Potential Implications of the Russia–Ukraine War for Northeast Asia

ABSTRACT

The Russia–Ukraine war has caused decision-makers worldwide to acknowledge the thinkability (plausibility) of limited nuclear war. It has probably reduced any confidence China may have about being able easily and quickly to invade Taiwan. It will stimulate the United States to spur allies in Northeast Asia to beef up their own military capabilities by developing, purchasing and deploying advanced defensive weapons effective in actual war. Having experienced dilemmas in the Russia–Ukraine war, the United States may be even more reluctant to use nuclear weapons in defense of its allies and it may become less strident in discouraging its vulnerable allies in NE Asia from having nuclear weapons. Experience from the Russia–Ukraine war also highlights the importance of broad-ranging economic warfare as part of a response to aggression. Also, it highlights the importance of having the industrial capacity and agility to support long wars demanding massive numbers of precision conventional weapons. Finally, experience with the war should make both analysts and policymakers even more skeptical about best-estimate predictions or assessments. In particular, they should not assume away scenarios that involve long military-economic wars, countervalue attacks that blatantly violate laws of war, or even the intendedly limited use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

KEYWORDS:

• Limited nuclear war
• nuclear weapons
• Russia–Ukraine war
• Northeast Asia
• Korean peninsula
• Taiwan

This commentary extends modestly the one developed earlier for the project “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia” (NU-NEA), a collaboration between the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition at Nagasaki University, Nautilus Institute and the Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. An earlier project report had identified over 25 plausible nuclear weapon “use cases” starting in Northeast Asia (Davis and Bennett 2022). On 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched its “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine. The Ukraine conflict has riveted world attention and promised to change many relationships among countries and many perceptions of warfare. The NU-NEA project team asked various scholars for thoughts about these changes. Part One of this commentary was my response as of September 2022 (Davis et al. 2016) with only minimal edits. Part Two adds further observations as of 16 January 2023.

Part One: Observations in August 2022

What implications may be drawn from the Russia–Ukraine war relevant to war and nuclear issues in Northeast Asia?

Plausibility of Nuclear Use

A recent paper laid out a taxonomy of nuclear-use cases for the Korean peninsula by considering both “logical” possibilities and possibilities arising from such psychological pressures in crisis as desperation, anger, a sense of destiny, or other non-rational considerations (Davis and Bennett 2022). The paper drew on earlier work that looked afresh for lessons from the Cold War (Davis et al. 2016; National Research Council 2014), and also on a recent study contemplating the role of nuclear weapons in deterring Russian aggression in the Baltic states (Davis et al. 2019). It seems that limited nuclear war is now all too plausible – a point made early by Paul Bracken (2000) and recently by Brad Roberts (2015). Reportedly, in-government wargames within the United States military and intelligence community before the Ukrainian war often led to the nuclear threshold and, if Putin saw his regime to be threatened, to nuclear use (Chivvis 2022).

What lessons do the war in Ukraine have for our thinking about such matters? They reinforce lessons of the work cited above. The vividness of the Ukrainian war, however, may be more effective than scholarly debate in changing minds.

Before the war, many officials, scholars and normal people were certain that limited nuclear war was an oxymoron and that those who discussed it were addled or worse. Once Ukraine’s heroic resistance to invasion began to frustrate Russian intentions, however, some of these same people began worrying about what Putin might do rather than accept failure. They recognized that he might use chemical or even nuclear weapons. They began to think about possible NATO responses: a limited nuclear use of a similar character, something a bit escalatory, or something dramatic using long-range precision conventional weapons rather than nuclear weapons. What might bring an end to the Ukraine war? On what terms? Exhibiting a discontinuous change of judgment, they were recognizing that limited nuclear war is plausible. If Putin used nuclear weapons, it would likely be with the intention of bringing about an end to conflict. Perhaps Ukraine and NATO would quickly agree to a ceasefire, with Russia having captured significant territory. Putin would realize that the West might respond – but perhaps only in some face-saving manner that would allow it to terminate hostilities thereafter. If Putin were right, there would be a limited nuclear war with a winner (perhaps Pyrrhic) and a loser.

Certainly, no one would suggest that the US President should initiate general nuclear war in response to limited Russian nuclear use. And, everyone would probably agree that all national leaders would be trying to avoid such ultimate escalation. Shouldn’t everyone therefore acknowledge that limited nuclear war might actually occur? If so, they would be catching up to what Herman Kahn and others recognized in the late 1950s when they thought about the unthinkable (Kahn 1960, 1962).

Those previously certain that no rational leader would use nuclear weapons have seldom been willing to acknowledge that a key leader might not necessarily be fully rational. Early in the conflict Mr Putin has been rumored (albeit with weak evidence) to be physically ill – perhaps with cancer, Parkinson’s, a bad back, or other ailments (Jack 2022). These illnesses and medications might affect his reasoning. Further, Putin apparently has a mystical belief in a version of history favored by extreme Russian nationalists such as Aleksandr Dugin (Burton 2022). Perhaps Mr Putin would like to re-establish as much of the Russian empire as possible as his final legacy, a transcendent goal of almost religious significance. To borrow from another aspect of the psychological literature, perhaps Putin is operating in what Prospect Theory calls the “domain of losses” (in his eyes, the tragic collapse of the USSR) and is correspondingly more willing to take risks (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; McDermott 2004).

Anyone sensible worries that a first nuclear use might well lead to general nuclear war, but the adjective “inexorably” should no longer be included. The range of nuclear-use cases discussed in an earlier work (Davis and Bennett 2022) appears even more plausible.

Defense Is Feasible for Smaller Nations

One consequence of the Ukrainian war is that China is probably less confident that it could quickly and easily defeat Taiwan. A related consequence is that Taiwan, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) can all be more optimistic about defending themselves – if they do all the things that would need to be done. The United States is certainly encouraging them to do exactly that. This includes urging Taiwan to drop purchase of more M1A2 tanks in favor of, for example, MH-60 R Seahawk helicopters, smart mines, Stinger antiaircraft missiles, cybersecurity capability and special forces (Wong and Schmitt 2022).

This line of reasoning suggests that the world is currently in a period of potential defensive dominance. Big invasions by classic mechanized forces after long marches or transit by sea are not obviously good ideas when faced with determined, well-prepared defenders. At long last, “classic” concepts of mechanized warfare from the 20^th century may have come to an end as envisioned for decades¹ To be sure, the cycle of competition between offense and defense will continue and offense may loom large again in the future, but now may be a period for defense.

Yet another insight for China may be that the economic consequences of a lengthy or failed aggression could be far greater than it has previously imagined. Although economic sanctions against an aggressive China would be even more difficult to organize than against Russia, significant world support for sanctions could be economically devastating to a China that has enjoyed rapid growth for decades. That rapid growth has helped reduce domestic dissent.

US Attention to NEA

A guiding question in the current NU-NEA project asks whether the United States is likely to pay more or less attention to Northeast Asia (NEA) as the result of the war in Ukraine. Predictions on this topic are fraught for a number of reasons.

• The full history of the Ukraine war has not yet been written. Will NATO intervention in the conflict, albeit not placing troops in combat positions in Ukraine or attacking Russians directly (at least, not as of this writing in June 2022), be perceived by the United States as having been a courageous and glorious success, a costly failure, or something else?

• US politics is notoriously volatile, and US behavior toward NEA will depend on the President and the composition of Congress after the 2024 elections.

• US behavior toward NEA will be affected by China’s behavior toward Russia in the context of Ukraine and by trends in China’s aggressiveness in NEA.

• US behavior will depend on the behaviors of both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the ROK, as well as on the willingness of NEA nations to form partnerships that help keep China in check while encouraging peaceful commerce and foreign relations.

• Whether the long-promised United States “pivot to Asia” will amount to much militarily may depend on the extent to which the Russian threat to NATO is diminished by Russia’s massive losses in Ukraine. Any such diminishment, however, will likely not be so clear-cut and irreversible as to free up additional US (or other NATO) resources for NEA. To the contrary, the war in Ukraine will leave persistent concerns about threats to NATO members in the Baltics and Eastern Europe. In any case, the pivot to Asia has always had a large component of rhetoric. Geography still matters, requiring continued US attention on Russian threats to Europe.

What May Be Predicted?

Some things are more predictable than others. The Ukrainian war has dramatized the significance of behaviors by the defended state itself. The Ukrainian military prepared for the war mentally and materially (far more than was recognized by outsiders). It has exhibited fierce determination and has fought above its weight.

The United States will begin to demand comparably determined preparations by Taiwan, the ROK and Japan. The notion of the United States protecting such states is perhaps giving way to a belief that it is plausible and appropriate for such states to largely defend themselves. The states might have support from the United States and other nations, but perhaps in the form of economic sanctions, intelligence, weapons and supplies rather than direct involvement of US military forces (except in the ROK where US forces are already deployed).

Much discussion has been stimulated by President Biden’s statements in May 2022 about US willingness to engage in defense of Taiwan. Some have claimed that his assertions contradict past policy, but both Biden and White House staff insist that US policy has not changed. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated on 26 May 2022 that “We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side; we do not support Taiwan independence; and we expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means” (Blinken 2022). Biden may be sticking with the policy of strategic ambiguity but increasing clarity on the margins to increase deterrence. This would continue a trend that has been going on for some time (Sanger 2021).

If Donald Trump or someone comparable succeeds Biden in 2025, US willingness to defend Japan, Taiwan, and the ROK will surely depend on those states greatly and visibly improving their own capabilities. Significantly, however, even if Biden is reelected or someone comparable is elected, the United States will probably demand more high-quality defensive preparations by the allies themselves.

As for nuclear weapons, the Ukrainian war has demonstrated US fear of nuclear war and suggested limits on what the United States will do for friends and allies. Although responding massively and firmly, the United States and NATO have refused to use direct military force against Russian forces or to allow its weapons to be used for attacks into Russia. This caution has been due less to Ukraine not being in NATO than to fear of nuclear escalation. If so, then US restraint might be expected in its support of more formally allied countries. For example, US military actions might be restricted to the high seas and to the air space around Taiwan. First nuclear use by the United States seems implausible except after DPRK chemical or biological use or after a disaster such as the sinking of a US aircraft carrier or destruction of its military forces in South Korea (see Table 3 in [Davis and Bennett 2022]).

US Nuclear Posture and Policy for NEA

Another question posed by the NU-NEA project was “Is the United States likely to change the deployment or status of nuclear or non-nuclear weapons systems in NEA as a result of the war in Ukraine, including around Russian territory in NEA?”

It is not evident that the war in Ukraine will affect such decisions, but what might change is attitudes of top US policymakers regarding independent nuclear capabilities in Japan, Taiwan and the ROK. Nonproliferation has been a dominant objective of US Presidents for decades, but that may no longer be the case. High officials will have to re-confront questions such as:

Would Russia have invaded Ukraine if Ukraine still had nuclear weapons?

Would the DPRK be willing to invade the ROK if the ROK had nuclear weapons?

Would China invade Taiwan if Taiwan had nuclear weapons?

Would the United States truly be willing to trade Los Angeles for Pyongyang in a nuclear exchange?

Arguably, Japan, Taiwan and the ROK could all achieve high levels of deterrence against nuclear-armed adversaries without developing their own nuclear weapons. One lesson from the war in Ukraine, however, is that deterrence can fail because nations greatly overestimate their ability to invade quickly and easily. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 both come to mind. Would it not be wise for a vulnerable nation to have an independent nuclear deterrent? Would this not be especially wise if developing a truly good conventional deterrent (deterrence by denial) were difficult because of economic and social costs, public apathy, and politics? If a US President learned that one of its allies was developing such a deterrent hedge, would it not be far more likely than a decade ago that the action would be “tolerated” or even countenanced? The fervent goal of non-proliferation is still important consideration, but no longer overwhelming.

Suggestions

Some suggestions for statesmen and scholars follow from this train of reasoning:

• Acknowledge the plausibility of war, the importance of nuclear weapons and the potential usability of nuclear weapons for some purposes in war.

• Acknowledge the very questionable credibility of extended nuclear deterrence when the potential aggressor has nuclear weapons that can strike the United States.

• Embrace the opportunities for advanced allies to achieve conventional deterrence of invasion by denial with precision weapons and intelligence.

• Urge allied investments in effective self-defense that exploits this modern technology. Reallocate investments accordingly, shifting to investments with the most defensive leverage.

• Urge that such investments be as manifestly defensive as possible, so that it is difficult for China to see them as a security threat² Publicize, exercise and discuss the defensive nature of preparations at every opportunity.

• Simultaneously, negotiate to establish rules of the road and better mutual understanding of realities, actions and signals. Indeed, if the vulnerable states more actively prepare for stalwart self-defense and perhaps for independent nuclear deterrents, prospects for regional arms control might improve.

Notes Added, 22 October 2022

Developments since the above material was written have included Ukrainian success using advanced weapons such as HIMARS, massive attrition of Russian forces during the war, Putin’s doubling down with extensive attacks against infrastructure and civilian populations, fake elections in and formal annexation of territories in Ukraine occupied by Russia, Ukrainian success in recovering some territory, Russian use of Iranian drones, and US plans to deploy air defenses against them. Putin has repeatedly hinted at possible use of nuclear weapons “if Russia is attacked”, while coming to treat the Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine as part of Russia. As winter has arrived in Ukraine, Russia has taken down a substantial portion of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Simultaneously, however, Russia’s troops are under increased pressure and may need to conduct more strategic retreats. Fresh Russian troops will become available due to the mobilization ordered by Russia starting in September 2022, but they will be of uncertain quality. Ukrainian determination remains high. The future of the war, then, remains uncertain.

Part Two: Further Observations, January 2023

Most of my initial observations (Part One) have held up in the months since they were first written, but I would make some amendments and offer some additional observations that loom large.

Amendments

Although the Russia–Ukraine war has demonstrated the feasibility of conventional defense with modern weapons, wars against the Republic of Korea (ROK) or Taiwan would be importantly different from war over Ukraine. Michael Spirtas (2022) has noted some of the special challenges for Taiwan. Defense issues for the ROK have been discussed by Bruce Bennett and co-authors (Bennett et al. 2021), as well as several authors in a recent special issue of nuclear-use potential in East Asia (Lee 2022; von Hippel et al. 2022; Lisowski 2022). A good possibility also exists that any aggression in Northeast Asia would involve different strategies than those on which most planning focuses. For example, instead of an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, China, might use techniques of blockade, siege, bombardment and economic warfare. In attacking the ROK, the DPRK might well avoid a direct conventional conflict that it would almost surely lose (Davis and Bennett 2022). Another lesson from the war in Ukraine is that modern war may include massive use of long-range conventional missiles, drones, sophisticated information and surveillance systems, cyberwar and multinational economic warfare. Thus, vulnerable states need to plan for diverse types of war.

Broader Observations

The Folly of Expert Prediction

The literature on strategic surprise (see, e.g. [Bracken, Bremer, and Gordon 2008]) is always humbling to consult, but then easy to forget because it is so uncomfortable to accept the reality that strategic surprise in international affairs is frequent rather than rare. As of 2010, Russia was largely out of mind for US and NATO defense planners, but in the course of the next decade Russia invested greatly in its military forces and practiced aggression against Crimea in 2014 and Georgia in 2018, as well as playing an active role in Syria. Then, of course, Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. That it actually invaded, rather than merely continuing to threaten and coerce, surprised many experts (although US intelligence saw it coming and President Biden issued strong warnings). Subsequently, the extent of Ukrainian resistance and the bungling of Russia’s military came as huge surprises across the board. So also, most were surprised at the unified support offered to Ukraine by NATO countries. The lesson here should be to be very skeptical about predictions. That applies both to predictions of doom (e.g. predictions of inevitable war) and predictions of a more complacent nature. It also applies to those who imagine that they understand the reasoning of adversary leaders. Before the Ukraine war, many experts believed that Putin was rational and pragmatic, although aggressive and unscrupulous (Pillalamarri 2015). After the war began, more credence was finally given to those convinced that Putin has long bought into a semi-mystical view of Russia that seeks to restore empire and that sees NATO and the West as fundamentally hostile (Ranzy and Troloanovski 2022; Hill and Stent 2022). What does this suggest for best-estimate thinking about East Asia and about China’s future actions in particular? My own view is that the lesson should be to acknowledge and assimilate deep uncertainty: neither predictions of doom, rosy predictions, or complacent faith in being able to muddle along should be accepted with confidence. Strategy and policy should address the range of the plausible and be well hedged. Admittedly, this reflects views that I have championed for decades with concepts such as capabilities-based planning rather than planning focused on comfortable committee-determined scenarios (Davis 2002, 2003).

The Folly of Focusing on Current Intent

In a similar vein, it would seem wise for policymakers to hedge any strategies based on the current perceived peaceful intent of nations – at least when changes of intent are plausible. In the 1990s, Russia had no evident hostile intent toward its neighbors. Even in 2000, its then-new leader Vladimir Putin said

“Russia is part of European culture. And I cannot imagine my own country in isolation from Europe and what we often call the civilized world. So it is hard for me to visualize NATO as an enemy” (Rankin 2021).

How different Putin’s intent seemed to be a few years later when he wrote about the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians and the necessity of Ukraine being sovereign only in partnership with Russia (Hill and Stent 2022).

Looking to Asia, in an earlier period, China’s leaders were concerned primarily with economic and social growth rather than aggression against Taiwan or forcibly controlling the South China Sea. But China’s intentions and policies (or at least its visible priorities) have changed under Xi Jinping.

It should hardly be surprising that national intentions change. Americans should remember that the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was arguably a blatant violation of the UN Charter that the United States largely wrote (Tyler 2004; Murphy 2004). So also, they should remember Donald Trump’s hostility to American alliance obligations with both NATO and its Northeast Asian allies.

The fluidity over time of national intentions is an uncomfortable restraint on what can be accomplished with international agreements, including nuclear arms control. Safeguards and hedges against slippage or reversals are essential. Arms control may probe possible again, but it should be shaped with this admonition in mind.

The Folly of Focusing on Short Wars

Russia’s war with Ukraine should has demonstrated the folly of security planning that focuses unduly on short violent wars fought on a classic air-land-sea battlefield according to rules imagined beforehand. The war has turned out to be a long, bloody exercise in attrition – much of it conducted with artillery or long-range missile strikes. Further, Russia has conducted massive “countervalue” attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure as well as allowing widespread rape and pillage among other war crimes (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSDE) (Helsinki Commission) 2022). Is there any reason to believe that the DPRK or China would be more scrupulous in war? More generally, real war is often much uglier than that played out in peacetime wargame and models. So also, the Russia–Ukraine war is an inaccurate label for what has become in part a global economic conflict with NATO and other countries sanctioning Russia in remarkably strong and unified ways (although effects remain less than dramatic so far), while Russia has responded by forming new international bonds.

Final Comments

For those involved with national security planning, all of these considerations suggest preparing for bad turns of events and even war – not because war is inevitable or desirable, but because it is prudent to prepare. Armies, moreover, should be prepared to fight if deterrence fails. To be sure, there is the problem that vigorous “defensive actions” may be seen as aggressive by the potential adversary – a security dilemma that can increase the perception of inevitable conflict. That dilemma must be dealt with. Interestingly, in the realm of nuclear planning, a spectrum of opinions exists from those who suggest that vulnerable nations such as Taiwan and the Republic of Korea should have their own nuclear deterrents to those who believe in the abolition of all nuclear weapons, as noted elsewhere by Van Jackson (2022). The war in Ukraine has not resolved the issues underlying such disagreements. However, in my view, it has gone far to falsify the notion that nuclear use is unthinkable or the notion that vulnerable countries can confidently depend on US extended deterrence. No US consensus exists on nuclear matters (even within the current administration), including nuclear-related policies for Northeast Asia.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Peter Hayes and David von Hippel for having stimulated this work and commenting on earlier drafts, as well as having commissioned a sizable number of very thoughtful related papers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Paul K. Davis

Paul K. Davis is a professor of policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and a retired Senior Principal Researcher at RAND. After earning a B.S. in chemistry from the University of Michigan and a Ph.D. in chemical physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he did research on strategic warning technology and practiced systems analysis at the Institute for Defense Analyses before joining the US government to contribute to strategic force planning and strategic arms control. Later, as a Senior Executive, he led analysis of global military strategy and related defense programs in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation. He then joined the RAND Corporation, where his research has dealt with strategic planning under deep uncertainty; deterrence theory; modeling; information fusion; and causal social science for policy applications. He has served on numerous national panels and journal editorial boards. His professional web page is https://www.rand.org/about/people/d/davis_paul.html.

Notes

¹ Some late-1990s studies sought ways to make invasions by a Soviet-style mechanized army obsolete (Defense Science Board 1996; Defense Science Board 1998). These and other studies of the period (Davis, Gompert, and Kugler 1996; Davis et al. 1998) urged “transformation” of US military forces. Andrew Marshall’s Office of Net Assessment saw the potential for a new revolution in military affairs (McKitrick and Angevine 2022). The US Joint Staff issued a visionary document (Joint Staff 1996) that was endorsed by the Secretary of Defense (Cohen 1997)..

² This may seem hopeless because nations often interpret defensive actions as threatening. It is notable, however, that – late in the Cold War – Soviet leadership came to recognize that its military posture was understandably perceived by NATO as aggressively offensive and threatening, and that NATO did not pose a credible offensive threat to the Soviet Union (Garthoff 1992, 1994). This shift probably contributed to Gorbachev’s unilateral decision to pull many forces back from Eastern Europe. Of interest to readers outside governments, the shift was probably influenced by the many informal non-governmental meetings held between Western and Soviet scholars in which the military balance was discussed candidly, sometimes at the political-military level and sometimes with discussion of nitty-gritty military analysis and even military modeling (Huber 1990)..