Performance management and political accountability: how local governments respond to performance feedback

ABSTRACT

Using the results of an annual assessment of local governments’ integrity levels from 2012 to 2016, we explore how Korea’s local governments respond to performance feedback provided by the central government. First, we find clear performance improvement only among localities performing below the average of their social comparison groups. This result supports the negativity bias hypothesis, which posits that policymakers are driven more by negative than by positive information. Second, local governments’ responses to feedback increased as election dates approached. This outcome suggests that electoral incentives magnify the effectiveness of performance management. Third, negative performance information released immediately before elections is associated with the incumbents’ electoral defeat, which is consistent with the hypothesis that performance information helps citizens hold policymakers accountable during elections. Overall, the findings imply that performance management (managerial accountability) and elections (political accountability) are mutually reinforcing mechanisms and that voter myopia can partially erode this synergy.

KEYWORDS:

• Performance management
• negativity bias
• political accountability

Acknowledgements

Authors are listed in alphabetical order, and all authors made equal contributions (joint first authorship).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Bounded rationality, Simon (1947) proposed, can, in most cases, be equally applied to not only individual decision-making but also organisational decision-making, obscuring the distinction between both (March, 1978).

2. While there have also been assertions that the punishment of corrupt politicians is quite limited (Bågenholm, 2013), many scholars have asserted that corruption in politicians can negatively affect electoral consequences (Klašnja, 2016; Krause & Méndez, 2009; Peters & Welch, 1980; Winters & Weitz-Shapiro, 2013).

3. Some previous studies also report evidence that casts doubt on the effectiveness of performance management systems as an accountability mechanism (Gerrish, 2016).

4. Another reason why the dissemination of performance information about corruption may have a greater impact as the elections approach is related to the availability heuristic (Folkes, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by the Yonsei University [2022-22-0011].

Notes on contributors

Sounman Hong

Sounman Hong is the Underwood Distinguished Professor in public policy at Yonsei University in South Korea. His research focuses on bureaucratic control, innovation, and reform and how to achieve a more efficient, responsive, and accountable public administration. He holds Master of Public Policy and PhD degrees from Harvard University and a bachelor’s degree from Yonsei University.

Suho Ji

Suho Ji is a PhD candidate in public policy and public administration at Yonsei University in South Korea. His research focuses on performance management, public finance, and political accountability in the public sector.

Taek Kyu Kim

Taek Kyu Kim is a Lecturer in public policy and public administration at the University of Exeter. His research interests include performance management, behavioural public administration, and collaborative governance. He holds a PhD in Public Affairs from the University of Missouri, a master’s degree in public administration from Yonsei University, and a bachelor’s degree from Kyung Hee University.