‘Thinking through the world’: a tianxia heuristic for higher education

ABSTRACT

Ancient Chinese civilisation developed two ideas about the ordering of large human spaces. The first was tianxia or ‘all under heaven’, the inclusive and cosmopolitan world as a whole, with no exterior, and governance on the basis of shared values and benefits, which first shaped statecraft in the Western Zhou dynasty (1047–1771 BCE). Second, the centralised nation-state which emerged in the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE). Both strands have been influential through Chinese history. In the last twenty years discussion of tianxia has revived, especially through Zhao Tingyang, stimulated by globalisation and the need for practical relations beyond the nation state. This paper proposes one version of tianxia as a heuristic for understanding, rethinking and remaking ethical relations in worldwide higher education. It reviews different understandings of tianxia in China, identifies a world-centred (rather than China-centred) tianxia , and discusses the potentials of tianxia in higher education. Tianxia is appropriate to world higher education because of its spatiality and its ethical commitment to universal benefit in diverse settings on the basis of mutual respect. The article suggests four clusters of relational values that could constitute a tianxia order in higher education, and compares tianxia to existing practices of globalisation.

KEYWORDS:

• Tianxia
• higher education
• globalisation
• global higher education
• China
• Chinese culture
• Chinese civilisation

Introduction

Globalisation is not everything, but it has changed everything. In his book All under heaven: The tianxia system for a possible world order (2021), Zhao Tingyang states: ‘It is precisely with the advent of globalisation that the limitations of international politics have become patently clear … As our contemporary world becomes ever more intimate and interdependent among nation-states, a renewed problem of world sovereignty emerges’ (2021, 14). Yet current understandings of the world as a whole are merely geographic, not political. Nor is the world as a single and whole entity customarily understood as a domain of ethical practices.

… and with respect to the political, only nation-states are deemed significant. It is for this reason that the world has only been exploited as a ‘common’ resource and treated as a domain to be fought over and abused … This is especially the case within ideologies of hegemonic nation-states, where other nation-states and even the high seas are conceived of as just so much territory to be dominated. (Zhao 2021, 185, 187)

A case in point is higher education and knowledge. The last thirty years have seen great growth in cross-border activities. A networked global science system has emerged, grounded in the bibliometric pool of papers, even though this still excludes much of human knowledge (Marginson and Xu forthcoming). One-quarter of all these papers involve authors from more than one nation (NSB 2020). International student mobility has expanded from one million students per year to more than six million (OECD 2021). There is a continuous expansion in university partnerships and consortia, branch campuses, global hubs in higher education, and online delivery such as MOOCs. Higher education institutions and scientists everywhere are embedded in nation-states and work to policy agendas, yet being active in global relations they also operate beyond governments, and not always with their full knowledge (Marginson 2022). The term ‘internationalisation’ (inter-national, between nations) does not capture these changes. If globalisation in higher education is to evolve in healthy fashion, and all countries and institutions are nurtured on the basis of mutual relations, we need to conceive the world as a whole and its diversity together. When worldwide higher education is not understood fully and in itself, it is more vulnerable to domination by a few hegemonic countries that claim the control of knowledge (Marginson and Xu forthcoming; Zhao 2021, 190). For these countries world higher education is merely ‘inter-national’, an outgrowth of themselves as nations and subjected to a ‘one-sided, unilateral universalism’ (Zhao 2021, 114).

How then can we conceive the world as a whole, as a positive environment for all within it? How can we understand and practice global or worldwide higher education in a less pejorative, less limiting, more inclusive and more equitable manner than the practices of global markets, global ranking, White Supremacy (Shahjahan and Edwards 2022), or an Anglo-American knowledge hierarchy (Marginson and Xu forthcoming) – the main ideas of worldwide higher education currently on offer? What is a possible alternative?

Adapting Lefebvre (1991), geo-cognitive scales such as ‘the global’ or ‘the national’ are constituted by three interactive elements: the material or structural, especially the geographical world itself; the imagination/interpretation of agents; and the normative and practical activities of agents (Marginson 2022). But how does this work when the scale is not just that of the global – world-building activities that happen across, above and beyond the separated nation states – but that of the world as a whole, which includes everything, all nations and all localities? How can we imagine the whole higher education and research world, and importantly, how can we practice relationships within and across that world?

Our contention in this article is that one possible solution can be developed out of Chinese civilisational notions of the governance of human societies, particularly tianxia.

Ancient China originated two key ideas about spatial governance of human societies. The first idea was that of tianxia, thinking on the basis of the world as a whole, with such a world governed on the basis of specific consensual values. Tianxia emerged in the Western Zhou dynasty (1047–1771 BCE) and was a primary mode of statecraft in China until the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE). The second and younger idea was that of the centralised nation-state. The first successful nation-state, the prototype of all others that followed, in every country (Fukuyama 2011), was that of the Qin dynasty, which after a short interregnum was succeeded by the Han dynasty (202 BCE–220 CE). The Qin and Han enforced their writ over a bounded territory, codified land ownership and taxation, standardised language, weights and measures and implemented national systems of transport and communication.

The Qin and Han dynasty replaced the politics of the world as the primary spatiality with the politics of the nation. However, the tianxia idea has continued as a strand in Chinese thinking and writing. Thinking through the nation and thinking through the world co-exist in China, and at times they have been brought into an explicit relationship. We see thinking through the world as especially relevant in higher education and knowledge, perhaps more so than in statecraft as a whole, because in higher education (especially research universities) the level of global connectedness and visibility is very high. Local institutions often pursue parallel trajectories and can readily see themselves as sharing a common space with each other.

This paper is about tianxia, its differing interpretations, and its potential applications to the self-ordering of global higher education. Notwithstanding the historical ambiguities of tianxia, including the tension between world-centred and China-centred visions, the paper will argue that tianxia can provide the basis of a heuristic for worldwide relations in higher education and knowledge. We see a tianxia order in higher education as one that both contains and supplements the presently recognised international order of nation-states.

The argument proceeds as follows. The next section explains that the article is grounded in an open ontology. The section that follows explores the evolution of the tianxia idea, with its different strands, and with special attention to practices of virtue in tianxia, and tianxia in the context of modern nationalism. The next section considers contemporary debates about tianxia and thinking through the world from China. Tianxia is an evolving and living notion with diverse interpretations, and it is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to provide a clear-cut singular definition of tianxia without losing important nuances. Nevertheless, the openness and diverse potentials of the tianxia idea are suggestive when it is applied to rethinking worldwide higher education. The article then reviews prior studies on the idea of tianxia and higher education, before developing its own main contribution: a tianxia heuristic for understanding and practising higher education, as mentioned in the title of this paper. It suggests four clusters of relational values that could serve as a basis for cross-border agreement by higher education organisations and persons, thereby constituting a tianxia order. The article also distinguishes between existing practices of globalisation in higher education, and practices suggested by the tianxia perspective, as part of its conclusion.

Open ontology

This paper takes an open ontological positioning, beyond dualism (Dow 1990). First, it understands reality as undergoing a process of continuous change whose outcomes cannot be predicted. Reality is not existing but emergent and includes both the actual and the many possibilities (Sayer 2000; Zhao 2021, 53–54). Second, the paper echoes Ashley’s (1984, 268) ‘dialectical unity of plural totalities’, which sits between the ‘particularity of the universal’ and the ‘universality of the particular’. The former interpretative stance questions the totality of universalising claims, while the latter challenges the intrinsic possibility of particularistic claims. Constructing a contrast between the ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ can also lead to the othering of certain ‘particularity’ (Agnew 1994, 63) – certain particular values are considered ‘universal’, with others positioned as ‘heretic’ or ‘barbarian’.

Furthermore, the paper is grounded in the idea of he er butong, a type of universalism that acknowledges and respects differences. Qian (2012, 30–31) refers to three kinds of universalism. The first is about the life-and-death struggle between the dominator and the dominatee. It realises ‘universality through the denial of the other.’ The second transcends the other by avoiding them, and pursuing a kind of ‘universality beyond others’ neutral to both oneself and the other. The third kind – ‘the universality that acknowledges and respects the other’ – entails recognition of the universality between oneself and the other through constant mutual recognition and respect, and actively seeking dialogue and consensus between oneself and the other. The Chinese concept of he er butong (unity of diversity; harmony with diversity) speaks to the equilibrium between seemingly opposing positionalities.

In this paper, we highlight a co-existence of particularity and universality in our engagement with the tianxia concept. We acknowledge the geo-cultural particularity of the tianxia idea, which took roots in the Sinic culture and tradition and is still relevant to contemporary Chinese society. Nonetheless, we also see the potential of tianxia travelling beyond the Chinese sphere and addressing universal questions about the world.

Scholars and thinkers like Zhao Tingyang, Xu Jilin, Liu Qing and Gan Chunsong see tianxia as an all-inclusive approach to visioning the world, one that embodies the he er butong ontology. In viewing and thinking of the world through tianxia we move beyond the dualistic worldview of Western thought, based on the distinction between ‘I’ and ‘others’.

Tianxia as an evolving and living concept

Tianxia is an ontological approach to the world and all relations within the world. Its Chinese characters are 天 (tian, literal meanings as sky, heaven, nature, God) and 下 (xia, literal meanings as under, below, down). In Chinese tradition, tian can both refer to the material and natural ‘heaven’, coming from Chinese people’s observation of ‘sky’, or a supernatural ‘heaven’ associated with Chinese people’s notions of worship (Gao 2012). The combined phrase tianxia means ‘all under heaven’.

Tanxia first emerged as an ecological imagining of all human beings and creatures on earth. It was an early construction of the world imagination, based on the observations, experiences and imaginations of Chinese people at the time (Liu 2006; Ge 2002). In the initial imaginary, China, or the Central Plain in Northern China, was located in the centre of tianxia. In a process of outward movement, the concept of tianxia then developed from this geographical and spatial imagination, becoming associated with cultural constitution and an understanding of the world order.

Tianxia is an evolving and living concept that is open to multiple interpretations and purposes. There are long-standing discussions about tianxia, from ancient times to the contemporary era, both inside and outside Chinese reality and scholarship. Tianxia appears in different disciplinary fields, such as philosophy, history, political studies, and international relations studies. It has also taken various meanings in different historical contexts.

The concept of tianxia has had profound influences in Chinese civilisation. Among the earliest examples include the Book of Songs: ‘All land under heaven falls within the domain of the Son of Heaven; all those on this land are his subjects’.¹ Mencius (372–289 BCE) emphasised the importance of tianxia as an affective social relation that rested on maintaining people’s support: ‘With little popular support, even their relatives will betray and desert them; but with massive popular support, everyone/all under heaven will pledge allegiance to them.’² Yi Zhuan noted: ‘All under heaven will lead to the same place, though with different deliberations; all under heaven will return to the same place, though travelling in different roads.’³ Here tianxia appears as an analogue of the Judeo-Christian ‘creation’, a holistic concept that embraced the natural, social and spiritual worlds.

Some Chinese thinkers viewed the world as transcending ethnicity and geographical location, reflecting a civilisational imagination of the world (Watanabe 2008; Gan 2018). They highlighted the commonness of human beings and downplayed the emphasis of China as the centre of tianxia. Ideas like ‘one tianxia (yitianxia)’ and ‘all under heaven are one family’ (tianxia yijia) were stressed. In contrast, some other thinkers focused on establishing a rigid and explicit hierarchical structure among groups of people inhabiting the tianxia space (Watanabe 2008). They centred around a political structuring of tianxia rather than tianxia as a civilisational sphere, highlighting a hierarchical order between xia (夏, broadly referring to Chinese Han ethnicity) and yi (夷, broadly referring to non-Han ethnicity).

As this suggests, the meanings of tianxia are multi-layered. By examining pre-Qin thinkers’ usages of tianxia, Yang and Chen (2020, 96) reveal that tianxia has at least eleven meanings: the territory of the Zhou Dynasty, political and social order, the regime, the supreme power, time and space, all human beings, people’s welfare and fortune, routine business, all creatures and things, the territory where people of Hua (华) and Xia (夏) lived, and political situations. In one summary of the multiple meanings of tianxia, Zhao (2011) finds that the classic concept of tianxia primarily has three meanings or dimensions: a geographical meaning, a psychological meaning, and a moral/political meaning.

Gan (2019) points to three facets of the classic idea of tianxia. First, geographically speaking, tianxia means all areas under heaven, or within the four seas. Second, tianxia refers to order, associated with the ideas of fu and nine zhou. For example, the Book of History divided China/the world into nine zhou, including Jizhou, Yanzhou, Qingzhou, Xuzhou, Yangzhou, Jingzhou, Yuzhou, Liangzhou, and Yongzhou. The nine zhou illustrated the general geographical area inhabited by the Chinese people since the Zhou Dynasty, even though they were never adopted as administrative divisions of the country. Third, tianxia points to the recognition of the values underlying the order. The first and third of these facets of tianxia constitute its potential relevance to higher education.

Some scholars stress the need to distinguish between tianxia as a normative appeal and tianxia in realpolitik. Wang (2005, 279) argues that the tianxia idea is simultaneously embodied ‘as a way of “knowing” [the world] and as a set of “normative” propositions’ [in dealing with institutions in the world]. Wang’s arguments are echoed by Xu (2017, 2), who suggests tianxia as part of the comprehensive assemblage of ‘family, state, and tianxia (jia guo tianxia) – a social continuum with self as the core’. For Xu (2017) the classic idea of tianxia has two closely interrelated meanings. One refers to the universal order containing a series of cosmic values, which belongs to the way of heaven (tiandao) and principles of heaven (tianli), and parallels the Western idea of the will of God. The other is associated with governance and order in realpolitik in an imagined space centring around the Central Plain, on the basis of universal order and with the objective of reaching the Great Harmony (Xu 2017, 5, 19). However, it is less clear to what extent the governance principles of tianxia were implemented as realpolitik in history, or could be so implemented today.

Tianxia and virtue

De, meaning virtue, is an essential notion in Chinese thinking about governance and in the expansion and stabilisation of regimes of governance. Virtues are central to tianxia. Confucius states that ‘Governance based on virtue is like the North Star taking its place in the sky, while all the other stars revolve around it.’⁴ Similarly, in Zuo’s Commentary on The Spring and Autumn Annals, Guan Zhong said to the Marquis of Qi, ‘I have heard it said: Win over the disaffected with respect and embrace distant peoples with virtue. With virtue and respect unchanging, there is no one that will not be embraced.’⁵

It is traditionally understood that an important reason for the Zhou Dynasty’s success in overturning the Shang Dynasty (1600–1046 BCE), and its long continuation after that, was its regime grounded in virtue. The original Zhou kingdom included only 50,000–70,000 people. The Yin-Shang political centre in the Central Plain had a million or more. But Zhou had the moral authority to ‘use the small to govern the great’ (Zhao 2021, 43). For example, the Zhou protected and respected the Shang people’s properties, original lifestyles, and religions. The only requirement made of the Shang was that they accept the Zhou regime (Li 2012).

The Zhou dynasty developed an institutional order that ‘did not rely solely on military threat for governance’ (Zhao 2021, 43). Rather it was based on a consensus about shared values, rituals and benefits. These values encompassed inclusion, respect for diversity, mutuality and respect for others, and governance based on the consent of people. According to Li (2012, 135), ‘the Duke of Zhou found the bond [to connect all people under heaven], de. The universality of de made it transcend and tolerate local diversity, and became a centripetal force that connected all together’. The Zhou dynasty values were practised, albeit to varying degrees even in relations with neighbouring kingdoms. However, virtue alone did not sustain the long life of Zhou governance. Meeting shared interests and maintaining the security and stability of the regime were also important. ‘Purely moral exemplars have a difficult time exercising influence unless they are at the same time exemplars of success’ (Zhao 2021, 74). Zhao suggests that the Zhou dynasty began to falter when it no longer had surplus land to distribute in exchange for virtuous conduct (Zhao 2021, 107–108).

This aspect of tianxia, its grounding in virtuous relations, is suggestive in relation to cooperation in worldwide higher education. Stable and lasting cooperation between autonomous institutions in different countries cannot be secured by hierarchical domination or coercion. It can be built and sustained only through consensual norms of conduct.

Tianxia and modern nationalism

Since the Qin dynasty in China tianxia has been entangled with nationalism. The inclusive and borderless approach has shaped relationality not so much in the world as a whole as within the borders of China (Zhao 2021, 119–120). However, when modern ideas of nationalism and nation-states was first introduced to China in the nineteenth century, many intellectuals saw tianxia as in conflict with nation-building and a cause of China’s weakness in the face of Western interventions (Liang 2015, 114). Xiao (1982, 728) stated that ‘only when the idea of tianxia is fundamentally challenged can the modern idea of state emerge’. Based on an exploration of the use of relevant terms in newspapers, archives, treatises and textbooks published around 1900, Jin and Liu (2009, 242) find that between 1895 and 1899, there was a sharp increase in the use of tianxia but that frequency of use decreased significantly after 1900. In contrast, the use of the term guojia (state) increased rapidly from 1895 and especially after 1900 (Jin and Liu 2009). Following the growing use of guojia was the growing use of minzu, meaning nationality/ethnicity.

In contrast, Sun Yat-sen saw nationalism and tianxia as not being in conflict. He saw nationalism, in the Chinese sense not the Western sense, as the foundation of tianxia:

… if we are going to bring peace and harmony to tianxia in future, we first need to restore nationalism and the status of our nation, to use our inherent morality centring around peace as a foundation to bring the Great Harmony to the world. This is the great responsibility of the 400 million Chinese people. … This is the true spirit of our nationalism. (Sun 1906[2011], 67)

Sun’s conceptualisation of nationalism aligns with the idea of tianxia. In the contemporary era marked by globalisation and the increasing geo-political tensions between nations, it has become important to explore the relations of tianxia and nationalism, especially how they can be integrated and disentangled. Sun’s notion of the nation as part of tianxia, with a responsibility to uphold the welfare of tianxia, has contemporary relevance. Arguably, higher education institutions also have a responsibility to uphold tianxia, though much depends on the conception of tianxia that shapes thought and practice.

Contemporary debates: tianxia, China and the world

It has been argued that in Imperial China, the practices of tianxia led to a hierarchical system of world order with China at the centre. Would the contemporary application of tianxia result in a new global empire or hegemon in place of the existing one? (e.g., Gan 2019, 116). Are more decentred global relations possible within the tianxia idea, in general and in higher education and knowledge?

In the classic tianxia idea, particularly when it is geographically referenced, certain civilisations and regimes are ‘centres’ while others are ‘affiliated’ or ‘peripheral’. Despite all under heaven being one family, there are unequal relationships between different groups of people, with the Han civilisation at the centre (Liang 2016). Arguably, under both the Zhou Dynasty and the Han Dynasty China was understood as the ‘inner’ part of tianxia and neighbouring countries as the ‘outer’ part. In practical terms this became manifest in the Sino-centric tributary system. Some scholars see this as structurally parallel to centre-periphery relations between nations in the modern world (Callahan 2008; T. Liang 2018).

From the 1990s onwards, interest in tianxia has revived in China. Contemporary work on tianxia sits between China-centred notions, and imaginings of the world as a whole that do not presume one centre, which could be called ‘world-centred’ tianxia. Different strands emphasise one or the other, or discuss China’s position within a world order not centred on China, or move ambiguously between various notions.

Global citizenship

Common to all of these strands is a more expansive and inclusive approach to the world than is implied by the Westphalian system of absolutely separated and sovereign nation-states, and its multilateral form in the United Nations system. Tianxia highlights the commonness of humanity and shared belonging to the human community (Gan 2019). Qiang (2010, 223) argues that the Western dualistic worldview focuses on transforming, assimilating or eliminating ‘the other’, in order to mitigate the tensions between ‘I’ and ‘others’; whereas the tianxia idea appeals to he er butong, which emphasises mutual respect, equality and reciprocity between differences, realising harmony in diversity.

For Gan (2019, 116) notes that ‘the idea of tianxia in the contemporary context is a rediscovery of the Confucian principles of mutual assistance and building a community’. ‘People have the same heart, and the heart follows the same way of reason (ren tong ci xin, xin tong ci li)’ (Gan 2018, 58). Gan (2018) stresses human beings’ natural sympathy and mutual understanding, which leads to a common consciousness. This shared awareness has the potential to mitigate existing tensions and conflicts between people and between communities. Gan’s argument partly resembles Adam Smith’s (1790[2010]) idea of natural sympathy, that reciprocal bonds spontaneously emerge through the natural sympathy between people, though Gan goes further than Smith. Following Confucian ideas, Gan (2018, 52) argues that with common consciousness and self-cultivation, human beings will sincerely follow the way of heaven and pursue justice, peace and harmony in the world.

Thinking through the world from China

One strand of the contemporary reinterpretation of tianxia associates it with both international relations and the rejuvenation of China. This includes Zhao Tingyang, whose works have played a crucial role in re-igniting the discussion of tianxia (Duara 2017, 70), Liu Qing, Xu Jilin and Gan Chunsong. These scholars want to contribute to a different narrative of the world order, in which developing countries are not under-privileged in dealing with shared issues (Ding 2018; Sun and Chen 2016; Z. Liang 2018).

Zhao (2011) views the reinterpretation of the tianxia idea as part of the movement of ‘rethinking China (chongsi zhongguo)’ that inspires China to re-build its own values, methodologies and frameworks, and rethink about itself and the world. Despite China’s economic achievements, it does not lead on global issues, undertake global responsibilities, or contribute its own thoughts about the world order. In Zhao (2021, 1), the whole world is ‘the thinking unit’. He adopts the perspective of ‘thinking through the world’ as a basis for conceiving governance in the global era, rather than universalisation on the basis of a single nation-state, as in imperialist brands of Western thought (2021, xiv, 114). Zhao contrasts thinking through the world with ‘thinking of the world’, in which the world is understood as an object rather than a subject in its own right, and is readily plundered and damaged without regard for the common good (Zhao 2011, 3; also Zhao 2003, 2018, 2019).

Zhao (2021) argues that three core elements in the classical notion of tianxia are integral to a potential modern order of tianxia. The first is the principle of ‘internalisation’. The world has no outer boundary and all territories, nations and peoples are included within tianxia. There is no ‘other’. The second is a ‘relational rationality that gives priority to minimising mutual hostility over the maximising of exclusive interests and stands in contrast to individual rationality and its pursuit of the maximisation of self-interest’ (2021, xv). In a tianxia order, instead of international conflict, the ‘focal point’ is ‘coexistence’ (2021, 4). The third is ‘Confucian improvement’, meaning ‘one improves if-and-only-if all others improve’ (2021, xv).

When thinking through the world, the world becomes a single entity with sub-collective agents, including the different nation-states (Zhao 2019). At the levels of nation, locality and individual the good of tianxia takes priority over parochial interests and all have a common responsibility to serve the world. Zhao (2011) accepts the existence of diverse agents and responsibilities, while emphasising that ‘it is necessary to create a new world view and a new political analytical framework so that we can understand the world according to the purpose of the world itself’. Further, ‘the world must be defined by the people under heaven, not by a certain group of people’ (2011, 107). Here the worldwide imagining in tianxia suggests a unity that is grounded in harmonious cosmopolitanism (Duara 2017; Beck 2016; Sun 1906[2011]). This vision resonates with the notion of education for world or global citizenship, which is already pursued in education programmes in many countries.

Zhao also calls for a world system of institutions and a world government. In his tianxia order the nations or ‘substates’ would be ‘independent in most respects’ but would derive their legitimacy, authority and responsibilities from the world government. The world order would be held together not by force or autarkic self-interest, but largely by cultural means. Shared norms and practices or ‘ritual’ would constrain the pursuit of self-interest by one against another (Duara 2017, 70). While such an order is remote from contemporary relations between states, it seems closer at hand and more feasible in higher education.

Z. Liang (2018, 78) argues that in this respect tianxia resembles the ideal communist order, in which universal peace and harmony are achieved through mutual respect and dialogue. Neither universality nor local particularity are pre-existing or fixed. They emerge, engage and evolve through cultural interface. To deal with the ‘narrow stance of the supremacy of national interests’, Xu (2015, 9) balances particularism with the universal he er butong. ‘The shared universality’ of tianxia is said to resemble Qian’s (2012) third kind of universality, ‘the universality that acknowledges and respects the other. This refutes the dominance of any single civilisation and the despising of differences and particularities. Rather, it aims to realise universality through equal dialogue’ (Xu 2015, 11).

Liu (2015) emphasises mutual influence in the construction and evolution of cultures. The idea of he er butong in the classical tianxia meant ‘seeking common ground and leaving aside existing differences’ (qiutong cunyi) and ‘absorbing anything and everything’ (jianrong bingxu) (2015, 8). Liu distinguishes this from the rise of nationalism and exclusivism in China since the mid-nineteenth century. Any world imaginary based on a central civilisation has a limited life. In reviving and reinterpreting tianxia, he states, ‘we should reject the illusion of returning to the past “Chinese Empire”, and strive to save the ideals of the world from the disillusionment of China-centrism’ (2015, 9). Tianxia should be about win-win cooperation and common development, and continuous dialogues between cultures (2015, 11–12). Again, this seems especially appropriate to relations in higher education and knowledge.

Equality and inequality in tianxia

Despite being all-inclusive, tianxia is not necessarily free from hierarchy. In Zhao’s tianxia system, there can be explicit hierarchies between states (see also Yan 2011, 97, 104). This compares to the present international order in which there is ‘only nominal equality between states’ and the imperialist states pursue undeclared primacy (Zhao 2021, 12). According to Zhao (2011, 19–20), meritocracy, not democracy, is used for selecting political leaders for global institutions in tianxia. Tianxia incorporates the people’s will (minxin), following the classic idea of tianxia (2011, 19); and as Zhao sees it, the best way to capture the will of the people is through meritocracy. Meritocracy is not just about capacity, it is also about virtue. Qiang (2010, 223) also models a hierarchical world order, including the moral responsibility of the ‘centre’ to the ‘periphery’. Yan (2011) agrees and suggests that an ethically grounded division of responsibilities is essential to harmony. In higher education this suggests the role of established universities in capacity building in emerging localities and countries. Resources for education and research are manifestly unequal. Nevertheless, not just distributed resources but also distributed agency is essential to harmonious collaboration.

Notions of formalised inequality invoke obvious issues and play into the concerns of those contemporary scholars who point to the limitations of the tianxia idea and question the motives for reviving it in China today. Ge (2015, 9) states that the existing literature on tianxia is primarily ‘non-historical studies or even anti-historical studies of history … that could only be viewed as reflecting a kind of romantic feeling and lofty idea.’ Modern reinterpretations of tianxia idea are ‘distorted’ and ‘out of historical context’ (2015, 9). The tianxia idea is a utopia that never existed and could hardly be achieved today. Given that China-centredness and centre-periphery were always intrinsic, there is a danger of China ‘claiming the tianxia idea, which is a true nationalism, as a new cosmopolitanism’ (2015, 54).

Callahan also suspects the contemporary use of tianxia in China. He sees tianxia not as a cultural regime but the projection of a global hegemon (Callahan 2008; Callahan and Barabantseva 2011). He is concerned about China’s pressure on smaller countries and the potential dangers of a new centre-periphery system. Many Chinese thinkers state that with the rise of its economic power, China should expand its soft power by re-imagining the world order. To some, tianxia is a way for China to establish its own discourses (W. Ding 2018; Sun and Chen 2016), for example in relation to the Belt and Road Initiative. Tianxia can be presented as the basis for a new Asian regionalism and even a solution to the Taiwan dispute.

In counter-point, the critiques of traditional inequality in tianxia and claims about its present use as hegemonic have inspired attempts by scholars such as Liu Qing and Xu Jilin to reinterpret tianxia through notions of de-centralisation and de-hierarchisation (see e.g., Xu 2015, 2017; Liu 2015). Xu (2015) proposes a universal order of tianxia that includes the principle of equality between ethnicities and between nations as a core ethical principle. This would seem essential if tianxia is to contribute to a worldwide higher education order.

Tianxia in higher education

Building on the previous discussion, in this section we present our tianxia heuristic for understanding and practising higher education. We begin with prior studies of tianxia and higher education. We then discuss the multi-scalar character of higher education and knowledge, which is not well understood in ‘Western’ higher education research. The sub-sections that follow list the main characteristics of the tianxia heuristic in higher education; set down the relational ethics of a tianxia order; and compare an understanding of worldwide higher education grounded in tianxia with a framework based on the global and globalisation.

Prior studies

Although there is a large English-language literature concerning globalisation and internationalisation in higher education, and tianxia offers a developed and distinctive lens with which to consider cross-border relationality in the sector, so far there has been little exploration of tianxia in studies of higher education. This partly reflects the domination of ‘Western’ ontologies and epistemologies; and the associated fact that in the real world, global and international relations in higher education are largely experienced as Euro-American influences that flow outwards across the border to culturally colonise other locations, whether within the ‘West’ or elsewhere (Yang 2014). This kind of asymmetrical cross-border relation is not imagined in tianxia, which is premised on the common development of all agents.

Hence in proposing a tianixia heuristic for higher education (below) the present paper breaks new ground. However, there is a small number of relevant prior studies.

Rui Yang (2015, 2016) examines paradoxes within the Chinese epistemology of tianxia, and unpacks its connotations in Chinese higher education under conditions of globalisation and internationalisation. He states that while the concept of tianxia includes the imagining of no boundary and all-inclusivity, it also denotes a hegemonic world order and a centre-periphery ontology. He argues that the internationalisation of Chinese higher education faces multiply-layered dilemmas in its relationship with the ‘West’, with Chinese traditions and Sino-centrism brought into conjunction with the modernisation of higher education, which has both internal and external drivers. Yang also suggests that the tianxia concept has potential as a heuristic key for unlocking the paradoxical internationalisation of Chinese higher education, a perspective that has influenced the present paper.

Yang and Tian (2022) review scholarship in Chinese and English on tianxia and discuss its relation to higher education. The review identifies two main scholarly takes. For one group, including Zhao Tingyang, Xu Jilin, Liu Qing and Gan Chunsong, the tianxia idea is an alternative approach to visioning the world order, superior to the dualistic Western worldview. The other group, including Ge Zhaoguang and William Callahan, see tianxia as utopian, unachievable and potentially Sino-centric. These arguments were reviewed above.

In comparing Anglo-American and Chinese approaches to the ‘public’ dimension of higher education, Lili Yang (2022) suggests tianxia weigong (‘all under heaven belongs to all and is for all’) as an alternative to the ‘Western’ notion of global public or global common good. Tianxia weigong entails a Confucian anthropocosmic world view that explains the dynamic relationship between the public (gong in the Sinic notion) and private (si in the Sinic notion) at the level of the world as a whole. Gong is understood as tianxia, si as the elements within gong. Anglo-American thought struggles to imagine a global scale that is distinct from nation-states. It can only imagine global public and common good as an outgrowth of nation-states. In contrast, tianxia weigong more readily moves beyond a nation-bound framework. It understands ‘global’ as beyond binaries such as the Anglo-American public/private good (Samuelson 1954) and is able to embrace diversity, in general and in higher education.

Multi-scalar higher education

In the ‘glonacal’ paper Marginson and Rhoades (2002) find that institutions and persons in higher education are simultaneously or severally active in all three dimensions (scales) of the global, national and local. The scales are different (e.g., the national is normatively centred by the nation-state, whereas the global has no normative centre), and they not contained in each other, but they intersect, with both synergies and tensions between them. While the weight of global activities and relationships is growing, the national and local scales are also especially important in higher education. Marginson (2011, 2022) discusses multiple scales in higher education and their materiality, imagination and interpretation, and social practices.

However, this multiple spatiality is not well understood in ‘Western’ social science, including research on higher education. Shahjahan and Kezar (2013) find that perception and research are mostly trapped ‘within the national container’, framed by ‘methodological nationalism’ which is grounded in the belief that ‘the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world’ (Wimmer and Schiller 2003, 301).

The tianxia idea offers a way to escape the national container by conceiving relations in higher education on a worldwide basis. Despite its past entanglement with nationalism and possible China-centrism, tianxia is not intrinsically confined to these possibilities. Worldwide tianxia is also distinct from the ‘global’ scale. Whereas ‘global’ refers solely to phenomena and activities that constituent worldwide relations, tianxia includes all of the different scales at the same time, as in the glonacal idea. Higher education in tianxia includes all of global systems such as science; national higher education policies, regulation and funding; local institutions; grass-roots research groups; even individual classes.

However, tianxia is more than just a geo-spatial descriptor, like ‘global’ or ‘national’. It also entails values and relationships, with implications for practice. Tianxia is at one and the same time a description of existing social relations, a framework for observing interpreting social relations, an ideal form of social relations, and a call to practice that ideal. It combines the actual and the possible and it both reflects and normatively shapes behaviour.

Definition and meanings of a tianxia heuristic

What then do we mean by a tianxia heuristic for higher education? In summary, in a tianxia higher education order, agents (individuals, groups, institutions and organisations, nations) understand and practise higher education in a single worldwide space, joining nature and the human world, with free relations between all agents. These relations are practised on the basis of consent rather than coercion, and voluntary and conscious connectivity and collaboration. They entail joint commitment to the welfare of the world as a whole, including the higher education world, equity and justice, mutual and equal respect, and combined support. They sustain openness to and the sharing of all knowledge, appreciation of diversity and learning from the other, and common protocols and rituals specific to higher education, including ethical practices that foster and further the tianxia order.

We will now expand on the meanings and ethical practices of the tianxia heuristic for higher education. The heuristic has the following meanings:

First and most importantly, tianxia entails ‘thinking through the world’. It imagines the higher education and knowledge world as a single networked and interdependent collective subject within a space without borders. This is more readily imagined for knowledge, where there is already a global system, although it is exclusive, hierarchical and radically incomplete (see below). Tianxia higher education and knowledge internalises all institutions and all knowledge. It entails an all-inclusive world beyond the nation-state dualism of I/not I, in which identity is exclusive and relations are naturalised as competitive. In tianxia, there is neither externality nor binaries. A tianxia order is grounded in relational rationality. It elevates avoidance of conflict over individual interests, and coexistence over conflict.

Second, then, the tianxia higher education heuristic highlights connectivity within the higher education world. It suggests collaborative ‘tianxia as one family’ (tianxia yijia) and the need to ‘establish a world government and a world system of institutions that endorse the pursuit of this ideal’ (Zhao 2011, 28). Such connectivity, which denotes equal partnerships across institutions and research networks, suggests the tianxia heuristic as the basis for identifying organisations in higher education and knowledge with worldwide reach. This includes research-intensive universities, and national and pan-national associations.

Third, the tianxia higher education heuristic foregrounds he er butong, harmony with diversity. It suggests inclusive cosmopolitan populations of students and faculty, in which all persons regardless of gender, age, race, ethnicity, nationality and other identities are equally respected. It also points to a radical opening up to all human knowledge. At present knowledge is subject to a severing process of codification and legitimation which reproduces the authority of inherited disciplinary frameworks and research universities in dominant countries. Global knowledge is structured by an internal/external dualism that privileges Euro-American, especially English-speaking, higher education. It excludes non-English language knowledge including all knowledge of endogenous communities, in continuity with the colonial period (Santos 2014; Marginson and Xu forthcoming). The tianxia heuristic also entails bringing into global networks all varieties of institutions – not just the model of the research university dominant in global ranking – enabling them to directly relate to each other.

Fourth, as in classical tianxia, the tianxia higher education heuristic is shaped by tensions between equality and hierarchy and combines horizontal and vertical differentiation. Hierarchies in higher education and research are both a material fact and shaped by normative calibrations. For instance, some universities provide more intensive or more diverse teaching programmes than do others. Some enjoy a higher status. Some produce knowledge that is especially highly valued. Nonetheless, hierarchies in a tianxia higher education world are not inevitable, nor structurally closed. Here material inequalities should be separated from value hierarchies. Vital questions are: who decides which value order to follow? How to open hierarchies to changes in equality, equity and justice? The wealth of scholarship on inequality and stratification of universities, epistemic (in)justice and violence, decolonisation, and feminism, provides blueprints for transforming vertical social relations in more egalitarian directions (e.g., Connell 2007; Fricker 2007; Santos 2014). The tianxia sensibility joins these lines of inquiry, with a potential to challenge the existence and definition of hierarchies.

Fifth, the tianxia higher education heuristic, like governance long ago in the Zhou dynasty, rests on the active consent of the participants. Higher education is a people intensive social sector that turns on sociability, groups, conversation and communication. It is inconceivable without willing participation. This element of the heuristic is already reflected in bottom-up research collaboration, student and faculty mobility, and university alliances.

Sixth, the tianxia higher education heuristic includes nature, the environment, ecological thinking and sustainability. This follows not only from classical tianxia’s preoccupation with nature but the understanding of the world as a collective subject. Higher education already promotes and facilitates ecologically sustainable futures, though arguably, not enough (e.g., McCowan 2020). Ecology rests on recognition of inter-dependence and holistic thinking in relation to both human society and the natural world, an approach embodied in tianxia.

Seventh and finally, the role of ritual, as in the Zhou dynasty, also has parallels in tianxia higher education. Rituals are well-established in higher education where they foster affective commitment and a sense of belonging. The classical higher education rituals are recognised across the world, albeit with local and cultural variations. These include academic degrees, credentials, ceremonies, and peer review in research. Nonetheless, these rituals are not fixed. The traditional approach is not always the right for the future. Rituals should be subject to critical reflections and examination to ensure the justice and equity across all groups.

Ethical practices in a tianxia order

A tianxia order is formed by and dependent on a constellation of agreed social values and ethical practices. Norms of content and conduct, and their protocols and other active forms, play a crucial role in sustaining widespread affect as well as coordinating conduct in higher education and in disciplinary research and scholarship. Tianxia values have the emotional resonances of a sense of belonging. Affective practices are key reminders of our shared humanity and a powerful force in attracting and holding people in higher education.

Identifying common values across the global higher education space is not a simple matter. Core practices such as academic freedom differ from country to country. In Anglo-American settings the primary emphasis falls on negative freedom, freedom from external constraint or coercion by the state or other parties. In China academic freedom is primarily understood in positive terms, as freedom to do, in conjunction with the prestige attached to carrying out high status public responsibilities (Hayhoe 2011). Nevertheless, in both contexts, faculty and students deeply value the exercise of autonomy in teaching and research.

What then might be the shared values and ethical practices in a tianxia higher education order? We suggest four clusters as a basis for agreement by higher education and research organisations and persons. These are not meant to be prescriptions for higher education activity. Rather, they are proposed as invitations for discussion.

1. Respect: Respect for the world as a whole and thinking through the world. Respect for nature and the environment. Respect for learning, personal educational development, knowledge and inquiry as profoundly important ends in themselves, and the source of potential applications and uses for social and global betterment. Respect for diversity in the forms and embodiment of knowledge. Respect for all knowledge agents in higher education in all positions, with all identities, and from all backgrounds as equal potential contributors to common knowledge.

2. Freedom: Freedom of higher education and research institutions to manage their affairs free of coercion. Academic freedom to learn, to inquire and to teach, free from constraint and with adequate resource support and scope to exercise intellectual agency. The free worldwide flow of knowledge in a common networked system. Support for the continuous exchange of academics, students and other knowledge agents across the world, across sectors, across social backgrounds and economic classes.

3. Openness: An open global knowledge pool that includes all bona fide scholarship and research as part of an accessible global repository of knowledge; including, for instance, the extension of translation functions so that all available knowledge is recognised in the global pool. Open sharing of knowledge (such as open access to data and publications; open education) and open practicing of knowledge production and usage (such as open peer review), unless there is a compelling and agreed case for non-transparency, and with cautions against exaggerating inequality.

4. Connectivity: Within the framework of open networked relations without limit, collaboration across all stakeholders that is conducted on the basis of mutually created consent, moving from hierarchy to equality and justice. Continuous connection to nature and environment that nourishes the sustainability of the world as a whole.

Though values and rituals are integral to a tianxia relational order, Zhao’s (2021) point about exemplars of success must also apply. What would hold a tianxia order in higher education and knowledge in place? The answer is apparent in the present conduct of cross-border collaborative relations in higher education and knowledge; for example, in the natural sciences. Here the shared self-interest lies on one hand, in the mutual accumulation of status through prestigious international activities; on the other hand, through the positive-sum benefits of information exchange, international education and especially, knowledge building in science and scholarship. Knowledge is inherently relational. The combined benefits of collaborative networks continually drive their growth and intensification. This is an observable feature of scientific activity in the networked environment (Wagner, Park, and Leydesdorff 2015).

Conclusions

This article has reviewed the Chinese civilisational idea of tianxia and taken its core notion of ‘thinking through the world’ into the development of a tianxia heuristic for worldwide higher education and knowledge. It is proposed that this could be a basis for conscious agreement and cooperation between institutions, groups and persons in higher education. The article has suggested, as a basis for discussion, the main features and ethical principles of a tianxia order. The tianxia favoured here has no outer border and is world-centred rather than China-centred.

Arguably, a tianxia order is more readily practised in worldwide higher education and knowledge than in relation to the worldwide political and economic order as a whole. This is partly because cross-border relations already play a larger role in higher education than in most other social sectors. It is also because higher education, like tianxia, binds people and institutions together on the basis of voluntarism, including shared activities and values, rather than the compulsions of market forces, state power, military or other coercive force. Despite the absence of compulsion, higher education and research organisations and agents constitute robust and expanding national and relations that reach into almost every country in the world, and are central to many societies.

How does this application of tianxia to worldwide higher education differ from concepts and practices of global higher education and globalisation? There are three main differences.

First, as indicated, in spatial terms ‘global’ refers to world-spanning and world-making phenomena, and ‘globalisation’ refers to processes of convergence and integration in the global scale. This scale is distinct from other scales such as the regional, national and local (Marginson 2022). Tianxia, the world as a whole, includes all phenomena in all scales.

Second, ‘global’ is a neutral geo-spatial term with no necessary implications for values or relational ethics. For example, the term is applied freely to global knowledge networks, global economic markets, global imperialism, global peace and global geo-political conflict. In global higher education there are hierarchical vertical relations and flat horizontal ones, centralisation and dispersal, heteronomy and autonomy, homogeneity and heterogeneity. Tianxia as discussed in this article has specific connotations for relational structures, values and relational ethics. It is open, decentralised and diverse, and it fosters all of autonomy, mutual support and harmony. In a tianxia higher education order, as suggested in this article, hierarchy is subordinated to equality of respect.

Third, global and tianxia carry differing historical baggage. Since the early 1990s ‘globalisation’ has become primarily associated with world markets and the Westernisation of culture, knowledge and education, in continuity with the colonial era. It is difficult to use ‘globalisation’ as a neutral geo-spatial term because of these associations. For some, tianxia carries with it the implication of China-centredness and national geo-strategic projects. However, tianxia is probably less weighed down by its historical baggage than is ‘globalisation’. It can help higher education to move beyond the limits set by the present neo-imperial Western global order, more so if it does not replace one centre with another.

Compared to a higher education order solely structured on the basis of nation-states, and grounded in neoliberal market competition and hierarchical rankings, a tianxia higher education order can realise greater benefits, more readily accessed and on a wider basis. The tianxia higher education heuristic allows us to think outside dualistic Western notions grounded in ‘possessive individualism’ (Macpherson 1962) that dominate present imaginings of global higher education – for example in university rankings – and divide, stratify and decisively reduce the total social benefits. Where the tianxia higher education heuristic connects to existing Western thought is in its parallels with counter-hegemonic sensibilities focused on a plural ‘ecology of knowledges’ (Santos 2014). Santos (2014) emphasises the need to close the ‘abyss’ between valued and unvalued knowledge. Tianxia has the same inclusive potentials.

Acknowledgements

We warmly thank the reviewers and editor for their time and helpful comments. An early version of this paper [Yang, L., Marginson, S., & Xu, X. (2022). Thinking through tianxia: A new/old heuristic for worldwide higher education (Yi ‘tianxia’ si tianxia: tianxia sixiang dui quanqiu gaodeng jiaoyu de xin qifa). Tsinghua Journal of Education (Tsinghua Daxue Jiaoyu Yanjiu) (2): 1-13.] was published in Chinese. This version was revised and submitted with permission from both Tsinghua Journal of Education and Globalisation, Societies and Education, and has been revised further during the peer review process. Some parts of the paper were presented at a Centre for Global Higher Education webinar. We thank the participant audience at the webinar for their helpful comments and questions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

The research was conducted in the ESRC/RE Centre for Global Higher Education, supported by the U.K. Economic and Social Research Council under grant number ES/T014768/1.

Notes

1 ‘溥天之下, 莫非王土; 率土之滨, 莫非王臣。’《诗经·小雅·北山》

2 ‘寡助之至, 亲戚畔之; 多助之至, 天下顺之。’《孟子·公孙丑下》

3 ‘天下一致而百虑, 同归而殊涂。’《易传》

4 ‘为政以德, 譬如北辰居其所, 而众星共之。’《论语·为政》

5 ‘管仲言于齐侯曰: 臣闻之, 招携以礼, 怀远以德, 德礼不易, 无人不怀。’《左传·僖公七年》