The art of effective oversight: unravelling the success of Israel's Cabel Inquiry Committee

ABSTRACT

Legislative oversight of the executive branch is a fundamental mechanism for ensuring government accountability, good governance, and enhancing democracy. However, formal oversight powers alone are insufficient, and the practical application eventually determines effectiveness. In contemporary times, a distinct set of political phenomena exists, notably the emergence of populism and polarisation, a deep-seated crisis of representation, and a systematic decline in public trust regarding diverse branches of government, coupled with the personalisation of politics and the weakening of political parties. In light of these developments, it is essential to engage in a meticulous examination of the means by which legislatures can enhance their capacity to effectively oversee governments. This article examines the parliamentary committee of inquiry led by Knesset Member Eitan Cabel in Israel from 2017 to 2019, which focused on credit arrangements for large business borrowers. This committee's rigorous investigation into financial system failures makes it an exemplary case of robust oversight in action. The article analyses the Committee establishment, composition, mandate, systematic meeting-planning and questioning process, unique physical setting, report publishing, and other details. The analysis of the Committee's work reveals important insights regarding effective oversight, and isolates the practices which made its work such an augmented performance of legislative oversight. Factors such as the committee's activeness, cooperation, independence, preparation, respectful yet critical approach, transparency, accurate use of media, and precise procedure, created an exceptional performance of legislative oversight. The article concludes that while legislative oversight relies partly on formal mechanisms, it is primarily driven by how political actors apply them, and reveals the importance and centrality of the human factor. This single case analysis, focusing on the committee's oversight practices can inform comparative learning on delivering robust oversight beyond Israel's context, and derive widely applicable insights into key practices for effective legislative supervision of the executive branch.

KEYWORDS:

• Parliaments
• parliamentary oversight
• inquiry committee
• oversight potential
• Israel

1. Introduction

The democratic importance of effective legislative oversight is well known. Ever since the establishment of legislatures in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their primary goal has been to oversee the executive branch and distribute governmental power among different governmental branches,¹ a role grounded in the heart of the philosophical concept of the separation of powers.²

This democratic and principled virtue manifests, in the government's routine conduct, in a significant set of more concrete attributes: It enhances governmental accountability on the one hand³ as well as governmental legitimacy on the other.⁴ It perfects governmental operations by ensuring that the government functions within the confines of the law, optimises financial management, achieves its defined objectives, and promotes transparency and trust in government.⁵ Moreover, legislative oversight protects the interests of vulnerable groups, ensuring that the government does not serve only the interests of the powerful.⁶

All these democratic qualities stem from legislative oversight and have always been crucial. However, their importance has multiplied due to global political transformations in the past two decades. These interconnected transformations include inter alia a crisis of representation;⁷ the growth of bureaucracy, which has given the executive greater power and influence;⁸ a systematic decline in public trust in various branches of government;⁹ the presidentialisation of prime ministers in parliamentary systems;¹⁰ the personalisation of politics; and the weakening of parties.¹¹ These alterations have significantly impacted Israel, which is the test case examined in this article.¹²

Nonetheless, the principled democratic importance of legislative oversight stressed here is not fully realised in democratic systems. Scholars have long recognised the distinction between the formal ability to oversee governments and the practical ability to do so vigorously or effectively.¹³ Novel literature has emerged, delving into the concept of ‘oversight potential’, its meaning, and its implications.¹⁴ The understanding that effective legislative oversight cannot rely solely on the mere existence of oversight tools leads to focusing on the way these mechanisms are used and applied. Therefore, through the prism of the Israeli test case, this article's main goal is to trace the main characteristics of strong and vigorous legislative oversight.

In the course of interviews conducted expressly for this inquiry with government officials, elected politicians, and relevant stakeholders, it was observed on multiple occasions that the discussions pertaining to the cancellation of debts owed by major borrowers to banks – convened by Knesset Member Eitan Cabel in his capacity as Chair of the Knesset Economic Affairs Committee – represent the most notable accomplishment of any legislative oversight assembly in Israel. The activity of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers (hereinafter: the Cabel Inquiry Committee or the Committee) holds much promise in terms of legislative oversight. Therefore, this article is dedicated to an elaborate depiction, characterisation, and evaluation of the activities of the Cabel Inquiry Committee.

The Cabel Inquiry Committee is important not only for descriptive purposes but also for analytical purposes. The Committee's tremendous success in oversight makes it an outstanding prism through which to observe and derive the essential qualities and characteristics we can identify as creating effective oversight. Here lies the most substantial contribution of this article, which presents a broad analytical perspective on the practical way to achieve effective legislative oversight. These include 21 different aspects that characterised the Committee's work: activeness, systematisation, inter-party cooperation, the opposition's significant role, lack of conformity, respectful and relevant discourse, special setting, sense of urgency and necessity, creating media and public interest, transparency and accessibility of information, professional advisory staff, widespread participation, accurate terms and procedure, pre-determined meeting dates, quorum demand and obligation of attendance, producing an outcome, sophisticated use of oversight instrument (parliamentary committee of inquiry), legislative qualifications and experience, motivation, preparation, and subject matter. These insights can be of special value and contribute to scholars and practitioners alike when trying to identify and isolate practices that may perfect legislative oversight, regardless of each legislature's specific mechanisms.

The article starts with sketching central perspectives of legislative oversight while emphasising the shift from the mechanisms that enable oversight to the different practices that occur in legislatures’ routines. Recognising the gap between mechanisms and practices calls for efforts to understand the practices that make a difference between the potential to perform legislative oversight and the actual ability to execute effective legislative oversight. The following section presents the methodology used in this current research and highlights the reasons for focusing on the Cabel Inquiry Committee and the different approaches used to analyse the committee's work. The subsequent section offers a detailed description of the Committee's work, addressing various aspects such as the background and the establishment of the Committee, the Committee's website, political and public support, the meetings’ planning, the meetings’ format, the discussions and questioning process, the Committee's setting, and the publishing of the Committee's report. The following section analyses the Committee's conduct and details 21 different relevant characteristics of the Committee's work that emerge from the description. The last section concludes, while emphasising the importance of the human factor vis-a-vis institutional arrangements.

2. Effective legislative oversight: definition and characterisation

In a democratic model of governance, which is founded upon the principles of the separation of powers, the legislative branch has the responsibility of setting rules and policy, while the executive branch is tasked with implementing these rules in accordance with the public policy established by lawmakers. The concept of separation of powers, introduced by Mill and Montesquieu centuries ago,¹⁵ aims to ensure checks and balances between the different governing branches in order to prevent any one entity from monopolising the governing power. In this context, legislatures, as the representative body of the people, must regularly scrutinise the actions of the various administrative agencies to assess whether they align with its objectives, abide by the policies set forth by it, and serve the public's best interests. This is the crux of legislative oversight of government. Nonetheless, the question of how to do so remains in dispute.

There is a divergence of opinions regarding the definition of oversight in scholarly literature. The definition that emerged in the 1970s and has been embraced over time characterises oversight as the actions of legislators that impact the behaviour of the bureaucracy, whether intentionally or not and whether at the individual or collective level.¹⁶ This definition is consistent with the substantial empirical research in American literature that evaluates the conduct of legislators and the various factors that inform their decisions, both individually and collectively.¹⁷ However, this definition has primarily been utilised in studies focused on the US Congress and is therefore limited by the context of American research literature.

Another model developed in the United States that has a broader application is the one offered by McCubbins and Schwartz in the 1980s, which distinguishes between two oversight models: the ‘police patrol’ model and the ‘fire alarm’ model. The former reflects active investigation and monitoring of the executive branch. Such oversight occurs in Congress through hearings, investigations, and reporting requirements. The latter is characterised by responsiveness, in which Congress waits for external factors (different groups, citizens) to flag issues that require oversight. Both models, of course, have other constraints and costs. Both, the authors argue, are necessary to hold effective legislative oversight.¹⁸

While McCubbins’ and Schwartz's model is based on the distinction between activeness and responsiveness, in the following decade, Gregory proposed a distinction based on the coerciveness of legislative supervision. This approach aims to establish a new comprehensive and inclusive understanding of the concept. According to this framework, strong legislative oversight involves imposing sanctions, while weak legislative oversight is carried out in the course of the body's routine activity. It involves continuous examination, verification, challenging, questioning, demanding responsibility, and criticism towards the controlled body. The mechanism of no confidence is an example of strong legislative oversight, as it is political in nature. In contrast, the ongoing work of committees, along with the routine oversight mechanisms on the legislature floor, reflect weak oversight.¹⁹

A more up-to-date definition, rooted in the effect of COVID-19 on parliaments, highlights parliament's significant role in policymaking. This definition recognises the heart of legislative oversight as ‘the limiting and the sharing of executive power’, while guiding political decisions and participating in governmental action.²⁰

Legislative oversight can also be defined in broader terms as the comprehensive inspection, surveillance, and supervision of the government and public entities, which encompasses the enforcement of regulations and laws,²¹ or in a more principled manner, legislative oversight can be conceived as a fundamental mechanism that enables parliament and its members to act on behalf of the people in holding the government accountable during periods between elections.²²

Different approaches to understanding legislative oversight try to deconstruct this concept instead of defining it. A prominent approach understands the legislative oversight of government as entailing three main objectives that remain relevant regardless of the supervisory structure implemented. The first objective is centred on content-based goals, which involve ensuring that the different administrative branches, public authorities, and executive entities perform their duties effectively and in compliance with the law. This also involves assessing how the executive branch exercises its authority, preventing waste, corruption, and abuse of power, as well as collecting and analysing relevant information for future policy design. The second goal pertains to political incentives, where legislative inspection creates a positive or negative image for the governmental authorities based on the quality of their work. Inadequate performance might lead to negative publicity and institutional and personal shaming. The third objective is institutional based, whereby legislative inspection aims to refine the distinction between the executive branch and Parliament. This involves assessing the power and authority entrusted to the executive branch and how it exercises it, and reporting this information to the public to apply effective public criticism.²³

However, the mere presence of oversight is insufficient. To be effective, the quality of supervision must be of a high standard. An essential and fundamental aspect that establishes a framework for effective supervision is the level of autonomy of the Parliament and its standing. Empirical evidence has proven that ‘robust’ parliaments – those with elevated status and authority, wherein autonomous legislative audit committees exist and possess the power to summon witnesses, modify significant portions of legislation, and impede policy execution by the executive branch – have yielded superior results in terms of oversight.²⁴

The controversy over the importance of the mechanisms themselves still remains, however. Evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic has enriched the discussion: while some argued that the variety of oversight opportunities and mechanisms that were available for legislatures had a significant role in parliaments’ ability to perform effective oversight during an emergency,²⁵ others emphasised legislatures’ strategic nature concerning oversight and the use of the mechanisms which were feasible during the pandemic. Parliaments exhibited creativity and pragmatism and succeeded in overseeing governments using only ‘interim mechanisms’²⁶ which, in Gregory's terms, would probably be conceived as ‘weak’.

This core disagreement – concerning mechanisms and the use thereof – has additional aspects. While some highlight the formal norms which allow oversight, whether constitutional, legislative, or sub-legislative,²⁷ others give much more weight to other factors. Among them is the norm interpretation, which has a central significance due to disagreements that may arise regarding the provisions.²⁸ Another critical factor is the legislative capacity to compel governmental cooperation or compliance. In some instances, there are legal sanctions for lack of cooperation, while in others, political sanctions are in place, such as a vote of no confidence or the withholding of legislation promotion or budget passage. Public pressure is another factor, and its significance cannot be understated, as it is a weighty tool for effective oversight. When failures, inefficiencies, and unmet goals are exposed, it often leads to severe public criticism, which creates incentives for the executive branch to avoid such negative outcomes. The media and civil society also play a vital role in disseminating criticism, ensuring that legislative oversight mechanisms remain effective.²⁹ The oversight arena is yet another significant factor. The standing committees’ nature, which hands it a strong advantage over the plenum concerning questions of specialisation, socialisation, and interaction, makes this arena the preferred one for effective oversight.³⁰

Moreover, a systematic analysis of legislatures has emphasised the centrality of political culture to monitoring and regulation. Though subjective and differing vastly between legislatures and governments cultures, political culture has a significant impact on the presence of effective supervision. Research has demonstrated that a legislature in which members encourage and uphold cooperation in certain spheres provides a fertile environment for cultivating a political culture in which overseeing and controlling government activities and policies is successful. Such an atmosphere motivates legislatures to participate in oversight work, affects control and oversight procedures, and reduces the inclination to act in a partisan manner. This culture also results in greater receptivity on the administration's part to accept the supervisory body's recommendations due to their practical nature and broad consensus.³¹

Recent studies – here, too, affected by COVID-19 and the pandemic’s influence on parliamentary oversight – have stressed this issue. Through comparative research as well as different test cases, there are clear findings that democratic resilience, as well as a robust political culture of parliamentary oversight prior to the pandemic, had a notable influence on countries’ ability to perform effective oversight during the emergency periods.³² While parliamentary oversight is important in the ordinary course of action, it has a heightened importance in a time characterised by the marginalisation of parliaments and governmental dominance, not only due to the COVID-19 pandemic but also due to decades of diminishing parliaments’ role.³³

Within these different characterisations of parliamentary oversight lies this article, which seeks to use the Cabel Inquiry Committee – an unusual, continuous oversight event – to better characterise effective oversight. In current times, when there is a substantial corpus of literature that already acknowledges the concept of the potential of oversight,³⁴ it behoves us to better characterise effective oversight. This is the primary goal of this article.

Before delving into the issue, a few short words regarding the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) are helpful. The Knesset is a small, 120-member, unicameral parliament with a proportional and multi-party electoral system. It was institutionalised on the basis of the British heritage and is dominated by the government. The Knesset holds constitutive powers, aside from its legislative powers, due to the lack of a formal, complete, and enshrined constitution, replaced by independent basic laws that are considered constitutional norms.³⁵ Although formally it holds immense political power, in practice, in many cases, the Knesset is the weakest governmental branch and is controlled by the government through strict coalitional discipline.³⁶

3. Methodology

As a part of a broad research project to thoroughly scrutinise legislative oversight in Israel, I conducted semi-structured interviews with relevant – mainly governmental – functionaries. These functionaries included women and men from the Knesset and the government, incumbent and retired, professional and political, along with legislative studies specialists. Most interviewees pointed out the Cabel Inquiry Committee as a role model for legislative oversight that merits further attention. These systematic references justified choosing the Cabel Inquiry Committee as a test case.

Moreover, the choice of the Cabel Committee accords well with current efforts to better understand parliamentary committees of inquiry and their contribution to effective oversight. Friedberg and Shapira argue, within the Israeli scope, that investigation committees have significant weaknesses.³⁷ They identify several institutional factors, asserting that their implementation allows for a better understanding of the parliamentary committees of inquiry oversight potential: is there a legal basis, and what is the normative hierarchy thereof; the dynamic between the minority and the coalition majority; the presence of a quorum demand; the committee's powers, including the power to sanction relevant factors; the issues being investigated; frequency of meetings, completion of work, and products; and the source of the information and the knowledge that it holds. Observing these institutional arrangements, the two find that Israel's parliamentary committees of inquiry are generally weak. A comparative perspective further supports this conclusion. However, the two argue, ‘the Israeli case also demonstrates that the institutional arrangements do not tell the whole story’.³⁸ Other legislative instruments, such as the broad interpretive spectrum of the Knesset's Rules of Procedure, allow parliamentary committees of inquiry to leave a mark if the committees’ powers are executed precisely and correctly.

Among the committees that succeeded in this critical task – as the two authors describe – are the Committee on the Location and Restitution of Property of Holocaust Victims (2000–2005), the Committee on the Trafficking of Women (2000–2005), the Committee on Violence in Sports (2001–2005), and the Cabel Committee, the subject of this Article. Delving into the work of the Cabel Committee, which won recognition as a valuable case, follows Friedberg’s and Shapira's work and is meant to add another piece of evidence to the effort to better understand parliamentary oversight – both its potential and effectiveness. Furthermore, as I will show in the latter sections, an in-depth examination of one specific test case uncovers further qualities that are not as observable within an institutional perspective.

In pursuit of describing a comprehensive picture of the Committee's conduct, the research started with the official committee documentation. It included reviewing the videos of all the committee sessions,³⁹ alongside conducting a detailed examination of all the presented background documents.⁴⁰ Then, an interview was conducted with former Knesset Member Mr. Eitan Cabel. Former Knesset Member Cabel answered questions regarding Israel's legislative oversight and how he perceived the Committee's goals. Subsequently, the media coverage of the issue was examined to understand the public perception of the committee. In order to address some unanswered questions, correspondence was held with the Knesset Economic Affairs Committee. This broad documentation, accompanied by subjective impressions of politicians and governmental practitioners, clearly shows why the Committee's work has been conceived as a prominent success in oversight terms. These different and diverse sources enabled the construction of a more refined, genuine, and precise profile of the Committee's work and, through this investigation, to hammer out the characterisation of effective oversight.

4. The work of the Cabel Inquiry Committee

4.1. Background and the establishment of the Committee

The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers was formed subsequent to the financial collapse of businessman Eliezer Fishman and his debt settlement,⁴¹ which resulted in the wiping out of sixty-seven percent of Fishman's debts, amounting to 2.7 billion NIS (approximately 750 million USD).⁴² The Fishman affair raised public issues in the broader context of regulatory oversight of financial entities in Israel, particularly about the provision of credit to large business borrowers by banks.

In 2017, Knesset Member Ayelet Nahmias-Verbin initiated the creation of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry. At that time, she appealed to the Chairperson of the Economic Affairs Committee, Knesset Member Eitan Cabel, to establish a subcommittee to investigate the conduct of banks and regulators in the Fishman affair.⁴³ The proposal of the Knesset Committee (the House Committee) on the establishment of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry was approved by The Knesset Plenum on 5 July 2017, without dissent or abstention.⁴⁴

The Committee was assigned a central role of investigating the conduct of banks and institutional and regulatory bodies concerning credit allocations for large business borrowers from 2003 onwards. Its mandate included analysing decision-making processes and considerations undertaken by banks, monitoring compliance with credit conditions, methods of handling violations of credit conditions, as well as examining the functioning and accountability of managements and boards of directors in credit-related work processes. Additionally, the Committee was tasked with evaluating the considerations taken into account when decisions were made, including examining the impact of the borrower's identity on processes and decisions made in each case. The Committee was also charged with examining the conduct of central regulatory bodies in credit allocations to large borrowers.⁴⁵ In April 2019, the committee presented a summary report on the Knesset table, outlining the identified systemic failures as well as recommendations on the subject.⁴⁶

Members from all sides of the political spectrum were represented on the committee, including Knesset Member Eitan Cabel (Zionist Union) as Chairperson, Knesset Member Yoav Kish (Likud), Knesset Member Roy Folkman (Kulanu), Knesset Member Dov Hanin (Joint List), Knesset Member Ayelet Nahmias-Verbin (Zionist Union), Knesset Member Chaim Yellin (Yesh Atid), Knesset Member Bezalel Smotrich (The Jewish Home), Knesset Member Yigal Guetta and his replacement Knesset Member Yitzhak Vaknin (Shas), Knesset Member Moshe Gafni (United Torah Judaism), and Knesset Member Issawi Freij (Meretz). The Committee was also supported by three professional advisers: Prof. Asher Veles, Prof. Nittai Bergman, and Adv. Rahamim (Rami) Tamam.

Officials from Israel's banking, finance, and regulatory systems appeared before the Committee. These included representatives from Bank Hapoalim, Bank Leumi, Israel Discount Bank, and the First International Bank of Israel, as well as regulatory representatives from the Bank of Israel; the Banking Supervision Department; the Capital Market, Insurance and Savings Authority; the Antitrust Authority; the Securities Authority; and representatives of financial companies such as the Migdal Insurance Company and Clal Insurance Enterprises Holdings Ltd. Furthermore, the Committee heard proposals and references from various civil society organisations.

To prevent conflicts of interest and external influences on its members’ activities, the Committee established internal ethics rules for conducting a non-biased examination of the topic at hand. These ethics rules included a prohibition on Committee members from meeting with banking, business, and relevant officials outside the Committee, as well as a requirement for Committee members to attend hearings. The Committee also determined that a member who did not participate in at least half of its discussions would not be able to participate in the votes.⁴⁷

4.2. The Committee's website

The Committee had a designated portal on the Knesset website, which is still online.⁴⁸ The website provides information about the Committee, its members, and the professional teams that accompanied its activities, as well as the areas of practice and means of contact. The website also features news regarding the Committee's actions, updates on its planned activities, agenda, letters sent on its behalf, and background materials and documents submitted by the various parties invited to the hearing. The protocols and broadcasts of the Committee's hearings are also available on the website, alongside the Committee's reports, including the summary report of its activities, which includes conclusions and recommendations and a comprehensive legal review of the issues at hand. The website contains instructions for those interested in attending discussions and access to relevant information for the public, such as the duties imposed on invitees, especially lobbyists. The volume of information available on the committee's website is significant.

4.3. Political and public support

The Committee served in the twentieth Knesset and the thirty-fourth government. The Committee comprised various parties, including Likud, Kulanu, the Jewish Home, Shas, United Torah Judaism, Yesh Atid, and Yisrael Beiteinu, with the latter withdrawing from the government a few months after the Committee commenced in November 2018. Members of the Committee who served in opposition included the Committee Chairperson Eitan Cabel, as well as Knesset members Dov Hanin, Ayelet Nahmias-Verbin, Chaim Yellin, and Issawi Freij. Notably, as part of the Committee's activities, there was considerable cooperation between the coalition and the opposition.

However, despite the Committee's collaborative nature, several doubts were raised in the press regarding the Committee's ability to bring about genuine change in banking policies and the provision of credit to large borrowers in Israel.⁴⁹ Furthermore, there were suspicions about the interests which motivated its members.⁵⁰ Some suggested that the powers granted to the Committee were excessive. While the Committee members were eager to fulfil their mission effectively, Knesset members, legal officials, and researchers opposed the expansion of the Committee's powers and applying them to officers in non-governmental bodies.⁵¹ Chairperson Cabel acknowledged this difficulty at the Committee's third meeting, stating that the Knesset needed time to ‘digest’ (in his own words) how the Committee conducted its deliberations. As a result, the beginning date of the hearings was postponed. Nevertheless, due to the importance of the issue and the media's interest, stakeholders were incentivised to participate in the Committee's work, even without formal authority to question them.

At the beginning of the meetings, Committee Chairperson Cabel clarified that if the Knesset were to disperse and enter an election period, as ultimately occurred, the Committee would convene several times a week to conclude its work.⁵² This highlights the great motivation of the Committee members to perform their duties and investigate the failures in the financial system, despite the difficulties they faced. Moreover, the members of the Committee were also incentivised by the aspiration to elevate the Knesset's prestige in the public's eyes as an entity that evaluates and oversees the government and governing authorities. To illustrate, during the inaugural meeting of the Committee, Chairperson Cabel underscored the significance of the Committee's undertakings as a means of fostering public trust in the Knesset:

The moment has arrived for the Knesset to manifest to the public its capacity. We possess an extraordinary chance to showcase our proficiencies, solicitude for the citizenry, and professionalism. Not everything is partisan politics; not everything is secular and religious politics; not everything is Jewish and Arab politics. For far too long, the Knesset has been plagued by a negative image and a deficient level of confidence on the part of the populace—some of the criticism is valid. We must acknowledge this. We will conduct a thorough, expert, and responsible process—our attentions and sentiments will be beholden to the citizenry solely. We do not plan to safeguard any specific bank, any particular overseer, or any particular authority. We will act with unwavering resolve and bravery to unveil the truth—what has occurred there all these years? How can billions of NIS be squandered in such a manner? If we fail to generate a thorough, expert, and responsible process, culminating in actionable recommendations that forestall adverse credit effects, as we have witnessed—then we have failed. I have no intention of failing. We aspire to excel and produce the optimal outcome for the Israeli economy and the Israeli public.⁵³

4.4. Planning the meetings

The Committee conducted sixteen hearings. The initial two discussions were primarily aimed at preparing for the questioning of the regulated entities. During the first meeting, only the Committee members were present, and they concluded among themselves how the discussions would be conducted, determined the work methodology, and discussed the procedures that would apply to them. The second meeting was open to civil society organisations, giving them ten minutes each to express their views on the Committee's activities and provide recommendations.

The subsequent twelve hearings constituted the core of the Committee's activities, featuring CEOs and chairpersons of banks and insurance companies, regulatory supervisors, as well as professional experts who sought to enrich the Committee members’ knowledge and perspectives and help formulate their conclusions. On some occasions, the Committee held two hearings on the same day. The final two hearings were aimed at summarising the Committee's activities. During the first of these, the Committee discussed and made decisions regarding the draft report's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. This was done confidentially, and the meeting's protocol was not published. The last meeting was a summary meeting. The Committee's report was presented, and the Committee members answered questions from journalists.

The Committee even termed the discussion as ‘hearings’, which is a foreign element in the Knesset.⁵⁴ This term was designated to equate the Committee's work to Congress, in which the hearings have a more professional character.

The Committee members recognised the importance of setting discussion deadlines and ensuring active and continuous participation. During the opening meeting of the Committee, the members discussed the dates for the next meetings. Committee Chairperson Cabel suggested scheduling the Committee hearings for Sundays or Thursdays, when the plenary and the committees usually do not convene. The rationale was to increase media coverage and public interest.⁵⁵ Additionally, this would avoid pressuring members of other committees, who would have to rush from one meeting to another,⁵⁶ demonstrating the Committee's members’ commitment. Ultimately, it was decided the Committee meetings would be held on Sundays.

4.5. The meetings’ format

The members of the Committee repeatedly emphasised that their objective was not to ‘crucify’ the regulated entities, such as banks, regulators, and insurance companies, but rather to identify and rectify the failures in the credit-granting market. The analysis of the Committee hearings indicates that the supervisory officials were given a fair chance to present their positions. The format of the discussions allowed for the supervisory officials to be heard and for Committee members to ask them questions and demand information from them for the betterment of the Committee's activities.

The length of the meetings varied from one discussion to the next, typically lasting between one and three hours. Generally, the Committee meetings began with Chairperson Cabel giving a brief presentation of the officials expected to appear before the Committee. Immediately thereafter, the invited parties were given around 15 min for an opening statement to demonstrate their activities and professional positions about the necessary changes in the credit-granting market. Some participants provided their position through a presentation delivered to the Committee and subsequently made available to the general public on the Committee's website. Following the opening statement, a round of questions from various members of the Committee began. Committee Chairperson Cabel was the first to present his questions, followed by the other members of the Committee. Each Committee member asked questions for a significant amount of time, typically 5 to 30 min, without limitations. At the end of the round of questions (and answers), invitees were allowed to voice additional issues that still needed to be addressed.⁵⁷ Finally, Chairperson Cabel concluded the hearing. In most of the meetings, after the conclusion, Cabel commented on the conduct of the meeting, both in terms of information sharing and assisting the committee (whether positively or negatively) and regarding specific and systemic failures detected in the Committee's work.

4.6. The discussion and questioning process

The nature of the questions and the mindset during the debates were characterised by professionalism and a focus on the issues. Committee members were well-prepared and asked relevant and focused questions about the invitees’ activities while showing respect towards them and maintaining a relaxed and respectful atmosphere. The Committee members had made it a stated goal to hold the hearings in a non-populist manner,⁵⁸ based on the understanding that proper and professional activity at the procedural level would impact public confidence in the Committee's findings. In only a few cases did Chairperson Cabel intervene in arguments between officials being questioned and members of the Committee.⁵⁹

Furthermore, the chairperson, Cabel, was observed on multiple occasions attempting to communicate the purpose of the Committee to the invitees. Cabel emphasised that the Committee's objective is not to forcefully uncover flaws in banks’ operations or insinuate that Israel's banking system is unstable. Instead, he stressed that the main issue at hand is the collaboration and interaction between the financial system, regulatory bodies, and large borrowers, which had created distortions detrimental to the public.

All Committee members were instructed to present a united front when dealing with the parties under supervision. Consequently, the Committee members refrained from interrupting each other's questioning or dominating the hearing for public relations or media benefits. In addition to the respect shown by the Committee members towards each other, it is evident that the Committee also maintained the dignity of the invitees by allowing them to speak respectfully and continuously. Only in a few cases did the Committee members interrupt the invitees, and these instances were mainly due to the invitees’ lack of response to the questions asked by the Committee members. The invitees were also aware that they could seek assistance from officials in answering the questions.

However, the Committee members also knew how to exert pressure on the officials summoned to the hearing, and at times shamed or rebuked them for their lack of willingness to cooperate with the Committee. For instance, after the Commissioner of Capital Markets, Insurance, and Savings, Dorit Salinger, cancelled her attendance on the morning of the first hearing, the Committee members criticised her sharply and publicly. The reason for the Commissioner's absence was the seating arrangement of the hearing,⁶⁰ which was similar to that of the U.S. Senate, with the Commissioner designated to sit in the centre of the room in front of the Committee members. Cabel castigated the Commissioner for refusing to attend the hearing with a late announcement and for not being willing to sit at the table in front of the Committee, which acts on behalf of the sovereign in order to supervise the executive branch. He argued that there could be no situation where the invitees from the executive branch dictate to the supervising authority how things should be conducted. He thanked the Committee members for their full support. Cabel added that he had no intention of giving up, and if Salinger thought she could evade accountability, she was mistaken.⁶¹ Following this event, Cabel appealed to the Attorney General to impose sanctions on Salinger and stated that invitees who failed to arrive would be summoned to the Committee again. He noted that in the absence of invitees, other governmental personnel would be summoned to testify before the Committee, as they can sometimes provide better insights than the governing bodies.

Another incident occurred during a meeting with representatives of the Migdal Insurance Company, a prominent Israeli insurance and capital corporation. The Committee requested that three senior decision-makers in the Migdal Insurance Company participate in the meeting: CEO Doron Sapir, Chairperson of the Board of Directors Oded Sarig, and controlling owner and board member Shlomo Eliyahu. However, only the company's CEO, Sapir, appeared before the Committee. Several days before the hearing, board chairperson Sarig resigned and refused to appear before the Committee. The controlling owner and board of directors’ member, Eliyahu, also declined to attend and claimed that the CEO could answer all the relevant questions. The three did not face any formal obligation to appear before the committee.⁶² Yet, due to their absence, Committee Chairperson Cabel decided to leave the chairs and the names of the two absent delegates in their place, even though the Committee was aware of their expected absences three days in advance. This decision was made to show the public their empty chairs, indicating an attempt to evade public accountability.

Another instance of applying pressure on regulated parties involved the Committee members’ threat to draft legislative amendments and institute a state commission of inquiry if relevant information were to be withheld from the Committee.⁶³ Chairperson Cabel explicitly stated that the Committee's objective was not to assign blame to any specific professional. Therefore, the invitees are expected to provide truthful and precise answers. However, bank representatives repeatedly refused to answer questions or present materials and data to the Committee, particularly when responding to questions about specific borrowers. The representatives claimed they were bound by confidentiality, limiting their legal ability to disclose information. Although the Committee members acknowledged the legal justifications of the supervisory entities to refuse to provide such information, they were displeased that representatives of the banks relied on legal opinions to evade questions, thereby impeding the Committee's ability to monitor and learn from past events. In numerous meetings, members of the Committee stated that if banks continue to use legal opinions as a shield, they will not hesitate to pass legislative amendments to overcome these challenges. In some cases, the Committee members responded to confidentiality claims by requesting that the bank ask its clients if the information contracted under confidentiality could be shared. It is difficult to assess these efforts’ actual impact on the banks’ willingness to disclose information.

Another example of how the Committee pressured supervisory entities to cooperate is the message sent by Chairperson Cabel to the Commissioner of Capital Markets, Insurance, and Savings, Moshe Barkat (who replaced Dorit Salinger in November 2018). During the hearing which concerned the insurance companies, Chairperson Cabel expressed dissatisfaction with the extent of the company's information sharing and reminded Barkat that the Committee had sent him a list of questions, and they expect answers.⁶⁴ In a similar vein, Chairperson Cabel stated at the beginning of the Committee's proceedings that he would summon any invitee for another hearing if needed.⁶⁵

4.7. The Committee's setting

Much consideration was given to the seating arrangement and its purpose during the Committee meetings held at the Knesset's Jerusalem Hall. From the outset, the Committee members discussed the seating arrangement of the invitees. Cabel emphasised the uniqueness of the seating order and proposed that all Committee members sit on one side in front of the invitees during the hearing. The seating arrangement was a fundamental part of the Committee's early hearings. Cabel intended to create a professional and respectable image for the Committee and its members and emphasised the importance of conducting the discussion as a question-and-answer hearing, while procedural rules would be set within the Committee.⁶⁶

The Committee's conference room was designed to emphasise the situation and the supervising role of the Committee during hearings. The Jerusalem Hall is a circular hall with two crescent-shaped tables facing each other. The Committee members and the parties who appeared before the Committee sat at these tables. During the first hearing session, a small round table was placed in the centre of the room, with a chair and a pitcher of water designated for the Commissioner of Capital Markets, Insurance, and Savings, Dorit Salinger. Committee Chairperson Cabel sat in the middle of the large table, with a large, official Knesset emblem behind him and Israeli flags on both sides. The Committee legal adviser and the Committee manager sat near Cabel. The rest of the Committee members sat at the table as well. Each participant had a microphone placed in front of them, a small stand with their name and role, and a pitcher of water.

The absence of the Capital Market Commissioner in the meeting due to the seating arrangements resulted in subsequent measures. The small round table in the middle of the hall was removed. Instead, members of the Committee sat in front of the supervised invitee, and the latter sat at a table similar to that of the committee members, facing them. This arrangement fostered a more pleasant and relaxed atmosphere than the prior setting.

It is noteworthy that this seating arrangement differs from the regular arrangements of Knesset committees, even in their later design. For instance, the Knesset's Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee holds its discussions in a smaller room in which the Knesset members sit at a long elliptical table, and the distance between the two sides is much shorter. The Chairperson of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee sits at the table's head, and two Israeli flags are placed behind him, but there is no official emblem of the Committee. Behind the Knesset members and participants, there is only one row of chairs for guests who come to watch the discussions. While the Cabel Committee's discussion room created the feeling that the Knesset members are seated in a ‘unified front’ vis à vis the invited party, the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee's arrangement creates a radically different atmosphere since the Knesset members face each other. When asked to speak before the Committee, guests sit alongside the Knesset members at the table.

The choice of hearing hall and its arrangement were adjusted to the identity of the officials who came to testify before the Committee. While hearings of supervisory officials were held in the Jerusalem Hall in the format described above, hearings attended by outside professional officials, not supervised by the Committee, were held in the hall of the Economic Affairs Committee. For example, Adv. Dror Strum (Chairperson of the Committee for Increasing Competitiveness in Prevalent Banking and Financial Services in Israel) and Prof. Avi Ben Bassat, who presented to the Cabel Inquiry Committee their professional position regarding several issues in order to help its activities, were discussed in the Economic Affairs Committee Hall, which is smaller than the Jerusalem Hall. Unlike other officials who were summoned to a hearing before the Committee and seated in front of Committee members, the two sat at the Committee table alongside them, as permanent members. Therefore, it is evident that the atmosphere was much more relaxed. The change of atmosphere was especially significant since on the day that the two appeared before the Committee, it conducted two discussions one after the other: the first with representatives of the Migdal Insurance Company in the Jerusalem Hall and the second with the experts Strum and Ben Bassat in the hall of the Economic Affairs Committee. The decision to replace the hearing hall on this day implies the importance given by the members of the Committee to creating a different atmosphere between different types of discussions, in a way that corresponds to the oversight purpose of the Committee.

4.8. The publishing of the Committee's report

The final session occurred approximately three months after the final hearing. During the concluding remarks delivered by the Committee Chairperson Cabel, he expressed severe criticism of the banking industry's behaviour regarding sharing pertinent information with the Committee. Although such conduct may be permissible according to various legal norms, Cabel contended that the privilege was intended to benefit the client, and therefore, the banks’ utilisation of confidentiality was a cynical and outrageous exploitation of the law's provisions. He further argued that since banks are a public entity, they are accountable to the public. Cabel also attributed blame to the Bank of Israel, which allowed the banks to avoid presenting data even in general formats. This conduct implies that there was likely a justifiable reason for withholding the information. Cabel expressed his criticism, stating that the findings reveal problematic issues in Israel's banking system, including a deficiency of transparent competition between banks. Cabel also stated significant failures in the activities of various regulators, including the Banking Supervision Department, the Capital Market Insurance and Savings Authority, the Competition Authority, and the Securities Authority. Cabel concluded his summary remarks by referring to the Committee's general functioning and the hearing method, explicitly stating that

Our work was accompanied by great doubts, mainly in light of my decision to hold the Committee hearings in a style yet to be seen in the Knesset, based on the hearings held in the U.S. Senate. They said we would be populist, that we were not at the level required to engage with the issue, that we had no tools to investigate, and that no one would come. To a large extent, the Inquiry Committee was for me an opportunity to improve the Knesset's prestige in the eyes of the public, and moreover, an excellent opportunity to move the Knesset forward and set a high bar for similar proceedings in the future. Today, when I look back on the process, I am proud to say that we met the challenge we had with great success. We have proven that there are serious, scholarly, professional Knesset members who know how to put aside day-to-day disputes, focus on the task, and collaborate with mutual appreciation. From Dov Hanin to Bezalel Smotrich, neither right nor left, only the public good stood before our eyes.⁶⁷

After Chairperson Cabel and other Committee members concluded their duties, they answered a brief cluster of press questions. Public representatives also referred to the Committee's activities. During the hearing, critical allegations arose. For instance, one journalist, addressing Knesset Member Hanin, claimed that the Committee's conclusions were predetermined. Although the Committee members aimed to address the journalists’ questions, they acknowledged that the work was not completed to the extent planned due to the Knesset's dispersal in late 2018.

5. Analysis and insights

In describing the work of the Committee, I have extended the presentation, stressing many details and nuances alongside various aspects of the Committee's work. Now the aim – which lies at the heart of this article – is to extract from this description the fundamental insights which made the Committee's work such a significant event. In the following I present 21 key insights. These insights are of high importance. In many cases, they are the difference between potential oversight and effective oversight. The Cabel Inquiry Committee performance, as stated, was exceptional. The identification and isolation of the aspects which made the committee perform such an augment oversight can help us better design future practices in a way that will improve parliamentary oversight elsewhere.

Activeness: While legislative oversight in Israel is typically responsive, whether through the government placing issues on the plenum and committees or through the public agenda,⁶⁸ the Committee's work was characterised by activeness. The Knesset established the Committee to provide comprehensive clarification of an issue related to the conduct of the government and its omissions. The Committee conducted its work systematically, continuously, and held many hearings. The event was comprehensive and intentional in terms of content, process, and logistical aspects.

Systematisation: One of the most problematic pathologies in Israeli oversight is the ad-hoc and sporadic nature of the Knesset's supervision. Even at the committees, which by their nature allow a better oversight process,⁶⁹ the relevant committee often does not conduct a follow-up process on its own recommendations, if it publishes any at all.⁷⁰ The Committee's work, however, was strongly characterised by systematic work. The supervisory event was carried out systematically and comprehensively, with continuity, despite some time gaps and even amidst the preparation for elections. The event was set up with opening and summary hearings, and the entire process was well planned and thoroughly thought out.

Inter-party cooperation: A prominent understanding worldwide is that proper legislative oversight requires at least a certain amount of collaboration. This was one of the main conclusions of the Committee on the Modernization of Congress, which finished its work and submitted its final report in 2022. In the concluding remarks of the hearings and discussions, which focused on congressional oversight, the Committee on the Modernization of Congress highlighted the need to observe the notion of supervision as a non-partisan activity and as a common goal for all government entities, regardless of their ideological position or political affiliation.⁷¹ While usually not accomplished in the legislative reality, this insight was realised in the Committee's work. Members of the Knesset and the Committee's staff worked as a team, with the aim of leading to significant oversight while collaborating between them. The objective was not to raise the profile of a specific party, nor was it to engage in conflict with the government. Instead, the goal was to achieve effective execution of the necessary clarification and investigation in the matter. The Knesset members had a great deal of freedom of action in the conduct of the Committee.

The opposition's significant role: Though legislative oversight is not solely the opposition's role,⁷² it is its first and most important task: to challenge the coalition in different ways.⁷³ However, in many cases, structural aspects, and the coalition dominance in controlling legislatures’ procedures,⁷⁴ allows them to minimise and diminish the opposition's standing. In many cases, this is a substantial obstacle in parliamentary committees of inquiry,⁷⁵ but the Cabel Committee was different. The Committee comprised six coalition representatives and five opposition representatives who cooperated. An opposition member headed the Committee.

Lack of conformity: In order to authentically inspect and examine the government, the oversight authority cannot align or conform with the inspected body. In Israel, many cases formally described as oversight discussions concluded with a minister appearing before the relevant committee and presenting the ministry's achievements in the past six months.⁷⁶ The Cabel Committee, notwithstanding, acted differently. The Committee emphasised its work's critical, supervisory, and investigative aspects and did not allow the inspected stakeholders to present their achievements. The conduct of the Committee distinguished Knesset members and professional advisers from the audited persons, and various threats of sanctions, such as legislation or the establishment of a state commission of inquiry, were used if the supervisory parties did not cooperate with the Committee.

Respectful and relevant discourse: With the growing effect of polarisation as a global phenomenon,⁷⁷ scholars have naturally recognised its influence on the ability to hold a productive discourse and on the ability to deliver different messages.⁷⁸ While the polarisation of the discourse itself did not pass over the Knesset, the discourse during the hearings remained respectful and relevant almost throughout all the hearings. Most of the meetings took place in a pleasant and professional atmosphere despite the significant investigation conducted in them. The members of the Committee avoided insulting, humiliating, or diminishing the inspected persons who appeared before them. The respectful atmosphere prevented antagonism towards the Committee and made it more difficult for governmental officials to abstain from appearing before the Committee, notwithstanding their legal obligation to do so.⁷⁹ Moreover, it bolstered the invitees’ (whether required by law to face the committee or not) willingness to not only appear before the Committee but also to collaborate to the best of their ability.

The setting: The Knesset is not characterised by the formality that usually depicts the US Congress or the UK Parliament. Professionals and citizens who appear in front of the Knesset's committees sit among the Knesset members, usually with a lack of formal etiquette or a unique setting. Knesset Member Cabel, who chaired the Committee, understood that the lack of formality hinders the ability to perform robust oversight.⁸⁰ Indeed, the Committee invested substantial resources in creating the appropriate setting for the event, starting with the selection of the hall and the seating arrangements of the Knesset members, the audited invitees, and the other attendees. The background, the physical location of the relevant stakeholders, and the media were central and contributed to creating the desired atmosphere in the discussions.

Sense of urgency and necessity: Since the Knesset, as an institution, often attributes minimal importance to its oversight function,⁸¹ the overall perception of oversight is not central, let alone prompt or immediate. Nevertheless, the volume and vitality of the supervisory event were felt in the ongoing work of the Committee members, and their willingness to conduct a comprehensive and meaningful investigation was visible and noticeable throughout the hearings. It was also emphasised that even in the case of dispersion of the Knesset, the discussions would be conducted continuously and strictly, up to completion.

Media and public interest: Another substantial pathology that impedes performing effective oversight over the government is the lack of suitable incentives. Legislators need strong incentives, since robust oversight requires intense work, preparation, thought, and effort. As being re-elected is legislators’ prime motivation⁸² (even under the perception that apprehends a broad range of motivations),⁸³ public interest and media coverage are crucial for driving legislators to invest the needed effort into oversight tasks. The Cabel Inquiry Committee fully realised this aspect. The Committee leveraged the tremendous public interest that the issue aroused and used the media accurately, among other things, to create positive incentives for arrival.

Transparency and accessibility of information: One of the most significant problems with modern governments is the information asymmetry between the legislative and executive branches. This asymmetry creates an agent-principal problem⁸⁴: The government ministers (agents) today hold much more information than the legislators (principals). This informational asymmetry allows the ministers to use the information they hold for their own needs without handing it over to the legislators, and to deviate from the mandate given to them.⁸⁵ The Committee was undoubtedly aware of the problem and made every effort to obtain the information and make it public and accessible. The dissemination of information was a fundamental aspect of the Committee's work. To achieve this goal, the Committee broadcasts were live and subsequently made available for repeated viewing. Additionally, transcriptions of the meetings were posted on the Committee's website. The website was noteworthy for its comprehensiveness and the publication of materials presented before, during, and after the hearings. Notably, the website remains accessible and hosts all relevant materials, even several years after the Committee's work was completed.

Advisory staff: Previous research has already identified the importance of a solid and well-qualified professional staff for successful legislative oversight.⁸⁶ This insight is central to the work of legislatures in all fields, as illustrated by the Committee on the Modernization of Congress, which emphasised the professional teams supporting the political work in Congress.⁸⁷ This was the case in the Cabel Committee. The Committee benefited from a variety of advisers, including the Committee's administrative staff, legal advisers, and experts in the fields of credit and finance. Although there were some concerns regarding the composition of these advisory bodies, the reliance on experts whose testimony and final reports were transparent and available to the public improved the Committee's oversight capabilities.

Widespread participation: The empirical knowledge regarding participation points out many advantages, of which two are of particular importance: The first is focused on the outcome.⁸⁸ The final decision is usually better since it takes into account different perspectives,⁸⁹ moderating the effects of blind spots and political burdens of inertia.⁹⁰ The second is process-based. The participatory nature enhances perceptions of a fair and equal process, which grants much legitimacy to the process.⁹¹ Accordingly, one of the Committee's basic concepts was to provide broad options for participation. The Committee engaged with various stakeholders, including banks, insurance and finance companies, and civil society organisations. This approach went beyond the mere legal obligations of relevant regulators. Furthermore, the Committee actively sought to encourage civic participation by inviting stakeholders to express their views on the matter. Incentives were also created to promote civic participation, resulting in proposals from organisations such as Lobby 99, the Financial Justice Organisation,⁹² and the Movement for the Quality of Government in Israel.⁹³

Terms and procedure: Determining procedural rules is central to a body's ability to act. Moreover, when the relevant body controls its procedure, it has the ability to influence the process and even the outcome.⁹⁴ In Israel, the rules of procedure are easily amendable.⁹⁵ This flexibility is an important advantage since it allows the oversight procedures to be amended according to the oversight requirements.⁹⁶ This was the case with the Cabel Committee. The Committee established clear rules, agendas, and procedures for conducting discussions. Members of the Knesset oversaw the proceedings, allowing for tailored discussions. The Committee also established ethics rules to ensure respectful discourse and orderly affairs. Through legislative tools and provisions, the Committee was able to fulfil its purpose effectively.

Meeting dates: The Knesset convenes on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. The morning hours are dedicated to the committees’ discussions, and the noon and afternoon hours are dedicated to Floor discussions. Moreover, Knesset members are usually members of three committees or more simultaneously,⁹⁷ a number which is substantially higher than the average in other democracies.⁹⁸ Due to these aspects, the Committee's hearings were scheduled on Sundays to avoid conflicts with the Knesset's plenum meetings (held on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday). This arrangement enabled the Committee members to consistently attend the Committee's hearings. It prevented a situation where committees could not convene due to a double convergence, which usually creates a significant problem.

The obligation of attendance: Although the quorum requirement is widespread in legislatures around the world, Israeli law, as well as the Knesset's rules of procedure, do not set a quorum requirement.⁹⁹ Critical voices in Israel argue that the lack of a quorum weakens parliamentary participation, the quality of the decisions made in the Knesset, and the basic principle of representation.¹⁰⁰ It seems that the Committee was well aware of the importance of legislative participation and of the importance of the quorum demand for the successful operation of the Committee.¹⁰¹ The Committee established a clear obligation for attendance and a reasonable sanction for those who did not meet the minimum attendance requirement. This ensured that all members of the Committee were fully engaged in the proceedings.

Producing an outcome: As mentioned, two key pathologies that hamper effective oversight are lack of continuity as well as lack of electoral and media incentive to perform vigorous legislative oversight. A prominent means which enables overcoming these two pathologies, at least partly, is publication of a final report. Publishing a report captures the public and the media's attention and usually leads to governmental response. In many cases (although not always), it concludes in a substantial change in government conduct.¹⁰² The Committee identified, from the very early stages of its work, the importance of handing out a final report that includes the Committee's work and recommendations. This goal was achieved. The Committee's hearings culminated in a comprehensive report that drew lessons and conclusions from the many discussions. While the report was criticised,¹⁰³ its publication prevented political and public indifference towards the Committee's significant work.

Oversight instrument–The Legislative Committee of Inquiry: A parliamentary committee of inquiry is not a commonly used oversight tool.¹⁰⁴ Since the establishment of the Knesset in 1949, it has been used only 26 times, in exceptional cases. The procedure for establishing a parliamentary committee of inquiry, as opposed to the usual oversight tools in the committees, requires the consent of the plenum.¹⁰⁵ It is appointed for a fixed term, and obliged to publish a final report upon the completion of its work.¹⁰⁶ While it is not an ordinary tool, this mechanism can be of special importance. The Cabel Committee's work proves that this mechanism can be an effective means of maintaining adequate supervision. The decision to prefer such an unorthodox mechanism for this kind of investigation demonstrates that creative thought about different mechanisms can make a significant difference.

Legislative qualifications and experience: With legislatures worldwide changing their nature and individual legislators becoming younger, in many cases legislatures lose valuable components such as legislative experience. This was not the case with the Cabel Committee. With his extensive legislative experience and knowledge of procedure and substance, Knesset Member Eitan Cabel was a critical factor in the Committee's work and played a significant role in its success.

Motivation: As stated, the human factor proved to be of great importance during the Committee's work. The Committee's success was strongly influenced by the high level of commitment and motivation displayed by Chairperson Cabel and the Committee members. Their willingness to conduct a thorough and effective supervisory event was critical to the Committee's achievements.

Preparation: The supervisory event necessitated extensive preliminary preparation. Firstly, the subject matter was presented to the Knesset plenum, and the Knesset rallied to vote in favour of establishing the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry. Secondly, the rules of procedure, content, and setting were established at the committee level, and preparatory materials were disseminated for each discussion. Thirdly, each committee member arrived prepared to the Committee meetings, often with questions formulated in advance for the audited parties.

Subject matter: The chosen topic is one that is devoid of associated political polarisation. The focus of the investigation was on the creditors, namely banks and insurance companies, while the audited governmental entity was the Ministry of Finance and its various divisions. By opting for a non-controversial subject matter in both the political and public spheres, not only was the decision to establish a parliamentary committee of inquiry easily passed, but it also facilitated the smooth operation of the Committee and garnered significant cooperation and political support. It can be inferred that if the subject matter had been politically contentious, the Committee's effectiveness would not have reached the same level. The ex-post nature of the investigation also contributed to its success and diminished the controversy regarding its work.¹⁰⁷

6. Conclusions

Delving into the details, atmosphere, setting, players, and dynamics that created this unique Committee allows to isolate and recognise crucial aspects of effective legislative oversight. As mentioned, these practices are a substantial source for comparative learning and identifying best practices. These practices were not based on different oversight mechanisms (i.e. presidential impeachment versus parliamentary non-confidence) but on the rigorous ways the relevant political players chose to apply them. This conclusion aligns well with post–COVID-19 research, which identified that legislatures’ pragmatic and strategic use of oversight mechanisms made a tremendous contribution to parliaments’ ability to oversee governments during the emergency periods.¹⁰⁸

Friedberg’s and Shapira's analysis of parliamentary committees of inquiry makes an important contribution to understanding the ways that such committees can contribute to parliamentary oversight.¹⁰⁹ This Article's conclusions are in line with their institutional framework. However, focusing on one prominent test case and probing into its core reveals a central and prominent factor that the institutional framework does not include: the human factor. Cabel's ability to lead the Committee, establish broad cooperation amongst the Committee's members, involve the media, recruit private and civil society factors, and so on, are to a large extent the consequence of his personal and professional ability as an experienced parliament member. This aspect, which is relevant to many of the features of the Committee's work (including its activeness, systematisation, inter-party cooperation, the opposition's significant role, respectful discourse, sense of urgency and necessity, creating media and public interest, transparency and accessibility of information, widespread participation, accurate procedure, the obligation of attendance, producing an outcome, legislative qualifications and experience, motivation, and preparation), made a tremendous contribution to turning the oversight process into an effective one, despite the weak institutional opening conditions. This insight also has practical future implications concerning the importance of devoted and experienced leaders for parliamentary committees.

This research is part of a broad research project aiming – through the Israeli prism – to better understand legislative oversight through legislatures’ practices. It maps the systematic and ad-hoc pathologies of legislative oversight and identifies prominent cases that succeeded in achieving strong and effective oversight. It is designed to better stress the difference between theory and practice and emphasise the importance of the actual execution of the varied oversight mechanisms.

The appearance of the ‘oversight potential’ literature is an important step towards a better understanding of legislatures worldwide, and this current research is designed to join this significant endeavour. The Cabel Committee's conduct is a great demonstration of turning the potential of oversight nto effective oversight. Further research is needed to broaden this corpus of studies, and through the recognising of best practices, to design ways to assimilate legislative practices which enhance effective oversight.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to express her gratitude to Mr. Guy Elzam for his substantial research assistance.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Tachlith (independant research Institution in Israel).

Notes

1 Bernard Manin, Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge University Press 1997); Edmund Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America (W. W. Norton 1989).

2 Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (first published 1748, Cambridge University Press 1989); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (first published 1861, Cambridge University Press 2010).

3 Rick Stapenhurst and others, ‘Legislative Oversight and Budgeting: A World Perspective’ (World bank Institute, 2008) <https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/epdf/10.1596/978-0-8213-7611-9> All online sources were checked on 4 August 2023; Rick Stapenhurst and Riccardo Pelizzo, ‘Improving Democracy and Accountability in Ghana: The Importance of Parliamentary Oversight Tools’ (2012) 25 Governance 335.

4 Kerry Jacobs and Kate Jones, ‘Legitimacy and Parliamentary Oversight in Australia: The Rise and Fall of Two Public Accounts Committees’ (2009) 22 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 13.

5 Jorum Duri and others, ‘Overview of Parliamentary Oversight Tools and Mechanisms’ (Transparency International, 2022) <https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/product/overview-of-parliamentary-oversight-tools-and-mechanisms>.

6 Rick Stapenhurst, ‘Parliamentary Oversight in Small States’ (2020) Parliamentarian 145.

7 Simon Tormey, ‘The Contemporary Crisis of Representative Democracy’ (2014) 1 Democratic Theory 104.

8 Gareth Griffith, ‘Parliament and Accountability: The Role of Parliamentary Oversight Committees’ (2006) 21 Australian Parliament Review 7; Heidi Kitrosser, ‘Accountability in the Deep State’ (2018) 65 UCLA L Rev 1532.

9 United Nations, ‘Trust in Public Institutions: Trends and Implications for Economic Security’ (United Nations, 2019) <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/2021/07/trust-public-institutions/>.

10 Robert Elgie and Gianluca Passarelli, ‘The Presidentialization of Political Executives’ in Rudy B. Andeweg and others (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Executives (OUP 2020) 358.

11 Lauri Karvonen, The Personalization of Politics: A Case Study of Parliamentary Democracy (ECPR Press 2010).

12 Gideon Rahat and Ofer Kenig, From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?: Party Change and Political Personalization in Democracies (Oxford University Press 2018); Maoz Rosenthal, Israel’s Governability Crisis: Quandaries, Unstructured Institutions, and Adaptation (Lexington 2017); Avital Friedman and Chen Friedberg, ‘Personalized Politics and Weakened Parties – an Axiom? Evidence from the Israeli Case’ (2021) 27 Party Politics 258; Tamar Herman et al., ‘Israel's Democracy Index 2022’ (Israel Democracy Institute, 2023) <https://en.idi.org.il/media/19697/the-israeli-democracy-index-2022.pdf>.

13 Giovanni Sartori, Elementi di Teoria Politica (IL Mulino 1987).

14 Chen Friedberg, ‘From a Top-down to a Bottom-up Approach to Legislative Oversight’ (2011) 17 Journal of Legislative Studies 525; Riccardo Pelizzo, Rick Stapenhurst and David Olson, ‘Parliamentary Oversight for Government Accountability’ (Research Collection School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University, 2006) <https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1136&context=soss_research>.

15 Mill (n 2); Montesquieu (n 2).

16 Morris Ogul, Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy: Studies in Legislative Supervision (University of Pittsburgh Press 1976) 11.

17 See David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (Yale University Press 1974); Kevin den Dulk and J. Mitchell Pickerill, ‘Bridging the Lawmaking Process: Organized Interests, Court-congress Interaction, and Church-State Relations’ (2003) 35 Polity 421; Andrew D. Martin, ‘Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers’ (2001) 95 Am Pol Sci Rev 361; Nathan W. Monroe and Gregory Robinson, ‘Do Restrictive Rules Produce Nonmedian Outcomes? A Theory with Evidence from the 101st–108th Congresses’ (2008) 70 Journal of Politics 217.

18 Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms’ (1984) 28 Am Pol Sci Rev 165.

19 Roy Gregory, ‘Parliamentary Control and the Use of English’ (1990) 43 Parliamentary Affairs 59.

20 Elena Griglio, ‘Parliamentary Oversight under the Covid-19 Emergency: Striving against Executive Dominance’ (2020) 8 Theory and Practice of Legislation 49, 69.

21 Hironori Yamamoto, ‘Tools for Parliamentary Oversight: A Comparative Study of 88 National Parliaments’ (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2007) <http://archive.ipu.org/pdf/publications/oversight08-e.pdf>.

22 Inter-Parliamentary Union, ‘Global Parliamentary Report 2017: Parliamentary Oversight: Parliament's Power to Hold Government to Account’ (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2017) 13 <https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/reports/2017-10/global-parliamentary-report-2017-parliamentary-oversight-parliaments-power-hold-government-account>.

23 Walter J. Oleszek, ‘Congressional Oversight: An Overview’ (CRS Research Paper R41079, 22 February 2010) 5 <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41079.pdf>.

24 Daniel Finke, ‘Institutional Conditions for Effective Parliamentary Oversight of European Union Politics’ (2019) 42 West European Politics 1.

25 Mihail Chiru, ‘The Resilience of Parliamentary Oversight during the COVID-19 Pandemic’ (2024) 47 West European Politics 408, 411.

26 Griglio (n 20).

27 Inter-Parliamentary Union (n 22) 28.

28 See, e.g. Miller v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union) [2017] 5 (UKSC) (UK); Kohelet Forum v. Prime Minister (2022) HCJ 6654/22 (Israel SC) (Isr).

29 Inter-Parliamentary Union (n 22) 28–29. For further work stressing the primary role of incentives in legislative oversight, see Bell E. Yosef, Mind the Gap: Typology of the Gap between Theory and Practice in Parliamentary Oversight – Lessons from the Israeli System (under review).

30 Lawrence D. Longley, ‘The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees’ in Lawrence D. Longley and Roger H. Davidson (eds.), Parliamentary Committees: Changing Perspectives on Changing Institutions (Routledge 2012) 1.

31 Inter-Parliamentary Union (n 22) 38.

32 Griglio (n 20) 60; Chiru (n 27) 410; Sven T Siefken and others, ‘Parlamente in der Pandemie: Erste Erkenntnisse aus einem international vergleichenden Forschungsvorhaben’ (2022) 52 Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 878.

33 Martin Loughlin, ‘The Contemporary Crisis of Constitutional Democracy’ (2019) 39 OJLS 435; Philip Norton, ‘Parliaments: A Framework for Analysis’ (1990) 13 West European Politics 1.

34 Sartori (n 13); Friedberg, ‘From a Top-down to a Bottom-up Approach to Legislative Oversight’ (n 14); Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson (n 14).

35 To understand Israel's constitutional nature and history in a broader context, see Suzie Navot, Constitutional Law in Israel (2nd edn., Wolters Kluwer 2016).

36 For further elaboration see Chen Friedberg and Reuven Y. Hazan, ‘The Legislative Branch in Israel’ in Reuven Y. Hazan and others (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society (OUP 2018).

37 Chen Friedberg and Assaf Shapira, ‘Employing the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry as an Oversight Tool: Israel as a Case Study’ (16 November 2023) The Journal of Legislative Studies <https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2023.2270271>.

38 ibid 16.

39 The meetings are detailed in the Appendix. All the meetings – except the confidential fifteenth meeting – have an available video online as well as written protocol, available online as well.

40 All the documentation is available at the Committee website, <https://main.knesset.gov.il/activity/committees/credit/pages/committeecall.aspx>.

41 The District Court approved the debt settlement. An appeal to the Supreme Court over the approval was dismissed. The Trustee for Fishman's assets v. Fishman [2020] DC (TA) CA 6730/20 (Isr).

42 Golan Hazani, ‘Eliezer Fishman’s Bankruptcy Ends with a Cut-off of 67%’ (Calcalist, 22 July 2020) (Isr) <https://www.calcalist.co.il/markets/articles/0,7340,L-3840875,00.html>. Unauthorised publications claimed that the original settlement was ninety-two percent of the debt, but public outcry led to a withdrawal of that offer. Eitan Abriel, ‘Will Hedva Bar Promise Today that the Fishman's Settlement will be Finally Buried?’ (TheMarker, 6 June 2017) (Isr) <https://www.themarker.com/markets/2017-06-06/ty-article/0000017f-dbfd-df62-a9ff-dfff25690000>.

43 DK (6 June 2017) 92 (Isr).

44 DK (5 July 2017) 179 (Isr).

45 The Committee's Area of Concern, The Committee of Parliamentary Inquiry into the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers (Isr) <https://m.knesset.gov.il/activity/committees/credit/pages/committeeareasofconcern.aspx>.

46 The Committee of Parliamentary Inquiry into the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers, Final Report (2019) (Isr) <https://www.knesset.gov.il/committees/heb/docs/cc20.pdf>.

47 During the opening meeting of the Committee, Knesset Member Cabel emphasised the importance of attendance. He stated that he will make every effort to ensure that discussions take place on either the first or fifth day of the week, according to the majority's preference. Cabel firmly believes that it is not feasible for discussions to occur simultaneously on Monday and Tuesday. He also mentioned that the Committee will determine ethical rules that all members will sign and be bound by, regardless of whether legislation is passed. Cabel further explained that those who attend at least fifty percent of the debates will be permitted to participate in the votes. He stressed the importance of order and integrity in this process and believes that it is no less significant than the character and ability of the members to explore or communicate with those who will appear before them. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Opening Meeting (26 July 2017) (Isr).

48 n 41.

49 Chagai Amit, ‘Eitan Cabel: TheMarker Top 100 Influencers 2018’ (TheMarker, 2018) (Isr) <https://www.themarker.com/magazine/2018-09-03/ty-article-static-ext/0000017f-edcc-da6f-a77f-fdceefba0000> (‘In October, Cabel will face a substantial challenge. The success of the ‘Fishman Committee’, as the media calls it, and whether it will stay only as a media circus, depends on whether it will yield tangible outcomes directed at the banking system’); see also Racheli Bindman, ‘The MKs Who Failed to Receive Answers from the Banks will Try to Get Answers from Hedva Bar’ (Calcalist, 4 November 2018) (Isr) <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3750523,00.html>; Shachar Ilan, ‘The Tycoons Credit Investigation Committee: The Big Loaners will not be Required to Give Explanations to the Knesset’ (Calcalist, 6 July 2017) (Isr), <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3716616,00.html>.

50 Racheli Bindman, ‘Salinger didn’t Want to be a Part of Cabel's Circus, Rightfully’ (Calcalist, 31 July 2018) (Isr) <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3743446,00.html>; Omer Cohen, ‘No Drama, Please: Salinger Refused to Fall into the Fishman's Committee Trap, and that's a Good Thing’ (Davar, 2 August 2018) (Isr) <https://www.davar1.co.il/141641/>; Amiram Gil, ‘The Tycoons Committee Brings the Primaries to the Capital Market’ (Globes, 22 April 2019) (Isr) <https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001283083>; Zvi Zarchia, ‘Not Only Salinger: Ministry of Treasury Bureaucrats Against the Knesset's Subpoena’ (Calcalist, 2 August 2018) (Isr) <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3743559,00.html>.

51 The dispute centered around the dilemma of balancing the committee's need for appropriate resources to carry out its duties effectively with the need to protect the rights of private entities and avoid the commission's shift from a primarily political entity to a quasi-legal tribunal. For further elaboration, see Dana Blander, ‘Chen Friedberg and Avital Friedman, Parliamentary Inquiry Committee as an Oversight Mechanism on the Executive Branch’ (Israel Democracy Institute, Policy Research 140 2019) (Isr) 11 <https://www.idi.org.il/books/29753>.

52 The Chairperson Cabel stated in the third meeting:

I would like to emphasize to those who pray for elections but are not present in the Knesset that I have already informed both the Committee's management and my fellow members of the Knesset about this. Assuming that the Knesset convenes or resumes after recess and decides on a dispersal, it will take a while. In the initial month, we will embark on a marathon where every Sunday will entail a morning session, a session in the afternoon, and discussions on Thursdays in the morning. We will have approximately ten discussions, give or take one or two, and with the help of God, we will be able to conclude all the processes in that month.

The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the Conduct of the Capital Market, Insurance and Savings Authority regarding Large Business Borrowers Protocol 4 (3rd meeting, 31 July 2018) (Isr).

53 ibid 8.

54 This term does not appear in the Knesset's ROP, which adhere to the term ‘discussions’.

55 It should be noted that in Israel, the ‘Shabbat’ (Saturday) is the official day of rest, and Sunday is a workday. The Knesset plenary usually works on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. See ROP 19(a)(1), and the committees’ work is structured accordingly.

56 The Knesset Members are often members of three or even more committees simultaneously. See Chen Friedberg, ‘How to Perfect the Knesset Work as a Legislating and Oversight Branch? Central Recommendations’ 15 (Israel Democracy Institute 2018) (Isr) <https://www.idi.org.il/media/10123/how-to-improve-the-knesset-as-a-legislative-and-oversight-body-key-recommendations.pdf>.

57 During certain gatherings, the members of the committee partitioned amongst themselves the assorted subject matters that the committee aimed to scrutinise in order to simplify the proceedings. To illustrate, during the meeting that was attended by delegates from Bank Hapoalim, a particular section of an audit report produced by the Bank of Israel was focused on.

58 During the opening meeting of the Committee, Knesset Member Kish expressed his concern over the potential impact of broadcasting Committee meetings on the course of the Committee's work. He asserted that the presence of cameras may lead to a form of populism, which could compromise the integrity of the Committee's proceedings. Kish acknowledged that all members of the Committee might be susceptible to this influence and cautioned against the temptation to prioritize personal gain over the committee's objectives. The Inquiry Committee on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Opening Meeting (26 July 2017) (Isr).

59 There were, however, some exceptions. During the meeting with Bank Hapoalim, Knesset member Dov Hanin engaged in a conversation with the Bank representatives. He posed several inquiries to the bank's representatives and raised various allegations that had emerged in the Bank of Israel audit report. When he did not receive satisfactory responses, Hanin began to raise his voice and demand answers from the delegates. However, when Hanin went beyond the scope of his questions and attempted to speak before the Committee, Chairperson Cabel intervened and urged him to ask his questions according to the outline of the discussion. Another instance occurred during the Committee meeting with Bank Leumi representatives, where one member of the Committee attempted to ask a question during the opening statement of the bank's representative. Cabel promptly intervened and clarified that Committee members would not interfere during the fifteen-minute period allotted for bank representatives to make their opening statements. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the Conduct of Bank Hapoalim Regarding Large Business Borrowers Protocol (4th meeting, 21 October 2018) (Isr).

60 The Committee News, ‘At the Last minute: Salinger Startled and Decided that She Won't Appear Before the Investigation Committee’ (The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers 31 July 2018) (Isr), <https://main.knesset.gov.il/activity/committees/credit/news/pages/pr_310718.aspx>.

61 The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the Conduct of the Capital Market, Insurance and Savings Authority regarding Large Business Borrowers Protocol 4 (3rd meeting, 31 July 2018) 3 (Isr).

62 Basic Law: The Knesset is the normative source of the power to summon individuals to face the committees and deliver relevant information. Article 21(b) does not include the private sector:

Provisions may be laid down in the Rules of Procedure regarding the authority of the Committees to summon an office holder or functionary in the Civil Service, a local authority, a religious council, a corporation established by law, or a government corporation, and to require him to provide information at his disposal on the activities of the body in which he serves, […].

63 Zvi Zarchia and Rachali Bindman, ‘Rosek Aminah at the Knesset: “We Can't Talk About Specific Loaners;” Kish: “We Will Consider a State Commission of Inquiry”’ (Calcalist, 28 October 2018) (Isr), <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3748542,00.html>.

64 Chairperson Cabel said during the meeting:

I would like to direct my attention to Mr. Moshe Barkat, the Commissioner of Capital Markets, as I believe he is currently present and observing our proceedings. It is important that I remind him of the request that was issued by the Committee's legal counsel to their own legal representative. Specifically, I requested different data concerning funds' credit, loans, investments and fees. The reason for stopping the publication of this information is unknown to us, and I asked that the legal representative inform us of when and why this publication was stopped. This information is crucial to the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements to Large Business Borrowers, and it is of utmost urgency that we receive it. Despite our efforts, we have not yet received the necessary material, even after I personally contacted Mr. Moshe Barkat on Wednesday. He explained that I should have contacted him directly in advance, and that had I done so, we would have received the material by now. However, the material has still not been received and we are currently missing vital information for our discussion.

The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the Conduct of Migdal Insurance Company Regarding Large Business Borrowers 4 (11th meeting, 30 December 2018) (Isr).

65 The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the Conduct of the Capital Market, Insurance and Savings Authority regarding Large Business Borrowers Protocol 4 (3rd meeting, 31 July 2018) 4 (Isr).

66 The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Opening Meeting (26 July 2017) 2.

67 The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Publication of the Inquiry Committee Report 6 (16 April 2019) (Isr).

68 Yosef (n 29).

69 In Israel, see Friedberg and Hazan (n 38) 309; Noa Kwartaz-Avraham, ‘The Interface Between the Knesset and the Government in Governmental Legislative Process’ (Israel Democracy Institute, Policy Research 147, 2020) 37 (Isr), <https://www.idi.org.il/books/32214>.

70 Friedberg, ‘How to Perfect the Knesset Work as a Legislating and Oversight Branch? Central Recommendations’ (n 58) 18.

71 Article One: Strengthening Congressional Oversight Capacity: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on the Modernization of Congress of the H.R., 117 Congress (2021), <https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/CHRG-117hhrg48604/CHRG-117hhrg48604.pdf>.

72 Current research supports the argument concerning the centrality of legislative oversight for coalitions. See Daniel Finke and Annika Herbel, ‘Coalition Politics and Parliamentary Oversight in the European Union’ (2018) 53 Government and Opposition 388; Shane Martin and Richard Whitaker, ‘Beyond Committees: Parliamentary Oversight and Coalition Government in Britain’ (2019) 42 West European Politics 1464.

73 In certain states, the opposition's responsibilities concerning government oversight are explicitly defined, and appropriate measures are established to fulfill this aim, such as allocating specific seats for opposition representatives on particular committees or requesting certain information to be provided to the leader of the opposition prior to its public release. For different constitutional and legislative examples, see Inter-Parliamentary Union (n 22) 28–29.

74 Gary W Cox, ‘On the Effect of Legislative Rules’ (2000) 25 Legislative Studies Quarterly 169.

75 Friedberg and Shapira (n 39) 8.

76 Yosef (n 29).

77 Iddo Porat, ‘Court Polarization: A Comparative Perspective’ (2023) 46 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 3, 3 (‘Polarization is on the rise around the globe. Political views are driven to the poles, and moderate views are weakened’).

78 Namkje Koudenburg and Yoshihisa Kashima, ‘A Polarized Discourse: Effects of Opinion Differentiation and Structural Differentiation on Communication’ (2022) 48 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 1068.

79 See the case of former MK Stav Shafir who created antagonism among the different ministries: The Special Committee for Governmental Information Accessibility and Publicity, ‘The Chair of the Personal Debt Committee in the Ministry of Interior Refused to Face the Committee’ (Committee News, 9 November 2016) (Isr) <https://main.knesset.gov.il/activity/committees/govinfo/news/pages/%d7%94%d7%95%d7%93%d7%a2%d7%94-%d7%95%d7%a2%d7%93%d7%94-%d7%9c%d7%97%d7%99%d7%95%d7%91-%d7%90%d7%99%d7%a9%d7%99-08112016.aspx>; Zvi Zarchia, ‘Shafir Says on the Ministry of Finance CEO: He Think He Runs the State and Can Threaten People; Folkman: You're Lying’ (Calcalist, 28 November 2018) (Isr) <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3750851,00.html>.

80 Interview with former Knesset Member Eitan Cabel (Oct. 2, 2022, Tel Aviv).

81 See, for example, Knesset Member Yariv Levin, formerly the minister of tourism and the minister responsible for the interaction between the Knesset and Government, speaking in the House Committee in June 2022:

In my view, we have unfortunately failed in our duty of parliamentary oversight of the various Knesset committees overseeing government ministries. As a former tourism minister, I experienced firsthand the lack of supervision from the Economic Affairs Committee, which was responsible for overseeing my office. It took significant effort on my part to persuade the chairman to hold audit hearings on my office twice in a five-year period. This highlights the challenge of ensuring that committee heads prioritize their supervisory responsibilities. It is our responsibility to hold government ministries accountable through our supervisory committees. If we fail to set discussions and require ministers to present information, we cannot later claim that our voices were ignored or that we were not considered. The 24th Knesset's House Committee, Meeting No 106 16 (7 June 2022)

82 Mayhew (n 17).

83 Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, ‘The Role of Courts in Improving the Legislative Process’ (2015) 3 Theory and Practice of Legislation 295, 298–99.

84 While the agent-principal problem was theorised through economy studies, Kiewiet and McCubbins have imported its rationales into political studies. D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (The University of Chicago Press 1991).

85 Thomas Saalfeld, ‘Members of Parliament and Governments in Western Europe: Agency Relations and Problems of Oversight’ (2000) 37 EurJPolRes 353, 354–55.

86 Oleszek (n 23) 42–45.

87 All the Committee's products and meetings are available at the Congress website. Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress, <https://www.congress.gov/committee/house-select-committee-on-the-modernization-of-congress/hlmh00>.

88 Barbara Sinclair, ‘Can Congress be Trusted with the Constitution? The Effect of Incentives and Procedures’ in Neal Devins and Keith E. Whittington (eds.), Congress and the Constitution (Duke University Press 2005) 297.

89 Victor Goldfeld, ‘Legislative Due Process and Simple Interest Group Politics: Ensuring Minimal Deliberation through Judicial Review of Congressional Process’ (2004) 79 NYU L Rev 367, 373.

90 For elaboration on blind spots and political burdens of inertia in the legislative process, see Rosalind Dixon, ‘Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form Versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited’ (2007) 5 ICON 391, 402–03.

91 Stacy G. Ulbig, ‘Policies, Procedures, and People: Sources of Support for Government?’ (2002) 83 Social Science Quarterly 789, 789; see also Amy Gangl, ‘Procedural Justice Theory and Evaluating of the Lawmaking Process’ (2003) 25 Political Behavior 119, 119–20. In this study, an experiment demonstrated that individuals emphasised the legislative process significantly when it was portrayed as balanced and inclusive and had multiple viewpoints. Conversely, when the procedure was depicted as closed and partial, its legitimacy was notably lower. Those who valued the process as impartial and incorporating diverse perspectives also placed higher importance on its legitimacy. Consequently, they believed their viewpoints were well represented, the procedure was unbiased, and the policymakers' objectives were noble. Remarkably, these findings were valid irrespective of the subject matter of the discussion.

92 The organizations' written arguments are available here: <https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/Credit/documents/CreditDoc100319.pdf>.

93 The organization written arguments are available here: <https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/Credit/documents/CreditDoc181218-2.pdf>.

94 Monroe and Robinson (n 17).

95 Friedberg and Hazan (n 38) 303.

96 Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, ‘Parliamentary Activity, and Legislative Oversight During the Coronavirus Pandemic – A Comparative Overview’ (Bar Ilan University Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 20-06, 2020) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3566948>.

97 Friedberg, ‘How to Perfect the Knesset Work as a Legislating and Oversight Branch? Central Recommendations’ (n 58) 15.

98 For instance, in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy, the average is one committee; in Belgium, Ireland, and Switzerland, the average is 1.5; in Finland, the standard is 2. The research, which focused on Europe, found that amongst all the countries examined, only in Austria, the average number of committees is higher (an average of 4 committees for each legislator). ibid.

99 Basic Law: The Knesset, art. 24, SH 69 (Isr); see E. Fast, ‘Attendance at Parliamentary Sessions and the Quorum Rule’ (1982) 17 ILR 197.

100 Israel Democracy Institute, Quorum Requirement in Plenum and Committees (Israel Democracy Institute, 15 February 2002) (Isr) <https://www.idi.org.il/parliaments/8873/9026>; Gonen Ilan, ‘The Quorum Requirement: Discussion and an Offer for a Reform’ (ICON-S-IL Blog, 4 July 2021) (Isr), <https://israeliconstitutionalism.wordpress.com/2021/07/04/%D7%93%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%AA-%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%9D-%D7%93%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%99-%D7%9C%D7%94%D7%A6%D7%A2%D7%94-%D7%92%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%9F/>.

101 Friedberg and Shapira (n 39) 5.

102 Meghan Benton and Meg Russell, ‘Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight Committees: The Select Committees in the British House of Commons’ (2013) 66 Parliamentary Affairs 772.

103 Zvi Zarchia and Racheli Bindman, ‘The Cabel Committee Bashed the Regulators But Neglected the Banks’ (Calcalist, 17 April 2019) (Isr), <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3760577,00.html>; Stella Corin Liber, ‘There is a Parliamentary Committee, There are Conclusions, But What about Some Accountability?’ (Globes, 16 April 2019) (Isr), <https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001282482>; Barak Gonen, ‘Fixed Match: Even at the Eliezer Fishman Affair No One Took Care for the Public Interest’ (MakorRishon, 5 December 2021) (Isr), <https://www.makorrishon.co.il/opinion/429417/>; Zvi Zarchia, ‘Cabel's Tycoons Committee Absolve the Banks of Responsibility’ (Calcalist, 20 March 2019) (Isr), <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3758648,00.html>; Irit Avishar and Amiram Barkat, ‘The “Tycoons Committee” Against the Bank of Israel: Sever and Continuous Deficiencies in the Supervision over the Banks’ (Globes, 16 April 2019) (Isr), <https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001282388>.

104 Blander, Friedberg and Friedman (n 53) 34.

105 Basic Law: The Knesset, art. 22, SH 69 (Isr).

106 Knesset Rules of Procedure, art. 135 (Isr).

107 Sven T. Siefken and Hilmar Rommetvedt (eds.), Parliamentary Committees in the Policy Process (Vol. 1) (Routledge 2021) ch 2.

108 Griglio (n 20).

109 Friedberg and Shapira (n 39).

Appendix

The Committee meetings

1. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Opening Meeting (26 July 2017).

2. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Hearings of civil society organisations (11 March 2018).

3. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the conduct of the Capital Market, Insurance, and Savings Authority regarding Large Business Borrowers (31 July 2018).

4. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the conduct of Bank Hapoalim regarding Large Business Borrowers (21 October 2018).

5. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the conduct of Bank Leumi regarding Large Business Borrowers (28 October 2018)

6. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the Conduct of the Capital Market, Insurance, and Savings Authority regarding Large Business Borrowers (4 November 2018).

7. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the conduct of the First International Bank of Israel regarding Large Business Borrowers (18 November 2018).

8. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the conduct of Israel Discount Bank regarding Large Business Borrowers (18 November 2018).

9. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the conduct of the Bank of Israel regarding Large Business Borrowers (25 November 2018).

10. The Parliamentary ommittee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the conduct of the Antitrust Authority regarding Large Business Borrowers (2 December 2018).

11. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the conduct of Migdal Insurance Company regarding Large Business Borrowers (30 December 2018).

12. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: promoting the reform to enhance competition and diminish centralisation in the banking sector in order to optimise the financial system's ability to provide credit (30 December 2018).

13. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the conduct of Clal Insurance Enterprises Holdings Ltd regarding large business borrowers (6 January 2019).

14. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the conduct of the Securities Authority regarding large business borrowers (6 January 2019).

15. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: deliberation and determination concerning the conclusions and recommendations formulated by the Inquiry Committee preliminary conclusions (11 April 2019) (Confidential meeting).

16. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: publication of the Inquiry Committee report (16 April 2019)