The rhetorical face of enmity: the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the dehumanization of Armenians in the speeches of Ilham Aliyev

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the process of othering through the creation of the ‘enemy image’ in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Ilham Aliyev’s speeches delivered between 2016 and 2020. Based on narrative and discourse analysis of the speeches, this article demonstrates the main discursive practices used by Aliyev to dehumanize Armenians. These analyses uncover three main components: identification of Armenians as the sole menace for Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis, depiction of Armenians as non-human and barbaric in essence, and stressing the superiority of Azerbaijan to eliminate the threat emanating from Armenians. Limiting itself to a state-backed dominant narrative, this article also highlights the connection of the dehumanization process of Armenians with the power legitimation dynamics in Azerbaijan.

KEYWORDS:

• Armenia
• Azerbaijan
• dehumanization
• Nagorno-karabakh
• conflicts

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Given the overall situation over the internet and media freedom in Azerbaijan and the fact that the Azerbaijani Government controls these segments, Ilham Aliyev’s speeches are an essential source. At least two critical segments are under the Government’s total control – media and education. These sectors are crucial to spreading ideas and educating citizens with particular ideologies and worldviews where Azerbaijanis will see Armenians in a concrete light. In the case of media, Azerbaijan is ranked among the not-free countries. In the most recent RSF index, Azerbaijan ranked 154th out of 180 countries (‘Index | RSF’|‘Index | RSF’ 2022). On February 8th, 2022, Azerbaijan’s parliament approved a bill legalizing censorship and trampling press freedom. As Tony Wesolowsky (2022) from Radio Free Europe states, ‘Journalists hounded and harassed to the point where many have fled the country. Independent or opposition media shuttered or blocked online.’ With this new law, both owners of media operating in Azerbaijan and journalists have to register with the authorities and follow many new rules, including one on the ‘objective’ interpretation of facts and events. Thus, the Government would evaluate the objectiveness, which is thinly veiled censorship.

Even larger sphere through which the worldview of Azerbaijanis is formed is education which is also wholly engaged in duplicating and reproducing ideas spread or backed by Aliyev’s Government. From the school textbooks to whole academic departments are engaged in this process. The textbooks duplicate the narratives that Aliyev’s elaborates in his speeches, where Armenians are dehumanized, and the role of father Aliyev is highly stressed. Furthermore, a separate department called ‘Aliyevshunasliq’ (can be translated as ‘Aliyevology’) was established to study the life of Heydar Aliyev (Broers and Mahmudlu 2022). By controlling these vital spheres, Aliyev creates an environment where only ideas backed by him can exist. In this sense, his speeches become a significant source for studying the whole process of dehumanization of Armenians.

2. This agreement establishes a ceasefire between the warring parties. The agreement was signed respectively by M. Mamedov in Baku on 9 May 1994, S. Sargsyan in Yerevan on 10 May 1994, and S. Babayan in Stepanakert on 11 May 1994. https://www.peaceagreements.org/generateAgreementPDF/990.

3. The question of genocide is central in many questions related to the Armenian-Turkic antagonism. The Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire as well as its memory play a role in the Karabakh conflict as well. As noticed by Vicken Cheterian (2018; Cheterian 2015, 279–97), the literature of the conflict contextualizes it mainly within the Soviet legacy. As the author argues (Cheterian 2018), the suppressed trauma of the Armenian genocide is ‘present in the mass psychology of the conflicting parties.’ Since 1960s, the discourse over the Armenian Genocide has been increasing in the political discourse of Armenia. At the same time, as Cheterian states, Azerbaijan ‘has developed its own state-sponsored discourse of genocide, vehemently denying that the [Armenian] genocide took place while portraying Azerbaijan as a victim of genocide itself․’.

4. Muslims break their Ramadan fast with a meal known as iftar. In many cases, this is accompanied with readings from the Qur’an. From country to country the ways of celebration and meal differ (Fieldhouse 2017, 287–88).

5. Azerbaijan has a predominantly Islamic population and the rope of Islam has been growing after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Ter-Matevosyan and Minasyan 2017).

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by the Science Committee MESCS RA [21AG-6A081] and Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

Notes on contributors

Naira Sahakyan

Dr Naira Sahakyan earned her PhD from the University of Amsterdam. Currently, she is a senior researcher at the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute and a lecturer at the American University of Armenia and Yerevan State Universities. She is the author of Muslim Reformers and the Bolsheviks: The Case of Daghestan (Routledge, 2022). Dr Sahakyan authored articles in the peer-reviewed journals including Caucasus Survey and Revolutionary Russia.