei take a low profile, with the communications firm back-pedalling on previously ambitious plans for a smart city project for Yerevan, in the context of highly geopolitical narratives around 5G infrastructure in the region (Avdaliani 2021). Chen (Huawei) advised that Huawei is meanwhile providing low key support to the rollout of renewable energy projects and the development of Armenia’s smart grid. Interviewees noted that Armenia needs investment in the development of its information technology industry and that China may yet be a suitable partner, given Western costs and restrictions on dual use technology.

Domestic risk factors

In the interviews a distinct cynicism was detected, albeit from a small sample, about the capacity of government to think strategically and long term, and a tendency at least in previous years for corruption. Nevertheless, it was noted that Armenia has an asset in its diaspora, which provides not only remittances but networks for business and other influence in the US, Russia, France and even a small trading community in China.

In conclusion, Armenia remains locked in a geopolitical dependency on Russia that makes the BRI all but irrelevant, at least for now. Nevertheless, there are opportunities for future geo-economic benefits in some scenarios, if geopolitical challenges can be overcome in future.

The case of Georgia

Georgia stands outside Russia’s sphere of influence, indeed with a frozen conflict in its border regions with Russia, and has none of Armenia’s hesitation about developing cooperation with China and the BRI. It was one of the post-Soviet states that was earlier encouraged on an EU integration path. Like Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia signed an Association Agreement and joined a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with the EU. Yet Georgia alone had not at the time of writing been offered a timeline or pathway to EU membership. In the post-Cold War era, the EU has sought to export to its eastern partners its norms and rulebook, the acquis communitaire, and has provided aid to governments and civil society to progress through what was perceived as an inevitable transition to a liberal democratic model. Even those who have signed up to full integration have struggled, however, to match western expectations for institutions, capabilities and norms and Georgia is no exception. Earlier interest in NATO membership provoked the Russian invasion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with Russian troops still occupying about twenty per cent of the country. Yet Georgia has had little support from the West. It might be expected therefore to look for a diversity of partners, perhaps along the lines of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy.

Geopolitical risk factors

Interviewees noted that Georgia’s imperative is to find its place in the international system, given its lack of resources, small size and problematical location. Its faltering western trajectory and its fear of Russia makes China an attractive additional partner. Former vice-prime minister Janelidze believed it was critically important to bolster Georgian security by building an economic corridor to China, to ensure Georgia is not dependent on any foreign power. The current Georgian Dream government was popularly criticised for its foreign policy pragmatism and for not being “pro-Western” enough, it was noted, but all interviewees observed the limited benefits Georgia has been able to attract to date from any foreign partner, indicating dependency is not the major risk for Georgia. Nevertheless, many would welcome a greater Western presence and US support remains important in the face of the ongoing Russian threat.

Geo-economic risk factors

Geographically located on the old Silk Road connecting Europe and Asia, Georgia had featured in the early talk about a “new” Silk Road in the post-Cold War period. At that time, Georgia had the support of the US for its proposals for new energy pipelines and transport infrastructure to link Europe with Central Asia, although it was not envisaged to extend all the way to China. When China outlined its Belt and Road vision, interviewees noted Georgia was initially left out of the envisaged BRI corridors. The Georgian government subsequently invested in relationship building with China to be included in the BRI. Now, as a result of the Russia – Ukraine conflict, interviewees believed the middle corridor has returned as a realistic alternative to trans-Russia trade, offering new opportunities to Georgia to not only benefit from logistics but to expand its own production and trade, deepening interdependence with major economies of Eurasia, which would equally benefit China as it seeks to expand exports along the route.

Georgia is a member of the AIIB and has a free trade agreement with China. Indeed, interviewees noted it is the only country in the region to have a free trade agreement with both China and the EU, the latter being its major trading partner as well as source of foreign investment. Georgia upgraded the China relationship to a strategic partnership in 2023, reaffirming its commitment to BRI cooperation (Government of Georgia 2023). Chinese companies are bidding for projects and winning about half, according to interviewees.

Although the South Caucasus is not perceived by local experts to be a high priority for China, there is one major piece of infrastructure connectivity that would make a significant difference for Georgia and for the middle corridor. Proposed construction of a deep-water port at Anaklia on the Black Sea would provide Georgia with a middle corridor strategic hub for trade connectivity between Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East that avoids Russia. The project has had some false starts (including, according to one interviewee, US pressure not to proceed with a Chinese partner) but planning has revived since the conflict in Ukraine (Ports Europe 2022). Who will build the project remained in contention at the time of writing and will undoubtedly be interpreted through a geopolitical lens, although the Georgian government has indicated it will retain a 50 per cent stake (Radio Free Europe 2022).

Georgia nevertheless is unlikely be become dependent on Chinese finance to develop this and other infrastructure, as interviewees noted that multilateral development banks and the EU are active competitors. Indeed, if Georgia returns to an EU membership pathway, deeper integration with EU infrastructure, including transport and energy, can be expected.

Domestic risk factors

Interviewees all perceived Georgia as small and an agenda taker rather than an agenda shaper in relation to the broader geopolitical and geo-economic forces in its neighbourhood, yet pursuing a pragmatic and diversified approach to its international relationships including the BRI.

In conclusion, Georgia has a set of geopolitical and geo-economic imperatives to diversify its partners and may be expected to strengthen its economic integration with China as a key partner on the Belt and Road in future, in particular if its EU pathway remains uncertain. Like Kazakhstan, it may be expected to develop a multi-vector foreign policy and to benefit from the development of a middle corridor to reduce dependencies on Russian supply routes, while simultaneously connecting it better to eastern and western markets.

The case of Mongolia

Wedged between Russia and China, Mongolia as a buffer state has a different set of issues to confront than the other cases investigated above. It provides key connectivity infrastructure between China and Russia and is interdependent with both. China may well in future seek to upgrade its rail connectivity in order to reduce dependencies on other suppliers, and so the BRI is likely to deepen Mongolian connectivity with its two giant neighbours. Mongolia itself is an important supplier of resources to China. At the same time, it has become an investment location for a diverse range of actors.

Geopolitical risk factors

Interviewees observed that Mongolia has an imperative to maintain good relationships with Russia and China and not to submit to either, while seeking to benefit from its proximity to both. Government adviser Baryaraa noted that Mongolia is inevitably interdependent with both of its buffer states and therefore must manage the subsequent risks. Reflecting its traditional regional power, Russia has actively sought to block greater Chinese investment in Mongolia, such as its actions against a planned rail connectivity to mining projects and against Chinese funding of a hydropower project (Mendee 2020). Yet Mongolia has actively sought Chinese partnerships and has developed other relationships beyond its immediate neighbours, including the US, Japan and the EU. As a member of the Minerals Security Partnership, it is possible international investors may help Mongolia develop its hitherto uneconomic rare earths deposits, although if these would be destined for distant markets, they would still need to transit China.

Geo-economic risk factors

Rich in resources and beside the largest market for processing and end use of such resources, interviewees noted that Mongolia is highly dependent on (and benefits from) China as its market for around 90 per cent of its exports. It provides an indispensable freight transport link between China and Russia, and a pipeline is planned to transport Russian gas to China (Moscow Times 2022). Interviewees reflected that Mongolia is dependent on Russia for energy. Interviewees welcomed diversification of communications partners for the future. It was observed how Mongolia has carefully diversified its sources of foreign investment to develop its resources, and maintained a national share of control.

Two of the largest copper mines in the world are in Mongolia, one state owned and the other being developed with the Australian mining company Rio Tinto as major stakeholder but also with a minor state share. The latter project, the giant Oyu Tolgoi gold and copper mine, illustrates Mongolia’s geo-economic positioning, with its exports to China and many of its critical inputs, including diesel, from Russia (Australian Financial Review 2023). Other major investors are highly diversified, including the US, Singapore, Canada and Japan, as well as China.

The national development strategy, Mongolia 2050, and its “Steppe Road” road, rail and energy connectivity initiative were observed by interviewees to align with the BRI, and that further investment in infrastructure connectivity can leverage Mongolia’s strategic location between China and Russia. Mongolia has consistently supported the BRI and has a large hydropower project underway, funded by China EXIM Bank. It is actively seeking to diversify its communications partners, utilising Huawei, Ericsson and ZTE, and also developing SpaceX for satellite communications.

Domestic risk factors

All interviewees mentioned to some extent the anti-Chinese sentiment that remains in Mongolia from the past, creating political risks for Chinese investors, although this was widely regarded to be reducing, while anti-Americanism and anti-Russian sentiment were on the rise. Interviewees described Mongolian media as chaotic and deep social media penetration means information, including about protests, travels fast. There have been outbursts of community anger against corruption, such as the claimed theft by officials of a huge stockpile of coal and sale to Chinese companies (AP News 2022). Some interviewees expected a trend of greater transparency and pressure against corruption. There was also a growing community opposition to non-renewable energy, which could in future push Mongolia towards a green energy transition, and therefore away from energy dependency on Russia. However, it was noted such a shift would probably rely upon Chinese partners at least as much, if not more, than for traditional energy projects.

In conclusion, Mongolia must deal with the reality of its geographic location and has an imperative to maintain and, if possible, balance its relationships with its two giant neighbours. Its further integration into trans-continental connectivity infrastructure will only deepen such interdependence with its neighbours, while in the meantime Mongolia can attract other international partners to assist it in exploiting its resources and in building communications connectivity with the international economy. Like Kazakhstan and Georgia, to date Mongolia appears capable of managing a diversification strategy to secure its interests.

Risk and opportunity framework

The following table takes the risk factors identified in the case studies (listed at Appendix B) and identifies three critical geopolitical, geo-economic and domestic political cross-case key risk/opportunity propositions that actors may wish to plot against multiple scenarios in order to plan for risk management and pursuit of opportunities. Given the wide spectrum of scenarios, the table necessarily illustrates only two binary scenarios, the worst-case and the best-case, and does not attempt to illustrate the infinite number of variant scenarios in between. The framework is not exhaustive and necessarily tentative, because the research was bounded in scope and did not extend to all of the countries in the region under discussion. Nevertheless, the table is presented as a simplified illustration of how actors will seek to understand risk factors in different scenarios and can then operationalise risk management strategies in uncertain conditions to minimise vulnerabilities and maximise opportunities (Table 1).

Table 1. Risk and opportunity framework.

Risk/opportunity proposition	Worst-case scenario	Best-case scenario
Dependency on major power(s)	Unstable environment for “in between” countries as a result of regional and security competition between West, Russia and China	Stable regional security achieved by “in between” countries balancing and diversifying partners
BRI regional integration of transport, communications, energy	BRI replaces dependency on Russia with dependency on China	BRI diversifies trade routes, reducing dependency on Russia and increasing economic links to China, Europe, Middle East
Domestic corruption and/or other poor governance	Anti-China sentiment and poor governance leads to dysfunctional economic interdependence	National agency aligns BRI engagement with national and sustainable development goals

Conclusion

The emerging new world order is as yet undetermined. There is a geopolitical contest underway with duelling narratives about whether economic interdependence with China can bring positive sum benefits or whether it brings negative sum vulnerabilities. While a geopolitical literature has emerged that describes a binary contest for power, inadequate attention has been given to stakeholder perspectives and agency in a diversity of locations and conditions along the Belt and Road. There is no established political risk literature on the Belt and Road in Central Asia. Moreover, conflicts such as the Russia – Ukraine war are reshaping trade routes as actors seek to reduce risks. These new trade routes provide opportunities to reduce dependency on Russia. How actors react to increasing interdependence with China appears to be determined by where they are situated and the dynamics at play in each particular country and indeed point in time. A sceptical approach appears therefore to be justified in relation to grand narratives of win-lose geopolitical contest, and a more fine-grained, empirical approach is recommended to more proportionately assess risks and opportunities in particular geographies and in particular cases. In the current era, disruptive change and uncertainty underlie not only geopolitics and geo-economics but also the global climate as well as transformative new technologies that may reshape industries. In such uncertainty, a risk management approach that constantly re-evaluates scenarios and proportionately develops strategies would appear to be warranted.

This research aims therefore to contribute to a more diverse research agenda for the Belt and Road Initiative, utilising a political risk approach and grounded in case studies and local actor perspectives. It aims to provide a practical, normatively sceptical framework for actors to assess risks and opportunities in multiple scenarios. As the BRI appears to be highly likely to feature as a key driver of future regional economic integration, actors will need to develop strategies to manage or mitigate risks, as well as to maximise opportunities and may need therefore to maintain some scepticism of geopolitical narratives that they must choose one side or the other. There may yet be a wider range of strategies available to actors, as illustrated by the multi-vector approaches taken by some of the governments in this study.

If China’s Belt and Road can encourage countries of Central Asia and beyond to harmonise customs and tariffs, and their digital, road and rail infrastructure, it may yet be China that integrates Central Asia in a way Russia was never able to do. Nevertheless, it appears that so far, at least, the discourse around China replacing Russia as regional hegemon is unlikely, given the agency and diversification strategies of key Central Asian states.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

David Morris

David Morris is a former Australian and multilateral diplomat. During the research for this paper, he was teaching and completing a PhD at Corvinus University of Budapest, a director of a number of companies, served as Vice Chair of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Sustainable Business Network and received research funding from Erasmus + Jean Monnet Research Network EUCON: https://www.eucon-project.eu/. He has no conflict of interest with the topic of the research.

Appendices

Appendix A

Interviewees

Interviews (Armenia)

Albert Hayrapetyan. Analyst, Amberd Research Centre of Armenian State University of Economics. Yerevan, 1 December 2022

Chen Liang. Vice-President, Public Affairs and Communications Department and Digital Power Business Department, Middle East and Central Asia Region, Huawei. Yerevan, 5 December 2022

Vardan Atoyan. Head of Social Sciences Department, Armenian State University of Economics. Yerevan, 6 December 2022

Mher Sahakyan. Director, China-Eurasia Council for Political and Strategic Research. Yerevan, 7 December 2022

Interviews (Georgia)

Vladimeer Papava. Director, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. Tbilisi, 13 March 2023

Viktor Kipiani. Director, Geocase. Tbilisi, 14 March 2023

Irakli Matkava. Government relations consultant. Tbilisi, 15 March 2023

Emil Avdaliani. Analyst, Center for European Policy Analysis. Tbilisi, 15 March 2023

Vakhtang Charaia. Vice-Rector, Dean of Business, Grigol Robakidze University. Tbilisi, 16 March 2023

Mikheil Janelidze. Former Vice-Prime Minister, government relations consultant. Tbilisi, 17 March 2023

Interviews (Kazakhstan)

Joanna Lillis. Journalist, The Economist. Almaty, 6 October 2022

Aizada Nuriddenova. Professor, Department of International Relations, Suleyman Demirel University. Almaty, 6 October 2022

Ge Liang. CEO; and Farida Toleubayeva. Director of the General Manager’s Office, Huawei Kazakhstan. Almaty, October 8

Bakhytzhan Shengelbayev. Professor, International Law, Caspian University; former diplomat; former Vice-Minister of Tourism and Sport of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Almaty, October 9

Baur Bektemirov. Chief Economist, Astana International Financial Centre. Astana, 10 October 2022

Nurlan Kussainov. Former Deputy Governor, National Bank of Kazakhstan; former CEO, Astana International Financial Centre Authority; and board member, Astana International Exchange. Astana, 10 October 2022

Timur Shaimergenov. Executive Director, China Studies Centre. Astana, 10 October 2022

Ikboljon Qoraboyev. Professor, International School of Economics, Kazguu University. Astana, 11 October 2022

Jessica Neafie. Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Nazarbayev University. Astana, 11 October 2022

Interviews (Mongolia)

Undraa Agvaanluvsan. President, Green Building Council of Mongolia; Affiliate, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. Ulaanbaatar, 20 March 2023

Song Yaxu. General Director; and Erdenekhuu Tuvshin. Director, Enterprise and Public Relations, Huawei Mongolia. Ulaanbaatar, 21 March 2023

Jargalsaikhan Dambadarjaa. President, DeFacto Independent Research Institute. Ulaanbaatar, 21 March 2023

Bayaraa Temuulen. Advisor, Minister for Digital Development and Communications. Ulaanbaatar, 22 March 2023

Appendix B

Table B1. Risk factors identified by interviewees.

Case study	Geopolitical	Geo-economic	Domestic
Kazakhstan	- Russian misinformation sets narrative for future intervention? (Lillis)- A potential Russian threat means Kazakhstan must manage its language and actions not to provoke (Shaimergenov)- Kazakhstan promoted Eurasia but has a different, pragmatic focus from Russia’s, which includes the BRI (Nuriddenova)- The integrationalist logic of EEU has been replaced by Russian hegemonic geopolitics, creating a dilemma for Kazakhstan (Qoraboyev)- Geopolitics of Covid, war, has reminded Kazakhstan of geopolitical risks (Qoraboyev)- The geopolitical dynamic may push Kazakhstan towards neutrality (Shengelbayev)- Tokayev understands China and will be able to win benefits and protect Kazakhstan (Kussainov; Shaimergenov)- SCO has been used to experiment in a relatively benign environment for China (Qoraboyev)- Kazakhstan plays a middle power role as friend to all (Neafie)	Importance of alternative routes to avoid Russia risks (Bektemirov) BRI take up was slow, but may speed up in particular the middle route in the new geopolitical dynamic, to avoid Russian trade routes (Kussainov; Qoraboyev) China integrated Central Asia for the first time with oil pipelines (Shaimergenov) No diversification of the economy fostered fear of Chinese investments as invasion rather than innovation (Lillis; Neafie) Most Chinese investment has been in extractive industries rather than infrastructure (Kussainov; Qoraboyev) There is more investment from the US and EU, so talk about Chinese investment exaggerated (Neafie) Academics and government support the BRI as offering opportunities for economic transformation (Nuriddenova; Shengelbayev; Shaimergenov) The EEU has brought no benefits, with no reciprocal access to Russia now likely to speed transition (Shengelbayev; Shaimergenov; Qoraboyev; Neafie) The BRI’s improved rail and road links will support export and import development (Bektemirov) New BRI routes will reduce Russia risks and support diversification (Bektemirov; Qoraboyev) Kazakhstan has rare earths and other inputs for the decarbonising economy (Bektemirov) More frequent train links, and Russian risks, attract investment in agricultural export to the Chinese market (Shaimergenov)	The Government has required BRI projects to align with the national development strategy and risks are shared (Nuriddenova; Shaimergenov) Kazakhstan has used its own resources to fund infrastructure projects, with minimal debt exposure to China, including completing road projects and fully funding all rail projects (Bektemirov; Shaimergenov; Qoraboyev) Lack of transparency about decision making inflames anti-Chinese sentiment (Lillis) Domestic corruption has burned China, such as the theft of funds that killed the airport light rail link, and Khorgos corruption on the Kazakh side embodying kleptocracy (Qoraboyev; Neafie) Lack of knowledge about China and lack of contact can result in conspiracy theories (Lillis; Nuriddenova; Neafie) Social media narratives in China and in Kazakhstan fuel populist fears and blame, and clumsy Chinese soft power initiatives have little effect (Neafie) Community anger when hear Chinese contracts require Chinese workers, when local skills available (Lillis) Historic anti-China sentiment from USSR (Lillis; Nuriddenova, Neafie) Familiarity leads to admiration, unfamiliarity with conspiracy theories (Shaimergenov) January unrest was fuelled by elite competition (Shaimergenov) Domestic unrest persistent below the surface (Lillis) Huawei has 90 per cent localised its Kazakhstan operations (Ge & Toleubayeva)
Armenia	Armenia is surrounded by unfriendly countries, with borders closed to east and west (Hayrapetyan, Atoyan) As a small country, Armenia must take care with all big powers, officially a Russian ally but seeking partnership with others (Atoyan) China may not wish to antagonise Russia by showing interest in Armenia and Armenia may not wish to antagonise Russia by showing interest in China (Hayrapetyan, Sahakyan) Geopolitical narratives around telecommunications (Chen)	Armenia’ connectivity relevance is Iran – Georgia (Hayrapetyan, Atoyan) IT industry development opportunities with China, given Western restrictions on dual use tech (Sahakyan, Atoyan) Huawei is supporting smart grid development and renewable energy rollout (Chen)	Corruption in government stymies long term planning (Hayrapetyan) Diaspora in US, Russia, France and even China (Atoyan)
Georgia	Imperative to find a place in international system, given lack of resources, small size and problematical location (Papava) Lack of support from the West, although it would be welcome, driving Georgia to pragmatic engagement with China, which is not focused on the region (Charaia, Kipiani, Avdaliani) Western pressure against Chinese participation in earlier plans for Anaklia port project (Charaia) Critical for Georgia, as European country, to build economic corridor to China to bolster security (Janelidze)	Georgia proactively lobbied to join BRI, after being first left out, joined AIIB (Papava, Janelidze) It, uniquely in its region, has free trade agreements with EU and China (Charaia) Middle corridor aligns with BRI and offers new opportunities for production trade and logistics from interdependence with economies of Eurasia, including movement of Chinese goods (Matkava, Kipiani, Janelidze) Chinese firms are bidding and winning about half of new infrastructure projects (Kipiani) Georgia is not dependent on Chinese finance (Matkava)
Mongolia	Buffer state diversifying partners but inevitably interdependent and must manage risks (Baryaraa)	Dependent on Russia for energy (Undraa) Dependent on Russia and China for transport routes (Jargal) Diversifying communications partners (Jargal, Baryaraa)	Public protest, nationalism, chaotic media (Undraa) Moderating anti-China sentiment (Undraa, Song, Erdenekhuu, Jargal) Greater transparency and pressure against corruption (Jargal)