Understanding the resurgence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

ABSTARCT

Between 2010 and 2021, Pakistan made significant strides in countering terrorism; however, the country is now grappling with a anotherwave of heightened terrorist activities following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has emerged as a major perpetrator of numerous attacks since then. Therefore, this study aims to examine the resurgence of TTP in Pakistan. While acknowledging the longstanding influence of structural factors such as socioeconomic and political marginalization, as well as state repression, in fostering and sustaining terrorist organizations, this study argues that these factors alone cannot fully account for the variations in terrorism or the survival mechanisms of different terrorist groups. By focusing on precipitant events, including the role of terrorist leadership, the consolidation of terrorist groups, external support, and the government’s negotiation strategies, this research seeks to establish these events as crucial explanatory variables for understanding the resurgence or revitalization of terrorist organizations like the TTP in Pakistan. The theoretical insights and empirical evidence on TTP presented in this study support the contention that precipitant events offer a more comprehensive explanatory framework for analysing the outcomes of such resurgences.

KEYWORDS:

• Pakistan
• terrorism
• Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
• Afghanistan
• counterterrorism

Introduction

Since its major military operation “Rah-e-Rast” in Swat in 2009, Pakistan has achieved significant success reducing terrorist attacks despite the period between 2008 and 2014 being intense in terms of terrorist incidents in Pakistan. For example, there were 2,347 terrorism-related incidents recorded in 2013 (SATP, 2023). Pakistan has suffered a massive loss of life, with more than 80,000 people dying as a result of terrorism during 2005–2013 (Iqbal, 2015). Kinetic measures, such as operations have resulted in a sudden increase in terrorist attacks since 2021. A range of factors are responsible for this, but a major one is state fragility in Afghanistan and instability in bordering regions in Pakistan. While many terrorists were killed because of security operations in Pakistan, thousands were also pushed into Afghanistan. In 2020, a United Nations report mentioned there were more than 6,000 terrorists in the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Afghanistan (Gannon, 2020). As the Afghan Taliban were regaining control of the country and marching towards Kabul in July 2021, they began releasing prisoners from jails, including thousands of imprisoned terrorists belonging to Al Qaeda, Islamic State and TTP (Ankel, 2021). Also, immediately after the takeover in August 2021, the Taliban released leaders of TTP who were prisoned by the Ghani government (Mir, 2022). Since then, TTP’s resurgence in Pakistan is visible not just through its increasing number of attacks inside Pakistan but also through other activities, for example extortion in Peshawar (Geo, 2022).

Pakistan’s terrorist problem has grown significantly since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021. This is already evident through an increasing number of attacks by various terrorist groups, including TTP. In an attack by TTP on 6 February 2022, five Pakistani soldiers were killed in the Kurram district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) (Hussain, 2022). In another attack on 18 January 2022, TTP allegedly attacked police officials in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. Since August 2021, when the Afghan Taliban took over in Afghanistan, Pakistan faces a sudden increase in terrorist attacks from 267 terrorist incidents in 2021 to 365 in 2022 (SATP, 2023). Pakistani hopes of tough action against TTP by the Afghan Taliban were dashed after they freed TTP militants from Afghan prisons. The Afghan Taliban’s success in Afghanistan is an important factor for the revival of TTP and its increasing effectiveness in perpetrating terrorism in Pakistan but is not the only one. Therefore, this article attempts to address an important question: what led to the resurgence of TTP after August 2021 and how is it complicating Pakistan’s terrorism challenge? To put it simply, what are the conditions that allowed the revival of TTP in Pakistan?

To answer this question, theoretical literature on terrorism has been reviewed to make sense of the revitalization of terrorist groups. The literature review highlights certain structural and precipitant factors that help to explain the resurgence of a terrorist group. Structural factors include a weak state and poor governance, understood as a state’s inability to maintain law and order, and provide the necessities of life for its people. Precipitant factors tend to consider aspects like leadership, an alliance between terrorist groups, negotiations with terrorist organizations, and state sponsorship as key factors for the resurgence of an organization and for it to survive and thrive. This study argues that structural factors are mainly static, so these do not explain violence-related variations, instead precipitant factors combine provide an enabling environment for a terrorist organization to survive and continue to perpetrate terrorist violence.

Theoretical debate: structural versus precipitant factors

Scholars find it hard to establish a direct causal relationship between terrorism and any singular factor, but they tend to agree on certain conditions that provide a conducive environment for the existence and expansion of terrorist organizations (Pilat, 2009). Specifically, scholars have identified several factors that are mainly structural to explain the occurrence of terrorism (Newman, 2006). Broader social, cultural, economic, or political environment defines structural factors that include rampant poverty, deep social inequality, and restrictions on political participation (Newman, 2006; Ross, 1993). Structural factors are also understood as poor governance (especially in weak or poor states), demographic issues (a bulging youth population), political exclusion, religious extremism, structural disparities or structural violence. For instance, a study found that [s]tates with poor governance; ethnic, cultural, or religious tensions; weak economies; and porous borders will be prime breeding ground for terrorism’ (NIR, 2000).

States with poor governance structures tend to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the population which in turn provides support for terrorism. O’Neill argued that “states that lack legitimacy and control over the economy and other traditional levers of power provide the space and oxygen for terrorists groups to flourish” (O’Neill, 2002: p. 20). A state’s legitimacy in the eyes of its population is highly contingent upon its effective governance or the services it provides (Collins, 2011). Bereketeab contends that states’ capability and willingness “to provide efficient, regular, equitable and just social services would proportionally increase their level of legitimacy” (2020, 60). Crenshaw observed that “legitimacy of the regime inhibits violence” (Crenshaw, 1981: p. 381). In addition, weak and poor states face serious human development challenges, characterized as structural factors, which has a correlation with terrorism (O’Neill, 2002: p. 20).

Structural violence and state repression generate support for terrorism. O’Neill contends that “[t]errorist leaders seek support from people who feel humiliated, threatened, aggrieved and without help” (O’Neill, 2002: p. 11). Similarly, Gunaratna (2002) argues that terrorism grows in environments of bad governance, corruption and human rights violations. Therefore, addressing structural issues is essential to prevent the resurgence of terrorist groups and support for terrorism (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2003; Simon, 2003). Explaining the role of structural conditions in perpetuating terrorism, Steinberg believes that “in the long run, terrorist networks will reconstitute themselves unless we make it harder for them to recruit new members and sustain their activities” (Steinberg, 2002). Ross argued that “the higher the number and intensity of structural causes of terrorism (the independent variables), the higher the number of terrorist acts perpetrated by any particular terrorist or terrorist organization (the dependent variables)” (Ross, 1993: p. 318). However, recognizing the importance of structural factors, scholar have argued that these factors may provide underlying conditions for terrorism, but they are insufficient to explain or predict terrorist attacks (Pilat, 2009: p. 173; Roy; Ross, 1993: p. 320). Therefore, precipitant events need to be examined more closely to account for the resurgence of terrorist organizations.

Martha Crenshaw defines precipitant as “specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism” stating further that these precipitants “directly inspire and motivate terrorist campaigns” (Crenshaw, 1981: p. 381). Precipitant factors are generally understood as things like leadership, availability of financial resources, state sponsorship, and continued political instability that act more like a catalyst (Newman, 2006). This study has paid close attention to the precipitant factors such as leadership role and organizational strategies, reuniting of TTP with the core organization, government negotiations with TTP and state sponsorship in the form of ideological and material support from the Afghan Taliban to explain resurgence of the group in Pakistan followed by a ferocious violent campaign.

The TTP’s emergence

TTP is largely a product of the “War on Terror” and the local dynamics in ex-FATA which was a semi-autonomous region until 2017. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US and its NATO allies attacked Afghanistan in December 2001, and it led to a quick defeat of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. However, many Taliban leaders and Al Qaeda terrorists took refuge across the Durand Line in ex-FATA and Baluchistan (Gunaratna & Nielsen, 2008). Back then, ex-FATA was not merged with KP, and the state of Pakistan did not enjoy a full control as local tribal laws and customs drove inter-tribal relations and people’s lives (Khan, 2011).

Pakistani veterans of the Afghan jihad and many local militants who had fought alongside the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s welcomed and provided protection to their fellow Pashtuns from Afghanistan and Al Qaeda militants, who later began attacking US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan. After facing a significant pressure from the United States, the Pakistani military ultimately entered its forces in ex-FATA for the first time since independence in 1947 to hunt down foreign militants, particularly members of Al Qaeda (Wilson and Akhtar, 2019). The military operations created deep resentment among the local Pashtun tribes who viewed these attacks as an infringement of their autonomy and violation of their local traditions. Local militants, many of whom had fought in Afghanistan with their Pashtun Taliban brethren, and shared their Deobandi radicalism, began to organize to fight the Pakistani Army. Local fighters who fought along the Afghan Taliban and shared radical ideology with Al-Qaeda violently reacted to these security operations. This eventually brought most local groups together to confront the Pakistani state and its security forces.

TTP was established in December 2007 as an umbrella organization with Baitullah Mehsud as its leader with the approval of 40 Taliban leaders from the ex-FATA (Abbas, 2008; Akhtar, 2019). Fighting against NATO forces in Afghanistan and launching defensive Jihad in opposition to the Pakistani military’s operations in ex-FATA were the initial stated objectives of TTP. Most importantly, the TTP’s goal is to overthrow the secular Pakistani state and replace with an Islamic state according to its radicalized Deobandi ideology. The Pakistani state has long nurtured Deoband militant groups, such as the Afghan Taliban and Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islam among others to achieve policy objectives in Afghanistan and Indian Kashmir, respectively. It is worth highlighting that the ideology of Deobandi jihadi groups such as TTP and others has been largely inspired by the Salafism exported from the Gulf States (Abbas, 2014). TTP has ideological and operational links with Al Qaeda. TTP also established close links with other militant groups in Pakistan such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and other Punjab-based Deobandi militants, also known as the Punjabi Taliban (Hussain, 2013).

TTP received much attention when it established control in different parts of ex-FATA and some parts of the Malakand Division during 2009 and 2010. TTP recruits largely come from Pashtuns residing in ex-FATA and KP and from other parts of Pakistan such as Karachi, having significant Pashtun community. TTP is the deadliest organization among all militant jihadi organizations operating in Pakistan. TTP’s terrorism over the last decade has caused most deaths in Pakistan. In 2012 alone, the TTP is estimated to have killed at least minimum 1,000 Pakistanis (Kaltenthaler & Miller, 2015: p. 942). The TTP’s attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar in December 2014, which killed almost 141 people including 132 children, isregarded as one of its most vicious attacks (Roberts, 2017). In addition, TTP adopted an indiscriminate approach towards violence while targeting civilians. This approach turned public support towards military operations against the organization (Boone, 2015). Despite being considered one of “the gravest internal threats” to Pakistan’s security, TTP suffered serious setbacks in terms of organizational strength and operational capability – because of various external and internal factors (Jadoon & Mahmood, 2018).

TTP emerged as the largest militant organization fighting against the Pakistani state. However, various military operations including “Operation Zarb-e-Azb” launched in June 2014 severely curtailed its operational capability by dismantling the financial and organizational structure (Abbas, 2021; Akhtar, 2019). While Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched following the TTP’s attack on the Karachi airport in June 2014, it increased in intensity after the TTP’s attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar in December 2014 (Afzal, 2021). Reportedly, the Pakistani military killed nearly 3,500 TTP fighters in this operation (Ghazanfar, 2016). During 2015–2019, the military courts in Pakistan convicted 641 people, including 345 who received death sentences (Zubair, 2019). In addition, US drone attacks have significantly contributed to the success of this campaign by “decapitating” the TTP leadership (Abbas, 2013). The weakening of TTP led to a considerable decline in terrorists’ violence in Pakistan, evident by the decreasing number of organization’s attacks in 2015, dropping by 33% compared to 2014 (START, 2018).

The overall strength of TTP was further degraded because of schisms and infighting when Fazalulla, who was from outside the Mehsud tribe, was appointed the leader of the group after the death of then-TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud in a 2013 drone attack. Following the change of the leadership, TTP disintegrated into several factions and most of the leadership and members took refuge across the border in eastern Afghanistan (Khattak, 2020). A group known as Jamaat-ul-Ahrar was founded after splintering from the main organization. In addition, several TTP commanders shifted their allegiance to the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) in late 2014 when Hafiz Saeed from TTP Orakzai chapter became its first head (Jadoon & Mahmood, 2018: p. 22).

Despite serious losses to operational capability since 2014, and suffering from internecine conflicts leading to breakaway factions, the organization has managed to conduct periodic attacks against the Pakistani state from its sanctuaries inside Afghanistan. For example, during the 2018 national elections campaign in Pakistan, TTP conducted a series of attacks against politicians (Khan, 2018; Reuters, 2019). Additionally, TTP targeted the national polio drive in Pakistan by attacking health workers and their police escorts, characterizing the immunization campaigns as a Western conspiracy. TTP conducted several attacks in April 2019 against health workers in the Bannu and Buner districts in KP, and in Quetta, Balochistan, which halted the government’s national polio vaccination campaign (Shams, 2019). Two police officers escorting a vaccination team were targeted by TTP militants in December 2019 in Lower Dir District, KP (TRT, 2019). TTP’s total attacks in ex-FATA and KP increased to 21 and 28 in 2019 and 2020, respectively, compared to a low of only 12 attacks in 2018 (Jadoon, 2021: p. 12). Most of these attacks have targeted Pakistani security personnel, the police especially, although the number of fatalities has been generally low (Farmer & Tipu Mehsud, 2020). While maintaining its presence in the terrorist landscape of Pakistan, in the following years TTP has vigorously attempted to regain its lost strength.

The resurgence of TTP

Scholars have acknowledged the significance of structural factors in elucidating the genesis and durability of terrorist organizations. Nonetheless, these factors, characterized by their static nature, are inadequate in providing comprehensive explanations for the resurgence of terrorist groups. The subsequent section examines the influence of structural factors in the ex-FATA and their role in the resurgence of TTP. However, an analysis of these factors reveals their persistent and unchanging nature, thereby rendering them insufficient to account for TTP’s resurgence.

Structural factors

This section examines how far structural factors are important in explaining the TTP’s resurgence since the Afghan Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan in August 2021. Despite ex-FATA’s merger with KP, there remains key governance-related challenges in which local grievances have remained unaddressed. The state has also failed to deal with the TTP dilemma, demonstrated by the recent negotiations between the state and TTP, brokered by the Haqqani faction of the Afghan Taliban. This can be seen as a sign of weakness of the Pakistani state. Its writ and legitimacy have been challenged by TTP in various parts of KP. For example, the group has been able to collect extortion money not just in ex-FATA areas but also in KP’s provincial capital, Peshawar (Geo, 2022).

Enduring governance challenges and grievances in ex-FATA

Poor governance in ex-FATA remains entrenched even after its integration into KP. The process of introducing state institutions in the previously semi-autonomous region has been very slow. For decades, FATA has experienced political marginalization and socio-economic underdevelopment (Wazir Khan, 2014). The Pakistani state administered FATA through a semi-autonomous structure which was originally established by the British government with political agents (civil bureaucrats) and local leadership called Maliks at the helm of affairs. The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) provided a legal framework which deprived FATA residents from any meaningful political participation and fundamental rights, and played a key role in pushing people and FATA towards terrorism (Zeb Ahmed, 2019).

In terms of socio-economic development, the FATA region suffered more compared to other parts of the country, partly due to the long-held semi-autonomous status of the region and partly due to poor funding of successive governments in Pakistan from 1947. The region’s socio-economic development conditions further degraded as it experienced a nearly two-decades long insurgency and counterinsurgency operation. Currently, the poverty-stricken region offers little in terms of public services such as health care, education, and employment. Reportedly, two-thirds of the FATA’s overall population live in poverty (Ahmed, 2016). In addition, a UN report highlights that FATA ranks lowest among Pakistan’s 18 regions in terms of human development indicators (Khan et al., 2021: p. 3).

It was long believed that the semi-autonomous status and the weak writ of the Pakistani state in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas was mainly responsible for insurgency and terrorism in the region (ICG, 2018). Therefore, integration of the FATA into the mainstream Pakistani state was proposed as a solution to end the socio-economic and political grievances of the people in an attempt to address the terrorism challenge.¹ In August 2016, a committee on FATA reforms, set up by the then-prime minister Nawaz Sharif, proposed the merger of FATA with the adjacent province, KP, in “a gradual and phased approach”, revoking the Frontier Crimes Regulations (ICG, 2018: p. 10). Following these recommendations, on 28 May 2018, the former FATA was merged with the neighbouring province of KP through an amendment made by the parliament to the country’s constitution.² In the words of one major daily newspaper’s editorial: “History has been made. FATA is no more […] the people of the region now have formal access to the constitutional and political rights that are legally available to all citizens of Pakistan” (Dawn, 2018b).

Following the merger, the extension of the formal judicial system to the integrated areas, now called the Newly Merged Districts (or NMDs), started in March 2019 but the process has faced numerous challenges. The introduction of the FATA Interim Governance Regulations (2018) to serve as a legal framework during the transition period allowed the government to continue with the previous authoritarian practices which were opposed by the people. On legal grounds, the Peshawar High Court declared the interim regulations in violation of the constitution (Khan et al., 2021: p. 6). In a January 2019 ruling, the Supreme Court of Pakistan reiterated that the people of the newly formed districts must be treated according to the law of the land. In addition, the Supreme Court ordered the KP government to build the necessary infrastructure within six months to pave the way for a uniform court system in the newly integrated areas. However, the pace of implementing judicial reforms remains glacial.

A permanent military presence in the region, even after the integration, has frustrated the local population. There are reports of widespread human rights violations by security forces (Farmer, 2019). Local communities are unhappy with the permanent deployment of military troops in FATA. The maltreatment by these forces involves frequent inspections, harsh attitude of soldiers towards the civilian population and security checkpoints established every few kilometres. These checkpoints are managed by soldiers from other parts of the country with little knowledge of local Pashtun culture or its traditions. Body searches of locals, especially women, by the soldiers are viewed as humiliating (ICG, 2018). Grievances of local communities, particularly in South and North Waziristan districts, are grave. The residents of these two districts have complained that their houses and businesses were not rebuilt after military operations in which they were destroyed (Sayeed & Shah, 2017: p. 18). Not only has the FATA merger into the neighbouring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province not ended peoples’ miseries and suffering, more modest practical steps regarding legal, administrative, and financial matters to facilitate integration are not forthcoming, only further exacerbating public frustration (Ali, 2018; Malik & Asrar, 2019). These enduring governance-related challenges in the ex-FATA region remained mostly static and therefore do not explain the increase of violence or TTP’s resurgence. This paper focuses more on precipitant events to explain the resurgence of TTP.

Precipitant factors

Our analysis underscores the significance of structural factors in providing an enabling environment for the growth and sustenance of terrorist organizations. However, it is important to recognize that these conditions alone are insufficient to account for their resurgence. The examination of precipitant factors reveals their pivotal role in the revitalization of terrorist groups, as evidenced by the ensuing discussion. This paper focuses on several key precipitant factors, namely the leadership and organizational strategies of TTP, the consolidation of splinter groups under the TTP’s leadership, the provision of ideological and material support by the Afghan Taliban following their triumph in Afghanistan, as well as the Pakistani government’s engagement in negotiations with TTP. Additionally, the impact of the Afghan Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan is explored in depth as a significant precipitant factor.

The role of leadership and organizational strategies

A review of theoretical literature on leadership exhibits how terrorist leaders make the organization effective in its terrorist campaign by providing motivation to followers and adopting various strategies. Theoretical insights from literature on leadership vividly inform the significance of this factor for the success of any social movement. Leadership is quite crucial to most forms of social movement because “[l]eaders are critical to social movements: they inspire commitment, mobilize resources, create and recognize opportunities, devise strategies, frame demands, and influence outcomes” (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004: p. 171).

Terrorist leaders play multifaceted roles within their organizations, employing various strategies to fulfill their objectives. Michael Freeman posits that terrorist leaders primarily fulfill two key functions: inspiring organization members and providing operational guidance (Freeman, 2014: p. 667). The ability of terrorist leaders to inspire and motivate their followers is crucial. Given the collective action problem inherent in many terrorist organizations, where benefits are shared collectively while costs are borne individually, a charismatic leader resolves this dilemma by motivating individuals to sacrifice for the collective vision rather than for personal gain (Freeman, 2014). Moreover, a charismatic leader possesses the capacity to “provide vision and a sense of mission, instill pride within the group, and earn respect and trust” (Humphreys & Einstein, 2003: p. 86). The formulation of an ideological vision also serves to motivate followers, thereby mitigating the challenges posed by the collective action problem (Bryman, 1996: pp. 281–282). An ideology functions as an intellectual framework expressed in both descriptive and normative terms, elucidating the “world as it is and as it ought to be” (Willner & Willner, 1965: p. 79). In addition to motivating their followers, terrorist leaders are responsible for developing organizational strategies and implementing them to achieve group objectives, strengthen the organization, and establish external connections (Weinstein, 2007). This form of operational management encompasses strategic planning, tactical considerations, and addressing organizational concerns. While an ideology primarily defines the overarching end goals, it is equally important to devise operational strategies to attain these desired outcomes, often centred around the use of violence (Mintzberg, 1975). The decision to employ violence becomes a strategic choice, addressing how it should be employed and identifying the targets of such actions.

Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud has reinvigorated the organization by improving internal discipline and issuing guidelines to limit attacks against civilians, among others changes (Sayed & Hamming, 2021: p. 29). The TTP’s indiscriminate targeting in the past drew heavy criticism from the Pakistani public which translated into support for the military operations against the group, thus contributing to the decline of the organization. Noor Wali Mehsud emerged as a new leader of TTP after the death of Mullah Fazlullah in June 2018 in Kunar province, Afghanistan, because of a US drone strike. With Noor Wali becoming TTP’s new chief, the leadership of the organization again returned to the Mehsud tribe. Before Wali became the leader, TTP faced serious setbacks due to internecine conflict and military onslaughts. Hence, Wali introduced various reforms to rectify the previous mistakes that brought the organization down, and that helped to consolidate the group’s internal cohesion and strength.

Noor Wali, known as a religious scholar with significant influence in jihadi circles, has played a prominent role in TTP. He previously held positions overseeing the group’s operations in Karachi and its publication cell. In his book “The Mehsud Revolution in South Waziristan: From British Raj to Oppressive America”, published in November 2017, Wali claimed that TTP was responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, former Prime Minister of Pakistan, in 2007 in Rawalpindi (Jadoon & Mahmood, 2018: p. 22). To consolidate his leadership and establish legitimacy, Wali orchestrated several terrorist attacks in July 2018, targeting Pakistani politicians. These attacks included the suicide bombing that resulted in the death of Haroon Bilour, a leader of the Awami National Party, in Peshawar (Khan 2018). TTP labelled the attack as “revenge for the previous government” (Firdous & Khattak, 2018). Another suicide attack in Dera Ismail Khan claimed the life of Ikram Ullah Gandapur, a political leader of the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (Seemab, 2018). Furthermore, in September 2018, TTP released an Urdu-language document titled “The Code of Conduct: For the Mujahideen of Tehrik-i-Taliban”, outlining their intentions to improve the organization’s strategy, structure, handling of defections, martyrdom operations, and target selection (Jadoon & Mahmood, 2018: p. 22).

Under Noor Wali’s leadership, TTP has undergone organizational changes, shifting from a loosely organized central structure to a more tightly controlled centralized structure, emulating the Afghan Taliban model. This transition has empowered the central command, strengthening the central leadership while diminishing the power of local leaders. The lack of tight central control was a contributing factor to the group’s fragmentation in 2014. In 2022, TTP introduced a shadow structure, consisting of nine shadow provinces and key central organizational units, giving the leadership council the highest authority to appoint shadow ministers (Sayed 2021). Various shadow ministries were established, including information and broadcasting, political affairs, defence, accountability, education, finance, and welfare, along with a General Directorate of Intelligence, a suicide brigade and training camp, a three-layer court system, and an institute of “Islamic” jurisprudence (Sayed & Hamming, 2023: p. 4).

The TTP’s attacks have not only increased in frequency but have also expanded geographically, targeting the ex-FATA and major cities in Pakistan. However, the primary targets of these attacks have been the country’s security forces. The number of terrorist attacks by TTP witnessed a significant surge from 2020 to 2022 from monthly average of 14.5 in 2020 to 45.8 in 2022 (Sayed & Hamming, 2023: p. 5). The acquisition of modern weapons, such as sniper rifles and carbines, occurred following the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and the subsequent collapse of the Ashraf Ghani-led government (Rehman, 2023).

Under Noor Wali’s leadership, TTP has issued instructions and guidelines in 2018, 2022, and 2023, aiming to limit terrorist attacks to government functionaries and security forces, thus reducing civilian casualties compared to their previous policy of indiscriminate targeting (Sayed, 2023: p. 5). Despite the increase in terrorist attacks, this approach has resulted in a notable decrease in civilian deaths due to suicide attacks. The previous policy of indiscriminate targeting led to significant civilian losses, which eroded public support for the group and facilitated military operations against them. The TTP’s survival was jeopardized by military attacks between 2014 and 2016, leading the leadership to seek refuge across the border in Afghanistan. To avoid past mistakes, TTP adopted a more selective strategy of suicide attacks in 2018, which underwent further refinement in subsequent years. Currently, the planning of suicide operations falls under the jurisdiction of the central suicide brigade and requires approval from the emir and his deputy. These measures have facilitated attacks against security forces while minimizing civilian casualties (Sayed & Hamming, 2021).

Under Wali’s leadership the group’s activities have expanded beyond KP. TTP has carried out attacks in the capital, Islamabad, as well as in Sindh, Punjab, and Balochistan provinces. In 2023, a senior officer of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was targeted and killed in Punjab. Additionally, Balochistan has experienced numerous TTP attacks, with most casualties occurring in Quetta. The group claimed responsibility for 11 terrorist attacks in Balochistan during the first three months of 2023. Following the ceasefire’s end on 28 November 2022, TTP claimed two suicide attacks between 30 November 2022, and 17 February 2023, primarily targeting police, military, and paramilitary forces (Sayed & Hamming, 2023: p. 6). The TTP’s ability to attract other terrorist groups to unite in their fight against Pakistan also remains a significant concern.

Splinter groups uniting under TTP

The existing theoretical literature emphasizes the significance of terrorist groups forming alliances or merging with one another, as it potentially enhances their organizational resilience and operational effectiveness in carrying out terrorist violence. Research by Horowitz and Potter (2014) suggests that when terrorist groups unite around a central organization, they become more operationally effective, leading to greater longevity for the main group. Additionally, alliances have been found to assist terrorist organizations in surviving leadership losses and enduring hostile environments (Phillips, 2014; Price, 2012). Other studies have found that alliances substantially contribute to the survival of terrorist groups and enhance their capabilities and lethality (Horowitz & Potter, 2014; Phillips, 2014).

The motivations driving terrorist groups to unite and form alliances are an important subject of inquiry. Bacon (2018, 3) argues that organizational needs, shared identity characteristics, and trust serve as significant factors that prompt different terrorist groups to join forces in their struggle. When organizations face weakness and struggle to revive on their own, they seek cooperation from other groups as a means of survival. The relationship between groups further strengthens when they find ideological alignment and can support one another in terms of organizational development. Trust also plays a crucial role in fostering closer cooperation and collaboration between groups. Empirical evidence suggests that mutual benefits are a motivating factor for different groups to form alliances. Mendelsohn (2016) examined Al Qaeda’s strategy of creating alliances with other terrorist groups, finding that the organization sought alliances as a response to its decline. Similarly, Byman (2014) discovered that Al Qaeda’s strategy of developing alliances enabled the organization to expand the scope and scale of its operations, gain local expertise, disseminate innovations more effectively, and, most importantly, enhance its legitimacy and mission.

Under the leadership of Noor Wali Mehsud, the group has not only revived its operational networks but increased its numerical strength. TTP has reunited with its breakaway factions which has increased its overall numbers and power. Mehsud became the TTP’s head after the death of Mullah Fazlullah in 2018 (Mehsud, 2018). Hailing from the Mehsud tribe, Noor Wali attracted militant groups belonging to his tribe who had parted ways from TTP after Fazalullah became the leader around 2009. Hassan Abbas notes, “the return of a Mehsud as the TTP leader […] persuaded many disgruntled Mehsud tribesmen […] to return to the TTP fold” (cited in Jadoon, 2021: p. 15). Most importantly, members of the Hakimullah Mehsud group led by Mukhlis Yar have rejoined TTP (Khattak, 2020). In addition, several other breakaway factions, including Jammat ul Ahrar (JuA) and Hizb-ul-Ahrar (HuA), rejoined TTP in August 2020 and pledged allegiance to the current TTP leader (Khattak, 2020). Both Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Hizb-ul-Ahrar proved lethal in carrying out deadly attacks within Pakistan in recent years (Raleigh et al., 2010). Hizb-ul-Ahrar carried out a suicide attack on a well-known Sufi shrine (Data Ganj Bakhsh Hajveri) in Lahore in May 2019 and targeted a mosque in Quetta in January 2020 (Bukhari, 2019; Satar, 2020).

The process of unification continued unabated. Several Punjabi Taliban groups, such as the Amjad Farouqi group, having strong links with Al Qaeda, and the Usman Saifullah group, a breakaway faction of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), pledged allegiance to the TTP leadership (UNSC, 2020). These factions played a crucial role in the formation and expansion of TTP. About these mergers, Jadoon observed, “cooperation between groups can often enhance groups’ longevity and their ability to plan and execute deadly operations” (2021, 14). After the process of reunification and consolidation, involvement of TTP has increased in extortion, intimidation, and targeted attacks in Pakistan’s border areas near Afghanistan (Mohammad & Noorzai, 2020). Analyst Daud Khattak reports that TTP has increased their activities in some districts of the FATA, in particular Waziristan and Bajaur, by getting involved “in resolving local disputes, forcing people to pay protection money and targeting those believed to be their opponents” (Abbas, 2021: p. 45). These tactics were used by TTP more than a decade ago when it first became a powerful force.

With the joining of two Al Qaeda affiliates, JuA and HuA, and a LeJ faction, TTP has created an opportunity to inflict terror attacks beyond its traditional stronghold in the FATA tribal district, such as in Punjab and the provincial capitals of Baluchistan and Sindh as well as Quetta and Karachi, where these groups previously enjoyed a strong presence. The group claimed to carry out a suicide bombing attack in a luxury hotel in Quetta on 21 April 2021. The attack killed four people, however, the intended target was China’s ambassador to Pakistan who remained unharmed (Shah, 2021). A scholar has aptly described the current TTP threat clearly: “TTP, even with its diminished capacity, will continue to pose a threat to the Pakistani state and its civilians as long as it propagates its extremist ideology and continues to recruit and conduct attacks within the country” (Jadoon, 2021: p. 21).

The consolidation of TTP through reorganization and the merger of splinter groups has significantly strengthened the group’s operational capacity, resulting in a notable increase in terrorist attacks. A United Nations (UN) report from February 2021 highlighted that these mergers have “enhanced the strength of the TTP and led to a sharp increase in attacks in the region”. One member state reported that the TTP was responsible for over 100 cross-border attacks between July and October 2020. The report also indicated that member state assessments of TTP’s fighting strength ranged between 2,500 and 6,000 (UN, 2021: p. 16). Data compiled by Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming showed that TTP carried out a total of 149 attacks in 2020. Specifically, from January 1 to 5 July 2020, TTP conducted 48 attacks. However, following the initiation of the unification process, an additional 101 attacks were carried out by TTP from July 6 to 31 December 2020 (Sayed & Hamming, 2021: p. 35).

To revitalize its campaign against the Pakistani state, TTP has sought to expand its support base. In addition to its focus on military and government targets, TTP has aimed to attract ethnic groups such as the Balochi by highlighting their grievances and commending their struggle against the Pakistani state (Sayed & Hamming, 2021: p. 36). TTP has urged the Pakistani population to support its mission of eliminating corrupt elites and implementing Sharia law, which it argues is the fundamental purpose of the country’s establishment. Moreover, TTP has expressed support for the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), despite the PTM’s anti-Taliban stance. The emergence of the PTM as a civil movement representing ethnic Pashtuns reflects the discontent of local communities with government policies. By advocating for the constitutional rights of Pashtuns, PTM has gained support from disenchanted youth in the region. The TTP has attempted to exploit these grievances to recruit individuals who sympathize with its struggle against the Pakistani state. In a propaganda video released in 2019, the TTP’s media wing featured interviews with residents of ex-FATA districts who blamed the Pakistani military for extrajudicial killings and forced displacement (Jadoon, 2021: p. 13).

Ideological and material gains from the Afghan Taliban’s success in Afghanistan

Foreign sponsorship plays a pivotal role in the survival and cohesiveness of terrorist organizations. The provision of resources and support by states significantly extends the lifespan of these groups. State sponsorship typically involves the supply of weapons, financial aid, training facilities, and territorial sanctuaries, allowing terrorist organizations to organize, plan, communicate, recruit, and operate with relative security (Byman, 2020: p. 2). Numerous studies highlight the importance of state sponsorship in sustaining terrorist groups. It is widely acknowledged that external support from governments is necessary to ensure the survival of these organizations, which often lack self-generated resources (Mickolus, 1989). Sponsors contribute vital resources, including monetary assistance, training facilities, weaponry, and safe havens, which enhance the capacity of terrorist groups to carry out their activities effectively. Financial resources are particularly critical for the operations and endurance of terrorist groups, given the asymmetrical nature of their conflicts. Terrorist organizations typically face significant resource disadvantages compared to their target states. State sponsorship helps bridge this gap, enabling groups to overcome logistical and financial challenges (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2007; Kydd & Walter, 2006). Moreover, state sponsorship not only supports a group’s external activities but also contributes to its internal functioning. A sponsored group is less likely to disintegrate and can incentivize its members to remain committed and loyal (Carter, 2012). The availability of resources allows the group to offer tangible benefits to its members, such as financial support, training opportunities, and other incentives, fostering intra-group unity (Levitt, 2006). The significance of state sponsorship extends beyond the material realm. It also presents challenges for counterterrorism efforts. The provision of territorial sanctuaries by sponsoring states allows terrorist groups to establish bases for planning, training, and ensuring their survival (Carter, 2012).

Before the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, Islamabad had repeatedly accused the Ashraf Ghani-led government in Afghanistan and Indian intelligence operatives for sheltering anti-Pakistan militant groups in Afghanistan (Shahzad, 2021). Hence, it was a natural expectation that a friendly regime, in the shape of the Afghan Taliban, would help resolve Pakistan’s terrorism problem by countering anti-Pakistan elements in Afghanistan (Abbas & Ahmed, 2021). These expectations, however, proved wrong after the collapse of the Ghani government in the wake of the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and the closure of India’s diplomatic missions there. The Afghan Taliban released hundreds of TTP operatives, including the group’s deputy leader Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, from the Afghan jails. Faqir vowed to impose sharia in Pakistan (Shah, 2021). TTP rejoiced over the release of its members by welcoming them in huge motor rallies in eastern Afghanistan. TTP enjoys complete operational freedom in Afghanistan since the Taliban’s takeover (Sayed, 2021). While in exile in Afghanistan, TTP leaders have managed to build relationships with the Taliban, demonstrated by an alliance to and “patronage by the Afghanistan Taliban” (Mir, 2022). This has become a significant part of the TTP problem for Pakistan. Previously Pakistan used to blame others, mainly India and the US presence in Afghanistan, for creating TTP (Mir, 2022).

TTP leaders renewed their pledge of allegiance to the Afghan Taliban and vowed to establish shariah in Pakistan, following in the footsteps of the Afghan Taliban. The Taliban takeover of Kabul has generally bolstered local militants in Pakistan including supporters of the TTP. The radical religious cleric, Maulana Abdul Aziz, head of the infamous Red Mosque in Islamabad and abettor of TTP, hoisted the Afghan Taliban flags in Islamabad after the Taliban victory in Afghanistan. He threatened Pakistani authorities with reprisals if they tried to remove them (Shah, 2021). The TTP’s leadership has declared they will seek to emulate the Afghan Taliban model, bringing a similar revolution to the Pakistani landscape. With the Afghan Taliban in power in Afghanistan in August 2021, TTP has accelerated its violent campaign. TTP perpetrated 32 attacks in August followed by 37 in September 2021. These are believed to be the highest number of monthly attacks carried out by the group in the last few years (Jadoon & Sayed, 2021). The number of suicide attacks has also increased significantly. Most of the attacks have been carried out against security forces, indicating the revival of the insurgency. Brian Glyn Williams, Islamic History Professor at the University of Massachusetts states that “[t]he Afghan Taliban’s stunning success in defeating the American superpower has emboldened the Pakistani Taliban […] They now seem to believe they too can wage a successful Jihad against the Pakistani ‘infidel’ state and have returned to insurgency mode” (Gannon, 2021).

The TTP militants have effectively used their sanctuaries in Afghanistan to unleash a massive wave of terrorism in Pakistan. Following the upsurge of TTP’s terrorist attacks against the security forces, the Pakistani government has repeatedly complained to the Afghan Taliban-led regime about TTP’s safe havens in Afghanistan, but the Taliban regime has not acted against the terrorist group. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2022, Pakistan’s prime minister, Shehbaz Sharif, expressed his serious concerns about “the threat posed by the major terrorist groups operating from Afghanistan, especially Islamic State, ISIL-K and TTP, as well as al-Qaeda, ETIM, and IMU” (Yousaf, 2022).

TTP has continued to use the Afghan soil under the Afghan Taliban government to spread terror in Pakistan without impunity. TTP abrogated five-month-long ceasefire agreement with the Pakistani government brokered by the Afghan Taliban on November 28 that accelerated TTP’s terrorist violence (Khan, 2022). TTP has further tapped the growing tensions between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban over the Kabul consistent refusal to accept the Durand Line as the international border. The border clashes between two countries’ security forces and Pakistan’s unpopularity in Afghanistan manifested in a cricket match in September 2022 has deepened mistrust and enmity further, making the Afghan Taliban less likely to take stern action against TTP. In addition, the TTP’s agenda of establishing Islamic Sharia in the former tribal areas has gained traction and support among some of the Afghan Taliban leaders (Rana, 2022). Ideological and logistic support from the Afghan regime allowed the TTP militants to continue to enjoy their sanctuaries in Afghanistan and to plan and execute terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. A state’s response to terrorists and their demands are also very crucial in determining whether the group thrives or diminishes in its capacity.

Negotiations with TTP: a sign of state weakness?

A comprehensive analysis of theoretical literature emphasizes the complex dynamics surrounding negotiations with terrorist groups and their potential implications. There is a prevailing consensus among scholars that engaging in negotiations with terrorists carries significant risks and may not yield substantial progress in resolving conflicts (Alexander, 2002; Narveson, 1991; Neumann, 2007; Wilkinson, 2001). Negotiating with terrorists is seen as conferring legitimacy upon them, their goals, and their methods, which can potentially fuel further acts of terrorism (Toros, 2008: p. 408). Laqueur (1987) argues that appeasing terrorists grants them recognition and emboldens them to continue their violent activities. Crenshaw (1983) highlights the power of terrorism in gaining political legitimacy and discrediting the legitimacy of the government. Engaging terrorists in negotiations is not without its drawbacks. Such negotiations may grant legitimacy to terrorist methods, undermining peaceful actors who pursue political change through non-violent means. Additionally, negotiations can destabilize the political systems of the negotiating government, undermine international efforts to condemn terrorism, and set a dangerous precedent (Neumann, 2007: p. 128). The flexibility shown during negotiations may be interpreted as an acceptance of violence as a legitimate means, potentially encouraging other groups to adopt terrorist tactics (Narveson, 1991).

Despite these concerns, some scholars argue in favour of engaging terrorists in negotiations. Proponents contend that by involving them in a political process, there is an opportunity for terrorists to renounce violence and pursue their political objectives through non-violent means (Ignatieff, 2004; Weinberg & Pedahzur, 2003; Woodhouse et al., 2003). Negotiations can provide a platform for terrorists to express their grievances non-violently, addressing the root causes that drive them towards violence. Furthermore, engagement may empower non-violent factions within terrorist groups, contributing to the transformation of the broader movement (Ignatieff, 2004; Woodhouse et al., 2003). The arguments put forth by proponents suggest that recognizing and accepting terrorist demands may offer potential avenues for conflict resolution (Ignatieff, 2004). However, it is crucial to acknowledge that the Pakistani state’s strategy of negotiating with terrorists has not yielded favourable outcomes, highlighting the complexities and challenges involved in such processes. Further research and analysis are necessary to fully understand the implications and efficacy of negotiating with terrorists in different contexts.

The Pakistani government had previously used negotiations as a strategy with TTP, but it was hardly successful. Nine agreements were signed between the government and the militants; however, these agreements failed due to violations from both sides (Khattak, 2012). TTP benefited from these peace agreements as they allowed the organization to earn much-needed legitimacy and to grow in terms of size, and financial and military capabilities (Akhtar, 2019). The last time the Nawaz Sharif government attempted negotiations with TTP, in 2014, failed because of continued violence from the group when it attacked Jinnah International Airport in Karachi. The government finally launched “Operation Zarb-e-Azb” in North Waziristan to eliminate them.

With the Afghan Taliban capture of Kabul in August 2021, the Pakistani government once again considered negotiations as part of a strategy to deal with TTP. Most importantly, the Afghan Taliban’s unwillingness to act decisively against TTP forced the Pakistani government to pursue negotiations with the outlawed organization. The Afghan Taliban acted as a mediator to facilitate the talks between the two parties. It is a commonly held perception that the Pakistani government position appears weak by insisting on negotiations at a time when TTP hardly shows any flexibility in its demands (Basit, 2021: p. 5).

To initiate formal talks the Pakistani government seemingly offered amnesty to the TTP militants in exchange for their pledge to renounce violence against the state, disarm their fighters and submit to the country’s constitution as the supreme law (Dawn, 2021). Initially, TTP rejected the offer of dialogue with the Pakistani state by calling the Pakistani constitution “un-Islamic” but later showed its willingness to enter into negotiation if the state ensures full implementation of sharia in the country (Basit, 2021). TTP initially also wanted the government to reserve its decision on ex-FATA’s merger with KP but then withdrew this demand as the negotiations proceeded (Baghwan, 2021). In November 2021, the TTP announced a ceasefire in exchange for the government releasing TTP prisoners. In December 2021, Pakistan released 80 TTP prisoners and there was a plan to release 46 more (Yousafzai, 2021). Still, TTP suspended the ceasefire in December 2021, blaming the government of Pakistan for not keeping to its commitments, such as releasing 102 TTP prisoners before November 2021. Also, TTP blamed the government for violating the ceasefire agreement through security operations against the group in Lakki Marwat, Swat, Bajaur, Dir and Swabi (Hashim, 2021). These actions, in the government’s view, would have been permissible as the government had reached no decision regarding amnesty for TTP (Haq, 2021).

The Imran Khan government wanted to resume negotiations with TTP. The second round of negotiations started in February 2022 and the government until then had released at least 100 TTP prisoners. A major hurdle in the way was still the issue of a presidential pardon for TTP which was not signed by President of Pakistan Arif Alvi. From March to April 2022, this was not a priority for the Imran Khan government as it faced a major challenge in the shape of the vote of no confidence against the Prime Minister from opposition parties. No progress has therefore been made for a peace agreement with TTP and it is unclear how the group will react to this while the country’s goes through heightened political instability (Dagia, 2022). Despite internal political instability, the new government under Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif must prioritize counter-terrorism. This would require greater engagement with the Taliban and regional actors to ensure that the roots of terrorism in Afghanistan are addressed. The root causes of terrorism in Afghanistan are linked to state fragility – something that Pakistan alone cannot address.

It is therefore highly unlikely that the negotiations between the state and TTP were going to succeed, as many had predicted. Partly because such efforts previously did not pay any dividends, partly because of the adamant attitude of the TTP leadership, and most importantly because of their irreconcilable demands grounded in their own interpretation of religion (Sheikh, 2020). Basit, an expert on FATA, argues that further state negotiations with the TTP would provide “the opportunity to [TTP to] undermine the Pakistani constitutional order and promote its extremist narrative to gain publicity” (Basit, 2021: p. 6). Despite these apprehensions, the Pakistani government went ahead with the negotiations process, which resulted into a one-month ceasefire enacted from 9 November to 9 December between Pakistan and TTP. However, the negotiations did not proceed further due to the deep-rooted mistrust from both sides and the inflexible nature of TPP demands, including imposition of sharia rule in the ex-FATA, the release of captured Taliban fighters and establishing a political office in a third country. The Pakistani government insisted on TTP to abandon violence and accept the legitimacy of the country’s constitution. With the end of the negotiation process, TTP accelerated its violent campaign, perpetrating as many as 45 terrorist attacks in December 2020 alone (Basit, 2022). These negotiations failed and the two sides have shown no interest in resuming those any time soon as they are on the offensive. While TTP continues to launch terrorist attacks, the government has launched another military operation in ex-FATA in April 2023 (Al Jazeera, 2023). These factors help to understand why TTP is gaining strength and have been quite effective in posing a serious challenge to the Pakistani internal security apparatus through campaigns of terror, which have gained momentum in recent times.

Conclusion

This article has examined the significance of both structural and precipitant factors in understanding the growth and resurgence of terrorist organizations. While structural factors provide an enabling environment for their sustenance, precipitant factors play a pivotal role in revitalizing these groups. The analysis has focused on several key precipitant factors, including the leadership and organizational strategies of TTP, the consolidation of splinter groups under the TTP’s leadership, the provision of support by the Afghan Taliban, and the Pakistani government’s engagement in negotiations with TTP. Additionally, the impact of the Afghan Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan has been explored as a significant precipitant factor.

Terrorist leaders play multifaceted roles within their organizations, inspiring and motivating their followers while also developing operational strategies to achieve group objectives. Charismatic leaders are crucial in resolving the collective action problem inherent in many terrorist organizations, as they motivate individuals to sacrifice for the collective vision rather than personal gain. The current leadership under Noor Wali Mehsud has provided discipline and unity to the group while cooperation with the Afghan Taliban offered necessary space to the organization to survive and reorganize itself, thus paving the way for the resurgence of TTP.

The formulation of an ideological vision also serves to motivate followers and mitigate the challenges posed by the collective action problem. Moreover, terrorist leaders are responsible for implementing organizational strategies and addressing operational concerns to strengthen the organization and establish external connections. The formation of alliances or mergers between terrorist groups has been shown to increase their strength and operational effectiveness. Alliances provide greater resilience and longevity, especially in hostile environments. Organizational needs, shared identity characteristics, and trust are key factors that motivate groups to unite. Mutual benefits, such as expanded operational capacity and legitimacy, further incentivize terrorist organizations to form alliances. The consolidation of TTP through the merger of splinter groups has significantly bolstered its operational capacity and led to a marked escalation of terrorist attacks.

Foreign sponsorship has been identified as a critical factor in the survival and cohesion of terrorist organizations. State sponsorship provides vital resources, including weapons, financial support, training, and safe havens, which enhance the longevity and capabilities of terrorist groups. Financial resources are particularly crucial for their survival and operations, as they face resource disadvantages compared to their adversaries. State sponsorship helps overcome these obstacles and ensures the group’s continued functioning and activities. In this regard, TTP has the support of the Afghan Taliban. The empirical evidence presented in this article supports the argument that both leadership and organizational strategies, as well as external support, play crucial roles in the growth and resurgence of terrorist organizations. Understanding these factors is essential for developing effective counterterrorism strategies and addressing the root causes of terrorism. Future research should continue to explore the complex dynamics between structural and precipitant factors to deepen our understanding of the evolving nature of terrorism and inform counterterrorism efforts.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. Earlier reforms were undertaken by Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) governments that included extending the adult franchise to FATA in 1996–1997 and allowing political parties to operate in FATA. Reforms were proposed in the Frontier Crimes Regulations in 2011 (ICG 2009; Dawn, 2009).

2. On 13 April 2018, the Senate had approved the National Assembly bill to extend the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Peshawar High Court to FATA. However, according to article 247, this jurisdiction could only be extended to those areas notified by the federal government (Dawn, 2018a).