Russian Private Military and Security Companies and Special Operations Forces: Birds of a Feather?

ABSTRACT

This article explores the degree to which Russian Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are similar to Special Operations Forces (SOF) in terms of their characteristics, their capabilities, and their efforts. First, it recognizes that like the US example and experiences in other Western countries, Russian PMSCs often rest on a SOF pedigree too. This is due to the SOF cachet and the desired skill sets of personnel. Second, the article contends that Russian PMSCs are indeed more SOF-like in some of the tasks they perform. This is especially because of their proclivity, compared to PMSCs from other countries, to employ offensive violence. Nevertheless, and finally, Russian PMSCs do deviate from expectations in terms of their varying strategic impact regarding deniability and their documented usage of crewed weapons systems.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• Pmcs
• Syria

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s). The views expressed in the article are those of the author; they do not necessarily reflect those of the Canadian Department of National Defence or the Government of Canada.

Notes

1. Though Bukkvoll and Østensen use the term “Private Military Company” (PMC) in their title, the article’s main body instead uses the term “Private Military and Security Company” (PMSC). This study also employs the term PMSC because it reflects the terminology offered in the Montreux Document, one of the main international regulatory tools considered later in this article. As the document puts it, “‘PMSCs’ are private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves” (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2008, p. 9).

2. General Townsend’s interest is not surprising as AFRICOM has encountered Russian PMSCs in the context of protecting resource extraction endeavors and their incorporation into military technical efforts.

3. The author understands that there are relative differences between Russian Spetsnaz and Western SOF with respect to elitism. Nevertheless, Spetsnaz and Western SOF often perform similar tasks. Moreover, Russia’s creation of a Special Operations Command makes the Russian and Western cases much more similar. Also, in hopes of not overblowing any relative differences, the author notes the intra-Western debates about who exactly constitutes SOF.

4. As a backdrop, one can recall the main SOF tasks as identified in NATO doctrine that can speak, in a variety of ways, to both the Western and Russian experience: military assistance, direct action, and special reconnaissance (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2019, p. 1–19; Marsh, 2017b; Galeotti, 2014).

5. One should note that the LNA is not the army of the recognized Libyan government.

6. For instance, chronological analysis of the Syrian conflict reveals the application of offensive PMSC violence alone or in conjunction with the Russian air force, Spetsnaz forces, and those under the direction of the Special Operations Command, the Syrian military, and various militias (Economist, 2017; Katz & Harrington, 2020).

7. The author appreciates the ongoing debate as to whether General Gerasimov’s thoughts should be considered as descriptive of changes in war in general or as a meditation on the Western way of war or if they should be interpreted as prescriptive for Russia (Duncan, 2017, p. 8). It is not this article’s intention to put this debate to bed. However, General Gerasimov’s specific comments regarding the potential offensive orientation of PMSCs do not correspond to the overall picture of state practice and international regulatory effect.

8. The author recognizes that in the US context, differentiations between “covert” and “clandestine” are reinforced by legal distinctions found in Title 10 US Code and Title 50 US Code (Congressional Research Service, 2019, p. 3–5).