Selling the junta abroad: PR campaigns and UK–Greek relations during the Wilson government, 1967–69

ABSTRACT

The propagandistic machine of the military dictatorship that ruled Greece between 1967 and 1974 has provided a focal point of scholarly inquiry in recent years. However, research has focused on the domestic front—the role of radio, television, and cinema—and has completely neglected the issue of public relations in the foreign policy arena. Nothing is known about how the dictatorship, which held an exceedingly weak reputational hand, strove to remake its image to the outside world. This article addresses this historiographical lacuna, exploring the Greek junta’s attempts to improve its international reputation by enlisting the services of foreign public relations (PR) firms. By demonstrating the interplay of nation branding and foreign policy in this way, this article highlights the underappreciated role of transnational non-governmental actors such as PR firms in the ‘nation branding’ of authoritarian regimes. In the process, it reveals how the lobbying activities of a London-based PR firm enlisted by the junta vitiated UK–Greek relations during Harold Wilson’s Labour government, and culminated in an important, and underexplored, flashpoint in political discourse concerning the outside interests of parliamentarians and standards of integrity in British public life.

KEYWORDS:

• Greece
• UK
• public relations
• branding
• junta

Introduction

On 21 April 1967, tanks and troops under the command of right-wing Greek army officers moved into Athens, taking control of key installations such as the Parliament, the Palace, and the radio station. By 4 a.m., most of the leading political figures had been arrested, including Prime Minister Panayiotis Kanellopoulos and former Prime Minister George Papandreou.¹ The Colonels introduced martial law, suspended the Constitution, and became ‘synonymous with torture and the blatant abuse of human rights and civil liberties’.² They formed a military junta which ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. It may have been a parochial military regime of a small state, but its imposition ‘caused a shock to Western public opinion’ and created widespread international reverberations.³ Greece held a highly symbolic value as a ‘cradle of democracy’ and was an active democratic nation, connected to dominant European and international trends of the 1960s.⁴ The drama and significance of the coup, and the reactions to it within and beyond Greece, explain the flurry of publications in recent years on the domestic political and social realities of the Greek dictatorship, as well as the role of international actors, with most attention paid to American, British, and French foreign policies towards the dictatorial regime.⁵ Innovative work has revealed much about the role of the resistance movement, Greece’s impactful part in the ascendancy of transnational human rights movements, and the democratic identity of European institutions like the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Council of Europe.⁶ As has been the case in the study of other authoritarian regimes, the propagandistic machine of the dictatorship has been an object of inquiry, but research has focused on the domestic front—the role of radio, television, and cinema—and has completely neglected the issue of public relations in the foreign policy arena. Nothing is known about how the dictatorship, which held an exceedingly weak reputational hand, strove to remake its image to the outside world.⁷ This subject is not without a wider literature.⁸ Indeed, it is well known that authoritarian regimes have utilised various forms of public diplomacy in their attempts to extract sympathy and foreign currency from international audiences.⁹ Neal M. Rosendorf’s study of Spain’s public diplomacy under the dictatorship of General Franco, for example, provides a compelling account of how a state possessing a dearth of ‘soft power’ relative to the United States was able to harness the power of ‘US overseas tourism, Hollywood film production, American advertising and public relations, and other related US media and institutions’, thereby achieving considerable success in the remaking of Spain’s image and reputation in the US.¹⁰ Emerging intersections between the study of public diplomacy and that of ‘nation branding’, moreover, encourage further exploration of the methods employed by nation states to project a positive image abroad, particularly those which were not limited to targeting ‘opinion leaders and cultural and political elites’.¹¹

Against this backdrop, this article explores the Greek junta’s attempts to improve its international reputation by enlisting the services of foreign public relations (PR) firms to make three significant contributions. First, it highlights the paramount but overlooked role of transnational non-governmental actors such as PR firms, and how authoritarian regimes drew on their services to build and project an image abroad, effectively sugarcoating the brutal nature of their rule.¹² Second, by placing the British PR firm that worked for the Greeks at its core, the article unveils the messy interplay and confrontation between state and non-state actors—PR firms, MPs, the Press, and academia—that shaped the public diplomacy of the junta and its reception in London. In so doing, the article complements and builds upon existing scholarship on the engagement of the British Labour government of Harold Wilson (1964–1970) with the junta, shedding more light on the clash between ‘the preservation its values’ and the ‘safeguarding of British interests’, and the manner in which this conflict was compounded by the contemporaneous elevation of human rights concerns within international discourse.¹³ Third, the article shows how the aforementioned entanglements at the intersections between public and private sectors impacted British political life, culminating in an important, and underexplored, flashpoint in political discourse concerning the outside interests of parliamentarians and standards of integrity in British public life.

The study of public integrity is a burgeoning field of inquiry that is conceptually ‘broad’, intersecting with scholarship on corruption and conflicts of interest.¹⁴ Within Britain, coverage of legislative ethics has provided a focal point, with particular attention being paid to tensions between legislators’ public duties and their private interests, often defined in financial terms.¹⁵ As Nicholas Allen describes, this trend is ‘itself a reflection of prevailing institutional concerns and the onus attached to the principle of legislative independence’, which has undergone substantial revision during the past 30 years.¹⁶ In this context, the establishment of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (or Nolan Committee) in 1994 by John Major’s Conservative government is widely regarded as a watershed moment, separating a new era of formalised oversight from the self-regulatory approach to issues of parliamentary propriety that preceded it.¹⁷ By uncovering the lobbying activities of a British public relations firm undertaken on behalf of the Greek junta—which implicated a Labour MP and triggered significant public debate concerning MPs’ outside interests—this article will underscore both the growing salience of integrity standards under Harold Wilson prior to the protracted adoption of a Register of Members’ Interests in 1974 and the institutional inertia that helped to sustain the pre-Nolan system of self-regulation in British public life.

To unveil this story, we have made extensive use of government sources at the UK’s National Archives and of British newspaper archives. We have also researched the foreign press, principally Le Monde, Der Spiegel and the New York Times, to capture the international reporting of the PR campaign and its implications as it evolved. Due to the heavy censorship imposed by the junta, the Greek Press, although studied, did not expose anything but snippets of information regarding this extraordinary episode in UK–Greek relations, which speaks volumes in its own right. Our article is intended, therefore, as a contribution to the study of the junta, of Greek–UK relations, and the relationship between lobbying and standards of propriety in British public life.

‘Enter Batman for the Greek colonels’

On 7 January 1968, an advert appeared in the Sunday Times seeking the services of ‘5 senior PR men’, four of whom would be experienced in ‘Political/International affairs’ and fluent in either Swedish, German, or French. The fifth man, based in London, ‘must have sound knowledge of International Economics’ (see Figure 1). Maurice Fraser & Associates, the British public relations firm that required this expertise, had, in December 1967, been hired by the Greek military dictatorship as part of an international publicity campaign designed to repair its image among overseas audiences, with a particular focus on Greece’s historically main allies, the United Kingdom and the United States. Indeed, Fraser’s remit—‘to put across what the Greek Government is feeling, to trumpet a counterblast to the noisy opponents of the regime, and generally to spread good news about the Government in Athens across the newspapers of Europe’ – was mirrored in the United States by the respected New York public relations firm Thomas J. Deegan Co., Inc.¹⁸ Deegan’s firm, which boasted a client list that included corporate giants such as Time Inc. and Coca-Cola, ‘quietly signed up as the Greek government’s foreign agents’ in January 1968 for a reported $243,000 annual fee in an agreement understood to last for two years.¹⁹ In the event, the arrangement between Deegan and the Greek government lasted a mere four months and ended calamitously when one of Deegan’s subcontractors appeared to endorse an attack by the Greek Consul General in New York, George J. Gavas, on Greek actress and vociferous critic of the junta, Melina Mercouri, whom he described as a ‘communist’ and the ‘wife of a Jew’.²⁰ Although no less ignominious, Fraser’s undertakings on behalf of the junta would prove to be far more consequential, both with regard to the fractious diplomatic relationship between the UK and the Greek dictatorship and the domestic political landscape in Britain.

Figure 1. ‘Maurice Fraser and Associates’, Sunday Times, 7 January 1968.

Fraser had been proactive in touting his alleged expertise to interested parties, contacting the Greek Embassy in London to offer his services in June 1967 before flying to Athens to discuss specific proposals with representatives of the regime in October.²¹ But aside from the fact that his wife was Greek, the 31-year-old ‘Batman for the Greek Colonels’ was a somewhat unlikely candidate for the position offered to him by the dictatorship.²² Born in Scotland and educated in Egypt, Fraser had worked primarily as a freelance journalist before entering the world of public relations and relied on an interpreter during discussions with his Greek employers. Maurice Fraser & Associates, established in 1967 after Fraser had left the PR firm Lex Hornsby and Partners, quickly developed into an international operation with offices in Paris, Bonn, and Copenhagen, as well as luxurious premises on Fleet Street. Still, it had not yet been officially registered as a business when Fraser was awarded two contracts by the junta—one pertaining to tourism, the other concerning ‘public relations problems’ more broadly defined.²³ On both fronts, the inexperienced PR man faced an unenviable task.

The development of the tourism industry in Greece had become a major concern for stakeholders across the political spectrum during the post-war years, with foreign exchange from international visitors providing an effective means of mitigating the country’s balance of payments crisis, and the promise of economic succour following the cessation of Marshall aid.²⁴ The sector grew rapidly, from a mere 33,000 registered tourist arrivals in 1950 to over one million in 1966, facilitated by the strategy of successive governments and the state-owned Greek National Tourism Organisation (GNTO), which centred on the expansion of vital infrastructure such as hotels and transport networks.²⁵ Extensive efforts were also made to ‘brand’ Greece as an attractive holiday destination by underscoring the famed hospitality of its people as well as its incomparable climate, relative exclusivity, and rich collection of antiquities.²⁶ Within the GNTO’s international advertising campaigns, moreover, Greece’s status as a pioneer of democratic governance, science and philosophy, of western ‘civilisation’ no less, was positioned alongside these charms in a manner that captured the hearts and minds of British Hellenists, who flocked to the country in growing numbers.²⁷ The emergence of mass tourism, brought about by innovations in air travel and the advent of the ‘package holiday’, swelled their ranks yet further, as Greece’s status as a Mediterranean travel hub came to depend less and less upon the historically minded cultural tourism that had sustained it during the immediate post-war period.²⁸

By the summer of 1967, however, it was being reported in the British Press that the Colonels’ military takeover had triggered a ‘sharp decline’ in Greece’s tourist trade.²⁹ For a country that had ‘seen its income from tourists more than doubled in five years’ and ‘expected a further 20% rise this year’, this was nothing short of an ‘economic calamity’.³⁰ The fact that the junta’s economic security depended, to a significant degree, upon the continued growth of Greece’s tourist industry was also well understood by its international detractors, as was demonstrated frequently in the form of letters to British newspapers urging would-be visitors to stay away on moral grounds.³¹ This weaponisation of tourism against the junta quickly gathered momentum within Britain. ‘Danger! Dictatorship! Stay away from Greece in 1968!’ beseeched a nationwide campaign coordinated by Labour MP and human rights advocate, Ben Whitaker. The Greek dictatorship, Whitaker explained, was ‘depending on its tourist trade for foreign currency’ and a ‘sharp drop in tourist earnings could bring about the collapse of the regime’.³² On 24 January 1968, another campaign was launched in London designed to dissuade British tourists from visiting Greece.³³ Speaking on behalf of the campaign, Labour MP John Fraser stated that ‘Greek consulates, tourist offices, travel agencies and shipping lines would be picketed—mainly, he hoped, by university students whose support was being canvassed’.³⁴ In response, Mr. Basil Iatribis, head of the Greek Tourist Office in London, argued that such efforts would ‘do no harm to the Greek Government, but would hurt the poor people of the islands’. According to Iatribis, protestors ought to bear in mind that tourism had ‘nothing to do with politics’.³⁵ Evidently, this was a fallacy. The dictatorship, as per a report submitted by Labour MPs Malcolm K. Macmillan and Alan Gregory following their visit to Greece in the aftermath of the coup, was keenly aware that international visitors needed to be convinced of its domestic popularity: ‘The dictatorship’s pretence of normality and its claim to its “acceptance” by the Greek people is clearly a fraud directed at foreign opinion and the tourist’.³⁶

But the movement to deprive the Greek dictatorship of much-needed tourist dollars was merely one aspect of a multifaceted anti-junta campaign that Fraser had been tasked with confronting. Indeed, by the time Fraser emerged as the junta’s unlikely mouthpiece in London, the city had become the focal point of Greek resistance to the regime on account of its noticeable concentration of Greek emigres and exiles. This movement included ‘not only high-profile politicians’ but also a preponderance of ‘internationally known personalities’, academics, journalists, diplomats, and scientists whose ‘access to highly respected and widely circulated media, including the BBC, The Economist and The Times, turned London into the headquarters of anti-junta activities’.³⁷ As Effie Pedaliu notes, this coalescence was underpinned by a widely held assumption that the social democratic Labour government of Harold Wilson was ‘likely to champion their cause for the return of democracy to Greece’.³⁸ In spite of parliamentary sympathy and opprobrium expressed within the House of Commons in the wake of the coup, these hopes proved to be misplaced as the Wilson government adopted a policy of cautious cooperation, entering into a working relationship with the junta in the hopes that British interests would be more effectively served through engagement than vituperation.³⁹

As described in a 16 May 1967 memorandum by then Foreign Secretary, George Brown, while public condemnation of the junta—which had detained political opponents and suppressed civil liberties—would ‘have fitted the sense of shock and repugnance which we felt and still feel at what happened in Greece’, it would have ‘left us with no direct means of speaking our minds to the new leaders’.⁴⁰ The Wilson government, then, would continue to ‘do business’ with the regime on account of concerns over the fate of Cyprus; Greece’s continued cooperation with NATO; the imperatives of containing Communism in the region; and the need to safeguard commercial contracts, but would stop short of implying approval of its policies by placing a moratorium on ministerial visits and conditions upon the supply of arms to the Colonels.⁴¹ In so doing, the Prime Minister opened himself up to accusations of hypocrisy. Wilson had engendered more proactive engagement with the international human rights system within Whitehall since coming to power in 1964, leading the UK to adopt a more positive interpretation of Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, which imposed upon member states the obligation to promote respect for, and observance of, human rights, and to cooperate with the UN to achieve this end.⁴² Yet the ‘competing priorities’ of Cold War Realpolitik, alliance dynamics, mercantilism, and issues surrounding regional instability clearly shaped British policy towards the junta ‘into one in which human rights had little bearing’.⁴³

As noted elsewhere, a concurrent uptick in international human rights awareness, buttressed by the emergence of influential non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty International, played a key role in transforming disparate, and often disjointed, anti-junta sentiment into a sizeable transnational movement.⁴⁴ A reflection of this zeitgeist was the manner in which the human rights abuses committed by the dictatorship became a subject of significant international debate within the fora of the Council of Europe (CoE) when, in September 1967, representatives from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands brought their case against Greece. Weeks later, the Labour Party Conference in Scarborough passed a resolution calling for the expulsion of Greece from the CoE until democratic rule was restored, although this was not heeded by the Wilson government.⁴⁵ Similarly, when the country fell under the rule of the colonels, the theoretical demand on democratic credentials for applicants to the European Economic Community (EEC) was put to the test. Greece had been the first country outside the founding six member states to have signed an association agreement with the EEC that also included a clause for full membership in the long run.⁴⁶ The EEC decided to freeze the association agreement in September 1967 ‘until the democratic and parliamentary structures are restored in Greece’.⁴⁷ This was not, however, a decision taken lightly or without controversy. Initially, the Commission was struggling to reach a consensus on how to react, with the European Parliament pushing for hard condemnation of the regime, while France, West Germany, and the UK encouraged prudency at all costs. George Brown subsequently defended the government’s stance of keeping ties with the dictatorial regime, asserting in Parliament that ‘it is easy to talk about expelling Greece from here and there. The fact of the matter is that if it ended in murder and bloodshed, which we were in no position to help or avert, we would have a hell of a responsibility on our heads for those who would suffer and pay the price for it’.⁴⁸

Clearly, the maintenance of the status quo between Britain and the Greek junta held significant implications as regards Labour’s ‘image and credibility’ and the ‘ideological discrepancy’ of its policy of appeasement towards the Colonels.⁴⁹ In this context, it could be suggested that Maurice Fraser’s objectives, chiefly the improvement of the junta’s international reputation, aligned with the interests of a British government that found itself facing a ‘cacophony’ of criticism, ‘generated from or embedded within its own ranks and its public too, which was massively assisted by Greek exiles and international organizations’.⁵⁰ In the event, however, the PR man’s chosen methods proved to be less than efficacious.

‘Whitewashing’ the ‘bestialities’ of the Greek junta

Fraser wasted little time in mobilising support for the regime within Whitehall. Following accusations levelled by Amnesty International against the Colonels that torture was being used against political prisoners (charges flatly denied by the junta), Fraser accompanied an all-party delegation of British MPs to Athens as ‘guests of the Greek Government’.⁵¹ Arriving on 15 April 1968, Gordon Bagier (Labour), Ted Garrett (Labour), Russell Johnston (Liberal), Anthony Buck (Conservative), and David Webster (Conservative) were initially ‘put out’ by the programme of activities scheduled for them by the Greek authorities in cooperation with Fraser, which provided for ‘little more than visits to farms, factories and tourist attractions’.⁵² This itinerary, it appeared, constituted a ‘deliberate attempt’ to divert the MPs from ‘any form of political investigations’.⁵³ However, when Bagier and Johnston were granted access to meet with political prisoners on Leros, any such manoeuvrings proved to be unnecessary. Both Bagier and Johnston were ‘reasonably convinced’ that brutality was not being committed in the country under government instruction, and the latter subsequently underlined in the Guardian how the ‘impressions’ he had formed during his ten days in Greece ran ‘contrary to the whole tenor of reporting in the British Press since the coup’.⁵⁴ Some of the Greek Press, subject to stringent censorship, was unaware that the MPs were official guests, and attacked them, much to the embarrassment of their hosts.⁵⁵ When they did get it right, the Greek newspapers reported on the visit, with front covers trumpeting the British MPs’ amazement with the government’s popularity.⁵⁶ The propagandistic reporting was completely uniform across mainstream journalism, demonstrating that Greek newspapers had turned into tools for manipulating domestic public opinion.

As described by Michael Stewart, British Ambassador to Greece, the visit of the MPs had been a ‘considerable success’ for the Greek government, an impression shared by his counterpart in London and within the Foreign Office’s Central Department.⁵⁷ It is interesting to note that Stewart also inferred some utility from the MPs public statements from a British perspective: ‘As far as public opinion in England is concerned, it seems to me that the visit may have done some good in that the MPs [sic] remarks should help to counteract some of the more biased and exaggerated criticism of the regime which has appeared in certain sections of the British Press’.⁵⁸ Although the Ambassador postulated that the charitable assessments of conditions in Greece put forward by the MPs indicated that they had perhaps allowed themselves to be ‘over-persuaded’ by their hosts, the Foreign Office argued that their ‘whitewashing’ of the regime was merely a reaction, long overdue, to the ‘blackwashing’ of the junta by the British Press.⁵⁹ Furthermore, from the point of view of Her Majesty’s government and its policy towards Greece, the visit ‘may help in that there are now some Members of Parliament (from all Parties) who have been to Greece and who evidently have a more balanced view of the situation than some of the views that have been expressed up to now’.⁶⁰

Fraser’s activities were not restricted to Britain. His representative in Bonn, Norbert Finkel, landed his ‘first big coup in political tourism’ in July 1968 when six Christian Democrat (CDU) members of parliament, selected ‘because of their versatile education and open mindedness’ (as stated by Fraser), willingly accepted a free trip to Greece. In their communique to the Press, they praised one of the Colonels, Brigadier General Pattakos, for his ‘deep seriousness’ and ‘palpable sense of responsibility’.⁶¹ Following such accommodating pronouncements, the military regime invited more and more prominent representatives of German politics, business, and the Press to visit Greece free of charge. When SPD deputies were invited, most of them rejected this type of travel as it was not a proper means of ‘getting political information’.⁶² Fraser’s glib methodology—‘selling Greece today is something different than managing washing powder. You have to believe that it is good’ – also won few admirers within the Party.⁶³ Nonetheless, within a matter of months, Fraser and his associates had flown 78 guests, including 45 journalists, from western Europe (mainly England, France, Germany, and Scandinavia) to Greece so that they ‘could get their own picture of the benefits of the junta at the expense of the junta’.⁶⁴

But the British MPs’ visit, and their subsequent public statements, exerted, at most, a limited ameliorative influence on the tenor of public debate concerning the Greek dictatorship. Fraser’s not-so-hidden hand in proceedings, moreover, came under increasing scrutiny. The ‘real tragedy’ of such initiatives, wrote one concerned reader of the Guardian, was that they ‘benefit neither the Greek people nor the cause of democracy, only the PR men themselves’.⁶⁵ In response, Fraser penned his own letter to the newspaper, refuting the implication that he had succeeded in ‘hoodwinking five British MPs from a cross-section of all the political parties’.⁶⁶ This was, after all, not ‘pre-1967 Greece’ but ‘post-1967 England, where British MPs and the British public do not easily accept suggestions that they can be taken for a ride’.⁶⁷ The MPs themselves also found their actions called into question by Anthony Marreco of Amnesty International, who claimed they had acted ‘deplorably’ by dismissing his organisation’s report on the torture of Greek political prisoners.⁶⁸ As such, the impression within some Whitehall circles that the MPs visit would serve to moderate the febrile nature of public debate over Greece was somewhat misplaced. Fraser’s machinations may have been well received by his paymasters, but they had, if anything, further complicated the management of UK–Greek relations as far as the Wilson government was concerned by providing a focal point of public backlash.

This became particularly noticeable following incendiary comments made in the Commons by Wilson himself on 25 June 1968. When asked if his recent discussions with the King of Greece had included the question of Greece’s expulsion from the Council of Europe, and NATO, the Prime Minister stated that while he ‘did not get round’ to this particular issue, the Greek monarch was nonetheless ‘in no doubt at all about the attitude of Her Majesty’s Government in connection with the dictatorship in Greece and about some of the bestialities which have been perpetrated there’.⁶⁹ In response, representatives of the junta conveyed their ‘deep disappointment’ caused by the remarks of the Prime Minister and accused the Wilson government of hypocrisy for apparently endorsing the findings of Amnesty International in this instance after disavowing the organisation’s reports of torture committed by British military forces in Aden two years earlier.⁷⁰ The British Embassy in Athens was informed on 1 July that Wilson’s comments had economic repercussions as well, triggering the cancellation of contacts, valued at approximately £4 million, between the Greek government and British firms pertaining to the supply of rolling stock for the state railway, nuclear reactors, and the Athens underground.⁷¹ Fraser’s firm confirmed the ‘trade ban’ the following day, and the cancellation of contracts was widely reported in the British Press on 3 July, with some commentators finding significance in the fact that the Foreign Office had not received any communication from the Greek government about the decision in advance of its announcement by Fraser.⁷² Somewhat taken aback, the Foreign Office surmised: ‘So far as we can tell all the Press interest arises from what Mr. Maurice Fraser has been putting about’.⁷³

Fraser, however, would soon be hoisted by his own petard. In September 1968, he sponsored the visit of another delegation of British MPs to Athens in order to ‘observe’ the spurious referendum on the Colonels’ proposed constitution. In this instance, the five MPs who had flown to Greece in April were joined by Dan Jones (Labour), George Roberts (Labour), Ray Dobson (Labour), John Astor (Conservative), and Robert Elliot (Conservative).⁷⁴ During the same period, six German and six French MPs also flew to Athens as well as numerous journalists, bankers, and businessmen. But the visit of the British MPs was to be overshadowed by revelations concerning a leaked document sent by Fraser’s firm to the Greek government, in which the details of his lobbying activities were disclosed.

The document was a confidential memorandum submitted to the Colonels around mid-June of that year that dealt with the work carried out by Fraser’s agency during the preceding six months, as well as objectives for the second half of 1968.⁷⁵ The report had been lifted by an anti-junta mole within Prime Minister Geórgios Papadopoulos’ office and sent to Konstantinos Karamanlis, the former Conservative Prime Minister of Greece who had been living in self-imposed exile in Paris since 1963. He, in turn, had sent a copy to Helen Vlachos, journalist, publisher, and anti-junta campaigner. Vlachos had suspended the publication of the daily newspapers Kathimerini and Mesimvrini in the aftermath of the coup, stating that the military junta’s censorship had made it ‘totally and absolutely impossible’ for her to continue publishing.⁷⁶ This act of defiance was of great importance because it deprived the Colonels of any hope of using the influence of these newspapers to their benefit. Vlachos continued fighting for the restoration of the freedom of the Press and was finally arrested by the junta after an interview she gave to the Italian newspaper La Stampa, in which she ridiculed its ‘simple’ and ‘ignorant’ leaders.⁷⁷ Vlachos was placed under house arrest, but managed to escape to London in mid-December 1967, becoming a leading figure among Greek political exiles there.⁷⁸ She and Takis Lambrias were tireless in offering information on Greece and the situation on the ground by publishing two émigré journals—the Hellenic Review and the Greek Report, respectively. ⁷⁹ Vlachos quickly grasped the potentially explosive nature of the leaked document and, in cooperation with Richard Clogg, a prominent historian of modern Greek studies and an active member in the anti-dictatorial resistance movement in London, approached the Sunday Times ‘Insight Team’ to publish the report. Fraser argued that the newspaper had obtained a copy of the report illicitly and applied for a High Court injunction against the Sunday Times editor, Harold Evans.⁸⁰

On 21 September 1968, Fraser was granted an interim injunction that prevented the paper from publishing the report, an intervention that was criticised by some. The Guardian reported that it is well known that Maurice Fraser and Associates have been operating as the publicity agents of the Greek government. An inquiry into their activities is therefore manifestly a matter of public interest, particularly just at the moment when the conduct of the Greek government is about to be considered by the Council of Europe and its Commission of Human Rights.⁸¹ Indeed, the granting of an injunction ‘added an aura of mystery to the proceedings and quickly transformed what might otherwise have been a scandal with short shelf-life into a political cause célèbre of major dimensions’.⁸² Days later, the argument that full disclosure was a matter of public interest was further amplified when Ivor Richard MP declared that a copy of the report in question had come into his possession and revealed a particularly explosive detail contained therein—that among persons employed by Fraser’s London office was a ‘British MP working behind the scenes with the object of influencing other MPs’.⁸³

‘The hidden persuaders’

Interactions between MPs and public relations firms acting on behalf of foreign governments had certainly increased during the 1960s and had provided a subject of considerable debate within Westminster prior to the revelations relating to Maurice Fraser & Associates.⁸⁴ Indeed, Richard Crossman, Lord President of the Council, had been struck by the growing influence of such arrangements following his receipt in July 1967 of a minute by the Commonwealth Secretary, Herbert Bowden, concerning the succession of Biafra from Nigeria and the breakaway state’s courting of international public relations firms in its global propaganda war.⁸⁵ Although it was Crossman’s view that this kind of activity required ‘active and continuous surveillance’, initial investigations revealed that information on PR firms and their dealings with foreign governments was ‘rather sparse’ and spread over a number of government departments. Clearly, ‘no-one has made a co-ordinated study of what is going on’, conceded the Commonwealth Secretary.⁸⁶ It was at this juncture that the possibility of introducing legislation to curb the influence of PR firms and their lobbying capabilities was first mooted by Crossman and subsequently disseminated for further, inter-departmental consideration.⁸⁷ These discussions, which involved the Home Office, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Overseas Development, the Foreign Office, and the Security Services, resulted in the ‘consensus’ opinion that the matter should ‘not be carried further’.⁸⁸ Unconvinced, Wilson conveyed his displeasure in no uncertain terms: ‘This conclusion is pusillanimous and wrong … The whole thing needs cleaning up. Whose side are we on?’⁸⁹ Consequently, the matter remained on the agenda, and in the background, while Fraser was striving to improve the international reputation of the Colonels.⁹⁰

By the time the injunction against the Sunday Times was lifted by the Appeal Court on 3 October 1968, the Wilson government was, it appeared, prepared to take action.⁹¹ Furthermore, the eventual publication of Fraser’s report by the Sunday Times and the Sunday Telegraph on 6 October amplified the degree of public interest surrounding the saga, and provided additional impetus for the Wilson government to intervene in order to curtail the political influence exerted within the UK by public relations firms. Its contents also gave credence to earlier speculation around the circumstances of Fraser’s unlikely appointment as the Colonels’ PR chief in London, specifically the supposition that the inexperienced Fraser had caught the junta’s eye because his proposals were ‘rather more uninhibited than any of his longer-established rivals might have cared to propose’.⁹²

The English translation of the Fraser report to the Greek regime was structured in three parts: ‘Organisation’, ‘Results’ and ‘Plans’.⁹³ It contained the names of Fraser’s staff, and referred to an unnamed British MP, who acted ‘as a linkman between the Commons and Fraser … tipping him off whenever the subject of Greece cropped up in the House’.⁹⁴ Fraser, it was revealed, had not only secured the surreptitious services of this MP but had, through his ‘director of political affairs’, Howard Preece, orchestrated the publication of a critical article in the Daily Telegraph concerning the mooted cancellation of contracts between Greece and the UK in July.⁹⁵ Under the heading of ‘Results’, the report listed a range of diverse activities and a number of approaches to well-known political personalities, while in the upcoming ‘Plans’ section the Fraser company stated inter alia its intention of contacting ‘a head of the BBC though a third party with a view to trying to tone down the hostility that has been shown [towards the regime]’.⁹⁶ Modest successes were recorded alongside setbacks. For example, the PR man had wished to explore ‘the possibility of sponsoring a historian or author of international repute to write a contemporary history of Greece … to dismiss the past’.⁹⁷ Fraser had held a meeting with Regius professor at Oxford, Hugh Trevor-Roper, in which he asked him to write this ‘history’, but Trevor-Roper had declined on the grounds that he was ‘too busy’.⁹⁸ It has, however, been suggested in the memoirs of Richard Clogg that Kenneth Young, a former editor of the Yorkshire Post and advisor to the junta on issues of Press legislation, served as a willing substitute, publishing an apologia of the dictatorial regime (The Greek Passion: A Study in People and Politics) shortly thereafter.⁹⁹

The report also highlighted Fraser’s French connections, revealing that the PR man had ‘organised a trip to Greece for four French journalists, specialised in financial affairs, who are about to write their articles’.¹⁰⁰An additional indication of the international scope of Fraser’s undertakings was provided in the slipstream of this exposé in the form of an apology published by a Swedish newspaper. The paper in question, Dagens Nyheter, had inadvertently hired an ‘agent’ working for Fraser as a stand-in freelance writer to run a daily column (in English) for the benefit of tourists.¹⁰¹ According to the managing editor of Dagens Nyheter, ‘looked at from a distance, the columns of those 10 days do show a pattern that would give an indication that they were edited by someone wanting to show the Greek regime in a favourable light’.¹⁰²

In the midst of these disclosures, the Wilson government looked to press on with its investigations into public relations firms and their lobbying on behalf of foreign entities. Richard Crossman wrote to the Prime Minister the day after the publication of the Fraser report seeking guidance on ‘how to handle the issue’. He reiterated his conviction, which he had held ‘even before the emergence of this Greek Government affair’, that a more proactive policy of supervision and regulation was needed.¹⁰³ In late 1968, Wilson duly entreated the Paymaster Edward Shackleton, to carry out an enquiry into ‘the present arrangements for employing advertising agencies; the methods by which advertising agencies are renumerated; and the levels of fees paid’ in addition to investigating ‘the extent to which public relations firms have recently been employed in Government Departments and, where they have, whether this is justified’.¹⁰⁴ At this stage, the identity of the Labour MP who had been on Fraser’s payroll had not yet become public knowledge. But when it became clear in March 1969 that Thames Television’s This Week programme had obtained this information—notwithstanding their inability to broadcast the identity of the MP due to legal action brought against the Sunday Times by Fraser—the MP in question, Gordon Bagier, came forward.

The Labour MP for Sunderland South, who had travelled to Greece in April and September the previous year, admitted that he had accepted a retainer to act as a ‘parliamentary consultant’ for Maurice Fraser & Associates—a position that he occupied from May to October 1968 – although Bagier denied taking any action ‘in Parliament or outside on behalf of the present Greek Government’.¹⁰⁵ The question Parliament was now faced with, as described in the Guardian, was ‘whether MPs who make these arrangements ought to be allowed to keep them secret. That Mr Bagier did nothing improper is not the main point. What matters is that if he had acted improperly no one need have known’.¹⁰⁶

A letter sent to Harold Wilson by an anonymous MP on the same day, however, indicated that the question posed by the ‘Bagier affair’ was by no means straightforward:

Dear Harold,

I would most stronly [sic] urge you to be extremel [sic] careful over the above and any resultant inquiry or action you may decide upon. You may well disturb a ‘Hornet’s Nest’ which could ‘sting’ many in the Labour Party and ruin the chances of ever winning a General Election. An investigation would almost certainly be bound to show than almost 80% of Labour M.P’.s [sic] have ‘hidden connections’, and this MAY apply to present Government Ministers? … Can you be positively sure that Bob Mellish is NOT STILL connected with the Bookmaking Industry … Is Denis Howell really free from his connections with a Public Relations Firm in the Midlands? Was George Darling still connected with his various dubious connections whilst at the Board of Trade, which he has now resumed? Is Ian Mikardo still connected with the numerous ‘firms’ and set-ups?, including tie-ups with the Russians, East Germans and almost all Communist countries? … I repeat, there is no knowing where this may end.¹⁰⁷

Although the letter was brought to Wilson’s attention during a briefing on the question of MPs’ interests and no ‘further action’ was taken by the Prime Minister, it is not unreasonable to suggest that its contents, which were not to be ‘circulated more widely than is necessary’, had a chastening effect on the activities of the Select Committee tasked with investigating the matter of MPs and their dealings with public relations firms, and their outside interests more generally.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, the report of the Select Committee on Members’ Interests, issued in December 1969, may have provided a ‘long overdue recognition of a scandal that has been poisoning the air at Westminster and bringing disrepute on Parliament’, but on account of its rejection of a Register of Members’ interests open to public inspection it was also criticised for not going far enough in the pursuit of greater transparency.¹⁰⁹

By this stage Fraser was no longer in the picture. His contract with the Greek government had been terminated on 31 December 1968, and he was suspended—before resigning—from the Institute for Public Relations after its council found that his insidious lobbying activities had violated standards of professional conduct as laid down by the Institute.¹¹⁰ Nonetheless, his efforts to improve the international reputation of the junta played an important, and underappreciated, role in shaping public discourse surrounding the issue of MPs interests; one that can only be fully appreciated in retrospect due to its lack of immediate, institutional repercussions. It was only in 1994, after all, that the present-day basis for ‘standards of propriety in public life’ was established under the auspices of the Committee on Standards in Public Life led by Lord Nolan, put in place by the Major government after a spate of allegations of ‘sleaze’ and corruption in Westminster.¹¹¹ This was, according to an authoritative account of the regulation of standards in British public life, symptomatic of a ‘step change’ that occurred during the 1990s concerning the ‘way in which the United Kingdom handled integrity issues’.¹¹² New ethical institutions, such as the Nolan Committee, were created, and ‘political elites were obliged to address integrity issues in a more systematic and sustained way than ever before’.¹¹³ Hitherto, high-profile episodes of impropriety, such as the ‘Profumo affair’, or the ‘Poulson scandal’ – which precipitated the introduction of a Register of Members’ Interests in 1974 – were treated largely as ‘isolated incidents’, due in part to the widespread perception that British politics was, ‘by cross-national standards, substantially free of problems’.¹¹⁴

This much is supported clearly by the foregoing analysis of the Bagier incident, which has been, somewhat surprisingly, overlooked by historians and political scientists in their coverage of the Wilson government’s various imbroglios relating to standards of integrity in public life.¹¹⁵ Fraser’s lobbying activities, and the attenuated political blowback that followed the public disclosure of his undertakings, nonetheless, ought to be situated within the broader history of unaddressed scandals and ‘unwarranted complacency’ that slowly gave rise to the salience of standards-related issues within British political discourse and, perhaps, laid the foundations of the 1990s ‘step-change’, at which point issues concerning MPs ‘outside interests’ finally captured the ‘public imagination in the UK’.¹¹⁶

Conclusion

The junta’s preoccupation with improving its reputation overseas by mollifying international critics of its policies and the suspension of civil liberties in Greece through the use of public relations firms has been neglected in the historiography. By situating the transnational public relations campaign conducted by Maurice Fraser and Associates on behalf of the Greek junta at the epicentre of our research, this article complements existing scholarship on UK–Greek relations during the Colonels’ rule and how Athens attempted to cultivate British support to gain legitimacy internationally and domestically.¹¹⁷ Perhaps, the most significant aspect of Fraser’s lobbying campaign, however, is not related to its efficacy (or lack thereof) as regards the enhancement of the Greek junta’s international standing, but in the role it played in further problematising UK–Greek relations for the Wilson government, compounding its struggle to reconcile the competing impulses that the Labour Party has often faced when in power. As has been suggested elsewhere, this struggle can be conceptualised as a ‘constant clash between the preservation of its values and the safeguarding of the interests of the country—an unrelenting struggle between idealism and pragmatism’.¹¹⁸ An examination of the archival record has yielded insights into Fraser’s situation within this balancing act. The PR man was, it appears, regarded by interested observers within the Foreign Office as a facilitator; someone who could assist Whitehall in its attempts to establish a more ‘balanced’ picture of Greece under the junta than that painted by large sections of the British Press and by leading human rights groups such as Amnesty International. In the event, Fraser’s undertakings merely amplified public scrutiny of the Wilson government’s continued engagement with the Greek regime and its ‘bestialities’.

Investigating Fraser’s lobbying efforts also adds to our understanding of what one PR boss coined ‘surreptitious journalism’, where writers are persuaded to produce favourable reporting in exchange for gifts and material advantages. The Colonels’ campaign of using favours to encourage praise of their dictatorship in the foreign Press was heralded ‘as unprecedented in the recent history of political reporting’.¹¹⁹ It became an object of controversy due to the realisation that any government could organise its propaganda abroad by hiring a commercial agency, raising the question of to what extent where these English, German and French deputies lending themselves to the propaganda operations mounted by the Fraser company. Indeed, analysis of the Fraser saga reveals an important flashpoint of a debate regarding a related issue that had been gathering momentum within the Labour Party for years prior to the coup of April 1967, concerning the disclosure of MPs interests. Although the report of the Select Committee on Members’ Interests on the subject was ‘something of a damp squib’, and the establishment of a Register of Members’ Interests would not occur until 1974, the ‘Bagier affair’ no doubt ‘contributed powerfully to making the case for such a register irresistible’, and arguably contributed to a broader shift in British political discourse pertaining to standards-related issues in public life, albeit one that took decades to achieve a lasting, institutional legacy.¹²⁰

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

The research has been generously funded by Research England and the Onassis foundation.

Notes

1. On the Colonels’ regime see, among others, Rizas, Greek Politics after the Civil War; Athanassatou, Rigos, Seferiades, ed. The Dictatorship, 1967–1974; Couloumbis, … 71 … 74; Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels; Fleming, A Piece of Truth.

2. On the issue of British–Greek relations during the junta, and the junta’s human rights violations, there has been a steady stream of publications: Pedaliu, ‘A Clash of Cultures?’, 101; Pedaliu, ‘A discordant Note’; Nafpliotis, Britain and the Greek Colonels; Sakkas, Britain and the Greek Colonels; Pedaliu, ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy’; Kostis Kornetis, Children of the Dictatorship.

3. Ibid.

4. Klapsis et al, ed. The Greek Junta and the International System.

5. Plassmann, Comme une nuit de Paques?; Pelt, Tying Greece to the West; Nafpliotis, Britain and the Greek Colonels; Kornetis, Children of the Dictatorship; Maragkou, Britain, Greece and the Colonels, 1967–1974; Anastasakis and Lagos, The Greek Military Dictatorship; Tsakas, ‘Europeanisation under authoritarian rule’.

6. Keys, ‘Anti-Torture Politics’; Snyder, From Selma to Moscow, 60–86; de Angelis and Karamouzi, ‘Enlargement and the Historical Origins of the European Community’s Democratic Identity’; Kornetis et al, eds. The 1969 ‘Greek Case’ in the Council of Europe; Soriano, ‘Facing the Greek Junta’.

7. Klapsis, ‘The Propaganda of the Dictatorship 1967–1974’; Tzanetakos, ‘Resistance-opposition: The press, censorship, and anti-propaganda’; Voglis, Dynamic Resistance. The only exception is a brief piece by Ioannis Stefanidis, ‘The Colonels’ Failed PR Coup’, and the memoir of Richard Clogg, Greek to Me.

8. See, for example, Snow and Cull, ed. Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy; Belmonte, Selling the American Way; Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency; Hatzivassiliou, ‘Shallow Waves and Deeper Currents’.

9. Piller, ‘Managing Imponderables’, 47–8. See also David-Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment; Bosworth, ‘Tourist Planning in Fascist Italy’; Schwarz, Die Reise ins Drite Reich.

10. Rosendorf, Franco sells Spain to America, 4.

11. Rojas-Méndez and Khoshnevis, ‘Conceptualizing nation branding’, 116. See also Szondi, ‘From image management to relationship building’; Gienow-Hecht, ‘Nation-branding’; Dinnie, Nation Branding, 1–30.

12. Work has been done mostly on tourism and authoritarian regimes. See Semmens, Seeing Hitler’s Germany; Piller, ‘Managing Imponderables’.

13. Maragkou, ‘The Wilson Government’s Responses’, 180.

14. Hine and Peele, The Regulation of Standards in British Public Life, 2. For international perspectives, see Lawton and Doig, ‘Researching Ethics for Public Service Organizations’; de Sousa and Coroado, ‘What Do We Talk about When We Walk about Ethics Regulation in Politics?’.

15. Allen, ‘Keeping MPs Honest?, 107. See also Williams, Conflict of Interest; Mancuso, The Ethical World of British MPs; Campbell and Cowley, ‘Attitudes to Moonlighting Politicians’.

16. Allen, ‘Keeping MPs Honest?’, 107.

17. See Hine and Peele, The Regulation of Standards in British Public Life; Bew, ‘The Committee on Standards in Public Life’; David-Barrett, ‘Shirking Self-Regulation?’.

18. ‘Greeks aim to improve their image’, The Times, 9 February 1968.

19. ’Junta uses N.Y. firm to aid Greek image: Manhattan publicists land Greek junta account’, Washington Post and Times Herald, 4 March 1968. Fraser’s annual fee for services provided to the Greek junta, it was later reported, was £100,000. See ‘The secret methods of selling the Greek junta’, Sunday Times, 6 October 1968.

20. ‘Greece is in fashion’, Washington Post and Times Herald, 21 June 1970.

21. ‘Man who wins friends for the Greek Colonels’, Sunday Telegraph, 29 September 1968.

22. ‘Enter Batman for the Greek Colonels’, Sunday Telegraph, 14 April 1968.

23. ‘Greeks aim to improve their image’.

24. See for example ‘Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Greece Monthly Report for September 1950 (R-41)’, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, 20 October 1950, (Accessed August 30, 2023) https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v05/d190; ‘Greeks depend on ruins to lure tourist dollars: Marshall Plan aid to end next year; foreign exchange becomes urgent problem’, Los Angeles Times, 21 January 1951; ‘Staff Study by the National Security Council: The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece’, FRUS, 1951, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, 6 February 1951, (Accessed August 30, 2023) https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v05/d209.

25. ‘More Tourists in Greece’, Financial Times, 30 September 1955; ‘Greek Capital Investment’, Financial Times, 22 January 1957; ‘Tourists to Greece’, Financial Times, 22 May 1957; ‘Tourism in Greece’, Financial Times, 13 February 1959; ‘£1,233 m. Investment Plans Announced in Greece’, Financial Times, 1 May 1959; ‘Greek shores await the million’, The Times, 25 April 1961; ‘Now Greece begins to woo tourists’, The Times, 10 October 1963; ‘New road, new Greece’, Guardian, 6 January 1965; ‘Byzantine city enters the tourist age’, The Times, 23 January 1965.

26. For examples of GNTO advertising campaigns featuring these elements, see ‘Greece’, The Times, 30 November 1960; ‘Greece’, The Times, 18 January 1961; ‘Greece’, The Times, 3 February 1962; ‘National Tourist Organisation of Greece’, Economist, 27 April 1963; ‘National Tourist Organisation of Greece’, Economist, 2 May 1964; ‘Display Ad 182 – No Title’, Observer, 10 January 1965; ‘Greece’, The Times, 23 January 1965.

27. See, for example, ‘You Were Born in Greece’, Financial Times, 30 April 1967; ‘The Development of the Tourist Trade’, Financial Times, 20 April 1967.

28. See Tsartas, Greek Tourism Development; Vlachos, Tourism, and the public policies in Contemporary Greece, 1914–1950; Nikolakakis, ‘Representations and social practices of alternative tourists in post-war Greece’.

29. ‘A time limit on Greek tolerance’, Guardian, 3 July 1967.

30. ‘Greece: where have all the tourists gone?’, Economist, 22 July 1967.

31. See, for example, ‘Avoiding Greece’, The Times, 7 August 1967.

32. ‘Lord Snow backs “don’t holiday in Greece” appeal’, Morning Star, 21 December 1967, The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), FCO 9/174.

33. ‘Campaign to boycott tourism’, The Times, 25 January 1968.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. ‘Report on a Visit to Greece by M. K. MacMillan, M.P. and Arnold Gregory, M.P.’, 18 May 1967, TNA, PREM 13/1690.

37. Maragkou, ‘The Wilson Government’s Responses’, 175.

38. Pedaliu, ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy’, 194.

39. See ‘Greece: British Nationals’, Hansard, House of Commons, Vol. 745, Col. 1160, 24 April 1967; ‘Adjournment (Whitsuntide)’, Hansard, House of Commons, Vol. 746, Col. 1773, 11 May 1967.

40. ‘Greece: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’, 16 May 1967, TNA, FCO 9/164.

41. Ibid.

42. See Grealy, David Owen, Human Rights and the Remaking of British Foreign Policy, 30–31.

43. Pedaliu, ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy’, 186.

44. Pedaliu, ‘Human Rights and International Security’; Keys, ‘Anti-Torture Politics’.

45. Nafpliotis, ‘A Gift from God’, 75–6.

46. Karamouzi, ‘Taking a Stance’.

47. Historical Archives of the European Union, European University Institute, Florence, Edoardo Martino Files, Declaration of Jean Rey, Brussels, 20 September 1967, EM 76.

48. ‘Government defeated on Vietnam and Greece’, The Guardian, 5 October 1967

49. Pedaliu, ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy’, 185; Maragkou, ‘The Wilson Government’s Responses’, 175.

50. Maragkou, ‘The Wilson Government’s Responses’, 176.

51. ‘Greeks to fight boycott call’, The Times, 15 April 1968.

52. D. S. L. Dodson to A. E. Davidson, ‘Visit of 5 British MPs to Greece’, 27 April 1968, TNA, FCO 9/168.

53. Ibid.

54. ‘MPs say prisoners on Leros were free to talk’, Guardian, 26 April 1968; ‘Greece under the generals’, Guardian, 4 May 1968.

55. Dodson to Davidson, ‘Visit of 5 British MPs to Greece’.

56. ‘Biased attitude from segments of the foreign press’, To Vima, 27 April 1978; ‘British MPs discover how popular the government is’, Ta Nea, 27 April 1968.

57. Michael Stewart to J. G. S. Beith, ‘Visit of Five British MPs to Greece’, 2 May 1968, TNA, FCO 9/165: J. E. C. Macrae to R. J. O’Neill, 27 August 1968, TNA, FCO 9/168.

58. Stewart to Beith, ‘Visit of Five MPs to Greece’.

59. Ibid.; Foreign Office (Central Department), ‘Visit of Five MPs to Greece’, undated, TNA, FCO 9/165.

60. Stewart to Beith, ‘Visit of Five MPs to Greece’.

61. ‘Searching the land of Greece with the soul’, Der Spiegel, 11 August 1968; ‘With expenses’, Der Spiegel, 16 November 1969.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. ‘Expenditure for publications’, Der Spiegel, 31 October 1976.

65. ‘Greece: stifling education and opposition’, Guardian, 7 May 1968.

66. ‘Letters to the editor: students’ ‘laughable’ grant increase’, Guardian, 16 May 1968.

67. Ibid.

68. ‘5 MPs reply to Amnesty critic’, Daily Telegraph, 25 June 1968.

69. ‘King of Greece’, Hansard, House of Commons, Vol. 767, Col. 251, 25 June 1968. Emphasis added by the authors.

70. D. J. D. Maitland to Sir Michael Stewart, 27 June 1968, TNA, PREM 13/2141; Athens to Foreign Office, Telegram No. 490, 28 June 1968, TNA, PREM 12/2141.

71. Athens to Foreign Office, Telegram No. 496, 1 July 1968, TNA, PREM 13/2141.

72. ‘Greek trade ban on Britain’, Daily Telegraph, 3 July 1968; ‘£4 m order cancelled by Greece’, Guardian, 3 July 1968; ‘Sanctions for all’, Daily Telegraph, 3 July 1968.

73. Foreign Office to Athens, Telegram No. 962, 3 July 1968, TNA, PREM 13/2141.

74. J. E. C. Macrae to The Hon. T. E. Bridges, 14 September 1968, TNA, FCO 9/168.

75. ‘The government makes public, in part, the report of its advertising agency in London’, Le Monde, 7 October 1968.

76. ‘Publisher closes two Athens papers’, New York Times, 3 May 1967.

77. ‘Ѐ una donna la piú decisa nemica dei colonnelli’, La Stampa, 24 September 1967.

78. See Vlachos, House Arrest.

79. Lambrias was a well-known Greek journalist and newspaper editor of Vlachos’s Mesimvrini newspaper. During the Greek Junta he left Athens and lived in London where he published the Greek Report.

80. Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 QB 349, [1969] 1 All ER 8, [1968] 3 WLR 1172, 112 Sol Jo 805 (Accessed August 30, 2023) https://vlex.co.uk/vid/fraser-v-evans-793260337; ‘The Propaganda of the Greek Junta: The Fraser affair causes a stir in London political circles’, Le Monde, 8 October 1968.

81. ‘The consequences of an injunction’, Guardian, 23 September 1968. See also ‘Judge stops Press report’, Observer, 22 September 1968; ‘Paper will fight Greek injunction’, Guardian, 23 September 1968.

82. Clogg, Greek to me, 120.

83. ‘British MP in pay of Greek regime’, Observer, 29 September 1968.

84. See Allen, ‘Keeping MPs Honest?’, 108; Shaw, ‘Members of Parliament’.

85. See Doron, ‘Marketing Genocide’. Doran explores how Biafra utilised Markpress, a Swiss-based PR firm, as a public diplomacy arm during the conflict.

86. Lord President of the Council to Commonwealth Secretary, 10 July 1967, TNA, FCO 95/304.

87. See G. S. Littlejohn-Cook to Sir Denis Greenhill, ‘Public Relations Firms in the U.K. Acting for Foreign Governments’, 31 July 1967, TNA, FCO 95/304.

88. Nancy Fisher to A. M. Palliser, 30 October 1967, TNA, PREM 13/2881.

89. A. M. Palliser to Miss N. Fisher, 1 November 1967, TNA, PREM 13/2881.

90. See Michael Palliser to Miss N. Fisher, 22 November 1967, TNA, PREM 13/2881; J. R. Williams to Michael Palliser, 23 November 1967, TNA, PREM 13/2881; A. M. Palliser to Mr. Gruffydd Jones, 5 January 1968, TNA, PREM 13/2881; Sir Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 17 January 1968, TNA, PREM 13/2881; Michael Palliser to Burke Trend, 29 January 1968, TNA, PREM 13/2881; R. J. D. to Prime Minister, 5 July 1968, TNA, PREM 13/2881; R. J. D. to Mr. Gruffydd Jones, 8 July 1968, TNA, PREM 13/2881; Foreign Office to Washington, Telegram No. 6791, 22 August 1968, TNA, PREM 13/2881.

91. ‘Secret lobbyists may be curbed’, Sunday Telegraph, 4 August 1968; ‘Ban on publication of Greek report lifted’, Guardian, 4 October 1968; ‘Paper can publish Greek public relations story’, Financial Times, 4 October 1968; ‘Pressure groups on MPs: Wilson to act’, Daily Mail, 4 October 1968; ‘Support for curb on foreign PR’, Guardian, 5 October 1968.

92. ‘The secret methods of selling the Greek junta’.

93. ‘As told to the Colonels’, The Sunday Telegraph, 6 October 1968.

94. Ibid.

95. ‘The secret methods of selling the Greek junta’. For the article in question, see ‘Sanctions for all’.

96. ‘As told to the Colonels’.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. ‘Junta’s Pocketbook and the Foreign Press’, Ta Nea, 20 April 1986.

100. ‘The Fraser report refers to French journalists and parliamentarians’, Le Monde, 12 October 1968.

101. ‘Regret for favouring Greeks’, The Times, 10 October 1968.

102. Ibid.

103. Richard Crossman to Prime Minister, 7 October 1968, TNA, PREM 13/2881.

104. Harold Wilson to Paymaster General, 1 November 1968, TNA, PREM 13/2881.

105. ‘MP admits link with PR firm’, Guardian, 7 March 1969.

106. ‘MPs and their interests’, Guardian, 8 March 1969.

107. Anonymous letter to Harold Wilson, ‘The Bagier Affair’, 8 March 1969, TNA, CAB 301/462. Emphasis in the original document.

108. D. Gruffydd Jones to P. L. Gregson, 26 March 1969, TNA, CAB 301/462; Peter Gregson to D. Gruffydd Jones, 14 March 1969, TNA, CAB 301/462. See also ‘Members’ Interests (Declaration)’, Hansard, House of Commons, Vol. 783, Col. 1556–1600, 14 May 1969.

109. ‘The hidden persuaders’, Sunday Telegraph, 21 December 1969. See also ‘New code for MPs “outside interests”’, Guardian, 18 December 1969; ‘MPs cash—the case against secrecy’, Sunday Times, 21 December 1969.

110. See ‘Greeks end contract of PRO in London’, Guardian, 26 September 1968; ‘Greeks drop publicists’, The Times, 27 September 1968; ‘Maurice Fraser leaves IPR after appeal’, Guardian, 30 May 1969.

111. Bew, ‘The Committee on Standards in Public Life’, 411.

112. Hine and Peele, The Regulation of Standards in British Public Life, 30.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid. Regarding the Poulson case, in which several MPs were implicated in a corrupt financial relationship with the architect John Poulson during the early 1970s, see for example Doig, ‘Watergate, Poulson and the Reform of Standards of Conduct’.

115. See, for example, Hine and Peele, The Regulation of Standards in British Public Life, 33–4: ‘Timeline of key changes in the integrity agenda’.

116. Ibid., 47; Smith and Newman, ‘MPs, Outside Interests, and Corporate Boards’, 2.

117. Nafpliotis, ‘“A Gift from God”’

118. Maragkou, ‘The Wilson Government’s Responses’, 180.

119. ‘Expenditure for publications’, Der Spiegel, 21 October 1976

120. Richard Clogg, ‘The Colonel, the PR Man and the MP’, Times Higher Education Supplement, 18 November 1994, TNA, CAB 301/462.