The myth of ‘Jacobin Kemalism’?: influence of the French Revolution on Kemalist elite and ideology during the early republican period

ABSTRACT

This study examines the first-hand sources of Kemalism to understand how and to what extent the French Revolution inspired the Kemalist elite and influenced Kemalism during the early republican period. In the literature, there is a general perception that the French Revolution and Jacobinism were highly influential on the Kemalists, but this perception mainly depends on broad interpretations without systematic empirical research. This study shows that there was really an influence, but not necessarily on the secular/Westernist reforms as proposed in the literature. Moreover, the alleged impact of Jacobinism on Kemalism was limited to only a few regime elites.

KEYWORDS:

• Kemalist elite
• Kemalism
• French Revolution
• Jacobinism
• early republican period

Introduction

The French Revolution (1789–1799) is one of the milestones in modern history. It did not just deeply influence French history, but the liberal and democratic ideas that arose from the revolution had a worldwide impact in the following decades and even centuries. One of the most significant impacts of the revolution was the formation of nation-states by stimulating nationalism across Europe.¹ Although it took place more than a century later, it could be expected that Turkish nationalism was also influenced by the French Revolution. There is already a general agreement in the academic literature that the founders of Turkey, Atatürk and the Kemalist elite, were highly inspired by the ideas of the French Revolution during the formation of the Turkish nation-state in the 1920s and 30s.

The ideological impact of the French Revolution on the Kemalist elite is particularly emphasized by underlining the presumed ‘Jacobin’ character of Kemalism.² As early as 1971, Şerif Mardin mentioned the ‘Jacobin aspects of Republican policy’³ to emphasize the authoritarian, elitist, and top-down features of the Kemalist regime. Since then, this type of usage of ‘Jacobin’ as an adjective, mostly in a pejorative sense, to define similar characteristics of Kemalism has been very common among scholars from a pro-civil society perspective in Turkey.⁴ As a reaction, pro-Kemalism scholars also argued that Kemalism was ‘Jacobin’ in the sense that it was revolutionary, radical, and vanguardist, but they strongly objected that this was something bad.⁵ These kinds of uses of ‘Jacobin’ to define Kemalism, both by its critics and supporters, continued until the mid-2010s⁶ in the context of political struggle between Kemalist state elite and conservative AKP/Erdoğan governments. Although the struggle ended with the victory of the Erdoğan governments, it is still very common to define Kemalism as ‘Jacobin’ in recent academic literature.⁷

The use of ‘Jacobin’ or ‘Jacobinism’ to define certain political movements is not peculiar to Turkey. In developed countries such as France and Britain, ‘Jacobin’ was used to define radical liberal or left-wing socialist political movements during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁸ In the relatively peripheral regions of Europe such as Italy or Poland, ‘Jacobin’ was used for nationalist and liberal political movements, which were pro-independence and mostly republican.⁹ In early twentieth-century Russia, Jacobinism was enthusiastically embraced by Lenin, who defined Bolsheviks as the ‘Jacobins of contemporary social-democracy.’¹⁰ In the Middle East, it was used to define modernist, nationalist, and secularist movements. For example, Edward Webb defined radical and top-down secularization efforts in Tunisia, Syria, and Turkey as ‘Jacobin projects.’¹¹ The exact ideological content of the political movements described as ‘Jacobin’ has varied by country since the French Revolution, but it has almost always been used to describe progressive, radical, and revolutionary political movements, both by their supporters and conservative opponents.¹²

In the Turkish case, according to the scholars who consider that Kemalism was influenced by the French Revolution and Jacobinism, this influence was reflected particularly in the Kemalist regime’s strict secularist policies and Westernist cultural reforms.¹³ These policies and reforms were defined as ‘Jacobin laicism’¹⁴ since they were implemented top-down by force and in a radical manner. Moreover, they did not just aim to separate governmental and religious affairs but also forced society to secularize and modernize, a product of a social engineering mentality.¹⁵ Some scholars also found similarities between the Jacobins and the Kemalists as both tried to create a new civil/political religion and imposed it on society.¹⁶

However, the problem with this literature is that the presumed influence of the French Revolution and Jacobinism on Kemalism is taken too much for granted. Without doubt, this perception of the influence of the French Revolution is not totally baseless, but it is impressionistic and mostly depends on broad interpretations and comparisons rather than systematic empirical research. This can be understood from the fact that the form of the proposed impact of the French Revolution and the similarities between Kemalism and Jacobinism vary strongly depending on whether the writer’s ideological perspective is liberal or Kemalist, especially in the public debates. Since there are very few academic studies on the subject, we do not precisely know the form and the extent of this potential impact and similarity.

Regarding the academic studies on the subject, Mardin makes a short comparative analysis between the French and Turkish revolutions and argues that ‘if the French Revolution is seen as revolutionary because violence suffused it, (…) then the Turkish Revolution was and is no revolution.’¹⁷ Nazım İrem makes a comparison between Jacobinism and Kemalism from a political theory perspective and argues that since the Jacobins of the French Revolution was a bottom-up movement with their roots in civil society, Jacobinism cannot be explanatory in characterizing the radical nature of the Kemalist regime.¹⁸ On the contrary, in his theoretical article following the international historical sociology perspective, Eren Düzgün describes the Turkish Revolution as ‘historically specific Jacobinism’ with its security and educational policies.¹⁹

This study approaches the subject from a different and novel perspective. Instead of adapting an interpretative or theoretical approach, it systematically examines the first-hand sources of Kemalist elite and ideology from the start of the Turkish War of Independence (1919) to the death of Atatürk (1938) and conducts a qualitative text analysis. In this way, the study aims to understand how and to what extent the French Revolution and Jacobinism were an inspiration for the Kemalist elite and were a part of the Kemalist ideology.

In the following parts, after a short discussion on historical sources and methodology, I first explain the perspective of Kemalists on the French Revolution, including the comparisons they made between the French and Turkish revolutions. Next, I account for the criticisms of Kemalists towards the French Revolution. Finally, I discuss the perspective of Kemalists on the Jacobins and end with my conclusions.

Sources and methodology

The study divides the Kemalist sources into two groups: The first group is the speeches and statements of the key figures in the ruling elite who decided on the policies and reforms. The most notable figure was naturally Atatürk, but I also included İnönü and Bayar as the prime ministers of Atatürk and Recep Peker, who was particularly influential in the 1930s. Finally, I have included the party programs of CHP. All the sources of key Kemalist figures examined in the study are summarized in Table 1.²⁰

Table 1. Key figures in Kemalist ruling elite and their sources to examine

Figure	Sources to Examine
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk	The Speech^a (1927)
	Atatürk’s Speeches, Statements, Correspondences and Conversations^b (1906–1938)
	The Books Atatürk Read^c (1983)
İsmet İnönü	İnönü’s Speeches and Statements^d (1919–1946)
Recep Peker	R. Peker’s Speeches^e
Celal Bayar	Bayar’s Speeches and Statements^f (1920–1953)
CHP	Party Programmes^g (1923–1976)

^a Atatürk, Nutuk.

^b Atatürk, Yazışma ve Söyleşileri; Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri I-II-III.

^c Tüfekçi, Atatürk’ün Okuduğu Kitaplar.

^d İnönü, Söylev ve Demeçleri.

^e Peker, R. Peker’in Söylevleri.

^f Bayar, Söylev ve Demeçleri.

^g Tuncer, CHP Parti Programları.

The second group is the sources from the Kemalist intellectuals/ideologues of the one-party period. These sources were mostly written in the 1930s to explain the Turkish Revolution²¹ (Türk İnkılabı) and formulate a coherent Kemalist ideology. Two of these ideologues, Recep Peker and Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, were also influential figures in the ruling elite, which makes their works particularly important. In selecting the sources, I included only the ones that particularly focus on the Turkish Revolution and Kemalism. For this reason, I did not include the works of many other notable intellectuals of the era, such as Falih Rıfkı Atay or Hasan Ali Yücel. All the sources of Kemalist intellectuals examined in the study are summarized in Table 2 chronologically.²²

Table 2. Kemalist intellectuals/ideologues and their sources to examine

Intellectual	Sources to Examine
Afet İnan	Civil Knowledge^a (1930)
Şevket S. Aydemir	Revolution and Cadre^b (1932)
Ahmet Ağaoğlu	State and Individual^c (1933)
Saffet Engin	Principles of the Kemalism Revolution^d (1938–1939)
Mahmut Esat Bozkurt	Revolution History^e (1933)
	Atatürk Revolution^f (1940)
Recep Peker	Revolution Lectures^g (1935)
Munis Tekinalp	Kemalism^h (1936)
Şeref Aykut	Kamalism: Explanation of the RPP Programme^i (1936)

^a İnan et al., Medeni Bilgiler.

^b Aydemir, İnkılap ve Kadro.

^c Ağaoğlu, Devlet ve Fert.

^d Engin, Kemalizm İnkılabı I-II-III.

^e Bozkurt, İnkılap Tarihi.

^f Bozkurt, Atatürk İhtilali.

^g Peker, İnkılap Dersleri.

^h Tekinalp, Kemalizm.

ⁱ Aykut, Kamalizm.

I carefully examined all the sources in Tables 1 and 2 and found all the mentions of the French Revolution, the Jacobins, and the related historical figures. Then, I categorized these mentions depending on the person who mentioned them, the year, the historical context, and particularly the themes/notions discussed.²³ Depending on this qualitative dataset, I reached conclusions on how the Kemalists perceived the French Revolution and the details of their perception related to the themes/notions they emphasized and the comparisons and criticisms they made. Thereby, I empirically tested the arguments in the literature regarding the ideological impact of the French Revolution and Jacobinism on the Kemalist regime and ideology.

Kemalist elite and the French Revolution

It is very clear from their speeches and writings that the Kemalist elite evaluates the French Revolution as a positive historical event to admire and follow. For example, in his two speeches publicly given to the French ambassadors in 1928 and 1933, Atatürk openly praised the French Revolution.²⁴ Moreover, he put it in a higher position than other revolutions in history.²⁵ This perspective is similar in the writings of other Kemalists such as Aykut,²⁶ Engin,²⁷ and Bozkurt.²⁸

The Kemalists’ high regard for the French Revolution is not surprising, considering their intellectual background. Both Young Ottomans and Young Turks in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were influenced by the ideas connected to the French Enlightenment and Revolution.²⁹ The French Revolution was popular among the young cadets and officers who would later form the Unionist and Kemalist cadres. For example, Mustafa Kemal and his school friends Fethi (Okyar) and Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) were having discussions about the French Revolution during their military high school and war academy years.³⁰ In particular, the Revolution of 1908 was a crucial event in showing the extent of the influence of the French Revolution on the Young Turks.³¹

In addition to the general praise, the Kemalists emphasized the importance of certain subjects or notions related to the French Revolution in their writings and speeches. Also, they frequently made comparisons between their revolution and the French Revolution over these subjects. There were two key notions emphasized by the Kemalists: national independence and national/popular sovereignty. Individual liberties can also be partly added to them.

In his ‘Speech on the French Revolution’ to the French ambassador on 14 July 1922, the anniversary of the storming of Bastille in 1789, Mustafa Kemal Pasha openly stated that the French Revolution and their revolution, which he described as the ‘Anatolian Revolution’ (Anadolu İhtilali), were similar.³² He also argued that the motivations behind the revolt of the ‘French nation’ in 1789 and the ‘people of Turkey’ during the War of Independence were the same: liberty/freedom.³³ In this way, Kemal Pasha identified the notion of liberty in the French Revolution with the national independence of Turkey.

In his draft notes of The Speech, Atatürk evaluates the birth and rise of nationalism during and after the French Revolution and how the revolution impacted the national independence movements all over the world.³⁴ In these notes, too, Atatürk interprets the notion of ‘liberty’ in the French Revolution as the ‘independence’ of nations against foreign/external powers rather than as a social emancipation of a class/group from oppressive institutions. He underlines the importance of the ‘one state, one nation’ principle³⁵, and quotes from the declarations of various parliaments during the French Revolution to indicate that the nations should respect each other’s independence and sovereignty.³⁶

A notable comparison between the French and Turkish revolutions in the writings of Kemalist intellectuals regarding the notion of ‘national independence’ emerges in proposing the Turkish Revolution as the Asian equivalent of the French Revolution. The justification for this proposition is that, according to Kemalists, the French Revolution influenced the European nations to be independent and to establish their own state, and the Turkish Revolution would do the same for the Asian nations. This idea is particularly prevalent among the Kadro writers³⁷ related to their anti-colonialist perspective³⁸ but it is also supported in Tekinalp’s³⁹ and Engin’s⁴⁰ writings. It can be argued that, in this way, Kemalists tried to make the Turkish Revolution more universal regarding its effects, similar to the French Revolution.

Another highly emphasized notion by the Kemalists was national or popular sovereignty. Related to this notion, anti-monarchist, anti-aristocratic, and partly anti-clerical aspects of the French Revolution were praised. For example, in his abovementioned speech on the French Revolution on 14 July 1922, Kemal Pasha criticized the monarch and his despotism and praised the riot of common people during the revolution.⁴¹ Similarly, during the debates on abolishing the sultanate in October 1922, Kemalist intellectuals such as Süleyman Nazif or Necmeddin Sadık (Sadak) referred to the French Revolution many times.⁴² In addition to the anti-monarchism, Aykurt⁴³ and Bozkurt⁴⁴ praise the anti-clerical aspects of the French Revolution. Yunus Nadi mentioned ‘bloody revolutionary action’ against the clerics in November 1922, which seems inspired by the French Revolution.⁴⁵

The Kemalists referred to the principle of popular sovereignty also in their comparison of the French and Turkish revolutions. Most notably, Recep Peker makes a conceptual distinction between the ‘revolution of liberty,’ such as the English and French revolutions, and the ‘revolution of class,’ such as the Russian Revolution of 1917, and classifies the Turkish Revolution in the first category with the French Revolution. According to him, the common point for this type of revolution is that ‘they stem from people.’⁴⁶ In line with Peker’s emphasis on ‘people,’ Bozkurt compares the French and Turkish revolutions over anti-monarchism and ‘national will.’⁴⁷

Atatürk makes a similar comparison over the notions of constitution and republic. In The Books Atatürk Read, there are hand-written calculations of him as ‘1923–1789 = 134’ and ‘1923–1875 = 48’ over a book he read.⁴⁸ Apparently, he aimed to find the time gap between the establishment of the republic in Turkey and the first promulgations of the constitutions in France and the Ottoman Empire. Related to Atatürk’s republicanism, it is known that he was very familiar with the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who also influenced the French revolutionaries, particularly the Jacobins.⁴⁹ Atatürk kept Rousseau’s books in his personal library⁵⁰, read his The Social Contrat⁵¹, and praised him in his speeches.⁵² It would not be wrong to argue that the Kemalist notions of ‘national sovereignty’ (hakimiyet-i milliye) or ‘national will’ (irade-i milliye) were modified versions of Rousseau’s ‘general will’ with their emphasis on unity and indivisibility of nation.⁵³ It is not surprising that the 1924 Constitution was based on the Rousseauist understanding of national sovereignty with a strong legislature depending on the unity of powers without checks and balances.⁵⁴

Related to national sovereignty and republicanism, the Kemalists also admired the democratic aspect of the French Revolution. In their writings, Peker, Tekinalp, and Engin emphasize the importance of ‘democracy’ during the French Revolution.⁵⁵ More specifically, Engin links the notions of nationalism and democracy in the French Revolution to each other and points out the importance of popular sovereignty by directly referring to Rousseau.⁵⁶ Moreover, Atatürk indicated in his two speeches that the American and Turkish revolutions were similar regarding how ‘they gained their independence’ and ‘established a democratic state.’⁵⁷ However, it is important to note that the Kemalists define a regime as a ‘democracy’ as long as the source of sovereignty is the nation/people and the government acts on behalf of the people, even if that nation/people cannot really elect its political representatives.⁵⁸

In line with the Kemalists’ admiration of democracy in the French Revolution, at least in theory, it is common in the literature to point out liberal and individualist characteristics of the 1924 Constitution with its protection of human rights and freedoms, which was inspired by the French Revolution.⁵⁹ For example, the 68th article of the constitution adopts the description of freedom directly from the 4th article of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man,⁶⁰ which does not cite the higher interest of any collectivity such as state, public, or nation as the border of individual freedom.⁶¹ Following this perspective, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, representing the liberal-oriented faction within the Kemalist elite, underlines the emancipation and liberation of the individual, equality before the law, and democracy as the positive aspects of the French Revolution.⁶²

It is also possible to mention a mediated impact of the French Revolution on the Kemalist regime and ideology. During the nineteenth century, classical-radical political movements that embraced the ideals of the French Revolution emerged in Western countries.⁶³ In France, the republican, left-leaning liberal, and secularist radical movement turned into the Radical Party in 1901. This party, including its key figure Georges Clemenceau, was in close contact with the exiled Young Turks in Paris in the pre-1908 period.⁶⁴ Later, the French Radical Party formed relations with the Republican People’s Party (RPP) in the 1925–1938 period and influenced its party ideology and program.⁶⁵ The International Entente of Radical Parties, led by the French Radical Party, invited the RPP to its congresses. The RPP accepted these invitations and sent observers to the congresses, although it refused to be a full member.⁶⁶ The relationship of Kemalists with the French radicals shows that Kemalism was considered by its contemporaries within the group of political movements in Europe, which were the followers of the French Revolution’s ideals.

Criticism of the French Revolution

The Kemalist elite and intellectuals did not just evaluate, praise, and compare the French Revolution but also criticized it, mainly to distinguish the Turkish Revolution and emphasize its presumed uniqueness and superiority. The starting point for this claim of uniqueness could be considered a speech by Mustafa Kemal Pasha in December 1921 in a parliamentary debate on the form of government of Turkey at that time. In the speech, Kemal Pasha first praised the French Revolution and described it as the most important revolution in history. Then, he indicated that Turkey’s form of government, which depended on the unity of powers, was better than the form of governments that emerged as a consequence of the French Revolution, which depended on the separation of powers.⁶⁷ Similar to Atatürk, Peker argues that, unlike the Ottoman constitutional monarchies of 1876 and 1908, which copied their regimes from the French Revolution, the Turkish Revolution was original and, therefore, successful.⁶⁸

In line with the abovementioned speech of Kemal Pasha, Halide Edip wrote that during the formation process of the new assembly in Ankara in March 1920, Kemal Pasha ‘talked like Rousseau’ by saying that ‘all sovereignty belongs to the people. It cannot be divided and be separated as legislative and executive.’⁶⁹ In this regard, in the literature, it is common to point out the similarity between the National Assembly of Turkey during the War of Independence (1920–1923) and the National Convention during the radical phase of the French Revolution (1792–1795), as both depended on the principle of unity of powers under extraordinary and revolutionary conditions.⁷⁰ Although this argument is plausible, it is interesting that Kemal Pasha’s speech clearly shows he believed the French Revolution represents the separation, not unity, of powers, and distinguished the Turkish Revolution over this point.

Maybe the most succinct expression of the uniqueness claim of Kemalists regarding the Turkish Revolution was in Atatürk’s well-known statement to Le Monde newspaper in 1928. After praising the French Revolution, he said, ‘Turkish democracy followed the way that the French Revolution opened, but it developed along its unique distinguishing points.’⁷¹ Although Atatürk did not explicitly explain what were those ‘unique distinguishing points’ in the statement, he implied that the Turkish Revolution was more ‘peace-oriented.’⁷² From his general perspective and other writings, it can be inferred that he most probably pointed out the imperialist and aggressive character that the French Revolution embraced during the Napoleonic period and wanted to distinguish the Turkish Revolution from it as being more peaceful. For example, in one of his speeches in the same year, he criticized Napoleon’s ambitions to conquer other countries by ‘prioritizing his interests over the French nation’s.’⁷³

A similar criticism of the French Revolution was raised by the Kadro writers in the early 1930s related to their anti-colonialist perspective. Şevket S. Aydemir argues that the French and Turkish revolutions were highly different from each other because the French Revolution brought up free trade and democracy, both of which led to the Western colonization of the world, including the semi-colonization of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, he argues, there is no way that the Turkish Revolution can be a follower of the French Revolution, as some Kemalist intellectuals, such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu, recommended.⁷⁴ However, it is important to note that the Kadro writers separated from the Kemalist elite with their direct negative perspective on the French Revolution as a whole. No other Kemalist elite or intellectual, including Atatürk, had such a negative perspective about the French Revolution.

An important point that the Kemalists distinguished the Turkish Revolution from the French Revolution is that the Turkish Revolution took place during a major war fought against an external enemy, unlike the French Revolution. Peker writes that the Turkish Revolution is superior to the other revolutions since it occurred in more challenging conditions related to the War of Independence.⁷⁵ Engin emphasizes the same point: the Turkish Revolution resulted from an ‘external struggle’ against the foreign invaders, while the French Revolution was an ‘internal struggle,’ which makes the former superior.⁷⁶ He also argues that the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was more similar to the French Revolution in this regard as it resulted from an internal struggle.⁷⁷

Kemalists’ ‘external’ and ‘internal struggle’ distinction between the Turkish and the French revolutions is directly connected to their perspective on social classes. We already know how the Kemalist elite objected to the class distinctions and conflicts in Turkey as a part of their nationalism and solidarism.⁷⁸ This objection was also reflected in their perspective on the French Revolution. According to Aydemir, the French Revolution resulted from class conflict; thus, it was a ‘revolution of the bourgeoisie.’ On the contrary, the Turkish Revolution was a reaction to colonialism, which was already the consequence of the French Revolution.⁷⁹ Without blaming the French Revolution as being responsible for colonialism, Engin follows this perspective by identifying the ‘internal struggle’ aspect of the French Revolution with class conflict. According to him, the French Revolution resulted from the conflicts of divided classes, but the Turkish Revolution resulted from a unified national struggle.⁸⁰ Bozkurt describes the French Revolution as a ‘struggle for bread’ to point out its class-related socio-economic aspect. He writes, ‘Turkish people did not beg for bread,’ unlike the French people, which made the Turkish Revolution superior.⁸¹

As another negative attitude of Kemalists towards the French Revolution, their abovementioned pro-liberal stance regarding individual liberties highly changed in the 1930s. In Civil Knowledge, Atatürk makes a very similar definition of ‘liberty/freedom’ in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights but, contrary to the spirit of the 1924 Constitution, this time indicates that liberty can be contained by the ‘nation’s general interests.’⁸² This perspective was followed by other Kemalists and sometimes carried to more extreme points. For example, according to Peker, individual liberties, which emerged as a result of the French Revolution, brought up exploitations, such as the abuse of the parliamentary system by reactionary forces. Because of these exploitations, the Turkish Revolution could not follow the French Revolution in every issue.⁸³ Similar to Peker, Tekinalp criticizes the Declaration of the Rights in the French Revolution as it provided ‘extreme’ individual liberties, which were open to abuse. Like Atatürk, he argues that individual liberties should be contained by ‘the supreme interests of society,’ as was already the case in the Turkish Revolution.⁸⁴

This anti-liberal perspective of Kemalists in the 1930s cannot be considered separate from the rising ultra-nationalism both in Europe and Turkey during this period.⁸⁵ With the impact of ultra-nationalism, the criticism of liberal-democratic regimes substantially increased among the Kemalist elite. As a part of this process, the criticism of the French Revolution and the affiliated notions, such as parliamentarism and individual liberties, also substantially rose. The French Revolution never lost its position as an admired historical event for the Kemalist elite altogether. However, it is possible to observe from their writings and speeches that the level of criticism towards it increased during the 1930s,⁸⁶ and the emphasis on the uniqueness of the Turkish Revolution was highly intensified. Peker even wrote in 1935 that the Turkish Revolution was the ‘supreme of all the revolutions.’⁸⁷

Kemalist elite and the Jacobins

My examination in this study gives the result that despite the widespread perception both in the academic literature and the public debates about how Kemalism is a ‘Jacobin’ ideology, except for two regime elites explained below, in none of the writings and the speeches of Kemalists, including Atatürk, İnönü, Bayar and Peker, there is any mention of Jacobins of the French Revolution, let alone a sign of admiration. It can be inferred from the Kemalist sources that the Kemalist elite was indifferent to the Jacobins, the Jacobin Club, or the well-known Jacobin figures, such as Robespierre, Danton, or Marat, of the French Revolution. They did not attribute any special meaning to the ‘Jacobin’ type of politics or Jacobinism either.

This indifference is not surprising considering the Kemalists’ way of evaluating the French Revolution. Kemalists had a holistic perspective on the French Revolution in the sense that they ignored the different political groupings within it, not just the Jacobins but also the Feulliants, Girondins, and others. For them, the French Revolution was an important historical event as a whole, and what mattered was the general modern notions that emerged as a result of it, such as ‘nation,’ ‘constitution,’ or ‘liberty.’ Ideological differences among the different factions during the revolution did not matter. For this reason, the Jacobins also had no special meaning for them.

For the Kemalists, let alone prioritizing one political group, such as Jacobins, over others in the French Revolution, the divisions into different groups and the power struggle among them was actually a subject of criticism (and also another point that made the Turkish Revolution superior to the French Revolution according to them). For example, in late 1922, when Mustafa Kemal Pasha answered a question about whether Turkey should follow a road of evolution or revolution, he cited the French Revolution as a negative example of the endless power struggle during which one political faction eliminated another.⁸⁸ Similar to this perspective, in Aydemir, Engin, and Bozkurt’s writings, it is argued that extreme individualism and class conflict, which were other points of criticism as discussed above, brought up a lack of collective discipline and action in the French Revolution. The French Revolution was carried out ‘disorderly’ mainly because of constant struggle among different factions and leaders. In particular, grassroots popular movements gave rise to anarchy and chaos. On the contrary, according to them, since there was no class conflict in the Turkish Revolution, it occurred without intense factional struggles, mainly reflected in the ‘unity’ in its leading cadres, and carried out ‘orderly’ in the direction of a pre-defined program.⁸⁹

To the extent that the Kemalists distanced themselves from the political divisions within the French Revolution, as we clearly see in Atatürk, Aydemir, Engin, and Bozkurt’s statements/writings, it already cannot be expected that they would attribute any special meaning to the Jacobins or any other political group. Their perspective on this subject, with an emphasis on the unity of leading elites, the order in the revolutionary processes, and especially the criticism of grassroots popular movements, actually reflects the influence of conservative-leaning philosophers/thinkers like August Comte and Gustave Le Bon, the former’s notion of ‘order and progress’ and the latter’s deep antipathy of revolutionary crowds. We know that these philosophers influenced Atatürk⁹⁰ and the Kemalists⁹¹, and they were critical to the French Revolution. This negative attitude of Kemalists towards the grassroots revolutionary movements also separated them from the French radicals of the nineteenth century because these movements were an integral part of French radicalism, for example in the 1848 Revolution.⁹²

It is important to note that the Kemalists’ indifference to the Jacobins in the French Revolution did not result from any lack of knowledge. They knew the history of the French Revolution and the Jacobins quite well. For example, in The Books Atatürk Read, it is demonstrated that Atatürk underlines the passages related to the rise and decline of Jacobins and puts some marks on a speech of Robespierre.⁹³ This means that he knew about these historical developments in the French Revolution. Even so, in any of his speeches and writings, there was a sign of admiration for the Jacobins, unlike for example Lenin in a similar period.⁹⁴

An interesting point in the speeches and writings of Kemalists is that, unlike the Jacobin figures, there are many mentions of Napoleon. For example, Saffet Engin compares Atatürk with Napoleon, Cromwell, Washington, and Bismarck, instead of Robespierre or Danton.⁹⁵ This idea of comparing Atatürk with European nation-founding commanders and statesmen is also common in the academic literature. Many scholars find similarities between Atatürk and Napoleone⁹⁶, Cromwell⁹⁷, Garibaldi⁹⁸, and Washington.⁹⁹ However, I have not encountered any study that compares Atatürk or any other Kemalist figure with the Jacobin figures. On the contrary, scholars from very different perspectives on Kemalism can agree that there was no Robespierre in the Turkish Revolution.¹⁰⁰

Two examples from the War of Independence could be considered inspirations from the Jacobins at the beginning but actually were not. The first one is the Independence Tribunals. We know that they were inspired by the Revolutionary Tribunals of the French Revolution.¹⁰¹ The Revolutionary Tribunals were formed during the radical phase of the French Revolution (1792–1795) and utilized effectively during the Reign of Terror of the Jacobins.¹⁰² Both tribunals’ purpose and function were the same as taking radical judiciary decisions quickly when the external and internal threats in the revolution and the war were at their culminating point.

However, despite their similarities, there is no historical evidence that the Kemalists adopted the Independence Tribunals because they admired the Jacobins. In line with their abovementioned holistic perspective, it seems that they were inspired by the French Revolution in general, not specifically by the Jacobins. The Independence Tribunals were already less radical than the Revolutionary Tribunals in their number of executions.¹⁰³ This was directly admitted by Kılıç Ali (a member of various Independence Tribunals) with the claim that the low number of executions during the War of Independence compared to the Reign of Terror indicates that the Turkish Revolution was not ‘impulsive’ like the French Revolution but more ‘reasonable.’¹⁰⁴ Kılıç Ali’s argument is in line with Atatürk, Aydemir, Bozkurt, and Engin’s abovementioned perspective regarding how the Turkish Revolution was more ‘orderly,’ without bloody power struggle of various factions.

The second example that could be considered an inspiration from the Jacobins is the ‘Committee of Public Safety’ (Selamet-i Umumiye Komitesi). It was a secret organization in the tradition of Young Turks, formed in the spring of 1922 and headed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Its primary purpose was to establish discipline within parliament, which may divert from Kemal Pasha’s personal decisions during the War of Independence, and pass the desired laws without strong opposition.¹⁰⁵ The committee's name was the same as the parliamentary committee (Comité de salut public) in the French Revolution’s radical period, during which the Jacobins were also in power for fourteen months and used the committee effectively.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, the rationale behind both committees was similar. They were formed and utilized to make quick decisions by bypassing democratic decision-making processes in their parliaments in the phase of revolution and war when the external and internal threats were at their culminating point, a rationale similar to the Revolutionary and Independence tribunals.

However, like the Independence Tribunals, there is no direct evidence that the committee's name in Turkey was inspired directly by the Jacobins. It was already given by its opponents, not the founders, with an inspiration from the French Revolution in general.¹⁰⁷ Also, each committee’s institutional position was different. The committee in France was a de facto executive branch of the French state legally formed within the National Convention, while the committee in Turkey was a secret organization.

The only real exception to the Kemalists’ indifference to the Jacobins is two relatively high-ranking ruling elite members: Mahmut Esat Bozkurt and Reşit Galip. Samet Ağaoğlu, son of Ahmet Ağaoğlu, likens Reşit Galip to Jacobin Saint-Just because of the similarity of their faces and young deaths.¹⁰⁸ However, not just personal, there were also ideological similarities between Bozkurt-Galip and the Jacobins. Most notably, Bozkurt and Galip published a newspaper called ‘Friend of People’ (Halk Dostu), the name of which was given by Bozkurt, most probably as an inspiration from the Jacobin Marat’s same-named newspaper (L’Ami du peuple) published during the French Revolution.¹⁰⁹ Bozkurt and Galip’s newspaper was also supportive of disadvantaged classes and aimed to fight against corruption and injustice, as was the case for Marat’s newspaper.¹¹⁰

In Atatürk Revolution, Bozkurt compares the French and Turkish revolutions over republicanism and he supports the harsh repression of royalist rebellions during the French Revolution.¹¹¹ Bozkurt argues that a revolutionary should never make a concession to a reactionary,¹¹² an idea Galip also shared.¹¹³ For this reason, he criticizes Danton and praises Robespierre because, according to him, Robespierre was more determined towards the reactionary forces with his uncompromising attitude.¹¹⁴ Bozkurt’s Atatürk Revolution is already the only Kemalist source that mentions Jacobin figures and the Jacobins as a separate political group in the French Revolution. Nevertheless, note that even in Bozkurt’s book, the word ‘Jacobin’ is mentioned only once.

Conclusion

As a result of its empirical examination of first-hand Kemalist sources, the study reaches three key conclusions, all of which are new contributions. Firstly, although it is correct that the Kemalists were inspired by the French Revolution, this inspiration was not on the subjects related to secularism/Westernism, as proposed in the literature. The Kemalist elite, except the Kadro writers, considered the French Revolution clearly as a positive historical event to follow and even put it in a higher position than other revolutions in history. They were influenced by the French Revolution mainly in their principles of national independence, national/popular sovereignty, also manifested as anti-monarchism and republicanism, ‘democratic’ state, and partly individual/human rights. With regard to national sovereignty, Rousseau’s influence was evident. However, these notions differ from those proposed in the literature, such as strict secularist policies, Westernist cultural reforms, and the implementation of a civil/political religion. There is also no evidence that the Kemalists were influenced by the French Revolution when they carried out these policies/reforms in a top-down manner with a social engineering mentality.

This finding does not exclude the possibility that there can be some similarities between the secularist policies/reforms of Kemalists during the Turkish Revolution and the Jacobins or other revolutionaries during the French Revolution. However, when the Kemalist elite implemented these policies/reforms, with the possible exception of anti-clericalism, their direct inspiration was not the French Revolution or the Jacobins. Therefore, expressions such as ‘Jacobin laicism’ used to define the secularist/Westernist policies of the Kemalist regime can be misleading rather than illuminating, as Şerif Mardin points out¹¹⁵ (even though he also used this expression frequently). It makes more sense to seek the inspirations of these policies/reforms and their top-down implementation in the Kemalists’ other influences, such as Comte’s positivism or Le Bon’s elitism.¹¹⁶

The second finding of the study is that the French Revolution was a subject of criticism for the Kemalists as much as it was an inspiration. The Kemalists distinguished their revolution from the French Revolution by its political regime based on the unity, not separation, of powers, and its peace-oriented character, being a result of external struggle rather than internal class conflict, and constraining ‘excessive’ individual liberties. They emphasized the uniqueness and superiority of the Turkish Revolution over these points, the intensity of which increased markedly during the 1930s with the impact of rising nationalism. These claims of superiority and uniqueness mean that there was a limit to their admiration of the French Revolution.

The third finding is that Jacobinism was not an inspiration for the Kemalists, except for a few regime elites. The Kemalist elite was mostly indifferent to the Jacobins, mainly related to their holistic perspective on the French Revolution. They did not attribute any special meaning to the different political factions within the revolution and even criticized their power struggle. They also had a very negative perspective towards the grassroots revolutionary movements with the influence of conservative-leaning thinkers. It is true that during the War of Independence, the Kemalists were inspired by the radical phase of the French Revolution, as exemplified by the Independence Tribunals and the Committee of Public Safety, but these inspirations did not come specifically from the Jacobins. The only exception to the indifference of Kemalists to the Jacobins was the admiration of Bozkurt and Galip, manifested in their newspaper and radical revolutionary perspective. However, it is not possible to generalize their admiration to the most notable Kemalist figures, Atatürk, İnönü, Bayar and Peker.

As indicated in the Introduction, since the French Revolution, it has been common to describe progressive, radical, and revolutionary political movements around the world as ‘Jacobin,’ both by their supporters and conservative opponents. With this broad and versatile meaning, it can also be used as an adjective to define Kemalism because it is correct that Kemalists shared a similar, if not the same, mindset with the contemporary classical-radical followers of the French Revolution’s ideals in Europe. However, if our primary concern is the real Jacobins, the members of the most notable political club of the French Revolution, the empirical examination of the Kemalist sources shows that they were a direct inspiration for only a few Kemalist elite members.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Emrah Gülsunar

Emrah Gülsunar received his BA from Middle East Technical University, MA from Ankara University, and PhD from Lund University in Sweden. He is still an affiliated researcher at Lund University’s Department of Economic History. His research is on revolutions in history, both political and economic, from a comparative perspective with a focus on Turkey and Europe. More specifically, he works on the French Revolution and British Industrial Revolution and their impacts and comparison to Ottoman-Turkish modernization.

Notes

1 Dann and Dinwiddy, Nationalism, 1–12.

2 The Jacobins were the members of the most influential political club during the French Revolution, which embraced radical left-wing politics, especially after 1791, and supported a republican regime depending on the unity of powers. They implemented authoritarian policies when they were in power, most famously state terror against the counter-revolutionaries, to achieve the democratic society in their minds in the future. For details, Furet, “Jacobinism,” 704–15.

3 Mardin, “Ideology and Religion,” 198.

4 Such as, Tunçay, Tek-Parti Yönetimi, 186; Parla, Siyasal Kültür II, 232; Mardin, Din ve Siyaset, 123 and 129.

5 Ahmad, Modern Turkey, 77; Tanör, Kuruluş Kurtuluş, 355–6; Timur, Türk Devrimi, 261–2; Also, Alaranta, Contemporary Kemalism, 37–8.

6 Some examples are Daldal, “1960 coup,” 76; Karaveli, “Kemalism,” 89; Celep, “Party Closures,” 388.

7 For example, in the studies elaborating on “Jacobin Kemalism” as the past opponent of current Erdoğan/AKP regime. Some examples are Ongur, “New Turkey”; Yılmaz and Berry, “Alevi Opening,” 7–8; Yavuz, “Turkish Secularism,” 4–7. In a recently edited book on “post-Kemalism”, the pro-civil society scholars and their use of “Jacobin” to define Kemalism are criticized. See, Aytürk and Esen, Post-Post-Kemalizm, 60–1 and 197–9.

8 For France, Spitzer, Blanqui, 14; for Britain, Brown, Modern Britain, 347–50.

9 Di Scala, Italy, 23–9; Fiszman, Poland, Chapter 1.

10 Lenin, Two Tactics, Chapter 6.

11 Webb, Jacobin projects; also, Timur, Türk Devrimi, 329.

12 For the perspective of conservative social theory on Jacobinism, İrem, “Kemalist Radikalizm,” 9–14.

13 For example, Kasaba, “Kemalist Certainties,” 24.

14 Din ve Siyaset, 172.

15 Some notable examples of this perspective are Aydın, “Revolutionary Ideology,” 69; Çolak, “Language Policy,” 82–6; Gülalp, “Secularization,” 363; Kuru, Secularism, 178–9; Taşpınar, “Turkish Model,” 59–60.

16 Webb, Jacobin projects; Mateescu, “Kemalism,” 226–8.

17 Mardin, “Ideology and Religion,” 198.

18 “Kemalist Radikalizm.”

19 Düzgün, “Turkish Revolution.”

20 Note that there is no mention of the French Revolution in the sources related to İnönü, Bayar, and CHP. Therefore, they are not discussed in the following parts of the study. However, I added them to Table 1 to demonstrate that the examined sources in the study are comprehensive enough to fully understand the Kemalist ideology.

21 I use the “Turkish Revolution” in the study to refer to the period of Turkish history from the start of the War of Independence (1919) to the death of Atatürk (1938). This definition is also more or less the same as the Kemalist ruling elites/intellectuals used in their speeches/writings.

22 These sources of both the Kemalist ruling elite figures and the intellectuals are the most notable ones. There can be mentions of the French Revolution in other Kemalist sources, but my assumption is that this would not change the main conclusions that I derive from these most notable sources.

23 See Kuckartz, Text Analysis, 35–36 for the methodological procedure I followed.

24 Söylev ve Demeçleri II, 275 and 315.

25 Söylev ve Demeçleri I, 230.

26 Kamalizm, 23.

27 Kemalizm İnkılabı, 98.

28 Atatürk İhtilali, 104–105.

29 Berkes, Secularism in Turkey, 359.

30 Mango, Atatürk, 44 and 51.

31 Georgeon, “Jön Türkler,” 184.

32 Yazışma ve Söyleşileri, 147–9.

33 Ibid., 150.

34 Yazışma ve Söyleşileri, 383.

35 Ibid; Also, Tekinalp, Kemalizm, 258.

36 Yazışma ve Söyleşileri, 383.

37 Aydemir, İnkılap ve Kadro, 121.

38 Türkeş, “Kadro Movement,” 95–97.

39 Kemalizm, 304–305.

40 Kemalizm İnkılabı I, 35–36.

41 Yazışma ve Söyleşileri, 147–149.

42 Turnaoğlu, Turkish Republicanism, 222 and 225.

43 Kamalizm, 22–23.

44 Atatürk İhtilali, 112.

45 Turnaoğlu, Turkish Republicanism, 222 and 228. However, it is important to note that anti-clerical references by the Kemalists in the context of the French Revolution were limited.

46 İnkılap Dersleri, 20 and 26.

47 Atatürk İhtilali, 102.

48 Tüfekçi, 223.

49 Doyle, French Revolution, 277–278.

50 Mardin, Din ve Siyaset, 69.

51 Tüfekçi, Atatürk’ün Okuduğu Kitaplar, 396.

52 Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri I, 231;

53 Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 109–111; Turnaoğlu, Turkish Republicanism, 224 and 228.

54 Özbudun, Constitutional System, 8. Turnaoğlu, Turkish Republicanism, 234–235.

55 Peker, İnkılap Dersleri, 26; Tekinalp, Kemalizm, 227; Engin, Kemalizm İnkılabı III, 116–117.

56 Kemalizm İnkılabı II, 5 and 64.

57 Yazışma ve Söyleşileri, 245–246 and 368–369.

58 Özbudun, Constitutional System, 8; Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 109–111.

59 Aydemir, Tek Adam III, 172;

60 Özbudun, 1924 Anayasası, 59–60.

61 Tanör, Anayasal, Gelişmeler, 224.

62 Devlet ve Fert, 37–38; Also, Shissler, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, 197–198.

63 McLaughlin, Radicalism, 69–71.

64 Hanioğlu, Young Turks, 80–81.

65 Zürcher, “Progressive Republican Party,” 2. Also, Duverger, Political Parties, 276–277.

66 Turan, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 117–140.

67 Söylev ve Demeçleri I, 230.

68 İnkılap Dersleri, 33.

69 Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı, 113.

70 Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 114–116; Timur, Türk Devrimi, 320

71 Söylev ve Demeçleri III, 120.

72 Ibid.

73 Cited by Parla, Siyasal Kültür II, 217.

74 İnkılap ve Kadro, 147–149.

75 İnkılap Dersleri, 21.

76 Kemalizm İnkılabı I, 34–35.

77 Ibid.

78 Ahmad, Modern Turkey, 62–63.

79 İnkılap ve Kadro, 149.

80 Kemalizm İnkılabı I, 36–37.

81 Atatürk İhtilali, 127.

82 Medeni Bilgiler, 65.

83 İnkılap Dersleri, 26–34.

84 Kemalizm, 107.

85 Zürcher, Turkey, 187.

86 In line with this tendency, the RPP ceased to participate in the French Radical Party’s international congresses after 1933, despite being invited until 1938. In his writing on the last congress as the RPP’s observer, Necmeddin Sadık (Sadak) stated how even the speakers in the congress admitted that the liberal principles that emerged from the French Revolution were in crisis in Europe. Turhan, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 130–1.

87 İnkılap Dersleri, 20.

88 Köker, Kemalizm, 170.

89 Aydemir, İnkılap ve Kadro, 232 and 241; Bozkurt, Atatürk İhtilali, 91; Engin, Kemalizm İnkılabı I, 35–6.

90 Aydemir, Tek Adam I, 270–1.

91 Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 113; Parla, Siyasal Kültür III, 304–305.

92 Spitzer, Blanqui, 90–1.

93 Tüfekçi, 100 and 158.

94 Jackson, “Russian Revolution,” 273–8; Lenin, Two Tactics, Chapter 6.

95 Kemalizm İnkılabı I, 15.

96 Aydemir, Tek Adam I, 12 and 67; Lewis, Modern Turkey, 482. However, Atatürk was highly discontent to be compared with Napoleon. See, Aydemir, Tek Adam III, 420 and 454; Parla, Siyasal Kültür II, 202, 217 and 234.

97 Modern Turkey, 482.

98 Kinross, Atatürk, 456.

99 Adıvar, Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı, 113; Timur, Türk Devrimi, 320.

100 Ahmad, Modern Turkey, 77; Mardin, “Ideology and Religion,” 198.

101 Aybars, İstiklal Mahkemeleri, 60–1 and 66–7.

102 Doyle, French Revolution, 236–7.

103 Aybars, İstiklal Mahkemeleri, 227–8.

104 Bora, Cereyanlar, 130.

105 Demirel, Birinci Meclis, 381–91; Tunçay, Tek-Parti Yönetimi, 39.

106 Doyle, French Revolution, 251–2.

107 Demirel, Birinci Meclis, 381; Tunçay, Tek-Parti Yönetimi, 39.

108 Babamın Arkadaşları, 163 and 166.

109 Uyar, “Bozkurt,” 215.

110 Bora, Cereyanlar, 158–9.

111 Atatürk İhtilali, 126.

112 Ibid.

113 Bora, Cereyanlar, 159.

114 Atatürk İhtilali, 67.

115 “Ideology and Religion,” 198.

116 Regarding this point, we can also mention a potential mediated impact of the French Revolution on the secularist policies of the Kemalist regime via the French Third Republic (1870–1940). Kubicek, “Republican People’s Party,” 110. It can be argued that the secularism of the Third Republic was mostly adopted from the principles of the French Revolution, and to the extent that the Kemalist regime was inspired by the practices of the Third Republic, it would mean that it was inspired by the French Revolution. However, this argument requires further empirical research.