Russia’s Nuclear Deployment, Posture and Alert Status in NEA in the Context of the Ukraine Situation

ABSTRACT

The armed conflict in Ukraine that began roughly a year ago involves nuclear powers and will therefore have long-term implications for global security, nuclear deterrence, and the strategies of many countries. Its influence on Russia, which directly and openly participates in the conflict, is obvious. Russia will have to adjust its nuclear posture and deployment in the European theater in response to changing situations and emerging challenges. At the same time, the question arises whether the situation in Ukraine will influence its nuclear posture and deployment in Asia and the potential impacts related to nuclear weapons use in the region. This paper attempts to analyze possible changes, accounting for the specifics of Northeast Asia and Russia’s role and interests in the region.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• Northeast Asia
• nuclear deterrence
• nuclear posture
• nuclear weapons use
• armed conflict in Ukraine

Introduction

In February 2022, the conflict between Russia and the collective West, which had been simmering for several years, entered an acute phase, resulting in hostilities in Ukraine. An armed confrontation unfolding there can rightfully be considered a proxy conflict (Carpenter 2022). On the one hand, waging proxy wars helps to avoid a direct military clash between major nuclear states, manage escalation, and prevent geographic expansion of armed conflict. On the other hand, even in the absence of a “horizontal” escalation of the conflict, the very fact of the involvement of nuclear powers expands the conflict beyond the boundaries of a certain region. In fact, even a conventional armed conflict involving at least one nuclear power automatically becomes global in terms of its political, economic, security, and impacts on other countries. Not to mention the psychological effects of the threat of nuclear weapons use and decisions made under the influence of these effects.

The current military confrontation is no exception. Almost a year of hostilities has already had a profound effect on the economies, military planning, and security concepts of countries around the world, prompting some of them to rethink their military doctrines and planning and buildup of nuclear and conventional forces. The conflict involving the nuclear countries could not help but affect Northeast Asia (NEA), a region where the interests of the major powers also converge.

The situation is aggravated by the information war, which, unlike military operations, is being waged openly. As a result, the specter of nuclear war has re-emerged in the global information space. Instead of dispelling this specter, officials and state media of involved countries, on the contrary, inflate threats and panic with their cold war-style statements. Global media space is filled with mutual accusations, threats, and quite justified concerns of countries that are not involved in the conflict but share one planet with nuclear powers.

The fog of the information war makes it difficult to correctly assess and predict the development of the conflict and further steps of the parties involved. At the same time, it is extremely important to consider all possible scenarios, especially when it comes to nuclear countries. The changes in nuclear posture, alert, and deployment of Russia (as well as military and nuclear planning of other participants in the conflict) are obvious and expected in terms of the European theater of operations. However, everything is not so clear with the NEA. The peculiarities of NEA itself, the specifics of Russia’s role there, and the balance of powers and the interests of other countries in the region play an important role. This article takes into account possible changes in Russia’s nuclear planning and deployment in NEA in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, taking into account these complex factors.

Even in the event of conventional armed conflict involving nuclear powers, there is always a certain risk of «vertical» escalation up to unleashing a nuclear war. The inflexibility of the great powers and their instinct for self-preservation give some hope that for the foreseeable future they will not change their tactic of waging proxy wars instead of direct clashes, and none of them will deliberately resort to using nuclear weapons. Some risks remain, however, and these risks will be considered in this article.

How Could the Conflict around Ukraine Affect Russia’s Nuclear Planning and Posture in NEA?

Although the conflict has produced an impact on nuclear planning and doctrine of the Russian Federation in the European direction, it could not but make Russia rethink its military planning in other regions, in particular, in Asia. First, Russia borders Northeast Asia through its Far Eastern region. And it can be assumed that, like any other country, its government draws experience from the conduct of conflicts in one region to use it further in modeling and predicting conflicts in other regions. The only question is to what extent the military experience gained in Europe is applicable in Northeast Asia, and whether there will ever be a situation in which this experience will be useful to Russia.

The specifics of NEA and the Asia-Pacific as a whole differ significantly from the western part of the world, as well as the balance of power and the distribution of roles there. This balance of power influences Russia’s position and posture in the region.

In the past, Asia has repeatedly become the field of proxy wars between the predecessor of Russia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the United States. Over the decades, however, the balance of power in Northeast Asia has changed drastically like in no other region in the world. A repetition of the Ukrainian scenario is impossible in this region, if only because there is a different theater of operations, other centers of power, and other states occupying dominant positions.

Russia’s nuclear deployment, posture, and/or alert status in Northeast Asia can be affected only by an imminent threat to its security and balance of power in the region. Experts indicated the following potential threats to the national security of Russia in Northeast Asian direction:

• The presence of permanently deployed military forces of the United States and their allies [navies of the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK)], having offensive weapons in a high degree of combat readiness, in territories adjacent to the Russian Federation.

• Continuous combat patrol by US Navy nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), ready to launch nuclear missiles in 15–20 min.

• Deployment in territories adjacent to Russia of anti-missile defense systems of the United States and its allies, including their naval components (increasing the number of ships of the US and Japanese navies equipped with Aegis and SM-3 anti-missiles); building of new destroyers equipped with missile defense systems by Japan, etc.)

• Japan’s territorial claims to the southern Kuril Islands.

• The fast pace of China’s naval build-up and expansion of its operational area (Korzhevsky et al. 2021, 341–347).

Although this list was compiled in 2021 before the outbreak of the conflict around Ukraine, these threats have not lost their relevance. At the same time the priorities have changed. It is logical to assume that the high pace of China’s naval build-up, due to the current conflict and the level of relations between Russia and China, has temporarily faded into the background.

To understand how these and other threats can influence Russia’s nuclear deployment and use, one should analyze Russia’s official nuclear doctrine. The Basic Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence of June 2020 – a document reflecting the most up-to-date nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation – lists the following factors that may affect Russian policy in the field of nuclear deterrence (and deployment):

• Build-ups of forces by potential adversaries, including nuclear weapons delivery systems, in territories adjacent to Russia;

• Deployment in NEA of anti-missile defense systems, cruise and ballistic missiles of medium and shorter range, or high-precision non-nuclear and hypersonic weapons; or uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons; and

• Deployment of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery on the territories of non-nuclear states (Presidential Executive Office 2020).

As we see, deployment of anti-missile defense systems is already reason enough for Russia to change its nuclear policy. Many of these factors are already present or are likely to emerge in NEA, particularly on the Korean Peninsula.

Given the latest trends, the ROK and Japan fall into the category of Russia’s potential adversary – both as allies of the United States and as “unfriendly countries” that have taken a position against Russia in the conflict around Ukraine.

Relations between Russia and Japan deteriorated significantly after the start of the conflict over Ukraine. Japan took a stand against Russia and joined the United States and European nations in sanctioning Russia. In response, Moscow has suspended talks on a peace treaty with Tokyo. Changes in relations between countries have been reflected in a new National Defense Strategy (NDS) (Japan Ministry of Defense 2022a) and National Security Strategy (NSS) (Japan Ministry of Defense 2022b) adopted by Japan in 2022. The NDS outlines the main directions of the government’s policy and provides for, among other things, launching counterattacks in the event of a missile attack from an unnamed “enemy,” and doubling Japan’s defense spending by the end of 2027. It will make the country’s military budget about 10 trillion yen (80 billion dollars) annually, the third military budget in the world after the United States and China (Gamza 2022). The NSS 2022 names Russia “the most significant and direct threat to security in the European region,” and Russia’s activities around Japan and coordination with China a “strong security concern” (Japan Ministry of Defense 2022b), a sharp contrast with the previous NSS of 2013, calling for “cooperation with Russia in all areas.” Russia’s coordination with China seems to be the main concern for Japan, while China itself – the main threat to its security – is characterized as “unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community by the NSS 2022. However, Japan’s efforts for military modernization, regardless of its main target and whether it is carried out as a part of allied obligations to the United States or independently, can serve as a reason for changing the policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence.

As for the ROK, after it took the side of the West in the Ukrainian conflict and joined the large-scale sanctions against Russia, the prospects for political dialogue and interaction between the two countries in international affairs became vague. Despite the curtailment of economic cooperation and the condemnation of Russia in ROK media, it cannot be said that relations with the ROK have worsened to the same level as in the case with Japan. On the other hand, there has never been much rapprochement between the two countries. Far more troubling are the prospects for ROK arms supplies to Ukraine. Moreover, Russia cannot help but pay attention to the buildup of the ROK’s own military potential, its military race with the DPRK, and maneuvers like the recent test of a solid-propellant space launch vehicle (Lee 2022) and Hyunmoo ballistic missiles.

Since both Japan and the ROK have always been perceived by Russia through the prism of their alliance with the main goal of Russian nuclear deterrence – the United States – a more serious threat will be posed by the readiness of these countries to cooperate with the United States in the deployment of additional components of American missile defense systems, tactical and possibly even strategic nuclear weapons. The latter may not only force Russia to reconsider its nuclear posture and policy but also significantly increase the risks of using nuclear weapons in the region.

It should be noted, however, that threats in the NEA are not perceived by Russia as sharply as, say, in Europe. It is the European direction and expansion of NATO that has for many years appeared as a threat in Russian concepts of national security (Presidential Executive Office 2021). NEA, or rather, some Asian states, pose an indirect threat, mainly due to the expansion of the US military presence and US–China rivalry there. And for a number of historical and geopolitical reasons, this threat is not acute or imminent. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia inherited a lot from its predecessor but not its positions in the NEA. In fact, Russia’s role has long been limited to playing a secondary role and supporting China. Russia’s “pivot to the East” policy, which was declared back in 2012 (Presidential Executive Office 2012) was hampered by economic, political, and bureaucratic factors and has not been implemented yet. In recent years, a pandemic and then the isolation of Russia against the backdrop of the conflict over Ukraine have been added to these negative factors. As a result, instead of diversifying its ties in Asia and strengthening its positions in the region, Russia has only increased its economic dependence on China, which has gradually been supplemented with a political one: China is one of the few countries that occupies positions ranging from neutrality to friendly support for Russia in its confrontation with the collective West. This trend will probably continue even after the end of the conflict, which means that there will be no sharp changes in Russia’s role in Northeast Asia and the balance of power there. Taking into account the fact that Russia is not an active player in NEA with regard to regional security, it will not become an initiator or main target of the future conflict there. Thus, it will take steps to change its position on nuclear deployment, posture and/or alert status in Northeast Asia only if it is required to do so through partnership commitments with China or if the Russian nuclear and conventional deterrents in the region are challenged.

At the same time, due to Russia’s geographic position and location of some of its strategic forces, it has to take into account any factor that could jeopardize its nuclear deterrence system. As a result, Russia may make changes in its nuclear planning, policy, and deployment as a reaction to certain events in the region. Thus, events such as redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, the emergence of new nuclear powers, a full-fledged conflict involving the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or preparations for a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan, may push Russia to revise its nuclear deployment and alert status. Based on the fact that, in the global dimension, the state of strategic nuclear deterrence that has persisted between the United States and Russia since the Cold War remains a threat to Russia’s military security, the priority task for Russian nuclear strategy in NEA and the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) in general is deterring the United States and its nuclear capabilities. The Chinese nuclear deterrent, despite its modernization, will not be perceived as a threat by Russia in the near future, at least officially. At the same time, Russia and the United States, although they are the main targets of nuclear deterrence for each other, cannot in the current situation perceive each other as the main adversary in Northeast Asia. Unlike China, Russia does not occupy a dominant position in the region, which means it cannot challenge the position of the United States. If a full-fledged conflict breaks out in Northeast Asia in the foreseeable future, it will be mainly a conflict between the United States and China. Russia’s role will be secondary and, with certain wisdom of leadership, neutral, allowing it to extract certain benefits from the confrontation of other major powers. Especially since China takes a similar position in the conflict between Russia and the collective West.

It should be noted that the withdrawal of the United States from Northeast Asia would also cause security problems for Russia. Although the United States is the primary target of Russia’s nuclear deterrence, the United States is also a sine qua non of the current balance of nuclear power in NEA in that the United States exercises control over the potential nuclear weapons programs of its Asian allies. If the United States fails to maintain its nuclear umbrella in NEA, more nuclear powers will almost certainly emerge in the region. If Japan, the ROK, or Taiwan develop their own nuclear weapons, Russia will be forced to revise its plans for the deployment of its own nuclear weapons as well as its deterrence goals. In recent years, even more prerequisites for the expansion of the “nuclear club” have emerged. Not the last role in this was played by global shifts, such as those caused by the current situation in Ukraine. NEA states have a vivid example before their eyes when a country that does not possess nuclear weapons (Ukraine) comes face to face with a nuclear state (Russia), while other big and/or nuclear states are trying to avoid direct confrontation or even passively observing this conflict and themselves to rhetorical rather than practical support. This could become another argument in favor of the creation by some countries of their own nuclear potential. This is especially true for countries that have a historical experience of being a bargaining chip in geopolitical games and arenas of proxy wars between major powers. For some regional powers, credible nuclear potential is becoming a synonym for security and a guarantee of the absence of hostilities on their territories. Therefore, it is not surprising that the DPRK accelerated its nuclear missile program and consolidated its nuclear status in its new nuclear doctrine (KCNA 2022). The number of people supporting the development of nuclear weapons has grown in the ROK. Surveys conducted last year have found that 71% of the ROK population favor a nuclear capability (Keck 2022). The active militarization of Japan suggests that the foundation is being laid that, in the future, will allow the development of its own nuclear weapon, despite a current “nuclear allergy” (this may be triggered by information about the ongoing development of nuclear weapons in the ROK). The DPRK’s nuclear missile program at this stage does not pose a threat to Russia and its nuclear deterrent, which cannot be said about similar programs in the ROK and Japan, once they are initiated. So far, the United States has managed to control the nuclear ambitions of its allies in the region. However, if they fail to do so further, or allow controlled proliferation, then Russia will have to reconsider its plans to deploy nuclear weapons in the region.

With all of the above in mind, the influence of the Ukraine situation on Russia’s nuclear planning and posture in NEA is rather indirect but with far-reaching consequences. One of the noticeable direct impacts of the Ukrainian crisis may be keeping Russia’s attention and forces (including nuclear) diverted to the direction of the West and pushing Russia closer to military cooperation with China and probably with the DPRK, which are both nuclear states.

At the moment, Russia has little incentive to change its nuclear posture in NEA. Comparing Russia’s Western versus Eastern security theaters, the European theater is more important for Russia than the Asian one. Although Russia has a huge nuclear weapons arsenal, sufficient for several theaters of operation, NEA is less important to Russia from a political viewpoint. Russia has not yet worked out distinct strategic interests in the NEA to be defended and advanced through its nuclear weapons posture in the region. NEA is viewed by Russia as being mostly China’s sphere of influence, and it is China, which currently bears responsibility for the balance of power in NEA, whose positions and plans could be disrupted by the scenarios of nuclear weapons use in NEA that have been previously identified. But as nuclear weapons use (or threatened nuclear weapons use) in NEA would also threaten Russia’s security, Russia would be forced to take an active role in the conflict.

Potential Impacts of the Ukraine Situation on Nuclear Weapons Use in NEA

As noted above, the priority goal of Russia’s nuclear strategy in Asia is to deter the United States. Despite current tensions, however, the likelihood of a military conflict between Russia and the United States remains extremely low. Both parties are interested in preventing such a conflict, primarily because the risk of such a conflict escalating into a nuclear war is high. Nevertheless, a number of scenarios are possible that could lead to nuclear weapons use.

The first of these would be an outbreak of a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, initiated by or with the gradual involvement of the United States.

Russia’s “Basic Principles …” provide for the use of nuclear weapons in response to an attack on Russia or its allies using nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, or in the event of aggression using conventional weapons, if “the very existence of the state is endangered.” At the same time, an updated document contains Article 4, which provides for Russia using nuclear deterrence “for prevention of an escalation of military actions and their termination on conditions that are acceptable for the Russian Federation and/or its allies” (Presidential Executive Office 2020). Indeed, a US invasion of the DPRK may not threaten the existence of Russia, but it would lead to the deployment of the US military and US nuclear weapons on the Russian border, which Russia would find an unacceptable outcome. The existence of the state is closely connected with sovereignty and territorial integrity, so it can be suggested that nuclear weapons can be used to defend a territory considered Russian from seizure by a potential adversary.

The likelihood of such a conflict is extremely low, however, despite a new round of escalation. First, despite being labeled an “enemy,” the DPRK is not a reason, but a pretext for expanding the US military presence in the region in particular and regional arms race in general. Moreover, the DPRK is well aware of this, despite its official rhetoric. The DPRK regime, as it is, meets the interests of the United States and other countries of the region, and none of the major powers are interested in changing it, as this would mean a serious disruption of the balance and status quo. The DPRK in its current form serves as both a buffer and a lightning rod. If its regime collapsed, the major nuclear powers would come face-to-face with each other, with all the ensuing consequences.

The main adversary and competitor for the United States in the region is China, not the DPRK, and a conflict between these two countries is most likely. Nuclear countries rarely, if ever, become a battlefield for major powers. It is far more likely that the role of such a field will be played by Taiwan.

If a conflict nevertheless occurs for any reason, then there are far fewer prerequisites for the use of Russian nuclear weapons than those of the United States for the reason that, unlike the Asian allies of the United States, the DPRK has its own nuclear weapons and is not subject to the guarantees of the nuclear umbrella of either Russia or China. Moreover, there is also the factor of Chinese nuclear weapons, albeit less numerous than Russian or American ones. Russia could theoretically use its nuclear weapons in the conflict on the Korean Peninsula only if DPRK leadership were unable to manage and control its own nuclear weapons. In this case, there would be an immediate threat to the territory of Russia, and it would react accordingly.

A more realistic and serious threat seems to be a conflict implying not military intervention of US troops on the territory of the DPRK but missile strikes on the nuclear facilities of the DPRK. Once launched, American intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would fly over the territories or through the airspace of Russia. Due to current tensions, these ICBMs would be regarded as a threat by Russia and, at best, would be shot down, and at worst, would provoke a retaliatory nuclear strike. There will be no time to figure out whether an ICBM detected in Russian airspace is in fact equipped with a nuclear or conventional warhead. The same would happen if the DPRK were the first to launch an ICBM attack against the United States. In this case DPRK ICBMs would fly above the territory of Russia, and the same would be the case for American ground-based interceptors (Pollack 2017). Due to the current poor state of United States-Russia cooperation and possible miscalculation, the launch of multiple interceptors from the United States may be mistaken for an attack by Russia and trigger a retaliatory strike. Among other things, Russia’s nuclear doctrine provides for the use of nuclear weapons in the case of “receiving reliable information on the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies.” (Presidential Executive Office 2020).

The second scenario is an armed conflict around Taiwan. Because NEA is considered by Russia to be China’s sphere of responsibility, Russia is unlikely to make a unilateral decision on nuclear weapon use in the region. Russia could conceivably use nuclear weapons in the event of a full-scale conflict between China and the United States, but it would do so only if China requested that kind of support from Russia, and as a last resort.

This circumstance, by the way, gives rise to optimism, as far as it is appropriate in this matter. The methods of solving the problems of international relations in Asia differ from those in Europe. Asian countries prefer dialogue to conflict and put economic cooperation in the foreground (Smirnov 2008, 28). Economic influence and interests all over the world significantly reduce the likelihood of a military conflict initiated by China, which seems to be more prone to economic and trade wars. A conflict between the United States and Russia would be more likely if Russia had the same status and influence in Northeast Asia as the USSR did in the past or China does now. In the past, the United States and the USSR clashed in many proxy wars in different regions of the world, including Asia (Vietnam War, Korean War). However, Russia is not the USSR, and China, with a different mentality and approach to warfare, has taken the place of the main rival of the United States in Asia. In addition to the mentality, there is another important factor – nuclear parity. While the United States and USSR/Russia have an approximate parity, China has a much smaller nuclear arsenal. However, it is true that the gap is shrinking (Insinna 2022) and the possibility of unleashing military conflict will increase in parallel with the growth of China’s nuclear arsenal. It should also be noted that the rhetoric of the Chinese government has undergone major changes in recent years, which resulted in Xi Jinping’s speech at the XXth congress of the Chinese Communist Party. According to observers, the mentions of «security» for the first time since 1949 exceeded “economy” (91 vs. 60) (Bloomberg 2022). This rhetoric was backed up by the rise of economic isolationism and demonstrations of force. But there is a high probability that China will limit itself to military demonstration only. Suffice it to recall the level of China’s threats during former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan (Baptista 2022) and the reduction of these threats to military demonstrations and exercises. The scenario when China, not ready for a direct conflict with the United States, would try to fight with the hands and nuclear weapons of Russia, is not an option too. Russia is an important buffer for China. If there is no buffer, China will have to face the United States one way or another. A friendly or at least neutral regime in Russia is also extremely important for China. If Russia is weakened, disintegrated, or becomes a satellite of the United States, then not only China’s ambitious plans, but also its regime, will be threatened.

The third scenario is the aggravation of territorial dispute with Japan over the Kuril Islands, accompanied by Japan’s remilitarization/nuclear weapons development/deployment and US involvement in the dispute.

The probability of this conflict at the initiative of Japan is still low, despite the provisions of the new NSS, the deterioration of bilateral relations, and sharp changes in attitude to Russia. First of all, NSS states in relation to the territorial dispute that: “… Japan’s basic policy of concluding a peace treaty through the resolution of the territorial issue remains unchanged” (Japan Ministry of Defense 2022b). Japan also has other territorial disputes in the region. Despite the rhetoric, the main threat to Japan under the current circumstances is not Russia, but China. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute between China and Japan has much more potential for conflict, especially since China passed a law authorizing its Coast Guard ships to use weapons in disputed waters (Yew 2021), and Japan allowed its Coast Guard to fire against foreign ships aiming to land on the disputed islands (Kaneko 2021).

Until now, both Russia and Japan have limited themselves to diplomatic notes on the issue of the Kuril Islands territorial dispute, without military escalations and public outcry. Naturally, incidents such as an accidental collision between the sea or air units of countries in disputed areas should not be ruled out, but the likelihood of escalating to the point where Russia’s nuclear forces need to intervene seems low. A real military conflict with Japan around territorial disputes could begin with the active participation of the United States, or as a part of bigger conflict with China, however it is also unlikely in the nearest term.

Conclusion

The Ukraine situation will mainly produce indirect impacts on Russia’s nuclear deployment, posture, and alert status in NEA. Moreover, although the situation in Ukraine accelerated shifts in security balance in NEA, these shifts initially started and are being influenced by other region-specific political, historical, and security factors. The NEA is mainly a place where the interests of the United States and China clash, and future events and possible conflicts there will largely depend on their geopolitical ambitions. In any nuclear use case or military conflict in general, the countries that have a well-defined strategy in Asia will be the initiators of conflict. As for Russia, its role in future conflicts will be determined by allied relations with China and changes in the nuclear balance in NEA as a whole. The intentional use of nuclear weapons by Russia is only possible in the case of a threat to its security and territorial integrity. The use of nuclear weapons would also be more likely if Russia had a leading position and clear strategic interests in the region. After the collapse of the USSR, Asia has been considered neither a sphere of interest nor a threat by Russia. Since there is no leading position there are no direct threats to Russia to be countered by its nuclear weapons. At the same time, unintentional nuclear weapons use by Russia may be caused by a miscalculation of the military threats from the United States, as in the case of dual-capable ICBMs flying over Russian territory. Russia has dual-capable systems as well, including missiles using “Iskander” tactical systems that are capable of reaching the territory of Japan. Such missiles can be equipped with either nuclear or conventional warheads. Their use in conventional equipment in the event of a conflict could in turn be misinterpreted by the United States and trigger an asymmetric nuclear response.

Although the situation in Ukraine does not affect Russia’s nuclear ་posture/strategy in NEA directly, indirect impacts of the situation in Ukraine on Russia’s nuclear policies in NEA cannot be ruled out. Examples of such indirect impacts include changes in nuclear weapons planning and deployment by the United States and China under the pretext or because of the Ukraine situation. If one country deploys additional offensive weapons systems to protect itself from a non-existent and overblown threat, its opponent will perceive such deployment as already a real threat. As a result, all countries involved will have their security threatened and will be forced to change their deterrence and defense strategies. Russia is no exception.

One of the far-reaching impacts of the Ukrainian crisis is that Russia is pushed to closer cooperation with China and the DPRK, including military cooperation. Despite negative attitudes of these countries (and Russia itself) on any kind of alliance, their rapprochement may in the future lead to an emerging bloc opposed to the US-Japan-ROK. Close cooperation between the three nuclear powers alone would produce a huge effect on the security architecture, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear non-proliferation regime of NEA and beyond. However, this would be a long-term prospect as well as a possible expansion of the “nuclear club.” Since all countries of the region are interested in preserving the status quo, there will be no dramatic changes in the balance of power in the region. Thus, Russia’s posture in the region in the near term will likely be limited to supporting China and reacting to the military activity of the United States. The probability of participation of Russian nuclear weapons in a conflict in the NEA, even if in the framework of partnership with China, is also extremely small, taking into account the fact that a full-fledged conflict in the region is unlikely.

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Anastasia Barannikova

Anastasia Barannikova is a research fellow at ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University (Vladivostok, Russia). She was a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in 2019, James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS), the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in 2020 and the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University in 2021. She holds a PhD in History from ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University. Barannikova is the author of more than 150 publications in scientific journals, newspapers, and blogs, including articles in Russian, English, Chinese, Korean, Mongolian, and Japanese languages. Her research interests include regional (Northeast Asia) security and nuclear non-proliferation; DPRK foreign and domestic policies, DPRK nuclear and missile program, nuclear posture, doctrine; Russia-DPRK-China cooperation.