DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 I have argued that there are corporeal dimensions of autonomy (Wright Citation2022a, Citation2022b, Citation2022c). Marshall et al. (Citation2024) discuss the significance of the body to considerations of capacity and autonomy (in their case, they highlight the changes to the brains of opioid-dependent individuals), but they miss an opportunity to engage theoretically with how their case implicates bodily integrity interests when the forced intervention does not necessarily involve physical invasion (unless restraints are used), but instead controlling the patient’s use of their body (Beever Citation2015). Future scholarship should more fully explore the corporeality of decision-making capacity and autonomy.
2 Individuals exercise their autonomy relationally, and some scholars argue that law and medical practice should recognize and facilitate relational autonomy (Wright Citation2018; Wright Citation2019; Wright Citation2020). Marshall and colleagues’ (Citation2024) recommendation to turn patient relationships with family and friends into a tool to control the patient is a perverse recognition of the centrality of relationships to decision making, and if adopted will likely cause relational harm.
3 In the case of the patient-provider relationship in the emergency department, Marshall et al. (Citation2024) note that typically there is not an existing relationship.
4 If arguments about how opioid use disorder changes individuals’ brains are a basis for finding such individuals to lack capacity, how will such individuals regain capacity?.
5 For example, they state “these scenarios are about the tension between protecting the well-being of the patient (beneficence) while displaying respect for autonomous choice” (12).
Wright, M. S. 2022b. Supported decision making, treatment refusal, and decisional capacity. The American Journal of Bioethics 22 (11):89–91. doi: 10.1080/15265161.2022.2123989. Wright, M. S. 2022c. Against externalism: maintaining patient autonomy and the right to refuse medical treatment. The American Journal of Bioethics 22 (10):58–60. doi: 10.1080/15265161.2022.2110985. Marshall, K. D., A. R. Derse, S. G. Weiner, and J. W. Joseph. 2024. Revive and refuse: capacity, autonomy, and the refusal of care after opioid overdose. The American Journal of Bioethics 24 (5):11–24. doi: 10.1080/15265161.2023.2209534. Beever, A. 2015. What does tort law protect? Singapore Academy of Law Journal 27:626–42. Wright, M. S. 2018. End of life and autonomy: the case for relational nudges in end-of-life decision-making law and policy. Maryland Law Review 77 (4):1062–141. Wright, M. S. 2019. Dementia, healthcare decision making, and disability law. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics: A Journal of the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics 47 (4_suppl):25–33. doi: 10.1177/1073110519898040. Wright, M. S. 2020. Dementia, autonomy, and supported healthcare decision making. Maryland Law Review 79 (2):257–324. Marshall, K. D., A. R. Derse, S. G. Weiner, and J. W. Joseph. 2024. Revive and refuse: capacity, autonomy, and the refusal of care after opioid overdose. The American Journal of Bioethics 24 (5):11–24. doi: 10.1080/15265161.2023.2209534. Marshall, K. D., A. R. Derse, S. G. Weiner, and J. W. Joseph. 2024. Revive and refuse: capacity, autonomy, and the refusal of care after opioid overdose. The American Journal of Bioethics 24 (5):11–24. doi: 10.1080/15265161.2023.2209534. Additional information
Funding
The author(s) reported there is no funding associated with the work featured in this article.
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