Syria Train and Equip: Who Left the Interns in Charge?

ABSTRACT

The U.S. Government’s decision to establish a Train and Equip (T&E) Program for Moderate Syrian Opposition (MSO) forces to fight the ISIS terrorist organization came to fruition in the third year of the Syrian Civil War. This article examines the Train and Equip Program, a small but important chapter in the overall post – Sadaam and post Arab Spring societal upheaval in the Middle East. The analysis employs a broad tool-kit that includes: three hypotheses, the multi-causal model for conflict analysis, theoretical grounding in both Groupthink and Lay-epistemics, and an interpretivist lens provided by critical hermeneutics. The aim is to use this discrete unconventional warfare campaign as a platform activity to examine how decision-making and actions at the executive levels of government influenced the overall outcome. The findings of this examination will show that the greatest outcome of the Syria Train and Equip Program may be to serve as a cautionary tale and a guide for policy makers – especially when considering Unconventional Warfare as a policy option.

KEYWORDS:

• Unconventional Warfare
• Syria
• Civil War
• Organizational Behavior
• National Security Council
• Department Of Defense
• Executive Branch

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Interview Subjects

The subjects who agreed to participate in this research include Presidential Appointees, senior ranking State Department Officials, Senior Civilian Defense Department Officials, and Flag and General Officers. Additionally, Staff members – both civilian and military provided unique perspectives and depth. In many cases, participants remain in some form of active service or are likely to be nominated to significant government positions in the future. Prior to the interview, participants were briefed on this researcher’s strongly held position on protecting sources prior to reviewing and signing an informed consent document. To mitigate concerns about the integrity of the interview process, a single copy of a cross-reference record is maintained by the author.

For clarification, and with the intent of maintaining effective obfuscation, certain terms of reference are applied throughout:

• Position locations are limited to the Department or Agency level

• Senior - when applied to a Uniformed Military or DoD civilian, is anyone holding the Rank of Lieutenant Colonel or above or GS 14 and higher. This ranges to Four Star equivalents, Senior Executives and Assistant/Under Secretary Appointees

• Senior – when applied to State Department, Intelligence Community or NSC personnel is anyone at the GS-14 level or higher. This ranges up to all levels of Foreign Service Officers, Ambassadors, Senior Intelligence Service, and Assistant/Under Secretary Appointees

Interview Subjects

Subject 01 – A Senior DoD Officer with routine access to both DoD and NSC meetings concerning Syria.

Subject 02 – A Senior DoD Officer with routine access to DoD meetings concerning Syria.

Subject 03 – A Senior DoD Officer who helped plan and implement many of the decisions related to Syria.

Subject 04 – A Senior DoD Official with routine access to both DoD and NSC meetings concerning Syria.

Subject 05 – A Senior DoD Officer with routine access to DoD, NSC, and Intelligence Community meetings concerning Syria.

Subject 06 – A Senior State Department Official who helped develop the State Department positions and policy concerning Syria.

Subject 07 – A Senior State Department Official with Broad interagency experience and routine access to senior decision makers concerning Syria Policy

Subject 08 – A Senior State Department Official with a long-standing Mideast portfolio and routine access to policy and planning discussions concerning Syria.

Subject 09 – A Senior State Department Official with a long-standing Mideast portfolio and routine access to policy and planning discussions concerning Syria.

Subject 10 – A Senior State Department Official with routine access to policy and planning discussions concerning Syria.

Subject 11 – A Senior DoD Officer with extensive Middle East experience and routine access to planning and policy discussions concerning Syria.

Notes

1. I completed the research for this article as part of my dissertation work at Kennesaw State University. I am now an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies at the Air Force, Air Command, and Staff College. All opinions expressed in this article are mine and mine alone and do not reflect the official position of the Air Force, Air University, or any DoD entity.

2. Also referred to as the Law of the Instrument and broadly credited to Mark Twain, Maslow, Buddha, etc. Admiral (Retired) Eric Olson was the Commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and used this comment as a staple in public speeches explaining the need for the varied capabilities of the USSOCOM components. The “Einstellung Effect” is the negative effect of our previous experiences when solving new problems.

3. Subjects 01, 02, and 04 Interviews, April–May 2019, all subjects held various positions in the DoD and offered varying accounts of the same joke.

4. Subject 01 Interview and Subject 03 Interview. Interview subjects were serving in different capacities in the same organization, during the time period in question but had strikingly similar recollections of the authority challenge.