![Sample our Area Studies journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5922/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Area-Studies.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Since 2011, Morocco has been undergoing a series of political, constitutional and institutional reforms, including the issue of rights. These reforms were a response to the February 20 movement that emerged against the background of the Arab Spring. Prompted by this movement and its nationwide protests, the King of Morocco delivered a speech in March 2011 on reform and modernization, resulting in the rapid drafting and adoption of a new Moroccan constitution in June 2011. After a referendum on the constitutional reforms in July 2011, parliamentary elections were held in which a coalition government led by the Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power. This paper analyzes the context of the 2011 constitution and assesses the trajectory of the constitutional reforms up to 2015.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Reformist thought in Morocco since the mid-19th century has followed a middle way between royal traditionalism as a political framework for Islamic authenticity and selective modernization. The latter calls for incorporating the military and organizational modernity embodied in the Western model as the best means to resist Western pressure and avert foreign domination and occupation. Due to this conciliatory approach between the native, hereditary system and the coercive Western model, Moroccan reformists were influenced, on the one hand, by thinkers of the Arab renaissance (Nahda) from the eastern Arab world, such as Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. Conversely, they were aware of the need to protect the authenticity of the nation from the dangerous hostile tide of Western imperialism. This perceptive approach to Moroccan reformist thought has shaped the awareness and struggle of Moroccan nationalism since the 1930s. It has also brought to maturity the ‘national covenant’ between the royal institution and civil society, based on political freedom, social modernization and institutional reform.
2 One activist wrote:
Firstly, it is an unorganized youth movement. This means that it has broken away from the bureaucratic control of the reformist parties and the trade unions. At the same time, however, the lack of organization means the absence of any centralized leadership with a clear programme and practical tactics which is capable of studying experiences and benefitting from the lessons of the popular Arab uprisings and revolts. (Marxy Citation2011)
3 Their leftist allies remarked:
They were participating in an opportunistic manner. In the beginning, their presence was poor, especially when the movement was threatened with suppression. However, wherever the movement was able to realize gains and the balance of power was in its favour, they came out in large numbers to silence the rest of the movement. (Marxy Citation2011)
4 Data are from national research on values in the report ‘50 Years of Human Development in Morocco’ and a study entitled ‘The Expectations and Representations of the Youth on Good Governance of Public Affairs’, Bledmag 22 (15 July 2010), both cited by Beurdeley (Citation2014, 45).
5 The slogans and demands did not oppose the king himself, his political symbolism or sovereign status in any noteworthy manner.
6 It is known that the culture of reform and renewal has been ingrained in political thinking and practice especially since the dawn of the Moroccan nationalist movement. In fact, the emergence of the February 20 movement was framed by the reformist, political, rights and institutional context known to Morocco since the ‘new era’ after Mohammed's accession to the throne in 1999.
7 In a lecture delivered in Rabat on 3 August 2015 entitled ‘We are in an intellectual crisis, not a conceptual crisis’, Marzouki stated:
It is clear that the only person to grasp the historical moment and understand that it deals with a decisive turning point is King Mohammed VI. The proof of that is the new constitution and the elections which brought the Islamists to power. This is the political savvy which produces reforms and prevents the eruption of a volcano.
8 On the main points of the speech, see Al-Din (Citation2015).
9 Mohammed V was at the head of the Moroccan nationalist movement to liberate the country from French and Spanish colonialism between 1930 and 1956.
10 Mohammed V led the initiatives and plans to build independence and establish the pillars of the national state between 1956 and 1961.
11 Hassan II initiated the ‘Green March’, a mass public march involving 350,000 citizens that forced Spain to negotiate and sign the Madrid Accords of 1975, which liberated the southern provinces (known as the Moroccan Sahara or Western Sahara).
12 The political and developmental initiatives adopted by Mohamed VI attracted widespread popular support in which the national consensus was renewed. Examples of that include: the 2004 initiative to establish the Justice and Reconciliation Commission to settle the cases of political dissidents subjected to arbitrary detention and forced disappearance; the 2011 initiative announcing political, rights and institutional reforms in the framework of the constitution of 2011; and the initiative to mobilize the resources of the state to develop the remote rural regions and many marginal poor urban regions within the framework of the royal institution's utilization of the mechanism of consensus (Rouvillois Citation2013).
13 The widely used expression ‘years of lead’ describes the autocratic rule under the reign of the late Hassan II during 1963–96, and in 1996 in particular.
14 The ‘new era’ describes the policies and programmes initiated by Mohammed VI since he took over the rule of the country in 1999.
15 Some of the juristic readings of the political, institutional and constitutional reforms adopted by the royal regime in Morocco have been influenced by Western political theory on the relationship of the monarchy with democracy. This explains the tendency to disparage these reforms.
16 This means that every judgement enjoys the agreement of the citizens and gains their satisfaction, thus becoming legitimate.
17 This means that it crystallizes and distinguishes the essential authorities in the system of rule, namely the legislature, executive and judiciary.
18 . This means the separation of the authority and the mutual definition of the powers of each.
19 . The democratic bloc formed in 1992 was composed of the four nationalist parties: the Independence Party (Hizb al-Istiqlal), the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Al-ittihad al-ishtiraki li al-quwwat al-sha‘biyyah), the Party of Progress and Socialism (Hizb al-taqaddum wa al-ishtirakiyyah), and the Organization for Democratic and Popular Action (OADP). This bloc was a political opposition axis that played a vital role in maturing the conditions for the political reconciliation with the late Hassan II, which was translated into the 1996 constitution.
20 This relates to the memoranda for reform submitted by the Socialist Union of Popular Forces and the Independence Party in October 1991, and then the memoranda of the democratic bloc in May and April 1992.
21 The new constitution added to the framework of essential ‘fixtures’ for the community. These were the Islamic religion, national and territorial unity, and ‘democratic choice’ as an irreversible choice.
22 In order to describe this ‘hegemony’, the requirements of Articles 41 and 42 of the new constitution are usually mentioned. Article 41 stipulates the limited religious authority of the king as Commander of the Faithful (amir al-mu’minin) and head of the Supreme Council of Ulama. Article 42 stipulates the status of the king in his role as head of state during which he performs his duties of ‘sovereignty, guarantee and arbitration’. Some regard the combination of the powers and the functions granted to the king in these articles as a sign of this hegemony (Al-‘Alam Citation2015).
23 This consideration is based on the fact that the Moroccan constitution does not accept the superiority of international treaties but the issuing of the constitution stipulates that the practice of this superiority in the sphere of domestic laws (Al-Sasi Citation2011).
24 As for this shortcoming, the king, after consultation with the head of the constitutional tribunal, proposed to parliament a plan to review some of the constitution's requirements. Parliament agreed on the plan for the review with a majority of two-thirds of its members (Al-Musaddaq Citation2011).
25 It is known that there were 185 of these memoranda issued by 100 social, political, trade union and institutional organizations which covered a wide social and political base that had entered into a collaborative approach to achieve constitutional reform.
26 Twenty-eight out of a total of around 36 Moroccan political parties agreed on the constitutional reform, while it was boycotted by six radical parties (four leftist and two conservative).
27 The first section of the constitution stipulates that (Al-Din Citation2011):
The system of rule in Morocco is a democratic, parliamentary, social and constitutional monarchy. The constitutional system of the kingdom is founded on the basis of the separation of powers, their balance and cooperation, democracy citizenship participation, and on the principles of good governance and linking responsibility to accountability.
28 The last paragraph of the constitution's preamble stipulates:
international agreements ratified by Morocco, within the rulings of the constitution and the laws of the Kingdom and within respect for its established national identity, on the publication of these agreements, [hold] precedence over the national laws and harmonize with this national legislation according to the provisions of this ratification.
29 On the ambiguous interpretation of this aspect, see Hassan Tariq's response in Akhbar al-Youm (14 July 2015).
30 Some constitutional legal jurists regarded this adherence to the political and economic aspects in the system of human rights as a model that turned away from the dominance of the French perspective of constitutional reform towards the Anglo-Saxon perspective (Al-Din Citation2015).
31 The leadership of the believers represents an essential historical element with roots in the structure of the Moroccan political system. The literal meaning of Article 19 in the five Moroccan constitutions (1862, 1970, 1972, 1992 and 1996) prompted a number of jurists in constitutional law to recognize it as a ‘hidden constitution’ at the heart of the actual constitution. In order to rebuff this ambiguity, it was substituted in the 2011 constitution by more welcome, modern demands included in Articles 41 and 42.
32 Article 41 of the constitution stipulates that ‘The king, Commander of the Faithful, is the guarantor of freedom of belief. He presides over the Supreme Council of Ulama which is charged with studying the issues that he presents to it’. Similarly, Article 42 stipulates:
The king is the head of state, its highest representative, symbol of the nation's unity, guarantor of the state's permanence and continuity and highest arbiter between the institutions. He guards the respect for the constitution, the good progress of the constitutional institutions, the protection of democratic choice and the rights and freedoms of the male and female citizens and communities, and the respect for the kingdom's international commitments. He is the guarantor of the country's independence and the territorial integrity of the kingdom within its true borders.
33 These peripheral readings include Glacier (Citation2015).
34 This same phrase from the speech that the king directed at the administrators and representatives of citizens in the provinces and regions on 12 October 1999 was repeated in later speeches.
35 Final report of the Justice and Reconciliation Commission (30 November 2005), 9.
36 Third paragraph of the constitution's preamble.
37 Final paragraph of the constitution's preamble.
38 Report by the High Commission for Planning (Haut Commissariat au Plan) at the Common Market Council (CMC) conference, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
39 The requirements of law 70.03 were similar to the Moudawana family code (al-Jaridah al-rasmiyyah, 5 February 2004).
40 The king states in the preamble of the Moudawana that it is not regarded as a law for women but a code for families, fathers, mothers and children. It wishes to combine the removal of oppression against women with the protection of children and the preservation of the dignity of men (Lafaruji Citation2010).
41 Here we mention the experience of the French Revolution in formulating the 1791 constitution. This provoked a heated debate and a bitter struggle erupted between the supporters of the ‘radical lights’ and the side of the populist tendency, the Jacobians. This struggle pushed the Marquis of Condorcet and his companions to adopt a middle approach based on the concept of the ‘moderate lights’ (Le Monde Citation2015).
42 These repercussions are embodied in the role played by the 20 February movement in calling for demonstrations and protests and raising the slogans for reform and fighting corruption which had also been used in the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in particular.
43 The terrorist attack of 16 May 2003 was a decisive turning point in the political position and the general trend of public politics in the country. The ‘throne speech’ a few months after the Casablanca attack reflected this change taking place in national political thinking on the state as well as political society (Al-Hijjawi Citation2012).
44 The various studies and approaches regarding the post-Arab Spring economic situation, whether originating from opposition or financial circles, are almost unanimous on the serious financial situation and the precarious economic circumstances (Aqsa Citation2015, Berrada Citation2014).
45 The experiment of the coalition government led by the JDP came under the dynamic context of ‘democratic alternation’ into which the country had chosen to enter. This culminated in the establishment and integration of a democratic political system according to the globally recognized criteria. From this viewpoint, the political and circumstantial conditions of the Arab Spring should not obscure the objective and effective progress of this political dynamism.
46 The current parliamentary political opposition was formed of four main parties: the Authenticity and Modernity Party (Hizb al-asalah wa al-muasirah), the Independence Party, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces and the Constitutional Union Party (Hizb al-ittihad al-dusturi). Despite the ideological differences between these parties, whose affiliations are distributed among liberals, conservatives and the left, their political positions intersected. Rather, their coalition was formed around a methodological plan for opposition to the government coalition in general and to the JDP in particular.
47 The constitution stipulated the issuing of around 20 systematic laws to activate a number of constitutional requirements. The government had put in place an executive plan aimed at formulating plans for these laws and proposing them to parliament and about 50% of these have been implemented so far.
48 Rachid Muqtadar, Professor of Constitutional Law, in an interview with Akhbar al-youm, 4 August 2015.
49 Statement by the Secretary General of the Party of Progress and Socialism, which forms the left of the government coalition, in Akhbar al-youm (5 September 2014).
50 The clearing system supports the essential resources for consumption through the mechanism of the clearing house which the state funds through public budgets. Its costs reached over 50 billion dirhams (around US$5 million) in 2014.
51 Studies on the actual effect of the state's subsidizing of the essential resources for popular consumption through the clearing house report that 80% of the clearing house's support was allocated for the benefit of the well-to-do classes. Only 20% was used to benefit the lower classes at whom the clearing house was aimed.
52 Announcement by the IMF following its delegation to Morocco between 28 May and 5 June 2015 for discussions with the Moroccan authorities on the second review of Morocco's economic performance under the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) arrangement, which was agreed upon by the IMF executive in July 2014 (Akhbar al-Youm, 8 June 2015).
53 Unemployment among the youth aged 15–24 years was 20%, and this rose to 36% in urban centres. Unemployment among those aged 25–24 years was 13.2%. The rate of unemployment among higher-education graduates reached 18.8% (report by the Minister for Employment and Social Affairs in a government meeting held on 2 July 2015; Akhbar al-Youm, 6 July 2015).
54 Statement by Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the IMF, in an interview with L’observateur du Maroc et d’Afrique (3 September 2015).
55 The High Commission for Planning (Haut Commissariat au Plan) is a public institution independent of the government. Its activities focus on matters of statistics and planning.
56 At a press conference held in Casablanca on 1 Jul 2015, Ahmed Lhilmi, the delegate for the HCP, drew a bleak picture of the prospects for the development of the national economy in 2016. He noted in particular that: ‘the recovery of the macro-economic balance in 2015 occurred at the expense of consumption and investment … especially the rate of investment which had become negative in 2013. … The same decline was seen in investment and economic growth which experienced a noticeable shrinkage’. For a summary, see Akhbar al-Youm (1 July 2015).
57 Presentation of the financial report for 2012 by the governor of the Bank of Morocco, 17 July 2013.
58 The assessments of the national financial and economic institutes as well as the analyses of economic experts converge with regard to the vitality and speed of the structural reforms of the national economy. On the need for structural economic reforms, see the reports by El Aoufi (Citation2011) and the JDP (Citation2015); the latter includes observations by the economist Najib Akesbi and the minister for planning.
59 This was to be achieved by reducing the budget deficit and increasing the reserves of hard currency to cover five months.
60 This was to expand the tax coffers by targeting the informal sector, imposing new taxes on higher wages and companies with an annual profit of over 20 million dirhams (US$2 million) and reducing tax on lower wages.
61 This support was to provide small farmers with modern irrigation methods for their lands, reviving the agricultural development fund and the allocation of its funds.
62 This was to create an agricultural development fund.
63 This was to enable contracts to recover value-added tax, hasten the payment of arrears and the payment of deposits by the government for contacts, as well as to ease the administrative rules for investors and set up a special committee to study the prime minister's portfolios.
64 Keynes (d. 1946) stated that in order to realize or restore full employment, the government must intervene to provide sufficient investment and urge public consumption or greater public employment. The interventionist policy of the state is the key to full employment and the end of unemployment.
65 With the exception of some radical opposition forces, including leftists and conservatives, there was national consensus on the issues of strategic importance. The main issues were territorial unity and national security international cooperation.
66 Muhammad Tuzi stated in an interview with Tel Quel (31 July 2015): ‘Morocco cannot be regarded as an autocratic or democratic state, it falls into both lists.’ We interpret this assessment as a ‘metaphor’ rather than as a political fact or scientific analysis.
67 In his speech in July 2015, the king announced a developmental plan aimed at taking the population of 24,000 villages and regions out of the poverty and marginalization surrounding them. This plan was to implement a developmental plan for health and education that would benefit 12 million people in the marginalized regions.
68 According to a World Bank study published in July 2015 (Al-Ahdath Al-Magribiyah news 30 July 2015), Morocco came in third place among the five top countries to utilize the best global programmes and initiatives for action on human development, i.e. India (first), Ethiopia (second) and Russia (fourth) and Bangladesh (fifth).
69 The radical opposition parties and currents are represented by the parties and currents of the radical right and left.
70 In the Fraser Institute's (Citation2015) Annual Report on ranking economic freedom, Morocco obtained a score below the international average for the index measuring the practice of freedoms. For example, Morocco was in worst position for personal freedoms despite its progress compared with other Arab countries. Hence, the writers of the report call for the government to work to improve and ‘respect Moroccan rights’. Morocco has also fallen in the freedom index (according to the same report) as it occupies 121st place out of the 152 nations included in the classification. Morocco also obtained a score of 6.17 while the international average was 6.96.