Choosing what (not) to do next: a preliminary theoretical framework on strategic innovation in terrorist organizations

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a theoretical framework on strategic innovation in terrorist organizations. By comparing three historical organizations (ETA, PIRA, and Red Brigades), it seeks to understand the rationale and dynamics of strategic innovation. In doing so, it delineates this phenomenon as a process articulated in four stages: Evaluation, Formulation, Adoption, and Implementation. While the first two stages involve different actors, leadership is crucial during the stages of Adoption and Implementation. Additionally, the framework discusses how innovation is not necessarily related to escalations in violence and highlights an important difference between strategic change and strategic innovation. Finally, the paper explores the role of culture to then suggest areas for future research.

KEYWORDS:

• Political violence
• terrorism
• ethnopolitical conflict
• extremism
• asymmetric conflict

Introduction

This article presents a theoretical framework for studying strategic innovation in terrorist organizations. It argues that strategic innovation – defined as the processes that lead to substantial shifts in the fundamental patterns characterizing an organization’s challenge to its adversaries (Lubrano, 2021: pp. 6–7) – consists of four stages, namely Evaluation, Formulation, Adoption, and Implementation. Moreover, innovations are not necessarily related to escalations in violence, and they do not inevitably lead to strategic change, as they can occur within specific strategies. Finally, different actors are involved in the process, but leadership is crucial. After providing a literature review and discussing methodology, the paper introduces the theoretical framework which is then applied to three case studies. The last section discusses the framework’s limitations followed by recommendations.

Although several authors highlighted its importance (Crenshaw, 1991; Cronin, 2006; Frisch, 2011; Harmon, 2001; Neumann & Smith, 2008), a thorough understanding of strategic innovation is lacking. The literature on strategy and terrorism has, indeed, focused on the “rationality” and “effectiveness” issues. Numerous scholars posit that terrorism is an inherently flawed strategy (Abrahms, 2006, 2012; Muro, 2019; Neumann & Smith, 2008), while others, instead, argue that it is effective and rational (Dershowitz, 2002; Kydd & Walter, 2006; Lake, 2002). A parallel scholarly debate has contributed to establishing typologies of strategies that terrorists can employ. For example, Kydd and Walter argue that terrorists employ five, non-mutually exclusive strategies, i.e., attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding (Kydd & Walter, 2006; see also Harmon, 2001; Merari, 1993). Likewise, the literature on terrorist innovation does not offer much insight. The available studies predominantly underscore tactical and/or technological innovation (Ackerman, 2014; Cronin, 2020; Dolnik, 2007; Gill et al., 2013; Hafez & Rasmussen, 2010; Jackson, 2005; Moghadam, 2013; Veilleux-Lepage, 2020). Thus, the strategic dimension of innovation has been largely neglected. Noteworthy contributions do nevertheless emerge. Among these, innovation is considered a gradual process aimed at problem-solving and somewhat inherently related to escalations (Faria, 2006; Hafez & Rasmussen, 2010: pp. 2–3, 2012, pp. 40–41). Additionally, recent works have proposed typologies that define strategic innovation, without however unpacking the actual process (Crenshaw, 2010; Kfir, 2021; Lubrano, 2021). Finally, the literature offers in-depth analyses of specific organizations, e.g., the PIRA or Al Qaeda. (Gill, 2017; Moghadam, 2013; Smith, 1995)

Overall, these debates fail to provide insight into the ”why” and ”how” of strategic innovation. First, the debate on the (ir)rationality of terrorism neglects the agency that terrorist organizations have in determining the conflicts in which they are involved. A debate so fixated on (dis)proving the effectiveness of terrorism fails to appreciate the dynamic nature of strategies. This impedes a thorough understanding of how strategies are developed and changed which can, implicitly or explicitly, demean terrorists’ decision-making processes. Regardless of end goals and ideologies, terrorist organizations adopt and modify strategies because they believe that said strategies will enable them to achieve their objectives. State actors also adopt ineffective strategies. The Global War on Terror clearly illustrates this. Yet recognizing that states employ fallacious strategies did not translate into a lack of scholarly attention. Likewise, terrorist organizations deserve attention. Not doing so reinforces the idea that changes in their strategies are mere responses instead of decisions “based on different reasoning, perception, and experience as well as the dynamics of the conflict” (Crenshaw, 2010: p. 50).

Moreover, the typologies of strategies are analytically useful but are not conducive to a deeper understanding of innovation. They often overlook the changes occurring within or among different strategies, and as such, do not contemplate the debates preceding the adoption of a strategy, the context in which it was implemented, or the organizational dynamics involved in the process. Similarly, the typologies of innovation offer clearer conceptualizations but do not explore the dynamics and rationale of the process. Finally, studies on individual organizations provide insight into their experience but do not elaborate from the perspective of innovation. Overall, these debates have neglected the issue of strategic innovation. Based on the assumption that terrorism is “almost never a static phenomenon” (Ackerman, 2015: p. 19), this paper formulates a theoretical framework that can be useful for understanding the rationale and dynamics of this phenomenon.

Methodology

The theoretical framework was developed inductively by comparing three historical organizations. The literature has highlighted the usefulness of this research design when handling the complex interaction effects that characterize innovation (Hafez & Rasmussen, 2012: p. 81). The case studies are carried out by means of “practice tracing” – a hybrid methodological approach that enables the recovery of both the causal “what” and the causal “how” of social practices (Pouliot, 2015: pp. 237–259). It thus allows exploring the strategic innovation processes in the contexts in which they took place to then “look beyond the specific cases, towards cross-case generality” (Pouliot, 2015: p. 240).

The case studies adopted an inductive approach “to recover the meaning of the world as it exists for the actual agents” without “imposing a scholastic and alien logic on practices (…) defined by their practical urgency and embeddedness in a social context” (Pouliot, 2007: pp. 364–365). Even the purest form of inductive practice tracing should however seek inspiration “from previous observations about what to look for” (Beach, 2017: p. 22). Hence, the rationale of the typology presented in the next sections. Various sources, i.e., documents published by the organizations, memoirs, interviews, court documents, and government or intelligence reports, underpin this study.

Case selection

This study prioritized hierarchical organizations to investigate the role of leadership and organizational dynamics in the innovation process. It focused on groups with sustained campaigns of violence and at least ten years of activity. The assumption here is that, since strategies are plans conceived to achieve long-term goals and since more than 50% of terrorist organizations last less than one year (Phillips, 2017), strategic innovations are more likely to occur in long-lived organizations. This allowed to select groups that have experienced multiple instances of innovation, facilitating comparisons within and across cases. Moreover, the selection was limited to groups relying on the strategy of terrorism. Terrorism is as a form of political violence directed against victims selected for their representative or symbolic value to convey one or more messages to, provoke a psychological reaction in, and thereby manipulate the perception and behaviour of a target audience.¹ However, solely resorting to terrorism as a tactic is not enough for a terrorist organization to be labelled as such. An insurgent group might occasionally resort to terrorism without relying on it as a strategy. What does it mean to rely on a strategy of terrorism then? Simply put, strategy lies in between operational capabilities and political objectives. Its primary task is to recognize the nature of the conflict and serve the ends of politics (Strachan, 2013: pp. 12–13). Terrorism is, by definition, about political goals. The organizations that employ it as a strategy resort to a clandestine, symbolic, representative, and communicative form of violence that aims at manipulating the behaviour of their targets to achieve one or more political goals. While an organization might use other forms of violence besides terrorism, the latter is the only one that has a strategic meaning, as it dictates the paradigms determining the distribution of means to achieve political objectives. Organizations resorting to the strategy of terrorism might switch to different strategies and vice versa.

Using the above two criteria, seventy-six groups were pre-selected. These were then categorized according to their operational area, ideological milieu, and whether they were considered innovative cases in the literature. This procedure aimed to determine whether innovation tended to cluster in specific milieus or areas – which was not the case. The selection process relied on profiles from databases like the Mapping Militants Project and the Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium as well as secondary sources. Preference was given to historical groups with ample documentation due to data availability. As a result, three cases were chosen: the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and the Italian Brigate Rosse (BR). These cases were then divided into time segments corresponding to the organizations’ employed strategies, resulting in the identification of twenty-two instances of innovation. The time segments were determined based on the organizations’ internal and external documents to ensure that the identified strategies aligned with the groups’ recollection of their own experience.

Moreover, these three groups experienced organizational splits. The approach here varied. The BR case study followed all splinter groups, allowing for an examination of diverging innovation processes within the same context. This also increased the number of observed innovations due to the BR’s shorter lifespan. Conversely, the ETA case study included solely the 1974 split between ETAm and ETApm, as most of ETA’s splinter groups were inconsequential or abandoned the armed struggle. Finally, the case on the PIRA did not follow any splinter. The abundance of data available and the PIRA’s primacy within the Republican Movement justified focusing on them over lesser groups. The next sections will now introduce the strategic innovation framework to then apply it to three instances extrapolated from the case studies.

A heuristic device

Before delving into the theoretical framework, it is important to define the different levels of innovation. This study adopts a typology that distinguishes between tactical, operational, and strategic innovation. Tactical innovation refers to substantial and permanent changes concerning aspects such as weapon selection, targets, hit squad compositions, and times and locations of the attack. Operational innovation refers to activities necessary to maintain an organization operational, e.g., propaganda, financing, recruiting, or organizational structure. Instead, strategic innovation refers to the processes that lead to the introduction of “game-changers”; i.e., substantial shifts in the fundamental patterns characterizing an organization’s challenge to its adversaries (Lubrano, 2021: pp. 6–7). What is, then, a game-changer? It is virtually impossible to state in the abstract what constitutes a game-changer, as this depends on the peculiar characteristics and dynamics of the conflict. In other words, what constitutes a “game-changer” in the struggle of, e.g., the PKK, might be completely irrelevant in the case of Sendero Luminoso. Context is therefore crucial. On an abstract level, however, game changers can be considered as the introduction of new elements or behavioural patterns that attempt to alter the nature and dynamics of the conflict, tipping the scale in favour of the innovating party.²

While the literature supposes the lack of predictive indicators, certain factors can facilitate innovation. These factors are categorized as endogenous, exogenous, and mixed drivers. Endogenous drivers include ideological predisposition, resources, the group’s self-perception, organizational dynamics, and the relationship with the constituency. Exogenous drivers, instead, encompass countermeasures, the broader political context, and state support. Finally, the group’s relationship with other organizations, the sources as well as practices of knowledge, and the dynamics of the struggle constitute the mixed drivers (Ackerman, 2014; Crenshaw, 2010: p. 46; Dolnik, 2007: p. 168; Faria, 2006; Jackson, 2001; Lubrano, 2021; Moghadam, 2013; Silke & Filippidou, 2020).³ This set of drivers purports to serve as a heuristic tool facilitating a holistic view on innovation and can be used as a compass guiding the empirical analysis. Now that definitions have been provided, the next section will introduce the theoretical framework.

The theoretical framework on strategic innovation

Overall, strategic innovation is a staged process that leads to game-changing shifts in the fundamental patterns that characterize a terrorist organization’s challenge to its adversaries. These shifts are not necessarily associated with the emergence of new outcome goals or with the transition to a new strategy and can have an escalatory or de-escalatory purpose. Several preconditions and catalysts interact to influence and determine the innovation process, which is also associated to changes in symbols, narratives, norms, values, and language. Finally, strategic innovations may impact the tactical and operational levels. The next paragraphs will now unpack the individual components highlighted above.

Stages and initiators of the innovation process

Strategic innovation tends to display a progressive build-up, which is consistent with the broader literature on innovation (Hafez & Rasmussen, 2010: pp. 2–3). This process is articulated into four stages, namely Evaluation, Formulation, Adoption, and Implementation.⁴ Evaluation consists of assessing the appropriateness of the current strategic posture in the specific context and phase of the struggle. If the strategy is deemed inadequate, the process moves on to Formulation. This involves developing the precepts of an alternative strategic posture. Once formulated, the process goes through the stage of Adoption and is complete with Implementation. There can be a temporal mismatch between the different stages, as strategic innovations can be implemented long after their adoption.

The Evaluation and Formulation stages can be collective or individual in nature, i.e., specific individuals or institutions within an organization can kickstart the process by steering its initial stages. Importantly, these individuals and institutions are not necessarily part of the leadership. Thus, actors that are either internal or external to the leadership can both play a pivotal role in the Evaluation and Formulation stages. This mix of bottom-up and top-down dynamics is also suggested both in Terrorism Studies (Ackerman, 2014; Moghadam, 2013) and Strategic Studies (Grissom, 2006). The subsequent stages of Adoption and Implementation, however, reaffirm the primacy of the leadership, as the decision-making bodies assume a more preponderant role (see also Hafez & Rasmussen, 2010: pp. 2–3).

Purpose of strategic innovation: change, outcome goals, and escalation

Strategic innovation does not necessarily lead to new strategies. In fact, even though they often coincide, it is important to differentiate between strategic change and strategic innovation. The former entails adopting new outcome goals and a new strategy to achieve those goals, while strategic innovation can occur within an existing strategy without replacing it. However, for it to be considered innovation, it must nevertheless contribute to changing the fundamental characteristics of the ongoing confrontation. That is, it must lead to substantial and permanent rewritings of the rules in the current stage of the conflict and contribute to a considerable reallocation of means. This can also lead to adding supplementary goals to the exiting one(s). The PIRA case study will illustrate this.

Related to this, innovation can occur with or without the emergence of new outcome goals. While certain instances of innovation involve adopting new goals, others occur with the sole retention of the old objective. At the same time, strategic innovation is not necessarily related to escalations in violence. Quite the contrary, certain instances aim at de-escalation. This corroborates Crenshaw’s warning about the importance of separating innovation and escalations (Crenshaw, 2010: p. 36).

Preconditions and catalysts

As discussed, several elements concur in determining the innovation process. While none act as the single greatest cause of innovation (see also, Hafez & Rasmussen, 2010: p. 4), the conceptual framework outlined above distinguished among the exogenous, endogenous, and mixed categories. The case studies point to an additional, important dimension that differentiates between preconditions and catalysts – a categorization that is reminiscent of Crenshaw’s theory on the causes of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981). Preconditions contribute to shaping the context in which innovations build up.⁵ Instead, catalysts provide momentum thereby accelerating the process and being thus instrumental in bringing it to completion.

Cultural change

Innovations are associated with changes within an organization’s cultural artefacts. More specifically, strategic innovation can include the adoption, rejection, or replacement of symbols, values, myths, language, and narratives. However, cultural aspects can also hinder, or at least slow down the innovation process, as elements within the organization might resist a specific change. Yet all positive – i.e., completed – instances of innovation tend to display different degrees of cultural changes. Some appear to be functional to the innovation process, while others are by-products. This is not to suggest that cultural changes can be considered indicators or predictors of innovation. Yet it is nonetheless intriguing to observe how the cultural dimension is involved and relevant in this process. Interestingly, scholars of Business Studies have similarly highlighted how aligning the organization’s culture with the new strategy is an important feature (Higgins & McAllaster, 2004)

On the relationship between strategic, operational, and tactical innovation

Finally, the impact of strategic innovations on the operational and tactical domains may be of different magnitudes. What emerges here is a complex web of interactions among these three levels. Tactical and operational innovations are sometimes intimately related to strategic innovations. Yet while a certain – even minimal – degree of tactical change is an inevitable consequence of strategic innovation, the latter can also emerge without causing significant changes in the other domains. Consequently, strategic innovations are not necessarily a prelude to a broader process involving the operational and tactical domains. As there does not appear to be a direct correlation, a case-by-case approach is warranted to uncover the implications for the tactical and operational spheres.⁶

The next sections will now demonstrate a practical application of this framework by providing in-depth discussions on three instances, namely the BR’s transition from Armed Propaganda to Attack on the Heart of the State, the PIRA’s launch of the Long War, and ETA’s inauguration of the Action-Reaction Spiral. A succinct overview of the organizations will first be provided to then delve into the individual instances. As providing an in-depth analysis of all the twenty-two instances analysed would be impractical, this paper discusses one instance per organization selected among the most representative – i.e., these instances epitomize salient characteristics and mechanisms of the innovation process outlined above. The primary objective of the following sections is therefore not to discuss the case studies themselves, but rather to provide a practical illustration of the application of the framework and of the analytical advantages it affords.

Application of the strategic innovation framework

Brigate Rosse

The Red Brigades (BR) were a Marxist-Leninist organization active between 1970 and 1988 whose mission was to trigger a proletarian revolution in Italy. During their early years (1970–1974), they engaged in Armed Propaganda (Caselli & Della Porta, 1991: pp. 71–75). In this phase, the BR were trying to assert themselves and build a constituency among the working-class in the North of the country while targeting managers and industrialists. Subsequently, they introduced the first innovation with the inauguration of the Attack on the Heart of the State (1974–1978), assuming a national dimension and leading the assault against the state. This phase evolved into the Transition to Civil War (1978–1982) – a stage characterized by an attempt to unleash a civil war (Caselli & Della Porta, 1991: pp. 83–90). Following the reprisal, the group experienced internal turmoil and a decrease in operational capability that led to the Strategic Retreat (1982–1984) (Caselli & Della Porta, 1991: pp. 98–99). Concurrently, the BR experienced a few organizational splits. The BR-PCC (Partito Comunista Combattente – Fighting Communist Party) – heir of the original BR – adopted the Relaunch: Economy and Internationalization strategy until they dissolved in 1988 (Sundquist, 2010: p. 60). Instead, the BR-Walter Alasia (1980–1983) resumed Armed Propaganda. Meanwhile, the BR-PG (Partito Guerriglia – Brigate Rosse - Partito Guerriglia, 1981-1983) advocated a movementist approach that focused on the marginal proletariat and the prison issue (Brigate Rosse - Partito Guerriglia, 1981). Finally, the BR-UCC (Unione dei Comunisti Combattenti – Union of the Fighting Communists, 1984–1987) similarly promoted movementism, while also attempting to internationalize the struggle (Brigate Rosse – Unione dei Comunisti Combattenti, 1985). Figure 1 – like the ones that follow – provides a visual representation of the innovation process. Each box represents a strategic stage. Each time frame – i.e., box – begins with the implementation of the innovations started during the previous stage. For example, the box “Attack on the Heart of the State” starts with the year 1974 – when the process that led to this instance of strategic innovation was completed.

Figure 1. Red Brigades: Strategic Innovations and Splinter Groups

From armed Propaganda to the Attack on the Heart of the State

On 18 April 1974, the BR kidnapped magistrate Mario Sossi in Genoa, Italy. Known as Operation Sunflower, the kidnapping inaugurated the Attack on the Heart of the State (ATHOS) (Brigate Rosse, 1974a). Until then, Armed Propaganda had aimed at gaining the sympathy of the working-class while also attempting to raise workers’ awareness regarding the strategic necessity of the armed struggle as the only path towards the proletarian revolution. Put differently, the BR strived to be the armed vanguard of the working-class (Brigate Rosse, 1971, 1973). Their constituency was the working-class, while their targets were industrialists and managers – the “fascists in white shirts” (Drake, 1989: p. 12). Arson, sabotage, and political kidnappings constituted their main tactics (Brigate Rosse, 1972; Tessandori, 2014: p. 30). However, as the year 1973 unfolded, the domestic and international contexts changed rapidly. In particular, the Yom Kippur War and the subsequent oil crisis hit the Italian economy hard. The ruling Christian Democracy Party (DC) introduced austerity policies to address the worsening economy and the increasing political instability. The BR saw this as an attempt to endorse an Italian version of Neo-Gaullism – i.e., establishing an identity between the personal interests of the DC and the law (Brigate Rosse, 1975b).

Concurrently, a trial was taking place in Genoa against the Gruppi d’Azione Partigiana (Partisan Action Groups – GAP), a far-left formation founded by Giangiacomo Feltrinelli in 1970. A businessman and millionaire, Feltrinelli embraced the armed struggle and was a strategic asset for the BR, as he allowed access to pecuniary resources and international contacts, e.g., the Rote Armee Fraktion, Cuba, and the Eastern Bloc (Senato della Repubblica - Camera dei Deputati, 2001: pp. 36–38). However, on 14 March 1972, Feltrinelli died while blowing up a high-voltage powerline and the GAP disbanded (Fasanella & Franceschini, 2007: p. 111). Weeks later, the authorities raided the BR’s base in Via Boiardo, Milan. Only a few members avoided capture (Moretti et al., 2007: p. 54). Yet the BR re-organized and introduced a few operational innovations. First, they began operating in full clandestinity, compared to when they had engaged in double-militancy – i.e., the organization was clandestine, but its members maintained their role in society (Fasanella & Franceschini, 2007: p. 111). Then, they introduced the Columns – compartmentalized entities that were politically and operationally autonomous and that were meant to increase the organization’s chances of survival (Moretti et al., 2007: p. 43). Following their recovery, the BR considered Feltrinelli’s death and the GAP Trial to be additional manifestations of something they had long feared; a neo-fascist coup (Brigate Rosse, 1973). The idea of a looming coup emerged in the late 1960s, but the events of 1972–1973 corroborated it (Jamieson, 1989: pp. 49–50).

Thus, the worsening economic conditions, the DC’s policies, the “Neo-Gaullist” project, the “coup”, and the GAP Trial contributed to the Preconditions. The BR saw a thread linking these events. This thread led back to the state, its suspected connivance with the far-right, and its role in shielding the multinational groups. From the BR’s perspective, the state had then become the Imperialist State of the Multinationals (Stato Imperialista delle Multinazionali – SIM); the direct expression of the corporate groups and a function of the capitalist development in the era of multinational imperialism (Brigate Rosse, 1975b). Consequently, Armed Propaganda was no longer effective (Evaluation). The BR needed to respond to the “strategic encircling of the workers” by extending the revolutionary initiative to the state’s vital centres (Brigate Rosse, 1974b). This meant focusing on the world of politics (new Outcome Goal) to strike the Heart of the State (Cuore dello Stato) – i.e., the project that represented the bourgeoisie political system and its counterrevolutionary program (Formulation) (Senato della Repubblica - Camera dei Deputati, 1983: p. 12). The BR then circulated a document announcing the need to attack the Heart of the State (Adoption) (Brigate Rosse, 1974b). The 1974 Divorce Referendum provided a final stimulus (Catalyst), as it was considered the DC’s final test for the Neo-Gaullist project (Jamieson, 1989: p. 81). Moreover, Operation Sunflower (Implementation) targeted magistrate Sossi, as the BR believed he embodied the anti-proletariat alliance between the judiciary power and the political forces (Moretti et al., 2007: p. 65).

Furthermore, ATHOS aimed at escalation. Yet this occurred only in 1976, when the BR introduced lethal operations (Brigate Rosse, 1976).⁷ The apprehension of founding members Renato Curcio and Alberto Franceschini, and the loss of the Robbiano di Mediglia safe haven in the autumn of 1974 partially explain this delay (Jamieson, 1989: pp. 85–88). With Mara Cagol’s death in 1975 then, the BR had now lost their first generation of leaders leaving Mario Moretti and Franco Bonisoli in command. These were the same leaders that oversaw the transition from Armed Propaganda to ATHOS (Internal Initiators) (Brigate Rosse, 1975a).

Interestingly, the inauguration of ATHOS did not witness much change from a tactical and operational perspective, as Operation Sunflower followed a modus operandi similar to previous kidnappings. Also, despite having no Column in Genoa in 1974, the BR did not make any organizational arrangements in loco (Moretti et al., 2007: p. 65; Ministero degli Interni - Direzione Generale Sicurezza Interna, 1974). Soon enough, however, they expanded their repertoire by including lethal operations and kneecappings (Drake, 1989: p. 19). Similarly, in 1975, the BR adopted a new structure. This included a Strategic Directorate, an Executive Committee, and the Fronts – vertical entities meant to support the Columns (Senato della Repubblica - Camera dei Deputati, 1988: p. 669). Similarly, they set up a Column in Rome – the geographical Heart of the State (Senato della Repubblica - Camera dei Deputati, 1983: pp. 13–14). Thus, neither the 1972 organizational changes nor the ones in 1975 took place during the implementation of ATHOS. Yet they were intimately related to it. The former was functional to its launch, while the latter substantiated ATHOS. Finally, launching ATHOS required some cultural adjustments, such as changes in the narrative – from the “fascists in white shirts” to the Imperialist State of the Multinationals – and symbols – i.e., the Heart of the State.

Overall, the BR’s transition from Armed Propaganda to ATHOS represents a prime example of strategic innovation that illustrates several of the notions discussed in the framework thus giving a useful demonstration of its application and analytical advantages.

Provisional Irish Republican Army

The Provisional IRA (PIRA, Provos, Provisionals) emerged in December 1969. Its goal was to remove Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom and pave the way to a 32-county, independent Irish Republic (Dillon, 1990: p. 482). In its early years, the PIRA embarked on the 3-Stage Strategy (1969–1976). The objective was to transition from a defensive stance to retaliation to then launch an offensive and defeat the British militarily (English, 2012: p. 125). Thereafter, it adopted the Long War (1976–1981) which consisted in a prolonged war of attrition that aimed at eroding the British will to remain in Northern Ireland (McKearney, 2011: p. 112). Following the 1981 Hunger Strikes, the PIRA launched the Armalite and Ballot Box strategy (1981–1994), thus upgrading its political dimension (English, 2012: p. 225). In 1986, the Provisionals experienced a further political upgrading – and an instance of strategic innovation – as Sinn Féin (the PIRA’s political wing) dropped the policy of abstentionism in the Republic of Ireland. This political dimension was further enhanced when the PIRA replaced the Armalite and Ballot Box with TUAS (1994–1998) – Tactical Use of Armed Struggle/Totally UnArmed Strategy. TUAS allowed the PIRA to maintain a credible military threat while engaging in the peace process (English, 2012: pp. 283–284). Following the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the PIRA declared a permanent ceasefire. After years of complicated negotiations, its decommissioning marked the end of the armed struggle in 2005 (English, 2012: pp. 295–296). Figure 2 illustrates the PIRA’s stages.

Figure 2. Provisional IRA: Strategic Innovations and Splinter Groups Figure

From Defense, retaliation and offensive to the Long War

Despite the exploits of 1969–1972, the PIRA was on the verge of defeat by the mid-1970s. Upon launching the armed struggle in 1969, the Provisionals embarked on the 3-Stage Strategy. This consisted of defence, retaliation, and offensive. The idea was to progressively move from defensive actions to retaliation and then launch a final offensive driving the British Army into the sea (English, 2012: p. 125). The early 1970s saw the PIRA gaining momentum. Following the failure of the 1972 negotiations, the Provisionals resumed “offensive operations against the British forces of occupation” (Twomey, 1972) and, on 21 July 1972, they launched a series of concerted bombings. Overestimating the authorities’ capabilities to deal with the bomb disposals and giving conflicting warnings, the Provos caused more damage than originally intended. This event went down in history as Bloody Friday and had two main repercussions. First, the popular support that the PIRA had enjoyed until then began deteriorating. There was now “widespread criticism (…) of the Provisional’s campaign of violence. (…) The Provisionals were now regarded as a nuisance and a hindrance to the much-wanted return to normal life” (Steele, 1973). Then, Bloody Friday gave the British Army a pretext to launch Operation Motorman and send armoured vehicles into the no-go areas of Belfast and Free Derry – established in the early days of the Troubles (Taylor, 1998: pp. 152–153). Deprived of their safe havens, the Provisionals were forced into the defensive. The apprehension of Chief of Staff Seán Mac Stiofaín and Joe Cahill over the next months contributed to this change of posture (English, 2012: p. 161; Extracts from a briefing document prepared for G. FitzGerald, 1986).

Seeking a way out, the PIRA launched the England Campaign in 1973 . This, however, failed to turn the tide (Bishop & Mallie, 1988: p. 253). The rationale for this campaign was to persuade the British Government and public opinion to give up on Northern Ireland. Although ineffective, it was meant to be a game-changer. Besides opening a new front in the conflict, it led to a major reallocation of both PIRA and British military resources thereby representing an instance of strategic innovation. Interestingly, however, it did not signal the transition to a new strategy; the PIRA was still employing the 3-Stage Strategy. Thus, the England Campaign highlights the importance of distinguishing strategic change from strategic innovation, as the two might not coincide. Moreover, it emphasizes the importance of context. Ramifications of the Anglo-Irish conflict had already reached England in the 1860s, 1881–1885, 1920–1921, and 1939–1940 (McGladdery, 2006: pp. 2–3). Yet the 1973 England Campaign contributed to reshaping the struggle in the early 1970s context.

Eventually, an opportunity for negotiations re-emerged and the PIRA declared a ceasefire that, despite occasional breaks, lasted from February 1975 until February 1976 (Taylor, 1998: pp. 168–197). The Provos entered the ceasefire with high expectations. However, the British used it to gather intelligence and finalize their new strategy of “criminalization, Ulsterization, and normalization” which would eventually serve as a Catalyst for the PIRA’s own innovation. In a nutshell, the British strategy passed on the duty of fighting the Provos to the Royal Ulster Constabulary, while removing the political status from imprisoned Republicans (The undermining of the IRA’s will to fight, 1974). Coupled with excellent intelligence, this contributed to the PIRA being “squeezed like toothpaste” (Moloney, 2007: p. 171).

The interactions between the above-mentioned Preconditions and the Catalyst prompted internal reflections in the PIRA. Interestingly, this process did not spring from the leadership but rather from the Long Kesh Detention Centre where several Republicans were serving sentences (External Initiators). The prisons had become the PIRA’s research department. Inmates had time to study and reflect on the armed struggle (Bishop & Mallie, 1988: p. 346). Already in 1976, Gerry Adams – writing under the penname “Brownie” for Sinn Féin’s Republican News – started criticizing the 3-Stage Strategy (Evaluation) (Adams, 2012). Contextually, he devised an alternative strategy – the Long War (Formulation). Eventually, the PIRA embraced this strategy (Adoption) announcing it at the 1977 Bodenstown Wolf Tone commemoration (Implementation) (Moloney, 2007: p. 15).

Overall, the Long War sought to erode the British will to remain in Northern Ireland by following five principles. First, a war of attrition aimed at instigating a demand for withdrawal among the British public opinion. Besides, bombing campaigns should have curbed financial investments making the British presence unprofitable. This should have, in turn, contributed to making the Six Counties ungovernable. Meanwhile, (inter)national propaganda should have ensured the necessary support. Finally, the PIRA had to wage an internal war against collaborators and informers (Provisional, 1977a). Despite envisaging a prolonged conflict, the Long War bore de-escalatory connotations. The number of PIRA’s attacks and victims during the first years of the Troubles would remain unparalleled.⁸ Moreover, the Long War introduced a political dimension to the struggle – i.e., Active Abstentionism. The idea was to surround the PIRA’s war machine with activities in the social and economic sphere (Moloney, 2007: p. 152). Thus, despite the spectacular attacks that occurred in this period, the Long War brought about de-escalation.

Moreover, the Long War impacted both the tactical and operational realms. The PIRA leadership recommended “the reorganisation and remotivation, the building of a new Irish Republican Army” (Provisional IRA, 1977a). The overarching goal was to gear the PIRA “toward long-term armed struggle” (Provisional IRA, 1977a). Until then, the PIRA’s structure had, somewhat ironically, mirrored the British Army. The Long War introduced a cell structure and established Southern and Northern Command to oversee operations in, respectively, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. These institutions joined the pre-existing Army Council, Army Executive, and General Army Convention (Horgan & Taylor, 1997: pp. 3–14). Similarly, the confrontations with the British Army changed substantially with the Provos now avoiding prolonged engagements in favour of single-shot sniping along with the usual bombing campaigns (Bishop & Mallie, 1988: pp. 232–233).

All in all, several aspects make the Long War an exemplary case of strategic innovation. The external initiators, the de-escalatory purpose, and the impact on the operational and tactical levels all contribute to further unpacking the dynamics and rationale of the innovation process. The next section will now discuss ETA’s Action Reaction Spiral.

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

An ethno-nationalist group seeking the independence of the Basque Country (Euskadi), ETA was established in 1958. They then spent the first decade (1958–1968) engaging in intense ideological and strategic debates. These led to eventually launching the armed struggle with the inauguration of the Action-Reaction Spiral (1968–1974) (Sullivan, 1988: pp. 35–70). The rationale was to provoke the Spanish Government’s overreaction which, in turn, would have radicalized the Basque population leading to an insurrection (Madariaga, 1964). The Action-Reaction Spiral failed and, in 1974, ETA split into ETAm (militarra) and ETApm (politiko-militarra). ETApm (1974–1982) launched Violence & Politics. This strategy simultaneously upheld the armed struggle and electoral politics. ETApm, then, disbanded in 1982 (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2007: p. 292). Instead, ETAm embraced a strategy of Outbidding (1974–1982) that aimed at outperforming ETApm (Mahoney, 2018: p. 921). Following their rivals’ demise, ETAm launched the War of Attrition (1982–1995) to force Madrid to negotiate (Punto y Hora, 1982). After several setbacks, ETAm abandoned the attrition strategy and adopted the Socialization of Suffering and Spoiling (1995–2011). The rationale was to deter public opposition to ETA while bringing the consequences of the conflict to the larger Basque society (Muro, 2008: pp. 163–164). Simultaneously, ETA explored the possibility of a pan-nationalist coalition (ETA, 2018; Mahoney, 2018: p. 531). However, they eventually sabotaged several negotiation rounds. Battered and isolated, ETA declared a permanent ceasefire in 2011 to then dissolve in 2018. Figure 3 illustrates ETA’s stages.

Figure 3. ETA: Strategic Innovations and Splinter Groups

From strategic non-violence to the Action Reaction-Spiral.

ETA made a commitment to launch an insurrection in Euskadi in the late 1950s. However, it was not until 1968 that they embraced the armed struggle. After a failed attempt in 1961, ETA had, indeed, realized that they were not ready to commit to violence (Positive Evaluation) (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2010: p. 73). In their words, the path to insurrection had to proceed by stages and so they could not go from phase one to ten “without previously going through each and every one of the intermediate stages” (Madariaga, 1964: p. 5). Therefore, ETA engaged in a long process that eventually redefined their ideology and designed the path towards the insurrection. Intense internal turmoil, organizational splits, and changes in leadership characterized this process, as different factions attempted to impose their agenda. Indeed, the 1963 Second Assembly certified the existence of a Marxist faction led by Patxi Iturrioz and of the traditional nationalist faction of José “Txillardegi” (ETA, 1963). One year later, the Third Assembly revealed the increasing influence of Julen Madariaga’s Third Worldist faction. Madariaga was also the Etarra who devised the Action-Reaction Spiral (Formulation and Internal Initiator). Its logic was to provoke the Spanish state to the extent that “the enemy, like a colossus stung by many bees, loses control of himself and (…) strikes blindly left and right” (Madariaga, 1964: p. 5). This should have, in turn, radicalized the Basques leading to the insurrection. The Action-Reaction Spiral (ARS) was officially adopted as ETA’s revolutionary strategy at the 1965 Fourth Assembly (Adoption) (ETA, 1965). Interestingly, ARS survived its creators. Shortly thereafter, the Marxists managed to seize control of the organization but did not scrap this strategy (Clark, 1984: pp. 41–42). However, Iturrioz’s leadership did not endure. Eventually, the rival factions expelled his fringe and the Third Worldist faction – led by José and Javier “Txabi” Extebarrieta – gained control of ETA (Punto y Hora, 1984: p. 10).

The rise of the Third Worldists did not translate into the implementation of ARS, as ETA could not sustain the fight. In fact, in 1965, its Military Front consisted of only six men, one pistol, and five Stein machine guns (ETA, 1965). Therefore, ETA engaged in bank robberies to procure funds (Gaizka, 2017: p. 25). Meanwhile, the Fifth Assembly announced a few operational innovations. First, it re-introduced the Military, Political, Cultural, and Economic Fronts which Iturrioz had previously replaced with the Branches. Then, ETA established a new institution, namely the Blitzar Nagusia (BN – National Assembly). This sat at the top echelon of ETA and was the supreme authority in terms of policymaking. The Fifth also created the Blitzar Txikia (Small Assembly) and the Tactical Executive Committee. The former operated in France. It was tasked with ensuring ideological rigour and with monitoring the latter, which oversaw the operative structures in Spain (Clark, 1984: p. 47; Llera et al., 1993: p. 116). These operational innovations were meant to enable ETA to launch the armed struggle.

Meanwhile, Euskadi was experiencing increasing polarization. Demonstrations were becoming violent, and the overall situation had gotten explosive by 1968. Unsurprisingly, members of ETA were heavily involved. The clashes became so frequent that Txabi Extebarrieta allegedly wrote that ETA “will hardly get out of 1968 without any death” (Punto y Hora, 1988: p. 43). The death Extebarrieta had predicted was his own. On 7 June 1968, after being pulled over by the Guardia Civil, Extebarrieta reacted and shot agent José Pardines dead. In the subsequent gunfight, Extebarrieta was fatally wounded (Punto y Hora, 1984: p. 16). His death represented the point of no-return. Upon hearing of Extebarrieta’s death, ETA convened an urgent meeting of the Blitzar Txikia. They decided to capitalize on the Basque people’s emotional reaction to Txabi’s passing and resolved to assassinate Melitón Manzanas, the police chief of the Gipuzkoa province (Punto y Hora, 1988: p. 43). ETA carried out this operation on 2 August 1968 thus inaugurating ARS (Implementation). There is then a substantial temporal mismatch between Adoption (1965) and Implementation (1968).

The Manzanas Operation had been in the pipeline for some time. As Etarra Jokin Gorostidi stated, the police chief’s days were numbered irrespective of Extebarrieta’s fate (Punto y Hora, 1988: p. 43). While the internal turmoil, the lack of resources, and the polarization of the Basque society during the 1960s had contributed to setting the stage for ARS (Preconditions), Extebarrieta’s death represented its Catalyst. Moreover, the Action-Reaction Spiral had a clear escalatory purpose, but, interestingly, the ultimate objective did not change; ETA still aimed at causing a widespread insurrection in Euskadi (Old Outcome Goal).

Additionally, the Action-Reaction Spiral entailed some tactical innovations. The Manzanas Operation inaugurated an era of political assassinations, but ETA soon introduced other tactics, such as political kidnappings (ETA, 1971; Sullivan, 1988: p. 135). Instead, as the operational innovations necessary to launch ARS had already been introduced at the Fifth Assembly, the implementation of ARS did not have major repercussions in this regard. Finally, the intense internal turmoil of the years preceding the armed struggle also testifies to the role of culture in the innovation process. The frictions between the Marxist, the Cultural, and the Third Worldist factions, indeed, point to different ideological and cultural interpretations of the armed struggle. The eventual emergence of the Third Worldists allowed ETA to solidify the notion of Euskadi as a colony and, thus, frame the overall struggle in anti-colonial terms. As Madariaga was himself a Third Worldist, this narrative underlies the Action-Reaction Spiral. This notion survived the Third Worldist faction, as the more orthodox nationalist leadership of “Txikia” retained it following its rise to power within ETA in 1971 (Clark, 1984: pp. 63–64).

Summing up, the Action-Reaction Spiral case epitomizes the progressive nature of the innovation process with a particular emphasis on the transition from Adoption to Implementation. Moreover, it represents a case of innovation that did not include the adoption of a new outcome goal. Finally, ARS sheds additional light on the complex interactions between strategic, operational, and tactical levels. While the operational innovations functional to ARS were introduced prior to Implementation, the tactical level experienced multiple innovations thereafter.

Relevance of the proposed framework

The objective of the case studies was to showcase the advantages of the proposed theoretical framework – the primary contribution of this paper. This theoretical framework constitutes a concrete tool that both scholars and practitioners can use to analyse, assess, compare, and perhaps even predict instances of innovations. The application of this framework thus discloses important avenues to further research the issue of strategic innovation and to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the changes that terrorist organizations can experience. As the previous sections have demonstrated, the framework contributes to identifying the stages, the initiators, the purpose of the strategic innovation process as well as its consequences on the operational and tactical level, and the influence of cultural aspects. While this paper examined historical organizations, the framework can also be useful when investigating contemporary cases. For example, as the potential for conflict in Northern Ireland keeps smouldering under the surface, the framework herein proposed can be applied to assess its hypothetical trajectories but the same can be done with other contemporary organizations active in different areas and contexts.⁹

Moreover, while remaining an under-researched phenomenon, terrorist innovation has garnered attention in scholarly debates and the framework here presented dovetails with the perspectives found in recent publications. For example, Gartenstein-Ross and Joscelyn have recently investigated strategic learning in al-Qaeda and ISIS thus providing an insightful analysis of innovation, adaptation, and learning in Jihadist milieus (Gartenstein-Ross & Joscelyn, 2022). Out of the other recent publications on this topic, three works stand out, namely Cronin (2020) Wilson (2020), and Veilleux-Lepage (2020). While Cronin argues that technological innovations are expanding the reach and force of terrorist organizations, Wilson retraces the history of modern political violence to explore the different forms it has changed over time. Veilleux-Lepage, instead, employs evolutionary theory to examine how terrorist organizations adopt, transform, innovate, and abandon “techniques of contention.”

Thus, there are three interrelated foci in these works, respectively technological innovations, political violence as a broader phenomenon, and terrorist techniques. The focus on strategic innovation – and the individual organizations’ strategic thinking – employed here can be integrated into these perspectives. Including an actor-centred approach could, indeed, contribute to understanding the impact of technological innovations on a given organization’s strategic thinking or the strategic rationale underlying the adoption, modification, and abandonment of techniques of contention. Similarly, it could shed additional light on how political violence transforms in specific contexts because of the strategic choices made by terrorist organizations, their adversaries/sympathizers, and states.

Indeed, retaining terrorist organizations as the units of analysis should not come at the expense of other actors. After all, the innovations observed in the case studies derived from complex developments which were – at times predominantly – driven and influenced also by external actors. For example, the Long War was fundamentally shaped by the British Government’s change of strategy. However, rather than being a mere “response”, the Long War constituted an instance of strategic innovation. Terrorist organizations do not operate in a vacuum but rather in hostile environments with limited resources and room for manoeuvre because of the constraints imposed by their state adversaries. Similarly, the relationship with friendly or hostile movements also influences their decisions. Clearly, excluding these elements would be detrimental. Yet, at the same time, focusing on terrorist organizations as the units of analysis allows retracing the rationale and dynamics of their decision-making process. Once contextual factors and external actors have limited and/or determined the available strategic choices, the ultimate decision resides with the terrorist organizations. The site of decision-making is thus simultaneously diffuse – as it is determined and influenced by external (f)actors – and centred on the organizations. Therefore, while mindful of how external actors and events shape and determine the strategic choices of terrorist organizations, retaining the latter as the unit of analysis contributes to uncovering the different contextual pathways to strategic innovations as well as their rationale. The final section will now discuss the limitations of the proposed framework and suggest future research areas.

The uncharted territories of innovation: limitations of the framework and suggestions for future research

Undoubtedly, a limitation of this paper is its focus on hierarchical organizations. Therefore, a suggestion is to encourage studies on innovation in Leaderless Resistance Movements (LRM) and hybrid organizations, as these might uncover different organizational dynamics, which challenge the assumption of leadership primacy during Adoption and Implementation. Yet a completely excluding of the leadership cannot be assumed. For example, “ideational” oligarchies can contribute to inspiring, planning, and executing attacks in LRM (Gray, 2013). Therefore, future research could determine whether this can also occur at a strategic level.

Moreover, this study dealt with positive – i.e., successful – cases. Investigating negative cases could contribute to shedding light on the stages that prove most difficult or on organizations that highlight alternative dynamics and rationales to the ones suggested here. Similarly, negative cases could elucidate the conditions that lead to failure.¹⁰ Likewise, the complex relationship between tactical, operational, and strategic innovation deserves further attention. Finally, this study focused on organizations within the same geographical context – Western Europe – and historical period which introduces a Western-centric bias. It is therefore important to expand the scope to include organizations from different geographical, historical, and cultural contexts to refine the understanding of innovation and the framework here presented. The qualitative approach appears to suit the study of innovation well, as it captures its complex, relevant nuances. Similarly, the comparative approach has also proved useful. Expanding the pool of organizations under scrutiny to carry out a Qualitative Comparative Analysis could, perhaps, constitute a viable next step.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Dr. Bernhard Blumenau, Dr. Kieran McConaghy, Prof. Richard English, Dr. Timothy Wilson, Alejandra Gentil, and the two anonymous reviewers for their useful suggestions, comments, and feedback.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. This definition draws on Bale (2018), p. 4

2. This idea of “game changers” is also highlighted in Business Studies, see (Markides, 1997)

3. For the role of constraints, see, instead (Logan et al., 2023),

4. Gartenstein-Ross et al. have similarly identified four stages in the tactical innovation process (Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2020), while sociologist Everett Rogers posited five stages (Rogers, 2003)

5. Business and Marketing scholars have similarly highlighted the role of preconditions in the innovation process. See (Christensen, 2004; Hargadon, 2003; Schlegelmilch et al., 2003)

6. An approach also recommended by Hafez and Rasmussen (2010: p. 4).

7. The BR killed two members of the Italian Social Movement in 1974, but this operation did not originally contemplate lethal force. See Jamieson (1989), p. 86.

8. For a breakdown of the Troubles victims, see (English, 2012: pp. 380–382)

9. In April 2022, the New IRA issued a statement on the challenges faced during the global pandemic and – adopting a terminology similar to that of this paper – argued that this moment provided opportunities for “evaluation”. See (New I.R.A., 2022)

10. For studies on negative cases, see Hafez and Rasmussen (2012): pp. 90–103 and Ackerman (2014).