EU counterterrorism, collective securitization, and the internal-external security nexus

ABSTRACT

The first two decades of EU counterterrorism policy are emblematic of the emergence of an internal-external security nexus. This has occurred through the EU’s collective securitization of terrorism as a transboundary threat that blurs the traditional divide between internal and external security requiring multidimensional and transboundary EU counterterrorism policies and practises. The EU’s status quo discourse of terrorism as primarily a national and internal security threat to be dealt with by domestic security agencies has transformed into strategic discourses, policies and practices that frame terrorism as a transnational threat to the EU requiring a transnational response that integrates internal and external policies, institutions, and capabilities. While institutional silos, turf wars, and differing institutional cultures continue to hamper the routinization of a transboundary response, this collective securitization of terrorism as a transboundary threat, within a wider internal-external security nexus, is reshaping the nature of the EU as a security actor.

KEYWORDS:

• Transboundary security
• internal-external security nexus
• European Union
• terrorism
• counterterrorism
• collective securitization

Introduction

Twenty years after 9/11 terrorism remains at the top of the European Union’s security agenda, with the European Commission arguing “Terrorism remains a real and present danger” (European Commission, 2020a, p. 1). What has changed in those twenty years is the way that the European Union (EU) has collectively securitized terrorism. The EU has increasingly highlighted the “ever-increasing cross-border/cross sectorial dimension of the threat” (European Commission, 2020b, p. 15), collectively securitizing terrorism as a transboundary threat¹ that blurs the traditional divide between internal and external security. This has reshaped EU counterterrorism. In particular, EU counterterrorism has increasingly focused on better coordination and even integration of internal and external policies, institutions, and capabilities. This contributes to the emergence of an internal-external security nexus² where terrorism and counterterrorism transcend geographic, institutional, and capability boundaries (Shepherd, 2021). The reframing of terrorism and counterterrorism as transboundary is emblematic of a wider internal-external security nexus that is transforming the nature of the EU as a security actor.

This article examines the ways and extent to which the EU’s collective securitization of terrorism as a transboundary threat, and its counterterrorism responses, have blurred traditional distinctions between internal and external security, not just geographically but also institutionally and in capabilities. This has significant implications for EU security governance and for the nature of the EU as a security actor. The article utilizes the collective securitization framework developed by Sperling and Webber (2017 & 2019) and Kaunert and Leonard’s (2019) work on the EU’s collective securitization of terrorism. It also builds on and contributes to a significant body of literature examining the development and effectiveness of EU counterterrorism policy. Kaunert (2010a) demonstrates how the EU has moved towards greater supranational governance on internal security matters through the policy entrepreneurship of the EU Commission, while Brown (2010) is more sceptical of the progress made. In assessing the effectiveness of EU counterterrorism Bures (2006 & 2011) argues the policy field amounts to a “paper tiger”, Argomaniz (2012) argues there was often a proclamation-implementation gap in EU counterterrorism policy, and Bossong (2008 & 2013) raises a number of problems with counterterrorism as a form of EU security governance. The article also contributes to the literature on the external dimensions of EU counterterrorism policy. Rees (2006) focused on EU-US counterterrorism cooperation, which Kaunert (2010b) argues saw a supranationalisation of EU external relations in counterterrorism. A range of other developments in the external dimensions of EU counterterrorism have also been examined. Kaunert (2010b) argued the Europol has been increasing its external role in counterterrorism, while Kaunert and Léonard (2011) have argued that EU counterterrorism in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), specifically towards the southern neighbour’s, has not advanced as far as some expected. Finally, Monar (2015) argues it is clear that the EU has become an international counterterrorism actor, but remains hampered by being subsidiary to its member states, a lack of capabilities, institutional complexity, and limited policy coordination.

The contribution this article makes to the existing literature is three-fold. First, it demonstrates how it is not just that terrorism has been collectively securitized or that EU counterterrorism has developed an external dimension, but that the very nature of the terrorist threat has been reframed through a process of collective securitization as a transboundary security threat. Second, the article illustrates how the transboundary nature of terrorism has further problematized an already incomplete and fragmented set of EU counterterrorism policies and practices. This has led the EU to try and develop a set of more coordinated and multidimensional counterterrorism policies and practices. This, the article contends, contributes to the emergence of an internal-external security nexus. Third, it argues that these developments shift the EU away from its claimed normative distinctiveness toward a more strategic and self-interested security actor.

The article makes these contributes in four parts. First, the article briefly introduces Sperling and Webber’s (2017 & 2019) collective securitization model and the way it has been applied to terrorism in the EU by Kaunert and Leonard (2019). Second, the article moves beyond Leonard and Kaunert’s argument that (a) the EU collectively securitized terrorism in the wake of 9/11, and (b) this required and led to an EU counterterrorism policy. Instead, the article argues that the EU has collectively securitized terrorism in a very particular way, as a transboundary security threat that contributes to the emergence of the internal-external security nexus. Section three demonstrates this argument through an examination of the collective securitization of terrorism as a transboundary threat from the inside-out, focusing on the ways internally orientated policies and practices (primarily from the field of Justice and Home Affairs-JHA) have been externalized. The fourth section demonstrates the argument through an analysis of the collective securitization of terrorism as a transboundary threat from the outside-in. This examines how EU foreign policies and practices (notably the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)) have incorporated counterterrorism as one of their central purposes. Finally, the conclusion draws these findings together and argues that the EU’s collective securitization of terrorism as a transboundary threat, the subsequent reorientation of EU counterterrorism, and the emergence of an internal-external security nexus, have had significant implications for the nature of the EU as a security actor. It argues that the EU has become a more self-interested security actor, focusing more on its own strategic interests and shifting away from conceptions of the EU as more normative security actor.

Collective securitisation

The collective securitization model developed by Sperling and Webber (2017) builds on securitization theory (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998) and Haacke and Williams (2008) work on collective securitization. Sperling and Webber develop a six-stage model of collective securitization: the status quo security discourse and policies; a single (or set of cascading) event(s) that disrupt the status quo; a securitizing move; an audience response; the formulation and implementation of policy; and the routinization of the new discourse, policy, and practice (bringing a new status quo) (Sperling & Webber, 2019, pp. 246–7). Collective securitization requires that “the actor in question acts on behalf of other empowered actors who themselves may have individual securitising imperatives. It entails aggregating these multiple securitisations and giving them authoritative articulation, and so is most obviously undertaken by formal international organisations” (Sperling & Webber, 2019, p. 236). They argue, therefore, that the process of aggregation and articulation of a security threat is particularly relevant to the EU given its multiple component parts (Ibid., p. 248). Specifically, Sperling and Webber argue the EU “possesses autonomy and a standing separate from its members” and can be “conceived of as a securitising actor with agency in its own right” (Ibid., p. 237). The EU, therefore, is able to act as a securitizing actor because it has been given legal and political authority to do so by the member states, and the member states are then influenced by the discourses and policies of the EU to whom they had granted power.

Kaunert and Leonard claim this has even occurred with EU counterterrorism despite it being a policy area which “largely remains the preserve of member states” and where “the EU mainly aims to add value” (Kaunert & Leonard, 2019, p. 273). They argue that since 9/11 actors within the EU and member states have collectively securitized terrorism as a single collective threat faced by the whole EU and has led to (a) the development of a common EU counterterrorism policy which has been steadily institutionalized and (b) to the routinization of counterterrorism practices in the EU (Ibid.). Moving beyond Kaunert and Leonard this article argues that the EU’s collective securitization of terrorism has (re)framed it as a particular kind of security threat; a transboundary threat requiring a comprehensive, multidimensional, and transnational response. This epitomizes the internal-external security nexus. According to Sperling and Webber (2019) collective securitization within the EU occurs in two ways. First, through the elaboration of a security discourse (the securitizing move), and second through a range of practices and policies embracing its security responsibilities (Sperling & Webber, 2019, p. 237). Therefore, the article now turns, briefly, to identifying the discursive securitizing moves that redefine terrorism as a transboundary threat, before elaborating in more detail how these moves have been consolidated and then routinized through the EU’s transboundary counterterrorism policies and practices.

EU security discourse: (Re)framing terrorism as a transboundary threat

In the wake of the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, then EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (HR), Federica Mogherini, claimed the EU’s perception of terrorism had evolved “from a mostly internal issue to a new situation, when the international dimension of terror is much more evident” (Mogherini, 2015, p. 3). Despite international terrorism not being a new phenomenon (Badey, 1998; Pluchinsky, 1991; Wittendorp, 2016) and the domestic terrorism experienced by several EU states often having an international dimension, Mogherini’s comments illustrate the priority assigned to international terrorism by the EU. However, the idea of “international” terrorism as opposed to “domestic” terrorism is an overly simplistic, even artificial, distinction (Harper, 2014; Sinnar, 2019). The two are intertwined by funding, training, perpetrators, motives, and targets that can all transcend borders, and by the rapid rise of the internet and social media as a mode of inspiring attacks, recruitment, radicalization, training and communication between individuals and groups. Instead, the EU is seeing an increasingly dense interweaving of international and domestic elements of terrorists’ causes, recruitment, financing, planning, operations, and audiences, meaning terrorism is better articulated as a transboundary threat.

In the language of collective securitization, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were the start of “a set of cascading events” that “disrupted the status quo discourse” of terrorism as primarily a domestic security threat to be managed by national authorities. This set of cascading events, including the attacks on Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, led to the collective securitization of terrorism as an international threat affecting all EU states and, therefore, requiring the formulation of EU level counterterrorism policies and practices (Kaunert & Leonard, 2019). As terrorist events continued to cascade into the 2010s, in parallel with the evolving discourse of threat, the reframing of terrorism as a transboundary threat gathered pace. This was particularly evident in a set of cascading events between 2015 and 2020 with attacks in Paris, Brussels, Nice, Manchester, Berlin, Vienna and elsewhere. These attacks and the EU’s responses consolidated and routinized the new discourse, policies, and practices addressing terrorism as a transboundary threat. This became the new status quo discourse, which the rest of this section will briefly trace.

The 9/11 attacks led the EU and its member states to make their collective securitization move (Kaunert & Leonard, 2019), reframing terrorism as an international and Islamist threat to Europe and the wider world and requiring an EU response. The European Council declared that the attacks were “an assault on our open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural societies” and “the fight against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective of the European Union” (European Council, 2001, p. 1). In 2003 the European Security Strategy (ESS) emphasized that the threat transcended the internal-external security divide: “Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism … Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium” (European Council, 2003, p. 3) and that “internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked” (Ibid., p.2). Following the Madrid and London attacks the EU’s new Counterterrorism Strategy argued the EU “is an area of increasing openness, in which the internal and external aspects of security are intimately linked … This is an environment which terrorists abuse to pursue their objectives. In this context concerted and collective European action … is indispensable to combat terrorism” (Council of the EU, 2005, p. 6). These strategies clearly demonstrate the discursive framing of terrorism as a transboundary threat and the emergence of an internal-external security nexus.

The increased focus on radicalized, “home-grown” terrorists, and later “foreign-fighters”, also had clear transboundary dimensions through recruitment, training, and funding of EU citizens within and outside of the EU. This was apparent in the attacks on Paris in January and November 2015, which were largely perpetrated by EU citizens, living in France or Belgium, who had travelled freely into, out of, and across the EU to train and fight in Syria with Islamic State (IS). The transboundary nature of terrorism is also evident in the way the EU discursively frames the conflicts and ungoverned spaces across Iraq, Libya, Mali, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, as being used by extremists to recruit people to their cause and territory, including up to 5000 EU citizens (Europol, 2018, p. 26). Some of these foreign fighters return to the EU posing a potential internal terrorist threat, further illustrating the internal-external security nexus. The transboundary nature of this type of terrorism was clearly articulated in the, 2020 EU Security Union Strategy, which argued the “challenge of foreign terrorist fighters is emblematic of the link between internal and external security” (European Commission, 2020b, p. 17). This phenomenon highlights the problems with the traditional divide between internal and external security, as recruitment, funding, advice, and training is increasingly transboundary, whether online or in person. A similar trend can be seen with right-wing terrorism, which is an increasingly prominent threat to EU security (Europol, 2020). While many right-wing attacks could be considered domestic terrorism, the international connections and networks of right-wing extremism are expanding rapidly (Auger, 2020).

These securitizing moves, discursively reframing terrorism as a transboundary threat, were accompanied by the development of increasingly transboundary EU counterterrorism policies and practices. These focused simultaneously on tackling terrorism from the inside-out and the outside-in. Working from the inside-out, the EU placed significant emphasis on the externalization of its internal security (JHA) policies. First, EU institutions, committees, and agencies primarily responsible for internal security (such as Europol, the Committee for Internal Security (COSI), the Terrorism Working Group (TWG), and DG HOME) are increasingly encouraged to work with institutions, committees, and agencies responsible for external security (such as the European External Actions Service (EEAS), the Political and Security committee (PSC), the Counterterrorism Working Party - International Aspects (COTER), and DG DEVECO). Second, EU internal security and counterterrorism capabilities such as police and judicial expertise are increasingly working alongside EU external security capabilities outside EU borders, such as in EU Delegations and CSDP missions. In parallel, working from the outside-in, the EU and its member states used the CFSP and CSDP, as well as other external policies such as Development Aid and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), to tackle terrorist threats in third countries to enhance EU internal security. It is to the inside-out and outside-in policies and practices that the article now turns as an important stage of the collective securitization process, the formulation and implementation of policy.

EU policy and practice: counterterrorism from the inside-out

The last twenty years of EU counterterrorism cooperation have seen a growing emphasis on the externalization of internal security policies and capabilities. This has seen internal security actors such as police, judicial, border, customs, and other officials cooperating and information sharing with counterparts in third countries; police, judicial, border, and customs officers being deployed outside of the EU; and cooperation with third countries on counterterrorism measures in other policy fields such as transport security and financial information exchange. Finally, there have been efforts to enhance cooperation between EU internal security bodies and their external security counterparts. These inside-out policies and practices contribute to the collective securitization of terrorism as a transboundary security challenge requiring a multidimensional and transnational approach, epitomizing the internal-external security nexus.

Following 9/11, a significant aspect of the externalization of internal security was facilitating institutional cooperation and information sharing with third countries. The most substantive, and often most controversial, cooperation has been between the EU and the United States. This phase of greater cooperation was initiated by the US-EU Ministerial Statement on Combatting Terrorism, which agreed to “vigorously pursue cooperation … in order to reduce vulnerabilities in our societies” (Council of the EU, 2001b). The statement outlined seven areas of cooperation: aviation and transport security; police and judicial cooperation (including extradition); terrorist financing (including sanctions); denial of other means of support; export control and non-proliferation; border controls (including visa and document security); and law enforcement access to information and exchange of data (Ibid.; Rees, 2006, p. 80), demonstrating the multidimensional approach transcending the internal-external security divide. This was followed by the European Council’s four-part “Plan of Action” on tackling terrorism, including cooperation with the United States (European Council, 2001). One of the key priorities was greater information and personnel exchanges including the exchange of strategic and technical information between Europol and US agencies, and even personal data (Kaunert, 2009, p. 55). These initial agreements were followed by several more information sharing initiatives, including the 2003 EU-US Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, the 2010 SWIFT agreement on bank transfer data, and the 2011 Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreement. While cooperation with the United States has been the most extensive, similar information sharing agreements have been signed with other countries, such as the PNR with Australia and negotiations on PNR agreements with Canada and Japan, as well as Strategic Agreements with Brazil, China, Russia, Turkey and the UAE, and Operational Agreements with the United States and 16 other non-EU states (Europol, 2021).

The second dimension of counterterrorism from the inside-out has been the exchange of personnel. The EU has progressively deployed more internal security agencies and personnel beyond its borders, as well as hosting third country personnel within EU institutions. Europol officers have been posted to a number of third countries as liaison officers and as part of policing operations, and it hosts liaison officers from 20 non-EU countries (Europol, 2021). Similarly, Eurojust has a network of over 50 contact points worldwide, hosts liaison officers from 10 countries at its headquarters and has international agreements with two further countries (Eurojust, 2021a). These liaison arrangements and agreements focus on cross-border investigations, including on terrorism (Eurojust, 2021b). A third example of internal security actors working from the inside-out is counterterrorism experts working in 13 EU overseas delegations to assist third countries in counterterrorism and preventing and countering violent extremism (Council of the EU, 2020, p. 14). These EU counterterrorism policies and practices consolidate the collective securitization of terrorism as a transboundary threat and the emergence of the internal-external security nexus, in this case from the inside-out.

As well as international agreements and personnel deployments, the transboundary nature of terrorism and the EU’s inside-out response is also evident in a number of EU counterterrorism strategies. The 2005 EU Counterterrorism Strategy clearly elaborated a transboundary dimension within its “Pursue” component:

Much of the terrorist threat to Europe originates outside the EU. “Pursue” must therefore also have a global dimension. The EU will work to reinforce the international consensus through the United Nations and other international bodies through dialogue and agreements (which include counter-terrorism clauses) with key partners […] Assistance will be provided to priority countries to help them introduce and implement the necessary mechanisms to disrupt terrorism, in coordination with the work of other donors (Council of EU, 2005a, p. 14).

There were also external dimensions to the other three components of the Counterterrorism Strategy - Prevent, Protect, and Respond. These included, working with third countries and international organizations to combat radicalization (Prevent); improving transport security, non-proliferation of CBRN materials and small arms/light weapons (Protect); and assisting EU citizens in third countries, protecting EU crisis management operations, and managing the consequences of terrorist attacks (Respond) (Ibid., pp. 9-16). The 2005 Strategy for an External Dimension of JHA epitomized the inside-out approach to counterterrorism. It focused on developing and deepening cooperation on counterterrorism with third countries and international organizations through institution building, implementing international instruments, and tackling terrorist recruitment and financing (European Commission, 2005). The inside-out approach to counterterrorism was also prominent in the 2009 Stockholm Programme for JHA, which called for continued engagement with third countries in tackling terrorism because “Addressing threats, even far away from our continent, is essential to protecting Europe and its citizens” (Council of EU, 2009, p. 76). This was reinforced by calls to deepen counterterrorism assistance in regions such as the Sahel and with states such as Afghanistan, China, India, and Pakistan (Ibid., pp. 81-2), clearly demonstrating both the transboundary nature of terrorism and the internal-external security nexus.

The more recent EU security strategies continue to develop policies and practices aimed at tackling terrorism from the inside-out, through information exchange and the externalization of expertise, personnel, and capabilities. Terrorism was one of three major threats in the 2015 Agenda on Security (alongside organized crime and cybercrime). It argued for maximizing policy dialogues and developing “specific joint action plans” with third countries and international organizations (European Commission, 2015, p. 4). The 2020 EU Security Union Strategy focused on the same three security threats emphasizing the “ever-increasing cross- border/cross sectorial dimension” of terrorism (European Commission, 2020b, p. 15), highlighting the transboundary nature of the threat. This, the strategy argued, would require the development of “counterterrorism partnerships and cooperation with countries in the neighbourhood and beyond … drawing on the expertise of the Network of EU Counter-Terrorism/Security Experts … to support partner countries capacity to identify and locate foreign terrorist fighters” (Ibid., p. 17). Finally, the 2020 Counterterrorism Agenda stressed “the transnational nature of terrorism” and reiterated that this “requires a strong collective approach at EU level” (European Commission, 2020a, p. 1). The final section of the Agenda focuses on international cooperation across all four of the strategy’s pillars (Anticipate, Prevent, Protect and Respond). In particular, the Agenda calls for “further strengthening of the EU’s external counter-terrorism engagement with a focus on the Western Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East, the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, in other African countries where terrorist activities are increasing, and in key regions in Asia” (Ibid., p. 22). The counterterrorism experts seconded to EU Delegations are seen as “essential” in “facilitating cooperation and promoting capacity building” as are the EU’s partnerships with key countries such as the United States (Ibid.). As well as working with third countries, the EU seeks to engage with other international organizations, notably the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, but also NATO, Interpol, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (Ibid.)

Finally, in addition to externalizing counterterrorism security policies, practices, and personnel, the last 20 years have been multiple initiatives aimed at transcending the institutional divisions between EU internal and external actors, including the removal of the pillar structure in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. While turf wars and institutional silos have complicated efforts to better coordinate internal and external counterterrorism actors, the progress that has been made has contributed to the collective securitization of terrorism as a transboundary threat and highlighted the internal-external security nexus. Following the 2004 Madrid bombings, the EU’s Situation Centre (SITCEN – later INTCEN), established in 1999 to support CSDP and external crisis management, began to collate and exchange internal security intelligence, including on terrorism, and its director began attending some JHA committee meetings (House of Lords, 2005, pp. 55–61). In 2005 the EU created the role of the Counter–Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) within (then) Pillar II and reporting to the HR for CFSP, yet they were to maintain an overview of all EU internal and external counterterrorism instruments. However, the CTC’s limited formal powers and tensions with DG HOME undermined their ability to ensure coherence (Author Interviews DG HOME and EEAS 2013). In 2008, the Council set up an ad hoc Working Party for JHA-External Relations (JAIEX) to improve coordination and information exchange, including on terrorism. In 2010 the Commission’s ISS in Action communication called for COSI and the PSC to “work together” (European Commission, 2010a, p. 15). In 2011 the Hungarian Presidency established quarterly inter-institutional meetings between the EEAS, Council, and Commission, where representatives from the PSC, COSI, relevant Council and Commission directorates (e.g. DG Home) and the CTC would exchange information on a range of security issues including terrorism (Council of the EU, 2011a, p. 3). The Hungarian Presidency also established joint meetings of Council preparatory bodies covering terrorism including the PSC, COSI, JAIEX, COTER, TWG with the CTC participating (Ibid.: 4).

The EU’s efforts to externalize its internal security policies and practices and better coordinate its internal and external counterterrorism actors consolidated the discursive stage of the collective securitization of terrorism as a transboundary security threat. While there remain tensions and divisions between (and within) EU internal and external security actors and the externalization of JHA and counterterrorism is still a work in progress, these developments illustrate the transboundary nature of terrorism and the emergence of an internal-external security nexus.

EU policy and practice: counterterrorism from the outside-In

This collective securitization has also been evident from the outside-in, with EU external relations and foreign, security and defence policy increasing incorporating counterterrorism elements. In particular, the EU seeks to use the CFSP, CSDP, and development aid to assist third countries in tackling terrorism. It does so primarily to enhance security within the EU, demonstrating both the collective securitization of terrorism as a transboundary security threat and the emergence of an internal-external security nexus. The EU’s efforts to tackle terrorism from the outside-in began immediately after the 9/11 attacks. The EU Plan of Action on terrorism called for CFSP “to integrate further the fight against terrorism” (Council of the EU, 2001a, p. 3). The 2002 Draft Declaration on the Contribution of CFSP and CSDP in the fight against terrorism, claimed terrorism was being incorporated in “all aspects of the Union’s external relations” (European Council, 2002, p. 21). This included strengthening conflict prevention, using political dialogues and EU agreements with third countries to focus on counterterrorism, and aiding third countries in responding to terrorism (Ibid.). The key priorities were intelligence sharing, situation assessments and early warning reports, countering terrorist threats to CSDP missions, and exploring how military or civilian capabilities could be used to help protect civilian populations from terrorism (Ibid., p. 22). The 2003 ESS made clear that terrorism transcended geographic, institutional, and capability divides, arguing EU counterterrorism, “may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means”, including potentially using CSDP to support third countries in combating terrorism (European Council, 2003, pp. 3–12). The 2004 Declaration on Combating Terrorism reiterated calls for “work to be rapidly pursued to develop the contribution of ESDP to the fight against terrorism” (European Council, 2004).

This led to the 2004 Conceptual Framework on the ESDP Dimension of the Fight against Terrorism, which was central to the outside-in dimension of EU counterterrorism. It called for incorporating the full spectrum of capabilities, including intelligence, police, judiciary, and military assets, and effective and swift cross pillar coordination (Council of the EU, 2004). The four main areas identified reflected the EU’s counterterrorism strategy: prevention, protection, response, and consequence management, as well as support to third countries. At the heart of all four areas was the need for “cross pillar co-ordination” and “interoperability between military and civilian capabilities” (Ibid., p. 6), indicating the need to overcome institutional and capability divides in EU counterterrorism. The framework focused on assisting third countries through crisis management operations and protecting EU personnel and assets in those missions. It also raised the possibility (based on the Solidarity Clause) of CSDP’s military capabilities supporting civilian instruments in the protection of populations and critical infrastructure within the EU (Ibid., p. 8). While this has not yet happened, the database of military assets relevant to the Community Civil Protection Mechanism and protecting civilian populations against terrorist attacks is available to EU counterterrorism actors (Ibid.). Despite these early efforts the role of EU foreign, security and defence policy in counterterrorism was, until the EU’s missions in the Sahel (see below), relatively limited. Argomaniz argued that this was due to institutional and capability weaknesses, conceptual shortcomings - whereby three of the four priorities in the Conceptual Framework focus on CSDP missions rather than internal security - and the lack of political will among member states to enhance CSDP for counterterrorism (Argomaniz, 2012, p. 39).

What limited role CFSP did play focused on three main areas: promoting UN conventions, providing counterterrorism assistance and including counterterrorism in political dialogues with third countries, and through conflict management and promoting good governance (Keohane, 2008, p. 140). For example, the EU assisted Morocco and Algeria on border, airport, and maritime security projects (Cornish, Heller, Kahl, Knight, & Tarhuni, 2008, p. 32). In addition, counterterrorism cooperation clauses have been inserted into all new and updated association agreements, including with all EUROMED and ENP partner states, in trade and development agreements, and specific counterterrorism measures have been developed with a range of third countries (Hayes & Jones, 2013, p. 17; Monar, 2015, p. 349). While, this has led to the mainstreaming of counterterrorism in external relations, the extent of cooperation with third countries varies significantly depending on the partner (Ibid.). Finally, the EU has also gradually increased funding for external counterterrorism and preventing violent extremism in third countries, rising to €465 m in 2019 (Council of the EU, 2020, p. 14). These developments illustrate how EU policies and practices were consolidating the collective securitization of terrorism as transboundary security threat. However, as with the externalization of JHA, implementing the declarations and strategies on CFSP and CSDP proved difficult. Limitations in the EU’s legal competences in this area, its institutional framework, and its internal counterterrorism measures, all restricted its international counterterrorism role (Monar, 2015, p. 335).

Nevertheless, counterterrorism was very prominent in the CFSP regional strategies for the Sahel and for the Horn of Africa, directly connecting terrorist threats in those regions to the EU’s internal security. The EU’s 2011 Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel makes explicit links between security in the Sahel and EU internal security: “[I]mproving security and development in the Sahel has an obvious and direct impact on protecting European citizens and interests and on the EU internal security situation (EEAS, 2011, p. 4)”. The growing emphasis on EU internal security within CFSP strategies alongside, or even superseding, the security of the regions in which the EU was operating, demonstrates terrorism’s transboundary nature and the internal-external security nexus. As well as featuring more prominently in CFSP, counterterrorism was being written into development and assistance programmes, funded by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). Finally, as part of tackling terrorism from the outside-in, counterterrorism became an explicit element of several CSDP missions in Africa. Counterterrorism had been a small and rather indirect element of previous CSDP missions, such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan (Martins & Ferreira-Pereira, 2012), but it became more prominent and explicit in the rationales, mandates, and practices of CSDP missions in sub-Saharan Africa.

Specifically, the focus of CSDP was on terrorist threats from the Sahel and Nigeria to the Horn of Africa and Kenya (Olsen, 2014, p. 295). The deteriorating security environment in these regions was framed as a threat to the EU because the ungoverned spaces it created were seen as potential safe havens for terrorist groups that could threaten EU internal security. Consequently, a key rationale for CSDP missions in the Sahel was addressing the threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and other violent groups (EEAS, 2015, p. 1). The collective securitization of terrorism as a transboundary security threat was apparent in the EU’s launch of EUCAP Sahel Niger in 2012, which argued “the intensification of terrorist actions and the consequences of the conflict in Libya have increased the urgency of protecting Union citizens and interest in the region and preventing the extension of those threats to the Union, while helping to reduce regional security threats” (Council of the EU, 2012, p. 48 emphasis added). Hence, the mission was “to support the capacity building of the Nigerian security actors to fight terrorism and organised crime” (Ibid.) to enable them to tackle the traffickers and terrorists using Niger’s desert regions as safe havens and routes towards Europe (EEAS, 2016a, p. 1). Similarly, the launch of a civilian training mission in 2014 (EUCAP Sahel Mali) to work with Mali’s police and judiciary, included a focus on terrorism (EEAS, 2016b, p. 1). The internal-external security nexus is clear in EUCAP Sahel Mali’s rationale, “[R]einstating security and lasting peace in Mali is of crucial importance for Africa and Europe” (Ibid., emphasis added). Finally, in addition to these CSDP missions, the EU provided €147 m to help set up the G5 Sahel Joint Force which has as one of its key tasks tackling terrorism across the Sahel states (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) (EEAS, 2019; Ministère de L’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères, 2019). The risk of terrorist bases emerging in the Sahel meant EU counterterrorism efforts were explicitly part of its external security policies to enhance the EU’s internal security, clearly illustrating the outside-in dimension of EU counterterrorism.

Similarly, in the Horn of Africa EU concerns about terrorist bases and Islamist movements linking up with Somalis living inside the EU shaped its policies and missions (Olsen, 2014, p. 298). The 2011 Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa argued unaccountable governance mixed with societal tensions permitted “piracy and terrorism to flourish in Somalia” to the level “where they threaten international security and, directly, the interests of EU member states” (Council of the EU, 2011b, p. 4). In 2012 a specific Counter-Terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen focused on law enforcement, countering and preventing recruitment and violent extremism, and tackling terrorist financing (European Commission and High Representative, 2012, p. 4). The internal-external security nexus is evident in the explicit reference to bringing “coherence between EU internal and external security” (Ibid., p. 2). In 2015, the EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020, highlighted terrorism, counter-radicalization, and violent extremism as key dimensions of security, partly to protect EU citizens from threats emanating from the region (Council of the EU, 2015a). The Action Plan called for efforts to span the diplomatic, security, military, trade, and development cooperation fields (Ibid., p. 25), illustrating the multidimensional approach to EU counterterrorism, which transcended geographic, institutional and capability divides.

The collective securitization of terrorism as a transboundary security threat is also evident in the priority placed on tackling foreign fighters. For many years, especially after the rise of IS, jihadist groups have encouraged people to join their conflicts across the Middle East, Maghreb, Sahel, Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Simultaneously, these groups have sought to remotely radicalize people within the EU via social media and other internet platforms, seeking to inspire, encourage, and assist in planning attacks across the EU (Europol, 2012, p. 6). The transboundary dimension of radicalization was evident in the 2014 Revised Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment, which included a section on aligning internal and external counter radicalization (Council of the EU, 2014, p. 13). The transboundary aspects to radicalization included: attacks often having external connections, such as planning, funding, training; Europeans undertaking attacks abroad; ideology and messages from third countries impacting on radicalization inside the EU; travel to conflict zones can radicalize individuals who then might return to the EU to inspire or undertake attacks; employing counter radicalization efforts in third countries and supporting and strengthening the rule of law and security sector through capacity building; and integrating counter radicalization into development planning (Ibid., pp.13-14). In 2014, the European Council declared, “the creation of an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria and the Islamist-extremist export of terrorism on which it is based is a direct threat to the security of the European countries” (European Council, 2014, p. 6). This was evidenced from 2015 onward with IS claiming responsibility for multiple attacks within the EU, most notably those in Paris but also Nice, Berlin and elsewhere. By the end of 2015, it was estimated that 5000 Europeans had travelled to Syria and Iraq to act as foreign fighters on behalf of IS or to marry IS fighters, and about 1500 foreign fighters had returned to the EU (Europol, 2018, p. 26). The Council of the EU made clear the transboundary nature of this terrorist threat, linking the foreign fighter phenomenon to the internal-external security nexus:

The joint efforts of the internal and external dimension in fighting terrorism, and in particular the phenomenon of the foreign terrorist fighters, is crucial … the work of the Foreign Affairs Council is particularly welcomed. The increasingly unstable situation in certain parts of the EU’s neighbourhood, such as Libya and Syria, is of great concern to the EU’s security and requires special attention. (Council of the EU, 2015b, p. 7)

The internal-external nexus can also be seen in France’s response to the November 2015 attacks, invoking the EU’s mutual assistance clause (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, Art. 42(7)). France requested other EU states replace some French troops in CSDP and other operations in the Sahel and contribute to further air strikes against IS in Syria (Cirlig, 2015, p. 6). The terrorist attack took place inside the EU, but it was inspired, planned, and funded with external assistance from IS, several perpetrators having travelled to Syria. Meanwhile, the response was both internal, in finding the perpetrators through EU police and intelligence cooperation, and external, through air strikes on Syria and troop redeployments. While the number of people travelling to and returning from conflict zones decreased as IS lost territory, the threat posed by foreign fighters remains a long-term concern for the EU (Europol, 2020). The policies and practices tackling this threat contribute to the collective securitization of terrorism as a transboundary security threat and illustrate the internal-external security nexus facing the EU.

Finally, it is not just jihadist terrorism that is transboundary in its recruitment, incitement, and communications. Right wing terrorism is a growing and increasingly prominent threat within the EU (Europol, 2020). While the EU’s focus on right-wing extremism and terrorism lagged behind jihadist terrorism, within Europol, DG HOME, and the CTC it is finally becoming a more significant priority. While many right-wing attacks could be considered domestic terrorism, the international connections and networks of right-wing extremism are expanding rapidly (Auger, 2020). Right wing terror attacks around the world, including in the EU (such as London 2017 and Halle 2019) have encouraged and inspired other attacks through physical and online communities, communications, and events (Europol, 2018 & 2020), requiring their own counter radicalization tools and international cooperation.

It is clear from this analysis that the EU’s policies and practices in tackling terrorism from the outside-in contribute to the collective securitization of terrorism as transboundary threat requiring EU level cooperation that transcends geographic, institutional, and capability boundaries. Whether developing partnerships with third countries, working with the UN and other international organizations, inserting counterterrorism clauses into CFSP agreements, deploying CSDP missions to assist in counterterrorism overseas, or mitigating the threats arising from foreign fighters and growing right wing terrorism, EU counterterrorism cooperation over the last two decades is clear evidence of the internal-external security nexus.

Conclusion: transboundary terrorism and the EU as a security actor

It is 20 years since 9/11 and the beginning of a concerted effort to develop an EU counterterrorism policy. This article has argued that following this precipitating event and the initial collective securitization of terrorism (Kaunert & Leonard, 2019), the EU and its member states have collectively securitized terrorism in a specific way, as a transboundary security threat requiring a multidimensional EU counterterrorism policy that transcends the internal-external security divide. This has been driven from the inside-out through the externalization of internal security policies and capabilities and from the outside-in through the integration of counterterrorism into external relations, CFSP, and CSDP. The evolution of this counterterrorism approach has transcended the traditional geographic, institutional, and capability divides usually associated with internal and external security, demonstrating the internal-external security nexus facing the EU in the twenty-first century.

The counterterrorism status quo discourse and policies focusing on domestic terrorist threats to be tackled by national security actors and instruments have been superseded by a new status quo discourse and policies emphasizing the transboundary nature of the terrorist threat and need for a multidimensional EU counterterrorism approach. These developments, while often reactive and slow to be implemented, have contributed to the blurring of the internal-external security divide. Geographically, the terrorist threat is simultaneously inside and outside of the EU, requiring actions that transcend borders. Institutionally, the EU draws on institutions and agencies from across the internal-external divide, from DG HOME and the EEAS to DG DEVCO and Europol. In terms of capabilities, EU counterterrorism now uses a range of humanitarian, development, financial, legal, political, and civilian and military crisis management instruments.

Last but not least, as well as demonstrating the internal-external security nexus, the collective securitization of terrorism as a transboundary threat requiring a comprehensive and multidimensional response has raised concerns about accountability and oversight in EU security decision-making and governance and about the changing nature of the EU as a security actor. Significant concerns have been raised about the opaqueness of EU security policymaking and the lack of parliamentary oversight. The blurring of internal and external security exacerbates these as it may not always be clear how policies were developed or under which decision-making system they fall, thereby potentially avoiding greater scrutiny and accountability. Finally, and perhaps most significantly the reframing of terrorism as a transboundary threat and its contribution to the emergence of the internal-external security nexus has changed the EU as a security actor. EU security discourse, policies, and practices have been reframed to better reflect its own priorities. This has undermined the EU’s characterization as a distinctive normative security provider pursuing what Wolfer’s called milieu goals, toward one that more explicitly articulates and prioritizes its own material and strategic interests, what Wolfer’s called possession goals (Wolfers, 1962). Within EU security strategies, this is best encapsulated by the EU Global Strategy’s notion of “principled pragmatism” (EEAS, 2016c). Therefore, the perceived distinctiveness of the EU as a security actor may no longer be based on its ideational principles and normative power. Instead, the EU’s distinctiveness as a security actor is better articulated as a practical distinctiveness, through its pursuit of a comprehensive, multidimensional, and transboundary approach to counterterrorism and the wider internal-external security nexus. Realizing this practical distinctiveness would potentially transform the EU into a far more effective security actor providing significant “added value” to its member states.

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Alistair J.K. Shepherd

Alistair Shepherd is Senior Lecturer in European Security in the Departmental of International Politics, Aberystwyth University. His most recent monograph, The EU Security Continuum: Blurring Internal and External Security, was published by Routledge in 2021. He is also the co-author of Toward a European Army: a Military Power in the Making? (Lynne Rienner) and co-editor of the volume The Security Dimensions of EU Enlargement (MUP). He has published articles various journals including International Affairs, European Security, Global Society, and International Relations and is author of numerous book chapters. He is an Associate Editor of the Sage journal International Relations and is on the editorial board of the Routledge journal European Security.

Notes

1 On transboundary threats see (Boin & Rhinard, 2008).

2 On the internal-external security nexus see: (Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009).