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ABSTRACT
Steady development of China–Arab economic relations has been taking place in a turbulent international environment, especially at political and economic levels. In such a context, this study shifts the attention towards approaching China–Arab economic relations from the perspective of international political economy. It is divided into three sections. The first provides a brief historical introduction to the relations between China and the Arab world. The second examines some of the main challenges that face China–Arab economic relations. The third explores the opportunities in which both parties should invest in order to reach the level of strategic partnership. The study approaches the subject from the perspective of international political economy and concludes with a discussion on how the political can play an incentive role for China–Arab economic relations.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 The ancient Silk Road connects Chang’an, China, with Iraq, Syria and Egypt across Central Asia. The ancient Incense Road, known in modern literature as the Belt, begins its first section on China’s western coast and crosses the Strait of Hormuz; its second section begins west of the Strait of Hormuz and goes west through the Sultanate of Oman, the city of Aden and then north along the Red Sea coast to Syria and Egypt.
2 This applies also to the free-trade area which is expected to be established between China and GCC countries, because a free-trade area represents only the first phase of the five stages of international economic integration in Bélla Balassa'' model (preferential trade area, free-trade area, customs union, common market, comprehensive economic integration) (Balassa Citation1961).
3 Completing the construction of these networks fulfils the objectives of ensuring smooth transport and shipping (land, sea and air) and facilitating cooperation to secure oil and gas transmission channels. However, the project is more ambitious. It also aims at building the so-called ‘Virtual Silk Road’ by creating massive communication and information networks to facilitate cross-border electronic financial and trade transactions, as well as a ‘Green Silk Road’ to promote renewable energies and to respond to the challenge of climate change (Shahrour Citation2016).
4 Benantar used this phrase in his critique of the concept of the pivotal state used by American literature in the mid-1990s to describe Algeria, among a total of nine other countries. It was argued that this concept was employed externally from the perspective of US national security exclusively, while the prevailing discourse in Algeria went along with that without being scrutinized as to its relevance to the interests of the United States in the region (Benantar Citation2005).
5 On the theory of regional security complexes, see Buzan and Waever (Citation2003).
6 It seems that the time has come to listen to the voices calling for problematizing the principle of non-interference in China'' politics, because it puts its interests in danger in the long term. It seems to be in the interest of both China and the Arab world to consider coordination and adaptation to replace the current non-interference framework. China is committed to maintaining a high level of transparency in any form of strategic intervention activities in the Middle East, in particular because it will prove to the world that China'' intervention (in counter-terrorism efforts, for example) really aims at protecting its assets and citizens in the region, not at achieving superiority or hegemony (Feng Citation2015).
7 In this context, one should praise, for example, Saudi Arabia'' investments in the Chinese economy besides increasing its export of oil to China (17% of its oil needs). Saudi Arabia offered to contribute to the construction of China'' strategic oil reserves in Hainan (more than 100 million tons). In addition, China'' SINOPEC and Saudi ARAMCO are investing in building oil refineries inside China. An important corporation of Chinese and Saudi companies was founded to construct large factories and complexes specialized in petrochemical production (Hong Citation1999).
8 Teaching Chinese in Arab universities remains a decisive challenge in this context.
9 In addition to economic achievements, other achievements have been made at the cultural and tourism levels. More than 20 Chinese universities founded Arabic-language departments, and China has opened more than 10 institutes in Arab countries to teach Chinese. Eight Arab countries have become major destinations for Chinese tourists, in addition to 145 flights a week between China and Arab countries (Gulf Center for Strategic Studies Citation2015).
10 Officially, the free-trade agreement negotiations between China and GCC countries deal with products trade, services trade, and economic and technical cooperation. In the long term, however, China is prospecting the relative wealth of Gulf Arab states, particularly with the latter having to restructure their economies as well as developing infrastructure and diversifying their industries, especially with the recent oil-price crisis.
11 The GCC remains an exception, which appears to be driven by an external security concern rather than an internal economic/social motive. The Maghreb remains an exception, however, in its resistance to the spread of regionalism, to the extent that it can be considered as a ‘region without regionalism’.
12 For full details, see Benantar (Citation2004).
13 In this context, Benantar (Citation2004) says that intra-Maghreb trade remains a true image of intra-Arab trade in general, which remains very weak, not exceeding 10% of the Arab world'' trade with the outside world, while intra-trade between the EU'' countries is more than 60% of Europe'' foreign trade. Currently, intra-Maghreb trade accounts for about 3% of Maghreb foreign trade.
14 In the case of the Arab Maghreb, for example, the three main Maghreb countries (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) signed association agreements with the EU, and each negotiates individually, while the MERCOSUR countries, for example, have succeeded in speaking with the EU as one voice.
15 It is important to emphasize that Arab–Arab integration can reduce the negative effects of the imbalance of China'' interestedness in Arab countries, a phenomenon justified by the implications of China'' economic interestedness in focusing on specific Arab countries more than others.
16 For the full text of document, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-01/13/c_135006619.htm
17 This trend has been reinforced by China'' decision to de-ideologicalize its (foreign) economic policies. It is well known that some Arab countries had reservations towards the role of foreign policies of certain countries (including China) in spreading Communist ideology in the Arab world. Over the last three decades, however, China has shifted towards pragmatist development, meaning to focus on pushing forward economic development, whatever economic policies, whatever the source of economic aid. ‘It does not matter the color of the cat as long as it is proficient in catching mice,’ said Deng Xiaoping (Jalal Citation2003).
18 Inspiration, here, does not mean dealing with the Chinese experience as undesirable and free of repercussions. Many social and economic dilemmas have emerged as consequences of China'' rapid economic development, such as the imbalance of interregional economic growth, increasing inequality in wealth distribution, corruption, environmental degradation etc.
19 China used to – and still does – self-present(s) as being closer to the countries of the South than the other great powers aspiring to hegemony (mainly Europe and the United States). On the one hand, China was a victim, not a maker, of traditional colonial policies and, on the other, it is one of the South countries. Thus, it has worked, and still works, in one way or another to build what Benantar (Citation2014) calls ‘the ideology of the South/belonging to the South’ (6).
20 Wu Peng Peng defines the interests on which China'' policies towards the Arab world rest as follows: the strategic interest of promoting cooperation with key countries and implementing the Road and Belt initiative; the political interest of China'' responsible role as a great power; the economic interest of facilitating trade and investment, as well as energy; the security interest in confronting and eradicating extremism; and the cultural interest of promoting a dialogue among civilizations and combining tradition with modernity (see http://islamonline.net/16868).
21 These reasons are historical and political at the same time. Chinese ancient and modern history (the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries) suffers some kind of foreign intervention complex. The issues of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Tibet, and their influence on the principle of ‘One China’, have led China to centre the principle of non-interference in whatever its forms. China'' apparent ‘sympathy’ with Russia'' direct military intervention in Syria can be justified by supporting the war against extremist groups.
22 Arab political and economic elites seem to have received sufficient clarification about China'' position during the landmark visits paid, during 2013, by King Abdullah II, King Hamad bin Issa Al Khalifa, President Abed Rabbo Mansour and President Mahmoud Abbas, for example, besides the six Arab foreign ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia, as well as the frequent visits of Chinese officials to the region, since 2011. These are in addition to the continuity of the shared bodies and committees such as the Arab–Chinese businessmen conference, the investment conference under the China–Arab Cooperation Forum, as well as the strategic dialogue between GCC and China.