The unintended consequences of the EU’s engagement in contested states: the case of Cyprus

ABSTRACT

The academic scrutiny of the EU’s engagement in contested states focuses predominantly on purposeful aims disregarding collateral outcomes that still occur despite the EU’s desire or willingness to pursue them. Aimed at unfolding a whole new layer of latent dependencies, this research draws on the concept of unintended consequences in order to address the ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ of such outcomes on the EU’s external action in contested states. In particular, taking stock of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ contested statehood, this article exhibits unintended and/or unexpected outcomes with significant reverberations on the EU’s broader engagement in Cyprus. Largely, it is argued that the EU membership of the RoC institutionalized asymmetry of power, thus reinforcing partition. In turn, that nurtured a grim consequence for the EU and its aspiration to utilize EU prospect as a catalyst for reunification.

KEYWORDS:

• Unintended consequences
• contested statehood
• europeanization
• De-europeanization
• cyprus

Introduction

While the descent of the international community into the Cold War era resulted in extreme inter-state competition, at the same time, a shift in the expression and articulation of self-determination occurred. Protectorates, satellite states, colonized agents, and ethnic groups aspired to rescind the narrow sovereign formula that had suppressed them for years, seeking emancipation. Over time, separatist entities (e.g., Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria), stateless groups (e.g., Kurdistan, Chechnya), old (e.g., Palestine) and new (e.g., Kosovo, ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)’ statehood petitioners have proclaimed independence in their strive to assert sovereignty, obtain statehood legitimacy and achieve international recognition.

The analyses of the European Union’s (EU) engagement in these contested states have largely focused on what is purposefully pursued, overlooking a large portion of unintended consequences and outcomes that still occur despite the EU’s desire to actually pursue them. Motivated to provide an in-depth examination of this phenomenon, this article explores the unintended consequences of the EU’s engagement in Cyprus (and the ‘TRNC’) by unpacking consequences that reside outside the boundaries of the EU’s intended aspiration. Going beyond conventional theorizing, it combines literatures on contested statehood and unintended consequences, seeking to analyse the EU’s engagement irrespective of intended impact, effect and/or effectiveness. Rather, the focus is placed on unintended elements and outcomes that occur regardless of the desire of the EU to see them emerging and which have significant reverberations on its overall engagement in contested states. Drawing on Burlyuk’s (2017) framework, this article addresses the ‘what,’ ‘why’ and ‘how’ dimensions of unintended consequences that delineate the type, reason and mode of management of those events by the EU, all viewed within the ambit of contested statehood that allows or at times enables their emergence.

The concept of unintended consequences has frequently been employed in the broader context of EU studies. EU internal (Murphy 2013) and external policies (Stevens 2006), democratization (Dandashly and Noutcheva 2019), state-building (Daase and Friesendorf 2010), foreign policy analysis (Casier 2019) and negotiations with third states are some of the most notable examples. However, the utilization of unintended consequences vis-à-vis contested statehood is a scarcely employed combination in the literature, with only a few examples (Bouris 2019).

Seeking to expand the epistemological angle of the discussion around the EU’s role in contested states, this research uses ‘TRNC,’ a heavily side-lined – by the majority of the international system – contested state¹ as a case study. Although literature has extensively examined the Europeanization of Cyprus (Ker-Lindsay 2005, 2007; Diez and Tocci 2010; Kyris 2012c, 2012a, 2013, 2015) and the effect of contested statehood on it (Kyris 2012b, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2020; Ker-Lindsay 2015; Bouris and Kyris 2017) existing research has only accounted for purposefully pursued policy aims, exclusively assessed through the lens of effectiveness or degree of success (Börzel 2011). The employment of effect-centered frameworks can hardly see beyond the EU’s premeditative aspiration, thus ignoring a whole layer of outcomes, consequences, and realities that emerge unintendedly.

To capture how these inadvertent outcomes come to be, this article brings forward the concept of unintended consequences in order to reveal significant unintended interdependencies that have gone unnoticed for years. The ‘TRNC’ is the most fertile ground for such analysis as the unaltered EU discourse in Cyprus is erroneously perceived as a stagnating indicator with minimal and liminal outcomes. In contrast, unintended consequences will hereby provide a new conceptual perspective according to which unchanged policies are not viewed as a constant wall of non-interaction (Brusset et al. 2016) but as disguised ‘interconnections, non-linearities, multi-dimensionalities and unpredictabilities’ (Koch and Verholt 2020, 509) with remarkable impact. Thus, seeing ‘TRNC’ through the lens of unintended consequences helps at unearthing collateral outcomes on a ground that despite looking static, produces a great number of unconventional developments – of major significance – that mainstream literature has disregarded throughout the years.

The contribution to the literature lies in elevating the importance of unintended consequences as a key blueprint for the analysis of the EU’s engagement in contested states. Unlike a big portion of the literature assessing the EU’s engagement through binary ‘impact – no impact’ perspectives (Sasse 2008), this article adopts a conceptual framework that could reveal a remarkable amount of influence that has gone unnoticed. In particular, it presents disregarded elements that go beyond the intent of the pursuing actor but end up being as important and decisive in shaping domestic dynamics and realities as those intended in the first place. Overall, it paves the way for the entire perusal of the EU’s external action going beyond the radius of purposefully sought goals, focusing rather on what occurs beyond intended aims and actions, which are often entirely disassociated from stipulated policy objectives and organized aspirations.

Methodologically, the article draws on a number of semi-structured interviews (Kitchin and Tate 2000) conducted in 2022 and 2023 via Zoom with Greek, Turkish, Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot and EU officials, all of whom were granted anonymity. The author used advanced digital spreadsheets to sort, group and triangulate empirical findings, minimizing the possibility of error or duplication. Open-ended questions enabled a fluid and more comfortable discussion. At times, questions were adjusted according to the capacity, experience and expertise of the interviewees – as required by the methodology of such interviews (Valentine 1997). This allowed for stronger engagement and drove interaction into a fruitful interplay as is often the case when semi-structured interviewing principles are applied (Longhurst 2003). The collected empirics have been an essential source of information as they provided unprocessed material and personal takes of policymakers, experts, academics, top officials and executives regarding the dynamics between RoC and Turkish Cypriots as well as the unintended consequences of the EU’s engagement in Cyprus. In practice, these materials, in conjunction with other primary and secondary sources (official communications, policy papers, reports), were used by the author to triangulate information and verify or refute certain assumptions stemming from the theoretical reading. Moreover, the empirics are structured around the parameters of the conceptual framework (‘what,’ ‘why’ and ‘how’ dimensions), which enables their operationalization through the synthesis of theoretical and empirical knowledge. One of the limitations the author faced was the lack of direct personal contact, but this was successfully mitigated as the interview was unfolding and the interviewees started feeling more comfortable.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section provides the contextual and conceptual background of this research by discussing important, for this study, themes, namely contested statehood, (De-)Europeanisation and unintended consequences. The third section presents the empirical analysis which is structured around the three dimensions of the conceptual framework and outlines the major unintended consequences which have challenged the EU’s engagement in Cyprus over the years. Finally, a conclusion where all arguments are set in the broader context wraps up the whole discussion.

Contested statehood, (De-)Europeanization, and unintended consequences

Contested states are largely perceived as agents residing outside the conventional logic and framework of sovereignty (Mandaville 1999), with unwarranted international stature, relative legal status and diverse internal composition (Kurtulus 2005). Their strive and survive tactics have drawn scholarly attention and resulted in academic enquiries focused on emergence, practices, and endurance (Geldenhuys 2009), diplomatic, social and economic characteristics (Caspersen 2009), political systems (Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2008), the way they pursue international recognition (Visoka 2022) and the reaction of the international community to their statehood aspirations (Ker-Lindsay 2012).

The growing interest in contested states encouraged scholars of European studies to examine contested statehood vis-à-vis Europeanization. The latter started as a concept to explain the impact of European integration on EU member states (Börzel 1999; Töller 2010), but throughout the years, it was also used to explain the impact of the EU toward its ‘near abroad’ (Lavenex and Uçarer 2004; Schimmelfennig 2015). That development shifted the focus of academic work from sovereign state actors (Sedelmeier 2011) to the role of Europeanization in highly conflicting environments (Kyris 2016; Bouris and Kyris 2017; Bouris and Papadimitriou 2020), the EU’s engagement in conflict resolution (Coppieters et al. 2004), EU state-building incentives in view of unrecognized statehood (Turner 2011; Bouris 2014), the role of the EU in recognition quests (Kyris 2015), the mode of management toward contested states (Ker-Lindsay 2018) and practices around a contested state that the EU does not recognize (Ker-Lindsay 2015).

However, the peculiar sovereign formula of contested states has often divided and, at times, fragmented the EU’s role and engagement on the ground. Both division and fragmentation derive from the different takes of the EU Member States on contested statehood, which has often led to alteration of the EU’s policy course in the face of dilemmas related to recognition and engagement. In order to overcome these divides, the EU labored toward a policy that would allow for the promotion of the European acquis (Radaelli 2000) without necessarily taking a stance over the legitimacy of those entities’ apparatuses. Widely used in the eastern faction of EU’s neighborhood (Harzl 2018), in Africa (Berg and Pegg 2018), in Asia (Cooley and Mitchell 2010;) and elsewhere, that formula comprises an ‘engagement without recognition’ (Ker-Lindsay 2015; Kyris 2018) policy manifestation which keeps the discourse recognition-free yet carves out a number of openings through which contested states can cooperate with the EU (most of times through their civil society). The formula is an essential asset as it constitutes the means through which EU financial and political support is promoted to states the EU does not recognize (Ker-Lindsay and Berg 2018). Also, it is a tool that enables cooperation and helps the EU navigate its diplomatic efforts while postponing formal commitments or tough recognition-related decisions for another day (Sebastian 2022).

Albeit the ‘engagement without recognition’ formula circumvents national foreign policy sensitivities and has untangled the EU’s external action from deadlocks or intra-EU conflicting views, there is a ceiling on how far can this type of investment reach. The by default constraining nature of that formula leaves plenty of space for engagement with other major international actors. Free of political entanglements and with the ability to present more attractive prospects, they often antagonize the EU in contested states as, for instance, Russia has done in Palestine (Bijan 2020) and/or the United States in Kosovo (Marleku, Gashi and Krasniqi 2017). This competition can – but not always – lead to increasing disengagement of contested states from EU-induced goals driven by the willingness of the former to explore partnerships that can better fulfill their aspiration for international recognition, legitimacy and visibility. The gradual depreciation of Europeanization’s relevance and normative value is what Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber (2016) described as ‘de-Europeanisation.’ The literature on de-Europeanization has mostly been employed in themes addressing the structural domesticities of the EU’s external action (Muller, Pomorska and Tonra 2021), a critical assessment of Europeanization’s constituent elements (Kaliber 2013), EU foreign policy (Smith 2021) and intergovernmental patterns (Thomas 2021), policies of the UK in the aftermath of Brexit (Copeland 2016), EU engagement in crises (Rosamond 2019), democratization discourses (Cebeci 2016), Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans (Alpan and Öztürk 2022), and migration affairs (Kaya 2021).

Now, the Europeanization and de-Europeanization typologies present a common denominator. Both inquire about the impact of EU policies, measuring the effect and influence of the EU’s engagement abroad. These effect-oriented outlooks often tend to ignore the occurrence of unintended consequences that dwell outside of the EU’s predefined course of action. Existing viewpoints stretch as far as what has been intended and purposefully pursued by the EU, overlooking the occurrence of unintended outcomes that turn out to be equally important for the EU’s engagement in contested states. Aimed at widening this epistemology, this study employs the concept of unintended consequences in order to unfold a whole new layer of interdependencies and fragmentations that have remained unaccounted for over the years, among which is the de-Europeanization of contested states.

Only recently has the concept of unintended consequences featured in the study of the EU’s external action (Burlyuk and Noutcheva 2019), EU state-building initiatives (Bouris 2019), international security governance (Daase and Friesendorf 2010), EU democracy assistance and support (Dandashly and Noutcheva 2019), domestic institutional change in the EU’s neighborhood (Börzel and Pamuk 2020), inter-regionalism (Lopez-Lucia and Mattheis 2020) and EU external migration (Reslow 2019). Growing scholarly interest has resulted in the employment of the concept in the broader EU literature and in themes such as EU integration (Pierson 1996), EU gender development policies (Allwood et al. 2013), institutional competence of EU bodies (Dimitrakopoulos 2001), the EU banking sector (Murphy 2013) and economic partnerships (Stevens 2006). The framework of unintended consequences is hereby clustered into three dimensions: the ‘what’ (type), ‘why’ (reason) and ‘how’(management) dimensions of unintended consequences, seeking to (i) enable accurate transposition of the concept into this study and (ii) orderly present the whole lifecycle of an unintended consequence from its very emergence to the way actors remedy their impact.

The first parameter is what Burlyuk defines as ‘modes of knowledgeability’ (Burlyuk 2017, 1022). In essence, this connotes the ‘what’ of unintended consequences and refers to the level of awareness and degree of knowledge of an actor as regards the probability and eventual occurrence of an event. The knowledgeability lever is imbued with the elements of anticipation and foresight, which in turn determine whether an actor expected and/or anticipated an outcome. For instance, when an actor foresees the potential emergence of an outcome but fails to predict its actual occurrence, that classifies it as an anticipated but unexpected unintended consequence. Conversely, when an actor predicts the occurrence of an unintended outcome but downplays or underestimates its actuality, it is earmarked as expected but unanticipated. That said, the range of unintended consequences can vastly oscillate between anticipated and unanticipated and between expected and unexpected.

The reason for their occurrence establishes the ‘why’ dimension. Emerging as the result of policies (Bouris 2019; Dandashly and Noutcheva 2019) or devices steering policies (De Ville and Gheyle 2019) that can produce unwitting outcomes themselves (Burlyuk 2017), unintended consequences are often results of obsession with norms and principles, erroneous assumptions, bureaucratic and purely technical outlooks or biased projections (Burlyuk and Noutcheva 2019). Similarly, weak risk analysis and forecasting, misreading of the underlying regional and/or societal trends, misdiagnosis of the external environment, recontextualized policy discourses or reprioritized policy priorities are some of the underlying reasons that explain their emergence. However, unintended consequences should not be exclusively viewed as products of ignorance or underestimation (Klitgaard 1997). Often, certain are allowed to occur either as calculated risks or as least negative outcomes (De Ville and Gheyle 2019), which make executive officials proceed with their course of action despite its occurrence prior (De Zwart 2015; Reslow 2019).

The management of unintended consequences comprises the ‘how’ dimension, where the value (desirable or undesirable) versus the initial intent denotes whether an unintended consequence frustrates or reinforces an actor’s intention (Burlyuk and Noutcheva 2019). Based on that relationship, it is construed whether, how and why actors decide to either tolerate or assertively counter unintended consequences (Burlyuk 2017). For instance, if the value is undesirable and frustrates the initial intention of an actor, yet the issue remains low on their list of priorities, efforts for compensation might be mild without a willingness to engage further. Conversely, if the intent is highly frustrated by an unintended effect and the matter at hand is a top priority, assertive follow-up efforts might be employed to remedy unintended consequences. This demonstrates selectivity over what needs to be mitigated and what does not, which ultimately reflects that decisions are often taken based on cost-effective analyses imbued with political deliberations (Gutner and Thompson 2010).

The employment of that triple dimension (what, why, how) attempts to expand the epistemological width of literature and research as regards the EU’s external action in contested states. Going beyond what mainstream literature accounts for, this article aims to capture a pluriverse of unintended outcomes that have been neglected for a very long time. By doing so, the epistemological angle and margins of research get enlarged, discovering new features and elements that are crucial yet entirely disassociated from the EU’s deliberate intent and policies.

The unintended consequences of the EU’s engagement in Cyprus

In 1973, thirteen years after the end of British colonial rule, Cyprus signed an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (ECC). The establishment of a customs union to the benefit of the entire Cypriot population (European Community 1973) failed to overcome domestic suspicion and wariness. Soon after independence, issues related to representation and internal governance stoked tensions between the two communities (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots), leading to inter-communal violent incidents (Ker-Lindsay 2009). The 1974 attempt at annexation by Greece ultimately prompted a military intervention by Turkey, which edged the island into de facto partition and territorial fragmentation that has remained ever since (Yılmaz 2010).

In essence, the island was torn in half. The Greek Cypriot community largely concentrated in the southern part, assuming the already existing international legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) (Kyris 2012a), whereas Turkish Cypriots settled in the North, developing their own state-like structures. Unlike Greek Cypriots, the leverage of the Turkish Cypriot community was marginal, as it was largely deprived of any international standing, official stature, or statehood. The desire to achieve a breakthrough led to a unilateral proclamation of independence of what is euphemistically known nowadays as the ‘TRNC.’ The act was perceived as secession and was met with heavy criticism, as reflected in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR 541/1983 and 550/1984). ‘TRNC’s unilateral declaration ushered in a long journey of mistrust for the two communities that has been replete with failed reconciliations, political backlashes (on either side), external interference and patronage, consolidating a deep-rooted, identity-based adversarial impasse (Fisher 2001).

Before proceeding with empirics, two important clarifications need to be made. Being unable to capture the entire Europeanization of Cyprus in a single article, the focus has been placed solely on two events. The rare window of opportunity that emerged in the 1999–2004 period – leading eventually to the EU membership of the RoC in 2004- and a narrower one dating back to the UN-led talks in 2016 and 2017. It is nonetheless acknowledged that numerous important developments occurred in between. Secondly, although Cyprus’ Europeanization and the ‘TRNC’s statehood contestation predate EU membership, the research picks up the thread from the early 2000s. That is justified by the fact that (i) EU path and membership Europeanized the conflict – what was previously a UN matter, remotely addressed at the European level (EEC), became a full-fledged European issue in 2004, and (ii) EU membership institutionalized the status disparity between the RoC and ‘TRNC,’ underlined it with bold letters and ascribed uneven prospects and opportunities based on that very condition.

Unintended consequence: reinforcement of partition

The ‘what’ dimension: emboldening domestic asymmetry of power through an imbalanced and fragmented membership

Following Cyprus’ endorsement for EU membership (European Council 1994, 1997), President Clerides extended an invitation to the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş for the upcoming EU accession negotiations. The refusal of the latter underpinned his fervent opposition to EU accession as membership contravened his confederative vision, would jeopardize the status of Turkish Cypriots and demote the role of Turkey in Cyprus (Dogan 2001). Unlike Denktaş, President Clerides’ strived for a unitary solution which, in the critical period of 1997–2004, strengthened the Greek Cypriot leverage. Clerides’ readiness to sign the Annan Plan – a UN reunification blueprint for a mutually endorsed governance model in Cyprus (Richmond and James 2001) – cemented by the Greek veto on enlargement should Cyprus was not part of the group of acceding states, made the EU conclude that ‘the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition’ (European Council 1999). In Copenhagen (Council of the EU 2003), Greece’s reaffirmation to torpedo enlargement unless Cyprus accedes to the EU confirmed what was stipulated in Helsinki some years prior: Cyprus will be admitted to the EU regardless of the progress on reconciliation. The decoupling of the European prospect from reunification hardly influenced the attitude of the Turkish Cypriot leader who stormed out from the UN negotiations in 2000 and exhibited unwavering reluctance to submit the Annan plan to a public vote in 2003, causing havoc in both instances (United Nations Security Council 2003). At that time, Dentkaş offered a giant favor to President-elect Papadopoulos as his vocal disapproval of the settlement halted the peace process and made him appear as the sole responsible for the collapse of negotiations. Against this backdrop, President Papadopoulos signed the EU’s Treaty of Accession in 2003.

With the official accession date being sealed, a marathon of diplomatic bargaining got underway. The EU urged both sides to support the UN proposal so that Cyprus would enter the EU as a unified state (European Council 2003). However, a great number of things changed between the first and the final version of the Annan Plan, which was eventually put to a public vote. With the RoC already a member of the Union, the Greek Cypriot motivation for reconciliation was scant, as confirmed by the televised plea of President Papadopoulos for an ‘oxi’ (‘no’) vote. In contrast, despite the ‘hayır’ (‘no’) campaign promoted by Denktaş, a pro-EU surge occurred in the Turkish Cypriot camp. What amounted to 75% of right-wing votes (Eroğlu and Denktaş combined) in 2000 was, only four years later, transformed into an overwhelming vote of confidence in EU membership, as validated by the verdict of the Turkish Cypriots in the ballot box. On 24 April 2004, Cypriots cast their vote over the prospect of a unified Cyprus that would accede to the European Union as a single state. While Turkish Cypriots ruled in favor, the Greek Cypriots voted overwhelmingly against it. The RoC acceded to the EU while Cyprus was still divided on 1 May 2004. These inauspicious circumstances (Nugent 2006) left many wondering: would the EU membership – in the form and shape that eventually emerged – be a blessing or a curse for Cyprus (Yesilada and Sozen 2002)?

The desire to see a unified Cyprus as a member of the EU was reflected in the idea of putting forward a single membership for the whole island despite the absence of a solution. Indeed, the EU accession treaty referred to Cyprus as a geographical whole (European Union 2003), with the caveat of temporary suspension of the European acquis in the North (Article 1 of the Protocol of the Accession Treaty) until the reaching of an agreement. The intent and aspiration of the EU was to use membership as an enabler and framework to help steer toward reunification in the long term (European Commission 2004). However, the single membership and its nuanced validity toward only a certain part of the Turkish Cypriot citizenry not only failed to pave the way for reconciliation, but also reinforced partition, which was an expected but unanticipated unintended consequence for the EU.

The EU membership offered the RoC a far superior role in domestic politics, institutionalizing the already existing asymmetry of power between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In the post-2004 era, the RoC was in the position to regulate the Europeanization of the Turkish Cypriots by arbitrarily switching the EU financial aid allotted for that purpose on and off, leaving Turkish Cypriots vulnerable to Greek Cypriot political deliberations. The multiple rounds of negotiations with the RoC in the meetings of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) before and after the launch of financial assistance and the curtailing of that assistance at times shows that Greek Cypriots often utilized membership as a lever to pressure against Turkish Cypriot economic aspirations (Interviewee 2). Making the most out of that asymmetric distribution of benefits, RoC attempted to Europeanize the Cypriot issue in all of its dimensions, placing it at the center of EU-Turkey bilateral relations. Transposing an existential issue (for its national security) to a friendly multilateral forum where the RoC had leverage, power and say was a safe way and optimal political and diplomatic corridor to address security concerns and achieve favorable concessions.

Furthermore, capitalizing on the reluctance of the EU to deal directly with the ‘TRNC’ due to lack of recognition, the RoC used its upgraded status to preserve the status quo, securing a monopoly on international legitimacy, recognized authority and statehood in Cyprus (Interviewee 5). Before and after EU membership, the use of quotation marks when referring to the ‘TRNC,’ the altering of titles and official capacities of ‘TRNC’ executives when meeting with European delegations, the selection of neutral meeting venues (Ker-Lindsay 2015), the streamlining of cooperation between the EU and the ‘TRNC’ through the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce instead of the Ministry of Trade (Kyris 2012a) and the outsourcing of EU services through national subsidiaries or third parties (Interviewee 2) illustrate the reluctance of Greek Cypriots to move an inch away from consolidated dynamics, their strive to avoid unwanted implied recognition and maintain the political and economic edge that EU membership ascribed to the RoC.

The EU expected that the membership would ascribe disproportionate leverage to Greek Cypriots, who in turn would not hesitate to instrumentalize it to shield their own foreign policy priorities. Signs prior to, during, and after RoC’s EU membership validate this claim. Namely, Papadopoulos’ U-turn on the Annan Plan after securing the membership and the RoC’s decision to bring the import of goods by Turkish Cypriot producers before the European Court of Justice (Talmon 2001) were suggestive of the Greek Cypriot intentions to maintain the monopoly of legitimate authority in the island. Similarly, the procedural deliberations during the introduction of the Green Line Regulation (GLR) (Council of the EU 2004) – as the GLR was adopted shortly prior to RoC’s official accession so the Greek Cypriots will not have the possibility to potentially block it – confirm that the EU was mindful about the sheer determination of Greek Cypriots to defend their membership-induced prerogatives. What is more, the blocking of the Direct Trade Regulation with Turkish Cypriots (European Commission 2004) once RoC was already a member of the EU confirms that the Greek Cypriots would preserve their upgraded status at any cost and would not consent to any initiative that implies change in domestic dynamics.

While the EU expected that the RoC might instrumentalize the EU-induced leverage to achieve its own national objectives, it did not anticipate the extended fragmentation that EU membership brought forward in social terms. The uneven Europeanization nurtured a profound fragmentation by recognizing some Turkish Cypriots as EU citizens in an unorthodox way and without a political solution in place. The distinction of the Turkish Cypriot community between those entitled to EU citizenship (proof of residence prior to partition) and those who were ineligible (either migrated to the island post-partition or failed to provide evidence) created a two-speed society. Turkish Cypriots found themselves in between borders and conflicting narratives (Interviewee 6). On the one hand, the EU’s narrative viewed them as a remote component of a federal-to-be Cyprus with a single borderline, citizenship and international standing, while on the other hand, the reality was that Turkish Cypriots were an actual component and part of the ‘TRNC’s collective. By extension, the EU-induced fragmentation repercussed the critical issue of citizenship, which, being a national competence (according to EU law), further empowered Nicosia as the competent authority to assess eligibility. That said, Turkish Cypriots of mixed families (Turkish and Turkish Cypriots) are not entitled to EU membership, although children of mixed marriages when one of the parents is a Greek Cypriot are entitled to EU membership instantly (Interviewee 1). That derogation ran against the EU’s intent of bringing the two communities closer, streamlining gains for all Cypriots (Tank 2002). What is more, it has put many left-out Turkish Cypriots in limbo, whereas it has made citizenship rights contingent on the course of bilateral political developments and progress for many (Interviewee 9).

These developments went against the EU’s aspiration to prepare Turkish Cypriots for the acquis and share -in fair proportion- the benefits of EU membership. Instead, it ascribed disproportionate leverage to the RoC without any trace of accountability (toward the Turkish Cypriots), imposed certain realities in Cyprus and in tandem with the strong Turkish military presence – posing an existential threat to the Greek Cypriots – emboldened the already existing partition.

The ‘why’ dimension: misdiagnosis of underlying dynamics

The reinforcement of partition was fundamentally premised on the erroneous conviction of the EU to proceed with the RoC’s membership while reunification had not been – beforehand - achieved. Aimed at disentangling RoC’s (under Clerides) European prospect from Denktaş’s intransigence, the EU made several steps forward without anticipating that unconditional support to RoC might create hardly re-negotiable conditions in such tumultuous dynamics. The misjudgment of the Greek Cypriot temper and intention, which was laying behind the compromising and considerate façade of President Clerides, exposed the weak foresight of the EU (Dodd 2010). The latter understood the inherent challenges EU membership brings forward only after RoC’s complacency (having achieved the coveted EU membership under Papadopoulos) and the Turkish Cypriot shift to a pro-Annan stance with Prime Minister Talat in 2003. Brussels overplayed the role that political and financial incentives play in resolving territorial contentions, erroneously equating Cyprus to the acceding Eastern European states. Nevertheless, by then, it was too late for them to retreat or disengage (Yiangou 2002).

In an attempt to remedy that primary miscalculation – which, to a great extent, should also be attributed to the probability of Greek veto on the 2004 enlargement – the EU designated membership as a catalyst for reunification in an ad hoc fashion (Yiangou 2002; Kaymak 2006). The recontextualization of the EU’s agenda from a ‘reunification for membership’ to ‘membership for reunification’ policy constituted a maneuver to rectify prior misdiagnosis, which nonetheless inherited major geopolitical, economic and decision-making challenges to the EU (Zervakis 2004).

Now, the wishful assumption that the RoC’s membership would steer inter-communal cooperation and pave the way for a future settlement in favor of both communities was a naive misconception as long as the EU was aware before, during and after RoC’s accession about the intentions of the Greek Cypriots as regards EU membership. The flawed risk analysis that the latter would enable an inter-communal positive spillover downplayed Greek Cypriot political deliberations for using membership to attain their own foreign policy aspirations. The overestimation of the RoC’s good faith and willingness to treat Turkish Cypriots equally as the offering of the EU was – by default – uneven and disproportionate proved to be a major miscalculation of the domestic dynamics. The EU failed to see the deep-rooted adversity between the two communities, and when it did, it was rather too late, as disparity had by then been institutionalized and entrenched into a formal membership.

On the societal strand, the social dichotomy of the Turkish Cypriot community had been a product of the EU’s failure to comprehend their need for collective self-identification as a whole society (Interviewee 1). The distinction of Turkish Cypriot citizens and the assignment of different civil statuses demonstrated the inability of the EU to grasp the identity-related issues that this dispute is imbued with. The EU-imposed reality went against the day-to-day real-life situation, creating social dichotomy and, in the long term, eroding the social fabric of the already vastly diverse Turkish Cypriot society. Paradoxically, the unanticipated dynamics that EU membership generated made living in the ‘TRNC’ more bearable (Interviewee 7). ‘TRNC’s authorities were off the hook as the little leverage the ‘TRNC’ government had relieved them of the task of delivering for the Turkish Cypriot citizens in the here and now. That said, the fragmented assignment of EU citizenship did not really weaken the ‘TRNC’ but rather strengthened its positioning, legitimizing a stagnating regime and making it more relevant to Turkish Cypriots and, in particular, those who remained invisible to the EU for years.

The ‘how’ dimension: mild, recognition-free, civil-oriented measures to rectify domestic imbalance

The instrumentalization of EU membership by the RoC seemed to be an unfortunate development that frustrated the EU’s initial aspiration, at least on paper. However, the meager effect in the short and medium term, coupled with legal (the RoC’s EU status) and political complexities (‘TRNC’s lack of recognition), forced the EU to tolerate its occurrence as the price it had to pay was by then insignificant (Interviewee 5). Similarly, the unanticipated social dichotomy of Turkish Cypriot society was low on the agenda of the EU, as the extension of citizenship rights to those residing in Cyprus prior to partition seemed to sufficiently cover the EU’s objectives (Interviewee 7). Under these circumstances, and within the policy framework of engagement without recognition, the EU proceeded with a set of recognition-free measures that did not really address the situation assertively but rather ensured communication channels with the Turkish Cypriots were kept open, without stepping beyond the demarcated boundaries of engagement.

In view of facilitating the mobility of Turkish Cypriots and providing more opportunities for cross-cultural cooperation, a series of civil-oriented measures and policy instruments were designed. The most prominent examples of this are the Green Line Regulation (Council of the EU 2004), that regulates the movement of goods and people from the North to the South, and the Financial Aid regulation (Council of the EU 2006) that provides financial and technical assistance to Turkish Cypriots facilitates their preparation for the implementation of EU law (Kyris 2020) and prevents a fall back of Turkish Cypriots vis-à-vis Greek Cypriots.² Furthermore, the EU has established, inter alia, an EU Programme support office in Nicosia, sub-leased through the German Development Agency to avoid any direct engagement or recognition by implication, as well as a series of scholarships for Turkish Cypriots students, which are offered through the British Council for the very same purpose since 2007 (Interviewees 6).

The EU’s measures reflect its attempt to balance out the disproportionate leverage of the RoC and keep a solid means of contact with the Turkish Cypriots seemed to bring up some positives for the Turkish Cypriot community. The interaction with the EU became more frequent while many more funds were funneled through. Although these measures seemed to rectify some imbalance, they nonetheless did not reach the levels Turkish Cypriots or the EU wished for, leaving the RoC in the clear and, thus, nurturing a grim consequence for the EU which was about to gradually develop and unfold in the near future.

Unintended consequence: De-Europeanization of Turkish cypriots

The ‘what’ dimension: the fading value of the EU’s offering

The defeat of the outgoing incumbent Eroğlu and the election of the pro-reunification candidate Mustafa Akıncı in 2015 revived hopes for a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus. The prospect of a – long overdue – solution enthused the Cypriot public as the two leaders (Akıncı and Anastasiades) toured together in Nicosia, raising the bar of expectations to an all-time high. The promising environment culminated in three high-level UN summits in Mont Pelerin (2016), Geneva and Crans-Montana (2017). Soon, though, conflicting views on territorial adjustments crumbled the fervor. In Mont Pelerin, Akıncı insisted that territorial reconfigurations shall be approached in conjunction with security guarantees, whereas President Anastasiades denied any connection between the two while negotiations veered off course (Antoniades 2017).

In January 2017, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot delegations met in Geneva. Greece and Turkey monopolized negotiations by unraveling a blame-game against one another. Both Anastasiades and Akıncı retracted, being unable to wean off their guarantors’ stagnating argumentative thread (Morelli 2012). Conflicting narratives and views on the issues of security and guarantees led to yet another deadlock. The two sides agreed to reconvene in Crans-Montana, what was widely perceived as the last opportunity for an agreement for Cyprus.

At Crans-Montana, President Anastasiades seemed reluctant to agree upon a comprehensive solution. The upcoming re-election vote and domestic criticism for succumbing to the overwhelming Turkish Cypriot demands compelled him to re-examine his approach. Shortly before the conference, he discarded the roadmap of the UN Special Adviser Eide (United Nations archive 2017) over controversy over security provisions. Also, he left the negotiation room even when Turkey adopted a more lenient approach towards territorial accommodations (Drousiotis 2021). The ‘Guterres framework’ aimed to revamp discussions and provide a stimulus to both sides. Nevertheless, diverging views on the presence of Turkish troops on the island, the irreconcilable issue of the Treaty of Guarantee and clashing dissents over political equality (rotating presidency) and territorial rearrangements ruined that momentous opportunity (United Nations Security Council 2017).

Crans-Montana was a turning point for the Turkish Cypriots. It confirmed the disclination of the RoC to go the extra mile to achieve reunification and proved the normalization of partition in the behavior and narrative of Greek Cypriots (Ioannou 2020). By extension, it was a calamitous development for the European prospect of Turkish Cypriots. Although the EU’s role in the Cypriot-owned, UN-sponsored talks was peripheral, the 2017 debacle piled up on the existing fatigue and disappointment of Turkish Cypriots as regards reunification and, by extension, the realization of the European prospect. The dwindled appetite of Turkish Cypriots to ever re-negotiate with the distrustful RoC – even if that would potentially hamper their European trajectory – and the incidental leaning towards the consistent Turkish offering – which subsequently increased the leverage of Turkey in ‘TRNC’ over time – signified the de-Europeanisation of Turkish Cypriots.

De-Europeanization emerged as an anticipated but unexpected and unintended consequence for the EU. The latter anticipated potential emergence as the augmentation of cooperation and strong economic, cultural, social and political ties between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots had been there all along (Ker-Lindsay 2005). The 1975 trade protocols, joint economic forums, partnership councils in the fields of security, defense and foreign policy, state aid and investment relief reflect how close Turkey and the ‘TRNC’ have been, diachronically speaking (Interviewee 3). Moreover, the heavy reliance on Turkey as regards state-building and state-formation was well known to all relevant international actors, including the EU. For instance, the Turkish Cypriot police are effectively controlled by the Turkish army, whereas the chief of that law enforcement body is nominated by Turkey without any accountability toward the ‘TRNC’s Ministry of Interior (Interviewee 2). Similarly, the Head of the Central Bank in the ‘TRNC’ is directly appointed by Ankara (Interviewee 4), proving that several important aspects of the ‘TRNC’s public and political life are entirely sponsored by Turkey.

However, the actual occurrence of de-Europeanization was unexpected. The lack of expectation is ascribed to the extended length of time during which Europeanization and the increased cooperation with Turkey ran in parallel without necessarily threatening one another. For years, both served as an Amazon store from which Turkish Cypriots had always chosen the best value-for-money services (Interviewee 8). Crans-Montana is a defining moment in this regard as it led to a major paradigm shift. In the post-2017 era, the Turkish offering outweighed the European prospect as a result of the repeated disappointments and dismay Turkish Cypriots experienced during the re-unification talks. In turn, that paved the way for the strengthening of Turkish role and leverage in ‘TRNC’ and manifested the reluctance of Turkish Cypriots to aim for the EU prospect as long as that was a ‘bumpy route heavily steeped in Greek Cypriot checkpoints’ (Interviewee 9).

Since 2017, the relationship between Turkey and ‘TRNC’ has morphed into a powerful bond that comprises a series of long-term strategic synergies. In 2019, the Turkish Presidency reformed and reinforced the coordination unit in ‘TRNC,’ which facilitates and streamlines Turkish assistance to Turkish Cypriots (Republic of Turkey presidency 2019). Vital agreements on resources, green electricity, water supplies, and border control were sanctioned, aimed at building and enhancing domestic governance (Interviewee 5). What is more, unlike the pre-2017 period and since the arrival of Turkish Cypriot leader Tatar, there has been scant appetite for EU-funded infrastructure projects including the joint, bicommunal ones (Interviewee 2). Instead, the ‘TRNC’ signed a financial aid and trade development protocol with Turkey (TRNC Public Information Office 2022) in 2022 and an economic protocol a year later (Anadolu Agency 2023) that envisage extensive funding in the form of grant agreements for development of infrastructure. In the political realm, domestic politics moved back to the pre-2002 dynamics (Interviewee 8), as evidenced by the absence of any actual reconciliation talks since Crans-Montana. Mainstream political parties became reluctant to risk their relationship with Turkey, arguing that it was ‘not the best solution, but the only tangible one we have’ (Interviewee 9). The election of Tatar in 2020 pulled Turkish Cypriots further away from a federative solution as during his electoral campaign, he echoed Turkey’s preferred two-state solution for Cyprus and warranted an economic upturn courtesy of Ankara’s handsome funding (Interviewee 4).

Under these circumstances, the willingness of Turkish Cypriots to pursue the EU prospect at the risk of deteriorating relationships with Turkey dramatically reduced (Interviewee 7), as did the eagerness of the Turkish Cypriots to cut that umbilical cord (Interviewee 2), as ‘the less Turkish Cypriots are getting from the EU, the more they will be needing from Turkey’ (Interviewee 9). The vague and far-reaching prospect of EU membership did not justify risking the comprehensive partner relationship with Turkey, and neither would Turkish Cypriots go above and beyond to get closer to the EU at any cost, especially when that relied on achieving a compromise with the highly unreliable – for the Turkish Cypriots – Greek Cypriot side (Interviewee 6).

The ‘why’ dimension: biased and introverted policymaking

Introverted policy making and wrong risk assessments meant a failure to foresee the actual emergence of de-Europeanization. Biased self-projections of the EU membership as ‘too attractive to turn down’ deluded the EU, which became, over time, complacent in devising sustainable, long-term solutions. For instance, unlike other contested states, there is no legal framework for the financial support of the Turkish Cypriots other than the Financial Aid Regulation, which was basically a compensatory product after RoC’s membership (Interviewee 2).

Furthermore, the prolonged patience of Turkish Cypriots conveyed the erroneous impression that partition could remain for years without any repercussions or fundamental change in the Turkish Cypriot foreign policy. Bureaucratic and purely technical outlooks hindered the situational awareness of the EU and downplayed how Turkish Cypriots were literally ‘sandwiched’ between Athens, Nicosia and Ankara (Interviewee 3). Against this backdrop, the nuanced strategy of providing ad hoc support to a civil society whose administration was entirely ignored and was not meant to be seen by the EU proved to be an approach of limited impetus (Kyris 2012a). Moreover, unable to tame the rather maximalist approach of the RoC throughout the years, the EU did not realize that a proportionate response was in the pipeline on the Turkish Cypriot side. Seeing a hardliner on the other side of the border called for the election of a hardliner in the ‘TRNC’ who would not succumb to the Greek Cypriot take-it-all approach and lead Turkish Cypriots into a new phase with more international visibility (Interviewee 2)

In the years that followed 2004, the EU did very little to steer strategic solutions and play a more assertive role in the reunification talks. Even after RoC’s accession, when the Cypriot question was a full-fledged European issue, the EU did not realize the significant responsibility it was meant to assume by mediating between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. By assuming observer roles and following the UN’s lead in reunification talks, the EU posed as a distant stakeholder, simply not doing enough (Ulusoy and Atakara 2023). That rather welcoming development for Turkish interests should be fundamentally attributed to a) the Turkish insistence on collaboration along the UN principles, as reconciliation was to be attained solely through the UN channels and b) Turkish persistence topush the EU to an oberver’'s role thus, minimising the Greek Cypriot leverage. Over time, the EU’s level of engagement made Turkish Cypriots doubt its impartiality and ability to stand as a fair broker, as the association with RoC looked rather bias-inducing. In addition, the EU’s lack of confidence and capacity to play a more assertive role in steering reunification came as a great disappointment to the pro-reunification part of the Turkish Cypriot society and impaired the EU’s credibility as a regional reconciliatory force. In view of these developments, the exponential decay of the EU’s leverage in the post-2017 era comes as an inevitability, making the role of the EU less and less relevant to the Turkish Cypriots.

As distrust and suspicion ran deep between the two sides, the President-elect Christodoulides and the Turkish Cypriot leader Tatar formed a duo that seemed rather satisfied with partition as long as they could separately pursue their own agendas (Interviewee 2). Moreover, while Greek Cypriots remain as close to the EU as they can get, seeking an upgraded role of the EU in the conflict (Theophanous 2023), the Turkish Cypriots seem to have found permanent shelter eastwards (Ergüven and Köprülü 2023) and look rather unwilling to call this bluff. And although the recent economic hiccups of the Turkish lira might have tested their financial resilience (in conjuction with marginal trade and commercial routes), bigger-picture dynamics have hardly shifted as military assistance remains intact providing security to the entire community.

The ‘how’ dimension: solving the unsolvable

Although de-Europeanization ran against the intent of the EU, the room for mitigation has been marginal. The EU seems unable to repair the situation that 2004 and 2017 led to, as the RoC has already got what it wanted, and the Turkish Cypriots have repositioned their priorities and sought a closer engagement with Turkey. Although the EU remains committed to the UN-led reconciliation talks and keeps streamlining its already employed initiatives aimed at regaining the trust of the Turkish Cypriots, the overall impact of those is meager and submissive. By contrast, the role of Turkey is growing, as reflected by its ability to influence domestic discourses and even determine electoral outcomes (Tacan 2021).

Under these circumstances, there seems to be a ceiling over what the EU can achieve in Cyprus (Interviewee 8). The contested nature of the ‘TRNC’, the reluctance to directly engage with it, and the strengthened role of the RoC, which stands ready to discredit any initiative that might hint at recognition for the Turkish Cypriots, are political limitations that can hardly be overcome. The EU missed the opportunity to link reconciliation with the EU accession process and present it as a prerequisite to both sides without exceptions and asterisks. That decision has resulted in a convoluted domestic scenery for which the current toolbox of the EU might not suffice to untangle. Against this backdrop, the EU is simply managing the status quo in Cyprus by favoring the stronger side, which happens to be the side it is associated with. It is, therefore, distancing itself even more from the Turkish Cypriot community (Interviewee 2), making the ‘TRNC’ the backyard and exclusive turf of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean (Interviewee 7). By doing so, the moderate and secular part of the Turkish Cypriot society, which identifies as Cypriot and deems reunification as a ‘life-saving’ prospect, remains beleaguered and defenseless against the nationalist agenda. In contrast, appeased with the current status quo and the increasingly growing number of ‘imported’ Turkish citizens to the island, Turkish Cypriot nationalists welcome the Islamization policies promoted by Turkey and the strategic partnership between the two in a series of vital domains. In the words of an interviewee, ‘Turkish Cypriots have embarked on a one-way journey toward the East, and although they keep looking at the West, they are surely reluctant to jump ship over a prospect that seems to be postponed until further notice’ (Interviewee 6).

Conclusion

The atypical sovereign formula of contested states drew the attention of European studies’ scholars who endeavored to conceptualize the EU’s foreign policy course in areas with unfulfilled statehood claims. The premise of that academic scrutiny was founded on frameworks that revolved around the effect, impact and influence of the EU’s engagement in conflict-laden regions. By doing so, scholarly work ignored what lies beneath the predisposed EU decision-making machinery, hence overlooking a large layer of unwitting consequences or collateral situations that the EU’s engagement inadvertently generates.

Seeking to unfold the unexplored offshoot of the EU’s engagement in Cyprus, and the contested state of the ‘TRNC,’ the article delved into the emergence of unintended consequences. Through a three-pronged analysis, it inquired on the degree of anticipation and/or foresight of the EU, the reason(s) for their emergence and the mitigating measures undertaken within the context of the EU’s ‘engagement without recognition’ policy course.

Focusing on 2004 and 2016–2017, this article identified two major unintended consequences of the EU’s engagement in Cyprus. Firstly, it pinpointed the reinforcement of partition, courtesy of the imbalanced and fragmented EU membership, which institutionalized the already existing domestic asymmetry of power and dichotomized the Turkish Cypriot public in an arbitrary fashion. Although that went against the EU’s intent, political and legal complexities allowed only for mild, recognition-free remedial measures.

Secondly, the article entertained the idea of de-Europeanization of Turkish Cypriots following the stalemate in Crans-Montana when Turkish Cypriots were convinced that the EU offering was a product of declining value, whereas Turkey’s consistent prospect is an asset that could bring tangible benefits to the ‘TRNC.’ Rooted in the EU’s failure to play a more decisive mediating role and Turkey’s consistent state-entrepreneurial efforts, de-Europeanization actualized unexpectedly, taking the European diplomacy and decision-makers aback.

In sequence, these two unintended consequences inherited a convoluted landscape steeped in mistrust, suspicion and antipathy between the two communities. As things stand, the complex and hardly manageable domestic dynamics are expected to further alienate Greek and Turkish Cypriots, making the Green Line what the EU never wanted it to be: an external border of the EU.

Acknowledgements

Sincere thanks and gratitude to Beste Işleyen and Olga Burlyuk for their feedback and spot-on recommendations. Much appreciation to the unsung heroes of this research namely the Greek, Greek Cypriot, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interviewees as well as EU officials in Brussels and elsewhere whose exceptional contributions helped me immerse myself into the topic and understand the complex scenery of Cyprus.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Alexandros Lefteratos

Alexandros Lefteratos is a Ph.D. candidate in the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences in Transnational Configurations, Conflict and Governance program at the University of Amsterdam. He holds two master’s degrees in European studies from College of Europe (awarded with full scholarship by the European Commission) and LUISS GUIDO CARLI (Rome), and a bachelor’s degree in European Studies and International Relations from Panteion University (Athens). His research interests revolve around the European Union’s external action in contested states in conjunction with processes of Europeanisation, external governance, peacebuilding, democracy promotion, migration and conflict resolution.

Notes

1. Official recognition by Turkey and three observer seats in the Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO), the Organization of Islamic Co-operation (OIC) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

2. Estimated annual budget of €32 m (Interviewee 2).