Abstract
The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa have had close cultural exchanges since ancient times, with linguistic, cultural and religious ties laying a solid foundation for the development of strategic cooperation between the two sides. After the Arab Spring, the Gulf countries have maintained their political stability and increased their strength. The war in Yemen pushed the geopolitical frontline of the Gulf countries to the opposite side of the Horn of Africa. The Gulf states, with their considerable financial resources, have increased their presence in the Horn of Africa through aid and investment. They are also actively involved in Horn of Africa politics, using their economic leverage to mediate conflicts and expand their political influence. They use the Horn of Africa as an extended battleground for geopolitical competition between them. However, the lack of strength of the Gulf states, the low return on investment, the reconciliation between the Gulf states, and the return of major powers to the Horn of Africa have reduced the momentum of their involvement in the Horn of Africa, prompting them to re-examine their Horn of Africa policies and to be more pragmatic in their political engagement and economic cooperation with the Horn of Africa countries.
1. Introduction
The Horn of Africa is the area located in the eastern Red Sea that extends outwards in a horn-like pattern from the Gulf of Aden. The Horn of Africa in a narrow sense includes the four countries of Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia. In a broader sense, the Horn of Africa also includes the neighbouring East African countries of Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda, covering a total area of approximately 4.3 million km2, and with a total population of approximately 190 million.Footnote1 Since the fifteenth century, Western countries have been competing strategically for the Horn of Africa. The United States, France and other Western countries have established military bases in the Horn of Africa at an early stage. In recent years, more than a dozen countries have established military bases in Djibouti and other countries with the aim of carrying out tasks such as combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden, escorting merchant ships and gaining a foothold in this strategically important region.
Since the Arab Spring, relations between the Gulf StatesFootnote2 in the Horn of Africa have been on the rise, mainly because of the Gulf States’ deepening involvement in the political, security and economic and trade spheres of the Horn of Africa countries, with the region increasingly becoming a strategic deep zone for the Gulf States.
The Gulf States began to attach importance to the Horn of Africa because of their geographical proximity, historical and cultural ties, as well as geopolitical considerations and economic interests. After the end of the Cold War, the military presence and economic investments of the major powers in the Horn of Africa were reduced, leaving a strategic gap for the Gulf States. After the Arab Spring, the Gulf states maintained their political stability and increased their relative strength. The war in Yemen led the Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to push their geopolitical frontiers across the Horn of Africa, making the Red Sea Rim their new geopolitical space. The Gulf states have invested significantly in the Horn of Africa, establishing military bases, military ports and other facilities in the region, and have sought to reshape the political landscape by intervening in internal conflicts in the Horn of Africa or by mediating between countries in the region to expand their political influence. The Gulf states have also used the Horn of Africa as a geopolitical battleground, where the geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East and the Gulf region are projected onto the region, and where the Gulf states compete with each other to marginalise each other’s power. On the economic front, the Gulf countries have seen a rapid increase in investment in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region, taking into account the region’s prime geographical position, rich natural resources and huge consumer market, in areas such as roads, ports, minerals and agriculture and industry.
However, after more than a decade of operation, the Gulf States have not reaped significant rewards from their political and economic expansion in the Horn of Africa. Political interventions, military outreach and infrastructure investments have not yielded the expected results. Factors such as the new pneumonia epidemic, political changes in the Horn of Africa countries, the easing of geopolitical competition in the Gulf and the political settlement of the Yemeni issue have limited the effectiveness of the Gulf countries’ involvement in the Horn of Africa. After the setbacks, the momentum of the Gulf countries’ involvement in the Horn of Africa has waned. The involvement of the Gulf states in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea Rim has had a significant impact on the politics and economy of the region and has reshaped the relationship between the two sides. This paper reviews the political engagement, investment and aid activities of the Gulf states in the Horn of Africa in recent years in the light of their historical and cultural ties with the region, assesses the effectiveness of these actions and looks at the future of relations between the two sides.
2. Historical and cultural connections between the Gulf States and the Horn of Africa
There are natural links between the Gulf States and the Horn of Africa. Geographically, the two sides are neighbours across the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Straits of Bab al-Mandeb, giving them a shared geopolitical space that integrates them into the Red Sea Rim. In human terms, there have been several waves of two-way migration between the two sides throughout history. The ancient inhabitants of Oman and Yemen in the south of the Arabian Peninsula were skilled in shipbuilding and sailing, and the Horn of Africa became one of their preferred destinations. The frequent exchanges of merchant ships and traders between the two sides had a profound impact on each other’s cultures.
The ‘habashi’ (inhabitants of the Horn of Africa and East Africa) were early immigrants to the pre-Islamic prehistoric Arabian Peninsula, located in the commercial centres of that time, such as Mecca. The earliest traces of Arab culture in the Horn of Africa date back to the early seventh century of pre-Islamic history.Footnote3
Islam is the most important link between the two sides. Bilal ibn Rabah (Bilal Habashi), the first mu’azzin (prayer caller) in the history of Islam, was a Habashi. The Horn of Africa was one of the first regions where Islam was introduced, and Muslims migrated from Mecca to the Horn of Africa from the early days of Islam to escape persecution. Arab traders came to the Horn of Africa via the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb and other shipping routes, and Islam was introduced to the region. The majority of the region’s population later converted to Islam, which is now practised almost universally in most countries in the region, with Muslims making up about 45% of Ethiopia’s population. Large numbers of Muslims make the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and many Habash Muslims have migrated to Yemen, Oman and other areas of the southern Arabian Peninsula, where their main occupation is to provide escorts for merchant ships travelling between the two sides.
There were close political and military ties between the Habash and the Arabs, and the Habash allied themselves with the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula and took part in local tribal conquests. When conflict broke out between the Hashemite and Umayyad clans of the Mecca Quraysh, both sides came to the Habash king and asked the latter for arbitration. When the Portuguese invaded Somalia, the chief of Mogadishu also approached the King of Oman for help, who sent reinforcements and repelled the Portuguese army. It is thus clear that the Sultanate of Oman, with its strong maritime presence at the time, brought parts of East Africa and the Horn of Africa under its sphere of influence and facilitated exchanges between the two sides.Footnote4
In terms of language, Arabic was widely spoken in the Horn of Africa and is still the official language of the Horn of Africa countries such as Somalia, Djibouti and Sudan. Amharic belongs to the same Semitic family as Arabic, which has had a strong influence on Swahili, one of the main languages of East Africa, which has a large Arabic vocabulary.
Given the deep historical and cultural ties between the Gulf and the Horn of Africa, Kenyan Arab scholar Ali Mazure argues that ‘the Gulf and the Horn of Africa should be integrated into a region called ‘Afrabia’.’Footnote5
3. Gulf States’ involvement in political and security affairs in the Horn of Africa
Driven by national interests and strategic diplomatic objectives, the geopolitical rivalry between the Gulf states and with Iran and Turkey extends to the Horn of Africa, a region that has come to be seen as an important link in the security system of the Middle East, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. 2011 has seen a shift in the political and security system in the Middle East. The shift of the centre of power in the Arab world from Egypt, Syria and Iraq to the Gulf has fuelled the geopolitical ambitions of the Gulf states, giving rise to geopolitical claims on the neighbouring Horn of Africa. By establishing military bases and mediating regional conflicts, they sought to strengthen their own military presence in the region in order to gain a strategic pivot and expand their military and geopolitical influence. The Gulf states have extended the battlefield of competition between themselves to the Horn of Africa and are competing with Middle Eastern states such as Iran and Turkey.
3.1. Counterbalancing the Iranian threat
After the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Iran’s power in the Middle East increased and it sought to expand its influence in the Middle East and beyond by supporting the Houthis in Yemen, imposing restrictions on shipping in the Red Sea and strengthening its military presence in the Horn of Africa, thus increasing the insecurity of the Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia. Iran signed a military agreement with Sudan and established a strategic partnership, committing itself to supplying Sudan with arms and equipment. As of 2007, Iran became Sudan’s main arms supplier.Footnote6 Iran has also established partnerships with other countries in the Horn of Africa. In 2008, Iran reached an agreement with Eritrea to station its navy at the Eritrean port of Assab and deploy militarily in the Red Sea region, and use the port for anti-piracy operations off Somalia under the pretext of protecting Iranian merchant ships.Footnote7
In 2015, Saudi Arabia joined with the UAE and other countries to intervene militarily in the civil war of Yemen to curb the expansion of Houthi and Iranian power, making Yemen a battleground for its proxy war with Iran. In January 2016, after Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic ties with Iran, Djibouti and Somalia also announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Iran. In exchange for Saudi and UAE aid, Sudan sent troops to the war in Yemen and announced that it had cut diplomatic ties with Iran. In April 2019, Mohammed Daglo, the commander of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), was appointed deputy chairman of the Transitional Military Council after Bashir stepped down. In 2017, Saudi Arabia signed a military and defence agreement with Djibouti to establish a military base in the country, and in September 2018, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a historic Saudi-brokered peace agreement, known as The Jeddah Peace Pact, ending a long-standing conflict. Peace Pact), ending a decades-long conflict and normalising relations between the two countries. In December 2018, Saudi Arabia hosted the first meeting of foreign ministers of the countries bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, which decided to establish a joint cooperation mechanism to maintain security and stability in the region. In early 2020, the second meeting of foreign ministers of the countries bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden was held in Riyadh, which decided to establish the Council of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.Footnote8 The Council, whose members include eight countries-Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Jordan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia-aims to enhance the region’s capacity to deal with dangers and challenges and to maintain security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden waters.
3.2. Reconfiguring the Red Sea geopolitical patterns
Unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE’s strategic objective is to expand its influence and enhance its position of power, rather than to contain Iran. The UAE extends its geopolitical interests to the ‘Horn of Africa’. Over the past decade, the UAE has expanded its military network abroad and increased its geopolitical influence by establishing military bases and joint military training with a number of countries in the ‘Horn of Africa’. The UAE established an airbase in the Eritrean port of Assab, which was the first permanent military base and overseas supply depot built by the UAE abroad. Since then, the UAE has established military bases in Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti, no longer relying on Saudi naval bases. The expansion of the UAE’s presence in East Africa and the Red Sea is a key objective of the UAE’s foreign strategy. The UAE has acquired the rights to operate important ports in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea coast, such as Mukalla, Aden, Moqa, Berbera and Assab, and has used some of these ports for military purposes. The UAE seeks to gain control of the sea from the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea, using Aden, Hodeidah, the Socotra Islands and the ‘Horn of Africa’ in Yemen as strategic pivot points, creating a strategic chain linking the Red Sea coast and the Arabian Peninsula, controlling the resources and important ports in the region, dominating the maritime transport routes in the Western Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, and creating a mini ‘maritime’ in the region. This will help the UAE to establish a mini ‘maritime empire’ in the region, increase its influence on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea and the East African coast, and help the UAE to seek hegemony in the region, excluding strategic rivals such as Iran, Turkey and Qatar.
The UAE has gained de facto control of the Yemeni island of Socotra by supporting the separatist movement in the south of Yemen. The island is a key location in the UAE’s overseas port chain programme and is important for its maritime security and maritime power building. Control of Socotra will help the UAE expand its geopolitical influence in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, open up new shipping routes to avoid the Strait of Hormuz and the Iranian threat, and create a maritime corridor and island chain linking the ‘Horn of Africa’ with the island as a hub. The UAE has also recruited a large number of troops on Socotra to provide troops for overseas military operations. According to Yemeni scholar Ali al-dhahab, Socotra could become the UAE’s ‘Diego Garcia’, providing an integrated service for UAE military bases abroad.Footnote9 By intervening in the Yemeni civil war, the UAE is building a military base and increasing its military capabilities in order to preserve and extend geopolitical gains and reconfigure the regional landscape in its favour.
The UAE is also involved in mediating the conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan. In November 2020, Sudan began to expand its control over the Fashaka area on the border between the two countries, which has led to increased tension between the two countries. In addition, the construction and operation of the Renaissance Dam project has led to ongoing conflict between the two countries, and a military build-up on the border in 2021 has led to near armed confrontation. Ethiopia has rejected Sudan’s and Egypt’s demand to stop the reservoir’s storage and operation, arguing that it has the right to build the necessary water projects without having to comply with the colonial-era agreement on the distribution of Nile water. In July 2021, Ethiopia completed the second year of storage of water in the dam’s reservoir, and Sudan and Egypt fear that the water supply from the Nile will be threatened. Ethiopia, the controversial issue of the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam poses a threat to the stability of the region. In response, international and regional organisations such as the United Nations, the African Union and the Arab League have all intervened to mediate, but with little success. The main reason for this is that Ethiopia accuses the Arab League of favouring Egypt and Sudan. Ahmed Gheit, the Secretary General of the Arab League, has clearly expressed his support for the position of Egypt and Sudan in the disputeFootnote10 and the other GCC members, with the exception of the UAE, have also expressed their support for Sudan and Egypt. As a country with highly relevant interests in the region, the UAE has taken a neutral stance on the issue in order to maintain its mediation capacity in the Horn of Africa.
3.3. Geopolitical competition
The geostrategic rivalry between the UAE and Qatar has also spilled over into the Horn of Africa. On the one hand, the UAE seeks to contain political Islam on a global scale. On the other hand, it seeks to suppress its regional rivals, expand its regional power.
First, Qatar and Turkey act in concert in the Horn of Africa. Since 2011, Qatar has aligned itself with Turkey as an important supporter of political Islam and has provided political asylum to members of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Egypt, Libya and other countries. In 2017, the UAE joined forces with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other countries to impose a blockade and sanctions on Qatar, which further consolidated and strengthened Qatar’s relationship with Turkey and to coordinate positions and form strategic alliances in the Horn of Africa. In Somalia, the UAE supports independence-leaning local governments in Somaliland, Puntland and the Federal State of Jubaland, while Qatar and Turkey support the central Somali government in Mogadishu.
In September 2008, with the support of the League of Arab States and the African Union, Qatar began to mediate between the Sudanese government and rebel factions in the Darfur region. In March 2011, Qatar successfully facilitated a peace agreement between Djibouti and Eritrea to resolve the border dispute between the two countries, and in May 2021, the two sides announced the resumption of diplomatic relations after Qatar’s efforts to end the dispute between Kenya and Somalia.
Thirdly, the UAE competes with Qatar in the Horn of Africa. Qatar’s economic development model is similar to that of the UAE and provides strong competition to the UAE in areas such as aviation and shipping. The UAE sees the Horn of Africa as an important strategic space for the projection of its influence, crowding out Qatar’s presence in the region. The Qatar cut-off has weakened its influence in the Horn of Africa. In the aftermath of the crisis, several Horn of Africa countries announced they were cutting diplomatic ties with Qatar, and Djibouti downgraded its diplomatic ties with Qatar, which then withdrew 450 peacekeepers from the region.Footnote11
In January 2021, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other countries normalised relations with Qatar and reopen all land, sea and air ports to Qatar, ending a comprehensive blockade of more than 3 years. The Gulf states begin to de-escalate relations with Iran and Turkey. In March 2023, China hosted Saudi-Iranian dialogue in Beijing, achieving a historic rapprochement and the restoration of diplomatic relations. The resumption of Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relations provides an important model for a Middle East conflict settlement and helps ease regional tensions, thereby reduced significantly the geostrategic competition between the Gulf states in the Horn of Africa. The Saudi-Iranian rapprochement boosted the Yemeni peace negotiation process. On 14 April of the same year, the Yemeni government and the Houthis began a large-scale prisoner exchange operation that will see the release of more than 880 prisoners of war.Footnote12 The advancement of the Yemeni peace process has reduced the need for the Gulf states to establish a military presence in the Horn of Africa. The UAE is also gradually reducing its presence in Eritrea. The UAE has converted its military base in Berbera, Somaliland, into a port and airport, and its port development in Boosaaso, Puntland, has been put on hold. Qatar’s development of the Somali port of Hobyo in Galmudug with Turkey has also not yielded substantial results. The UAE and Qatar have also taken a wait-and-see approach to the dispute over Somalia’s 2021 presidential elections, and neither country has intervened in the political crisis in Somalia. In May of the same year, Qatar began to engage with Somaliland and Somali opposition leaders. Qatar and Turkey are interested in easing relations with the UAE and other countries, and the rapprochement between the Gulf states has reduced the intensity of their competition in the Horn of Africa.
The involvement of the Gulf States in political and security affairs in the Horn of Africa has a greater impact on the region.
First, the mediation efforts of the Gulf States have contributed to the improvement of relations among the countries in the region, contributing to peace and stability in the region. Political support and economic assistance from the Gulf States to countries such as Eritrea have helped them to stabilise their regimes, repair their military facilities and improve people’s livelihood, thereby reduced factors of instability.
Secondly, the geostrategic rivalry of the Gulf states in the Horn of Africa has exacerbated the internal conflicts of the countries in the region. The Gulf states’ involvement in the internal factional struggles of some of these countries has exacerbated their internal divisions and weakened their national governance capacity. For example, the UAE’s support and assistance to the Sudanese Rapid Support Force and the Somali political opposition has exacerbated the political divide between these two countries, eventually leading to armed conflict between the two Sudanese armies and a political crisis in Somalia. The geopolitical rivalries arising from the internal contradictions of the Gulf states, who see each other as the main threat to the security and stability of the Red Sea region, are themselves the most serious security risk in the region.Footnote13
Finally, the Gulf states have forced the Horn of Africa countries to choose sides due to competition between them. In order to gain political and economic support from Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, some countries have been forced to join the anti-political Islam bloc and reduce or cut off diplomatic relations with Qatar or Iran. In this way, the conflicts between the Gulf states spill over into the Horn of Africa, forcing the countries of the region to become involved, breaking the original regional pattern and undermining the security interests of the countries of the Horn of Africa, to the detriment of the Horn of Africa’s autonomy in building a political and security structure in line with its own national interests.
4. Economic and trade relations between the Gulf States and the Horn of Africa
The Gulf countries have a long history of economic and trade relations with the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa is located in northeastern Africa, bordering the Indian Ocean, separated from the Arabian Peninsula by the sea, and is the gateway to eastern and central Africa for the Gulf states, which are choked by the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. Since the 1970s, with their rich oil revenues, the Gulf states have provided assistance to the Horn of Africa countries, but at that time there was less engagement between the Gulf states and the Horn of Africa countries.Footnote14 After the outbreak of the war in Yemen in 2015, in order to expand after the outbreak of the war in Yemen, in order to expand their regional influence, the Gulf states increased their military investment in the Horn of Africa and became involved in its political affairs, and economic and trade relations between them became closer. The economic cooperation between the Gulf countries and the Horn of Africa covers a wide range of areas, including humanitarian aid, trade and investment, infrastructure development, and industrial and agricultural cooperation.
4.1. Bilateral trade
Agriculture and livestock are important areas of trade cooperation between the countries of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf States. For example, livestock is the mainstay of the Somali economy, accounting for 40% of the gross domestic product (GDP), and Saudi Arabia and the UAE account for 80% of Somalia’s livestock export market.Footnote15 In addition, the Horn of Africa countries export tropical fruits, timber, flour, feed and textiles to the Gulf countries. In recent years, geopolitics has played an important factor in the trade between the Gulf States and the Horn of Africa countries. Djibouti and Sudan are the pivot points for the Gulf countries to maintain their presence in the Horn of Africa, hence the high bilateral trade, while Oman has limited influence in the Horn of Africa and therefore has less trade with Eritrea.Footnote16 Saudi Arabia is Sudan’s seventh largest trading partner, with trade with Sudan at $5.2 billion in 2017, Kuwait with Sudan at $4 billion, Qatar with Sudan at $3.8 billion and the UAE with Sudan at $2.6 billion.Footnote17
Djibouti has close trade ties with the Gulf countries. In 2017, Saudi Arabia traded with Djibouti for $3.2 billion and the UAE with Djibouti for $542 million. The UAE has been the largest source of investment in Djibouti for many years. With the exception of Djibouti and Sudan, the Gulf countries have smaller trade volumes with other Horn of Africa countries. Ethiopia is the largest economy in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia is Ethiopia’s largest trading partner in the Middle East and the second largest source of investment in Ethiopia. The UAE is Ethiopia’s second largest trading partner in the Middle East.
4.2. Humanitarian assistance
In 2012, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) reported that the region was facing a serious food crisis due to drought and that some 12 million people were in need of food aid in areas such as Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti.Footnote18 Since 1976, Saudi Arabia has provided a total of 79 million riyals in humanitarian aid to the Horn of Africa countries, supporting humanitarian organisations to carry out aid projects in Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti.Footnote19 Saudi Arabia provides 155 SAR million annually to Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea through the aid agencies of the League of Arab States, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Islamic World Union and other international Islamic organisations.
The UAE is an important donor to the Horn of Africa. Aid agencies such as the UAE Red Crescent, the Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Charity and the Sharjah Charity Foundation have built refugee camps in the Horn of Africa and worked with refugee relief agencies in Ethiopia and Kenya. Since 2011, the UAE has positioned itself as a key player in international humanitarian aid initiatives. The principles of the UAE’s foreign aid policy are, firstly, the opening of the investment market by the recipient country to the donor country. Open markets are an explicit objective of UAE humanitarian aid in order to exclude other Gulf countries in terms of market access, market dominance and partnership building, and the acceptance by recipient countries of the UAE’s anti-political Islamic ideology. Since the Arab Spring, the UAE has provided large-scale aid to countries in the Horn of Africa with the aim of developing their economies, stabilising the political situation and preventing a greater humanitarian crisis in the region.Footnote20
Qatar’s foreign aid is predominantly official. Since 2010, Qatari aid to the Horn of Africa countries has reached $210 million.Footnote21 In 2015, the Qatari Red Crescent Society signed a memorandum of understanding with the Somali Red Crescent Society, committing to create jobs for Somali youth, improve vocational skills training and address issues such as the shortage of medical resources and lack of drinking water. 2010-Eritrea and Djibouti ranked 8th and 10th among the top 10 countries for Qatar’s development assistance in 2012. Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD) data shows that Sudan and Somalia are the largest recipients among sub-Saharan African countries in 2017–2019. In 2016, eight of QFFD’s 15 projects in sub-Saharan Africa were in Sudan’s Darfur region.Footnote22 2017 ‘diplomatic break crisis’ In the wake of the ‘diplomatic crisis’, Qatar stepped up its competition with the UAE and Saudi Arabia in the Horn of Africa region. It signed an aid agreement (QC4HCR) with UNHCR to expand coordination and cooperation on aid humanitarian assistance and to raise funds for the Horn of Africa countries through UN agencies.
4.3. Infrastructure development
The Horn of Africa has a long history of political and social instability and weak infrastructure. The Gulf countries are involved in the construction of schools, hospitals, government buildings, transport, ports, power stations, dams and other infrastructure for agricultural development in the Horn of Africa for humanitarian reasons (see ). For example, Saudi Arabia is involved in the Upper Atbara and Setit Dams Projects, the Merowe Dam in Sudan, the Port of Djibouti, the expansion of the Djibouti International Airport, etc. In 2019, Saudi Arabia provided a loan of $140 million to Ethiopia for the development of Roads, energy infrastructure and health projects in the country. Kuwait’s assistance to water irrigation and rural water harvesting projects in Sudan. Qatar is involved in the development of projects such as the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development in Somalia, the Mogadishu Municipality building and the Presidential Palace building in Mogadishu. In 2017, Qatar assisted in the construction of the Mogadishu-Jawhar road (Mogadishu-Jawhar) and the Mogadishu-Afgooye road (Mogadishu-Afgooye) projects, which are Afgooye, which are important transport arteries linking the Somali capital to the rest of the country. The Kassala-Eritrea road project is a major infrastructure project for Qatar’s investment in the Horn of Africa, with a total length of 26 kilometres and the first road linking Sudan and Eritrea. 2014 saw Bahrain’s support for the construction of the Bahrain Academy of Sciences at the University of Mogadishu, an institution that will raise the level of higher education in Somalia and pioneer a new form of humanitarian aid.
Table 1. Selected infrastructure projects involving Gulf countries in the Horn of Africa countries.
4.4. Investment in industry and agriculture
Gulf countries have undertaken investments in the Horn of Africa countries mainly in the form of joint ventures and loans from 2000 to 2017, Gulf countries made 434 investments in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Sudan and Ethiopia, for a total of $13 billion.Footnote23 Kuwait has been one of the largest donors in Eastern Sudan since the signing of the peace agreement in the region in 2006. In December 2010, Kuwait hosted a conference on aid and investment in eastern Sudan, where participants pledged $3.547 billion to Sudan, of which the Kuwaiti government pledged $500 million for investment in eastern Sudan.Footnote24 In Somalia and Eritrea, the Gulf countries’ investments are more diversified and include bilateral cooperation, multilateral cooperation with GCC countries and business-to-business partnerships, among other forms of investment. For example, Saudi Arabia has invested in Somalia to build agricultural development projects such as the Juba Sugar Factory.
Djibouti is an important partner and investment destination for Gulf countries in the Horn of Africa. 2006 saw the acquisition of the 30-year operating rights of the Doraleh Container Terminal at the Port of Djibouti by Dubai Global Ports (DP World), with the aim of turning it into a shipping hub in the Horn of Africa.Footnote25 In 2016, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) signed 14 agreements with Djibouti for a total amount of KD 7830, including power stations, ports, airports, roads and other infrastructure projects to finance the development of Djibouti’s economy.Footnote26 Among them, the Sheikh Sabah Sabah Al-ahmad Road is one of the largest projects in which Kuwait has invested in Djibouti. When completed, the project will contribute to the economic and social development of the northern region of Djibouti and facilitate logistics and trade between Djibouti and Ethiopia.
Compared to Saudi Arabia and the UAE (see ), Qatar’s investments with countries in the Horn of Africa are smaller. The Sudanese economy was hit hard after the independence of South Sudan in 2011. Subsequently, Qatar signed an economic and security agreement with Sudan to provide natural gas to Sudan for power generation and deposited $1 billion in the Central Bank of Sudan in 2014 specifically for energy and agricultural investments. In November 2017, Qatar signed a $200 million agreement with Somalia for infrastructure development. In addition, Qatar has investments in the construction, real estate, agriculture, tourism and mining sectors in several other countries in the Horn of Africa.Footnote27
Table 2. UAE and Saudi investments in Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti (2003–2020).
Agriculture is the focus of cooperation between the Gulf States and the Horn of Africa countries. The Gulf countries have a weak agricultural base, little arable land and depend on imports for food. Following the global food crisis in 2007–2008, the Gulf countries made large-scale agricultural investments in the Horn of Africa, leasing land to build overseas farms to maintain their food security. In recent years, in order to attract investment, the Horn of Africa countries have implemented trade facilitation measures such as zero tariffs, and agricultural cooperation between the Gulf countries and the Horn of Africa countries has become closer.
Despite the wide range of economic cooperation between the Gulf States and the countries of the Horn of Africa, which covers a wide range of areas, bilateral economic cooperation faces the following challenges:
Firstly, the security situation in the countries of the Horn of Africa is critical. The Horn of Africa is one of the regions in the world most affected by terrorism. Terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Somalia frequently launch attacks, causing social unrest and humanitarian crises. The region’s weak governments, political instability, civil wars and coups are frequent, and industrial and agricultural investment projects are vulnerable to political instability.
Secondly, the game of extraterritorial countries in the Horn of Africa is fierce. In recent years, Middle Eastern countries have been competing to deploy military bases in the Horn of Africa. The UAE and Qatar are actively mediating internal conflicts and border disputes in the Horn of Africa. Turkey and Iran are also actively expanding their influence in the region. Turkey has invested in the Awash-Kombolcha-Hara Gebeya railway project to help develop Ethiopia’s defence industry, and the Turkish bank Ziraat Bank has opened a branch in Ethiopia. The Gulf States have extended the geopolitical game of the Middle East to the Horn of Africa, turning some of their investment projects into a political tool to seize spheres of influence and marginalise rivals at the expense of their viability and sustainability.
Once again, political conditions are attached to investments in the Gulf States. The economic relations between the Gulf States and the countries of the Horn of Africa are geared towards serving political aspirations. The Gulf states demand that the Horn of Africa countries choose sides and support their political positions. For example, in 2016, after Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations with Iran, Somalia then broke off diplomatic relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia announced $50 million in aid to Somalia.Footnote29
Finally, the return on investment is poor. The purchase of land and food production for export by Gulf countries in the Horn of Africa countries has raised local concerns. The lack of infrastructure and skilled workers in the Horn of Africa countries, poor business environment, financial instability and other conditions expose Gulf countries to greater business risks in their investments. Port construction projects in the Horn of Africa have been slow for Gulf countries.Footnote30 Signed an agreement with Dubai World in March 2018 for the right to operate the Port of Berbera. The Somali government opposes the project, arguing that only the Federal Government has the right to sign the agreement. The Somali Parliament declared the project a violation of sovereignty and declared the agreement null and void. Since taking over the Port of Djibouti terminal in February 2018, Dubai Global Ports Group has accumulated losses of $1 billion on the project.Footnote31
The Gulf countries provide humanitarian assistance to the Horn of Africa countries and invest in infrastructure projects, which contribute to the economic and social development of the region and alleviate the humanitarian crisis. The Gulf countries have also signed labour cooperation agreements with the Horn of Africa countries to export surplus local labour to the Gulf countries, which not only solves the employment problem in the Horn of Africa countries, but also meets the labour demand of the Gulf countries. However, the economic cooperation between the Gulf countries and the Horn of Africa countries also faces many challenges in terms of security and finance, and is less sustainable.
5. Conclusion
The relations between the Gulf States and the Horn of Africa have deep historical and cultural roots. The Gulf countries have become the main donors of aid to the countries of the Horn of Africa, and aid has gradually become a tool for expanding their influence in the Horn of Africa. Since the Arab Spring, Gulf countries have begun to view the Horn of Africa from a geopolitical perspective, actively expanding their influence in the Horn of Africa by setting up military bases, participating in conflict resolution and investing in large-scale infrastructure projects. However, the process of expanding the influence of the Gulf states in the Horn of Africa has not been smooth and has fallen far short of expectations. Problems such as delays in the construction of military bases, losses in project operations and frequent civil strife in the Horn of Africa countries have prevented the Gulf countries from deepening their cooperation with the Horn of Africa countries. The Gulf countries are involved in internal and regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa, but the root causes of these conflicts are complex and the political settlement is prone to recurrence, and the Horn of Africa countries are wary of the expansion of the Gulf countries and do not want to be subordinated to them. Since 2021, geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East have cooled down, and there has been a wave of reconciliation, which has reduced the geopolitical rivalry between the Gulf states in the Horn of Africa. The political settlement of the Yemeni issue has reduced the need for the Gulf states to extend their influence in the Horn of Africa. At the international level, the United States, Russia and other major powers are beginning to refocus on the Horn of Africa, and are increasing their investment in the region, which will create a competitive relationship with the Gulf states. These factors have prompted the Gulf states to re-examine their policies in the Horn of Africa and to develop their relations with the Horn of Africa countries in a more pragmatic manner, and the relationship will enter a new phase of stable development.
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2 The term ‘Gulf states’ in this paper refers to the six GCC member states of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman.
3 A. Mazrui, ‘Qadhaya fikria: ifreeqiya wo al-islam wo al-gharb’, Cairo: Center for African Future Studies, African Studies Series, (1998), pp. 145–146.
4 M. al-Utaibi, ‘Al-qarni al-ifreeqi ‘mqan istirateegiyan khalijeen’, Doha: Aljazeera Centre for Studies, (2021), p. 33.
5 A. Mazrui, The Africans: A Triple Heritage (London: Little Brown and Company, 1986), p. 25.
6 M. Darwich, ‘Saudi-Iranian rivalry from the Gulf to the Horn of Africa: changing geographies and infrastructures’, available at: https://pomeps.org/saudi-iranian-rivalry-from-the-gulf-to-the-horn-of-africa-changing-geographies-and-infrastructures-1
7 R. Mason and S. Mabon, The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa-Interests, Influences and Instability (Oxford: Manchester University Press, 2022), p. 79.
8 ‘Red Sea Peace Initiatives: Saudi Arabia’s role in the Eritrea Ethiopia rapprochement,’ King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, (April 2020), p. 21.
9 A. al-Dhahab, ‘al-Tad’iyat al-’askariyyah wa al-Istiratijiyyah li-saytarah al-Imarat ‘ala Arkhabil Saqtar al-yemaniyah’, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, (29 July 2020), p. 4.
10 L. Hultberg, ‘Can the UAE solve the GERD dilemma?’, Gulf International Forum, (17 August 2021), available at: https://gulfif.org/can-the-uae-solve-the-gerd-dilemma/.
11 S. Barakat and S. Milton, ‘Why did Qatar leave the Djibouti-Eritrea border?’, Al Jazeera, (18 June 2017), available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/06/qatar-army-djibouti-eritreaborder-170618100118290.html.
12 ‘Yemeni government, Houthis launch massive prisoner swap’, Xinhua, (14 April 2023), available at: http://www.news.cn/world/2023-04/16/c_1129527494.htm.
13 ‘Intra-Gulf competition in Africa’s Horn: lessening the impact’, International Crisis Group, (19 September 2019), p. 36.
14 ‘Gulf state rivalries in the Horn of Africa: time for a Red Sea policy?’, Danish Institute for International Studies, (1 May 2019), available at: https://www.diis.dk/en/research/gulf-state-rivalries-in-the-horn-of-africa-time-a-red-sea-policy.
15 ‘Somalia registers record exports of 5 million livestock in 2014’, FAO, (April 2015), available at: https://www.fao.org/somalia/news/detail-events/en/c/284955/.
16 Muhammad Fāyiz as-sharīf, as-siyāsa al-ḵārijiyya al-mamlaka al-arabiyya as-su’ūdiyya, dāru al-malki ‘Aba al-’Azīz, Riyadh, (2007), p. 102.
17 ‘Sudan signs $6 billion UAE deal for new Red Sea port’, Africa News, (12 December 2022), available at: https://www.africanews.com/2022/12/14/sudan-signs-6-billion-uae-deal-for-new-red-sea-port/.
18 ‘Millions of people face food shortages in the Horn of Africa’, FAO, (29 January 2017), available at: https://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/468941/icode/.
19 Muhammad Fāyiz as-sharīf, as-siyāsa al-ḵārijiyya al-mamlaka al-arabiyya as-su’ūdiyya, dāru al-malki ‘Aba al-’Azīz, Riyadh, (2007), p. 453.
20 J. Mosley, ‘Turkey and the Gulf States in the Horn of Africa: fluctuating dynamics of engagement, investment and influence’, The Rift Valley Institute, (2018), p. 55.
21 Mdakh al-’ajamiyy al-Otaibah, al-qarn al-ifrīqiyy ‘amuqā ‘istirātījiya khrījiyya, Doha: al-Jazeera Centre for Studies, (2021), p. 77.
22 ‘Qatar Fund for Development Annual Report 2016’, Doha: Qatar Fund for Development, (2016), pp. 22–23.
23 J. Meester, W. van den Berg and H. Verhoeven, ‘Riyal politik: the political economy of Gulf investments in the Horn of Africa’, Clingendael Institute Conflict Research Unit, (April 2018), p. 5.
24 Mdakh al-’ajamiyy al-Otaibah, al-qarn al-ifrīqiyy ‘amuqā ‘istirātījiya khrījiyya, Doha: al-Jazeera Centre for Studies, (2021), p. 80.
25 K. Young and T. Khan, ‘Extended states: the politics and purpose of United Arab Emirates economic statecraft in the Horn of Africa’, The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa Interests, influences and instability, (25 January 2022), p. 119.
26 ‘78.3 Milyuna dinnār qurud al-Kuwayt l-Jībūtiyy munḏu 2004’, Al Rai, (February 2016), available at: https://www.alraimedia.com/article/710003/2004.
27 A. Dahir, ‘Strategic geography in jeopardy: Qatar-Gulf crisis and the Horn of Africa’, The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa Interests, influences and instability, (25 January 2022).
28 J. Mosley, ‘Turkey and the Gulf States in the Horn of Africa: fluctuating dynamics of engagement, investment and influence’, The Rift Valley Institute, (2018), p. 55.
29 ‘Somalia received Saudi aid the day it cut ties with Iran: document’, Reuters, (17 January 2016), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-saudi-iran-idUSKCN0UV0BH.
30 Somaliland is a federal state in north-western Somalia. Since the 1980s, Somaliland has sought independence from Somalia, but has not yet been recognised by the international community.
31 ‘Dubai’s DP World wins ruling against Djibouti over seized port’, Arab News, (January 2020), available at: https://www. arabnews.com/node/1612881/business-economy.