The geopolitical environment impact of Arctic Passage on Eurasia: An analysis based on multi-factor geometric potential models

ABSTRACT

As the melting of Arctic ice accelerates, the Arctic Passage continues to grow. Geopolitical influence has increased the strategic value of the Passage, attracting the attention of countries around the world. The geopolitical environment of the Arctic Passage is not affected by single factors but is instead determined by the combined effects of multiple factors. This paper analyses the multi-dimensional geopolitical environment factors of the Arctic Passage, and extracts features to construct a multi-dimensional geopolitical environment index system, which takes the Northern Sea Route as an example to construct the Arctic Passage Geo-potential Model, and quantitatively analyse the geo-potential for different states in Eurasia with the development and utilization of the Arctic Passage. This paper combines clustering and similarity analysis to explore the geo-spatial pattern of the Northern Sea Route, and identifies two interest groups that are represented by Russia and the United States. We further analyse the preference of stakeholders in the jurisdiction of the Northern Sea Route. This exploration addresses a gap in the current discussion on the Arctic Passage’s geopolitical environment, which only considers a single factor, and it helps to explore new methods and ideas that will assist the quantitative evaluation and pattern analysis of the Arctic Passage’s geopolitical environment, especially in Eurasia. Meanwhile, it will provide a comprehensive reference for the development and utilization of the Arctic Passage about the geopolitical environment patterns.

KEYWORDS:

• Arctic Passage
• geopolitical environment
• geo-potential model
• Northern Sea Route
• cluster analysis
• similarity analysis

1. Introduction

As the Arctic heats up and the Arctic Ocean warms, the melting of the Arctic sea ice is accelerating, and so the full opening of the Arctic Passage is becoming possible (Borgerson, 2008; J. L. Chen et al., 2021). These changes may result in increased vessel traffic across the Arctic and Arctic Passage. The internationally recognized Arctic waterways include three routes, specifically the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the Northwest Passage (NWP) and the Transpolar Sea Route (see Figure 1). Vessel traffic is expected to grow in the NSR and the NWP, with different climate-forcing scenarios influencing growth in the former and latter, and this will increase the independent of climate forcers by the middle of the century (Stephenson & Smith, 2015). With the increase of the transportation of liquefied natural gas in recent years, the Arctic Passage also requires new navigation support. A non-heuristic search has been undertaken to identify the best route near the New Siberian Islands (Koyama et al., 2021).

Figure 1. Sketch map of the Arctic Passage (the boundary was obtained from natural earth (http://www.naturalearthdata.com/), figure quoted from (C. Wang et al., 2022)).

The Arctic Passage is a golden maritime channel that connects the Pacific and the Atlantic. It is an important geographic location, and the significant profits of its opening have attracted many countries: it may not only change the world shipping pattern, but can also enhance the Arctic’s strategic position and cause changes in the geopolitical pattern (Li, 2010a, 2017; Lu, 2010a; Schach & Madlener, 2018; Wang et al., 2016). The U.S, Canada, Russia and other Arctic coastal states have long attached great importance to the Arctic waterways and have closely focused on Arctic geopolitics, and Japan and South Korea have also researched this issue in more detail (Lu, 2010b; Ye et al., 2019). As an important carrier of resource transportation and economic trading in the Arctic region, the Arctic Passage has unique geographical advantages and important geopolitical features, which both accentuate its strategic value (Guo, 2019; He, 2014; Wang, 2017).

The influence of the geopolitical environment of the Arctic Passage does not only relate to the location of the waterway, but also concerns various factors such as the politics and economics of different countries. In that way, how to comprehensively consider the issue of geopolitical environmental factors? How to use quantitative methods to evaluate the geographical environment characteristics for various countries in Eurasia? And also how to analyse the geopolitical pattern of the Arctic Passage? Then we need to analyse from two aspects. The first is the influencing scope of the Arctic Passage, and the second is the influencing factors of that.

1.1 The arctic Passage’s scope of influence

The geopolitical influence and level of economic development of countries along the Arctic Passage will improve with its opening, and the global extension of the waterway will not just enable the Arctic states to enjoy the various benefits brought by the opening of the Arctic Passage, but will also produce considerable benefits for countries that are located on the Passage’s extension line (He, 2014; Li, 2010a). In particular, the Northern Sea Route has a better navigable environment, a more optimistic development outlook and more significant commercial value. It serves as the shortest waterway connecting Western Europe and Northeast Asia, with most sections located along Russia’s northern coast. It has a wide range of navigation, which connects five sea areas, and it also owns ten important straits and four important ports. In comparison with the traditional course, the navigation of the Northern Sea Route can greatly shorten navigation mileage, save navigation time and reduce fuel consumption (Guan & Guo, 2008a), which may have an important impact on the global political and economic structure (Cao et al., 2011; Guan & Guo, 2008b; Guo & Guan, 2009; He, 2010; Qian et al., 2015; Xie, 2014). The influencing scope of the Northern Sea Route can be considered by referring to two dimensions. The first is the Arctic region: as part of the Northern Sea Route, the opening of the Northern Sea Route will affect the five Arctic nations and the eight surrounding Arctic nations. The second is other regions: this mainly refers to the reach of the Northern Sea Route and the buffer zone within a certain range of influence, which includes European and Asian countries (Ding, 2014; Guo, 2019). Gunnarsson (2021) evaluate traffic on the NSR in 2016–2019 and discuss policy implications for future Northern Sea Route shipping. And the study shows that Russian domestic shipping dominates shipping activities on the Northern Sea Route. It investigates the temporal and spatial changes of shipping along the Northern Sea Route in order to better understand possible drivers of traffic volume and future trends (Li & Zhang, 2020).

1.2 An assessment of the Passage’s geopolitical influence

The melting of sea ice in the Arctic will set off a new wave of exploration for the Arctic Passage, and more countries will seek to realize their interests (Bruun & Medby, 2014; Wang et al., 2016), including the export of goods from ASEAN countries (Salam & Chishti, 2022). This could complicate geopolitical relationships in the Passage, and cooperation and competition between countries will occur (Koivurova, 2012; Li, 2010b, Lu, 2010a; Rowe, 2020; Wegge & Keil, 2018; Woon, 2020). Scholars have therefore carried out geopolitical research that has developed theories of the Passage and investigated associated patterns. The discussion of geopolitical theories has mainly focused on the decisive role of hard power (Agnew, 2013; Bilgin, 2007; Brutschin & Schubert, 2016; Holland, 2020; Mercille, 2008; Ye et al., 2019; An et al., 2017), despite the fact that this is insufficient to explain the Passage’s political and geographic pattern. The Chinese Scholar Li (2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a) identifies four major assumptions of Arctic route political theory, and proposes that they establish a foundation for an Arctic Passage geopolitical theory system. He also uses a quantitative method (Fuzzy clustering of artificial fish school and energy terrain simulation) to analyse the Passage’s geopolitical pattern and evaluate its evolution trend (Li & Min, 2011). He proposes that the geopolitical scope of the Arctic route should not be limited to geographic areas, but should extend along the Arctic route. And he notes that the internationalization of the Arctic route requires the public area of the Arctic to be acknowledged. He adds that the issue of the Arctic and Arctic routes must be resolved on a global basis (Li, 2010b). He also discusses the normative game mechanism of the geopolitics of the Arctic route, analyses the seven supporting mechanisms of the normative game (meta-norm, membership, domination, international social recognition, deterrence, internalization and law), conducts research into the evolution of geo-security pattern and calculates the security index (Li, 2011b). Some scholars provide quantitative evaluations of the geo-economics of the Arctic Passage, and seek to assess the geo-economic benefits that will be produced by the opening of the Arctic Passage (Guo, 2019). Their analysis shows that the countries with the most geo-economic benefits are Russia, the U.S, China and Japan.

The countries with the least geo-economic benefits are the beneficiaries of traditional routes. Countries such as Germany, South Korea, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and the Arctic countries such as Norway, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Canada, Denmark, actually have a small gap in geo-economic benefits, while Spain, India and Singapore have relatively weak profitability. Sur and J (2020) rank states on the basis of the commercial interested obtained by the opening of the Northern Sea Route, and undertake a gray relational analysis that refers to distance, the cost of transportation and icebergs and trade volume. Analysing the advantages and disadvantages of the modes of oil transportation currently used makes it possible to put forward an intelligent Arctic logistics management digital system, which aims to improve the transport and logistics efficiency of the Arctic offshore oil field (Marchenko & Babyr, 2021). With regard to the abundant oil resources of the Arctic continental shelf, the results of geo-information support tools make it possible to develop natural risk management in the Northern Sea Route. This can then be adapted to climate change in the Arctic; Foresight technologies, the risk management approach and other methods can also be adapted and applied (Abramov et al., 2021). The concept of the Northern Marine Transportation Corridors is put forward to strengthen the safety of marine navigation in the Arctic, and to provide an efficient planning guide for present and future Arctic investments (Chénier et al., 2017).

Analysis of the cohesive subgroups of the geopolitical pattern suggests that trade between countries is still affected by geopolitical factors and that trade relations will be closer. China’s core degree will increase every year (Wang, 2017). Research into aspects of the Arctic’s economic development considers interaction between humans and the environment, along with relevant issues of Arctic governance (Tabata et al., 2021). The potential effects of various stressors are assessed by referring to vessel traffic in the Arctic Ocean (Stevenson et al., 2019).

In summary, the influence of geopolitical factors on the Arctic Passage has been explored over a long period of time. Although both qualitative and quantitative methods are used, qualitative and descriptive methods are used the most, and many are based on single factor analysis like geopolitics or geo-economics (Guo, 2019; He, 2010; Li, 2017; Li & Zhang, 2020). A number of other factors, including the role of the military, culture, technology, channel operating and the capacity use of different countries are not considered. But in the Arctic region, where there are checks and balances and dynamic games between different actors, the benefits that actors gain from the Passage are the result of the balance of power of multiple factors. Military, technological and cultural strength, which are important indicators of a country’s hard and soft power, play an important role in ensuring peace and stability in the Arctic region, and contribute directly to the exploitation of resources and the construction of waterways in the Arctic region. The number of icebreakers in a country, the quality of port infrastructure and the average number of times that channels are used every year can also provide a good evaluation of a country’s needs and hardware conditions for the use of Arctic waterways. These are all important factors that make it possible to measure a country’s ability to benefit from the Arctic Passage. So single-factor analysis cannot fully measure the Passage’s geopolitical environment impact. At present, research into the geographical environment of the Arctic Passage lacks a systematic, comprehensive and quantifiable multi-factor evaluation system and model. The geo-potential model can make it possible to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of the geopolitical environment by undertaking a comprehensive consideration of the influence of multiple factors; this makes it possible to analyse the total impact of all other surroundings on the fixed location, and this model has been applied successfully by some studies. For example, Wang et al. (2018) use the geo-potential model to explore changes in geographic relations between China and Central Asia. Dong and Shing (2020) calculate China’s geopolitical potential in Pakistan, with the aim of benefitting research into China’s investment strategy in Pakistan. But the application of the geo-potential model to the Arctic Passage has not yet been mentioned.

This paper aims to answer aforementioned questions, and seeks to sort out research ideas and the related process (see Figure 2). In referring to the geopolitical environment influence factors of the Arctic Passage, including perspectives of the comprehensive strength of actors and the operation capacity of the Arctic Passage, this study selects various factors (geopolitics, geo-economics, geostrategy, geo-technology, geo-culture, laws and regulations, and the operation and utilization capacity of the Arctic Passage) as the analytical factors and builds a geopolitical environment index system based on multi-source data. This system is then used to classify hard and soft power and interdependence, which makes it possible to build a Geo-potential model. In recognizing the utilization rate of the Arctic waterways, and the availability and validity of data, this study uses the Northern Sea Route to demonstrate how to quantitatively evaluate the ability of different stakeholders to obtain geopolitical benefits from the Northern Sea Route. It combines quantitative analysis with spatial pattern analysis and integrates multiple factors to discuss the spatial pattern of the Arctic region. This approach compensates for the shortcomings of current single-factor analysis and enables the resolution of the comprehensive problem of combining quantitative evaluation and spatial analysis.

Figure 2. The quantitative assessment and spatial pattern analysis of the Arctic Passage’s geo-setting.

2. Geopolitical environment factors based on comprehensive actor strength

The exploitation and administrating of the Arctic Passage are currently primarily carried out on the national basis. As the strategic position of the Arctic region constantly improves, Arctic states and beneficiary states along the route have accelerated their participation in Arctic governance, with a view to safeguarding their interests in the Arctic region. In engaging with the current order of the Arctic region, we take the most important actors, namely Arctic and beneficiary states, along the route as the research objects and analyse the characteristics and expressions of the Passage’s geopolitical environment factors. We integrate index data, spatial data and text content, and undertake a multidimensional analysis and management that incorporates geo-economics, geostrategy, geo-technology, geo-culture, geopolitics, laws and regulations. Quantitative index data and qualitative descriptive data are both included.

2.1 Geo-economic factors

Geo-economy refers to the economic relationship between countries or regions, and it is based on geographic location, resource endowments and economic structure. This relationship encompasses various forms of interaction, including cooperation, alliance, competition, confrontation and even containment (Guo, 2019; Lu & Du, 2013). GDP is one of the potential driving factors for achieving sustainable development efficiency (Chishti et al., 2023). The effects of natural resources (NR) on GDP, environmental taxes (ET), and economic globalization (EG) are looked at in relation to a policy framework (Chishti & Patel, 2023). This study mainly selects four indicators: GDP, GDP growth rate (annual percentage), import dependence (the proportion of import trade in GDP) and export dependence (the proportion of export trade in GDP) to measure a state’s geo-economic level. Of these, GDP is the total indicator used to measure economic level and GDP growth rate is the developmental indicator that describes a country’s economic development (Huang et al., 2019). In acknowledge of globalization and games among states in the Arctic region, the dependence of imports and exports are used to reflect the interdependence of actors in commercial intercourse, along with their international trade condition. Data are provided by the World Bank.

2.2 Geostrategy factors

Geostrategy can be interpreted as the military situation formed by geographic factors (Chen, 2015). The opening of the Arctic Passage has facilitated and diversified military delivery and operations conducted in the Arctic Ocean, and this has made the area a new battlefield for strategic games between states. But the policy statements of almost all Arctic states emphasize there is no military threat in the Arctic and all promise to abide by the basic principles of international laws when operating in the region, in the belief this will help to ensure peace and stability in the Arctic (Sun, 2016). In referring to measurable data, this study uses military expenditure (percentage of GDP) as a numerical indicator of a state’s geostrategy level. Data are provided by the World Bank.

2.3 Geo-technological factors

Geo-technology focuses on examining the interplay between technology, international politics and the global economy within the broader framework of the international system. It represents an extension of the concepts of geopolitics and geo-economics, emphasizing the crucial significance of scientific of scientific and technological strength in the contestation of comprehensive national power among nations (Zhao, 2007). The recent paradigm shift toward achieving green economic growth calls for divulging the important drivers of green growth to derive the salient policies for triggering the green growth process (Zaman et al., 2023). This study adopts two numerical indicators, namely the number of patent applications and R&D researchers (per million people) to measure a state’s geo-technical level, which is taken as the manifestation of a state’s hard power. Of these, the number of patent applications measures a state’s scientific and technological output, and the number of R&D researchers (per million people) measures the number of professionals involved in creating new knowledge, products, processes and methods in a state. This is understood to reflect a state’s talent resources that is invested in scientific and technological creation. Data are provided by the World Bank.

2.4 Geo-cultural factors

Geo-culture is the analysis and prediction of the world or regional strategic situation and political behavior, and it is based on various geopolitical elements and the geographical form of the political structure (Wei et al., 2016). This study draws on the broad concept of geo-culture and it selects two numerical indicators, specifically the proportion of the total expenditure on education in GDP and the rate of enrollment in institutions of higher education, to measure the intensity of cultural construction and the cultural level. Of these, the ratio of total education public expenditure in GDP reflects a state’s investment in residents’ education, while the enrollment rate of higher education reflects a state’s cultural output and level of education. Data are provided by the World Bank.

2.5 Geopolitics factors

Geopolitics takes geography as the decisive influence on a state’s political behavior. It analyses and predicts international situations and national behavior by drawing on various geopolitical factors and the geographical form of the international political structure (Chishti et al., 2023; Chishti et al., 2023). Grasping the connotation of geopolitics is an important prerequisite for realizing national political interests (Agnew, 2013; Li, 2010a, 2017). The selection of geopolitical indicator system uses three numerical indicators, specifically Government Effectiveness, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, and Voice and Accountability (from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)) to measure a state’s geopolitical capabilities. Of these, Government Effectiveness reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government’s commitment to these policies; Political Stability and Absence of Violence measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Voice and Accountability reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, along with freedom of expression and association, and the extent of free media.

2.6 Legal and regulatory factors related to geography

The use of the Arctic Passage must comply with corresponding laws and regulations. Each coastal state has its own domestic laws that relate to the navigation of the Arctic. Although these laws are based on international conventions that the state has acceded to, a number of differences in geographical location, national strength and foreign policies have resulted in the adoption of different domestic governance models. For instance, geographical advantages and historical influences help to explain why Russia and Canada seek to exert control over the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage, and this is why waterway governance is part of their domestic legislation. States such as Norway and Iceland apply the ambiguity principle in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which governs the waterway by formulating specific executing regulations that are based on relevant international conventions. This study draws on the quantification of the executive ability of laws and regulations to select two numerical indicators, specifically strength of legal rights index and rule of law, to measure a state’s capacity to apply both indicators. They are both important standards that enable the World Bank to measure the level of global governance, and provide insight into a state’s political and economic situation and, by extension, its efforts to exert influence and make decisions. Data are taken from the World Bank and WGI database.

3. Analysis of the impact of Northern Sea Route on Eurasia based on potential model

3.1 Analysis of factors of geopolitical environment that impact the Arctic Passage’s operating capability

A state’s potential to benefit from the Arctic region is not determined by a single factor, but is instead a result of a country’s comprehensive strengths, including its economy, military, technology, culture and politics. In the case of the Arctic Passage, state requirements and use capability are also crucial. This article draws on the use of comprehensive geopolitical environment factors, such as geo-economy and geostrategy, to measure a country’s geopolitical strength, and it also quantifies a country’s operation and utilization capacity. Three numerical indicators, specifically the number of icebreakers, the throughput of container terminals, and the quality of port infrastructure, are used to reflect the construction of the waterways and a state’s navigation hardware facilities, and this makes it possible to undertake a further analysis of a state’s waterway operation capabilities. Two other numerical indicators, specifically the average annual number of channels used and the cargo quantity carried by the channel, are used to reflect a state’s channel usage and navigation demand. Data are taken from the statistics of the Northern Sea Route Information Office and the World Bank.

3.2 Building the geo-potential model

The Northwest Passage and the Central Passage in the Arctic Passage are infrequently used. The Northern Sea Route has a relatively wide range of navigational applications, and its navigation data is richer. Hence we select the Northern Sea Route to demonstrate the application of the Arctic Passage. 18 states with relatively complete transborder data are chosen as research objects to construct the comprehensive evaluation index system for geopolitical environment impact and the geo-potential model of the Northern Sea Route (S1Table).

Geo-potential refers to the spatial distribution of state power in different regions, and regions do not just include those within the national territory, but also extend to those outside. In a state’s territory, its internal geo-potential can be influenced by the spatial distribution of military power, unbalanced economic development, the complexity of the regional terrain and the degree of transportation convenience (Hu et al., 2014). Beyond a state’s territory, the difference in geo-potential can be attributed to the economic potential difference formed by a state’s hard power, soft power, interdependence, and territorial distance. This study uses the concept of ‘potential’ from physics and the theory of ‘geo-centric gravity’ to build a geo-potential model, and it draws on relevant research results to construct a geo-potential evaluation index system for the Arctic Passage (Dong & Shing, 2020; Hu et al., 2014). The system is mainly composed of three evaluation items: hard power, soft power and interdependence. Hard power includes five first-class indicators (geo-economics, geostrategy, geo-technology, channel operating capability and channel using capability) and ten second-class indicators. Soft power includes three first-class indicators (geo-culture, laws and regulations and geopolitics) and seven second-class indicators. Interdependence is measured by one first-class indicator and two second-class indicators. The standard deviation method is used to weigh the geo-potential evaluation index (see Table 1).

Table 1. The geo-potential evaluation index system

Evaluative items	Weight	First-class index	Weight	Second-class index	Weight
Hard power	0.631	Geo-economics	0.182	GDP	0.091
				GDP growth rate	0.042
		Geostrategy	0.075	Military expenditure of GDP	0.027
		Geo-technology	0.252	Number of patent applications	0.114
				R&D researchers (per million people)	0.025
		Channel operating capacity	0.230	Container terminal throughput	0.116
				Port infrastructure quality	0.008
				Number of icebreakers	0.160
		Channel using capacity	0.261	Average annual usage count of channel	0.112
				Cargo volume carried by channel	0.119
Soft power	0.118	Geo-culture	0.298	Total public education expenditure of GDP	0.017
				Enrollment rate of higher education institution	0.019
		Geopolitics	0.393	Government effectiveness	0.027
				Political stability and no violence	0.010
				Voice and accountability	0.019
		Laws and regulations	0.309	Legal rights index	0.019
				Degree of legal perfection	0.020
Interdependence	0.251	Interdependence rate		Import dependence	0.028
				Export dependence	0.028

The calculation formula of geo-potential follows:

(1) $P\mathrm{i}=\sum \mathrm{jn}\mathit{\alpha jMj}/(\mathit{\beta i}\mathrm{di}{)}^2$(1)

Where P_i represents the geo-potential of a state in region i; α_i represents the weight of each indicator; M_j represents hard power, soft power and interdependence; d_i represents distance, and the geographic location of each state. Geographic location mainly refers to the distance between the states and the Arctic Passage. In referring to the specific expression of the distance between states and the waterway, we classify countries affected by the Northern Sea Route into specific regions. In the case of the five Southeast Asian countries, the minimum distance of their respective ports to the port of Vladivostok will be used; for Nordic countries, the minimum distance of their respective ports of the port of Murmansk will be used; and Canada and America will use the distance between their ports and the nearest Russian port.

According to the weight obtained from the standard deviation method, the hard power of state J is composed of five first-class indicators (geo-economy, geostrategy, geo-technology, channel operating capability and channel-using capability). Different weights are assigned to different indicators, which is:

$H_j=0.182A_{1j}+0.075A_{2j}+0.252A_{3j}+0.230A_{4j}+0.261A_{5j}$

Where A_1j represents geo-economy; A_2j represents geostrategy; A_3j represents geo-technology; A_4j represents channel operating capability; and A_5j represents channel- using capability.

Soft power is mainly composed of three first-class indicators (geo-culture, geopolitics and laws and regulations), which are assigned different weights, that is:

$S_j=0.298B_{1j}+0.393B_{2j}+0.309B_{3j}$

Where B_1j stands for geo-culture; B_2j for geopolitics; and B_3j for laws and regulations.

Interdependence is related to the degree of trade dependence, which is composed of import I_j and export dependence E_j. When assigning I_j and E_j different weights, then:

$M_j=0.028I_{1j}+0.028E_{2j}$

Where I_1j represents import dependence, and E_2j represents export dependence.

When using Formula (1) to calculate the geo-potential scores of different states, the results differ greatly among states. The geo-potential scores of states with nearer distance are significantly higher than those further away. This implies that the existing formula has magnified the influence of distance, which makes a big difference in denominator magnitude, meaning that Russia and Norway will have a shorter distance score that is apparently higher than other countries. We therefore improve the formula to eliminate the expansion effect of the attenuation factor, and obtain Formula (2):

(2) $P\mathrm{i}=\sum \mathit{jn}\mathit{\alpha jMj}/{\mathit{di}}^2$(2)

After Formula (2) is used to recalculate, the gap between state scores is reduced to a certain extent, and this implies that it is helpful to weaken the expansion effort of distance. In addition, taking into account the characteristics of marine transportation in the Arctic Passage, it is generally believed that a state’s ability to obtain benefit from the Passage is closely related to its use. To be specific, when the channel is used more frequently by a state, it is more likely that it will benefit from the waterway, and this applies to a greater extent when it is more powerful. On the basis of Formula (2), we therefore introduce the variable of channel utilization rate, as denoted by r_i (measured by the proportion of the number of times the channel is used in each country), and this enables us to obtain Formula (3):

(3) $P\mathrm{i}=\mathit{ri}\sum \mathit{jn}\mathit{\alpha jMj}/{\mathit{di}}^2$(3)

3.3 The comprehensive analysis of geo-potential scores

In accordance with the geopolitical environment evaluation index system of the Arctic Passage and geo-potential model of Northern Sea Route that have been established, the index data is preprocessed and calculated by applying Formula (3). Differences in the geo-potential scores of each state are considered at reasonable intervals, as Table 2 demonstrates. After taking the significance of the indicator of channel utilization rate into account, we infer the result is reasonable and undertake further analysis. The scores show four obvious echelons of both Arctic and non-Arctic states, as Table 2 demonstrates.

Table 2. Each state’s geo-potential score

Arctic states	Hard power	Soft power	Inter-dependence	Score	Geo-potential	Non-Arctic states	Hard power	Soft power	Inter-dependence	Score	Geo-potential
Russia	0.241	0.037	0.032	0.165	3570.110	China	0.232	0.031	0.023	0.156	29.915
Norway	0.038	0.067	0.047	0.044	46.239	South Korea	0.039	0.060	0.050	0.044	3.813
The U.S.	0.145	0.069	0.017	0.104	16.491	Japan	0.038	0.048	0.024	0.036	1.254
Sweden	0.020	0.073	0.059	0.036	2.706	Germany	0.032	0.060	0.058	0.042	0.490
Finland	0.053	0.066	0.052	0.054	2.257	Poland	0.010	0.046	0.070	0.029	0.098
Denmark	0.021	0.070	0.069	0.039	0.443	The Netherlands	0.018	0.055	0.101	0.043	0.093
Canada	0.044	0.068	0.043	0.047	0.167	The United Kingdom	0.016	0.062	0.042	0.028	0.088
Iceland	0.007	0.062	0.056	0.026	0.069	France	0.013	0.056	0.042	0.025	0.040
						Vietnam	0.017	0.033	0.138	0.050	0.031
						Thailand	0.014	0.038	0.072	0.031	0.021

Overall, Arctic states have a better geo-potential in the Northern Sea Route than non-Arctic states. The geo-potential scores of eight Arctic states makes it possible to classify four echelons: Russia is ranked in the first echelon, and its score of 3570.110 places it far ahead of other states; Norway and America are in the second echelon, with respective scores of 46.239 and 16.491; two European states, Sweden and Finland are in the third echelon, with respective scores of 2.706 and 2.257; and Denmark, Canada and Iceland are in the fourth echelon. The geo-potential of non-Arctic states also has four echelons: China is in the first echelon, with a score of 29.915, and there is a large gap between it and Russia; two other Asian states, South Korea and Japan, are in the second echelon, with respective scores of 3.813 and 1.254; Germany is in the second echelon, with a score of 0.490; and four European states of (Poland, the Netherlands, Britain and France) and two Asian states (Vietnam and Thailand) are in the fourth echelon and all have scores of less than 1. In general, Arctic states are in a higher echelon than non-Arctic states. Russia ranks first among Arctic states and is far ahead of other states; the second echelon of Arctic state scores fall within a range of 10–50, which is the same as the first echelon of non-Arctic states; the third echelon of Arctic states is equivalent to the second echelon of non-Arctic states, and scores fall within a range of 1–10; and the fourth echelon of Arctic states is equal to the third echelon of non-Arctic states.

Russia has the highest geo-potential score, which is about 81 times the score of Norway, which underlines the scale of its significant advantage. With regard to hard power, its military expenditures account for the largest proportion of GDP, and its geostrategy advantage is also significant, being 2–3 times that of many other states. It has the largest number of icebreakers (about 4.4 times the number of second-placed Canada) and its annual average channel usage count is 41, about four times that of second-placed China. Strong channel operating and use capability make a substantial contribution to Russia’s hard power score. Another advantage that enables Russia to rank first in geo-potential is that it is the shortest distance away from the Northern Sea Route’s cruising area.

Norway and America, which rank in the second echelon of Arctic states, and China, which ranks in the first echelon of non-Arctic states, fall within the same geo-potential range, which implies that the two ends of the Northern Sea Route do not only link Europe and Asia, but are also connected to the Americas. The representatives of the three continents have obvious advantages over other states. Norway’s overall strength score ranks seventh among 18 states, and its distance advantage is significant and this makes a considerable contribution to its geo-potential score. China and America, which are both major states, have excellent geo-economy and geo-technology. Their GDP respectively rank second and first among 18 states, and their number of patent applications and container terminal are also in the top two. Hard power accounts for the two states having a higher score.

There is a uniform distribution of geo-potential of the Northern Sea Route among Arctic states in the third and fourth echelons; this also applies to non-Arctic states in the second, third and fourth echelons in the spatial pattern of the continent level.

3.4 Analysis of the geo-potential scores of European states

The result of geo-potential scores for European states presents a clear three-echelon distribution. Norway is in the first echelon, and scores significantly higher than other European states; Sweden and Finland are in the second echelon; and Germany, Denmark, Poland, the Netherlands, Britain, Iceland and France are in the third echelon. Taking into account the first-class indicators of geo-potential, Norway’s comprehensive national power is second, and its geo-potential score is significantly higher than that of other European states. This reflects the shortest distance between the Norwegian port and the port of Murmansk, which is a distinct advantage that enables it to score higher than other states.

Figure 3 provides insight into the comprehensive power of European states, and shows that Finland receives the highest score points, which are significantly higher than other states; Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Sweden score higher in comprehensive power, and have similar points; the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Iceland and France score lower in comprehensive power.

Figure 3. The comprehensive power score of European states.

With regard to hard power, the scores of Finland, Norway and Germany are apparently higher, but there are no big differences among other states. Finland benefits from high scores on all indicators, and its channel operation and use capabilities are outstanding. Hard power accounts for a large proportion of the total power score, and this is why its comprehensive strength score is the highest.

With regard to soft power, with the exception of the Netherlands’ scores, which are apparently lower, there are no big differences among other states. This reflects the fact that the Netherlands has the lowest score in strength of legal rights index and rule -of-law among all European states, and this difference is found to be significant. With regard to interdependence, the Netherlands scores particularly highly, and its import and export dependence are obviously higher than other European states, which reflects its active import and export trade. Norway, the United Kingdom and France score lower, and the gap between other states is small.

3.5 Analysis of the geo-potential scores of Asian states

The geo-potential scores of Asian states present a similar distribution of the three echelons. China is in the first echelon, and scores remarkably higher than other Asian states; South Korean and Japan are in the second echelon; and Vietnam and Thailand are in the third echelon.

Figure 4 shows that the comprehensive power score of China is distinctly higher than the other four Asian states, and highlights there are no big differences among other states. With regard to hard power, China stands out among Asian states, and its score is more than six times that of South Korea and Japan; 13 times that of Vietnam; and 16 times that of Thailand. There are two main reasons. The first is the GDP advantage, which makes its geo-economic grade much higher than other Asian states; the second is that China’s score in cargo volume carried by channel and average annual usage count of channel is remarkably higher than other states. In terms of soft power, South Korea scores highest, and Japan scores lowest, and there are no big differences among states. South Korea has the highest score in geo-culture, and Japan performs well in Government Effectiveness, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, and Voice and Accountability. In terms of interdependence, Vietnam has a high dependence on import and export, which highlights the importance of import and export trade to Vietnam. Japan and China’s low score in interdependence is due to their high GDP and the fact they are less dependent on import and export trade than Vietnam.

Figure 4. The comprehensive power score of Asian states.

4. Geospatial pattern analysis based on Eurasia states

4.1 Clustering-based geospatial analysis

In the cluster analysis based on geo-potential scores, Russia’s score is too high to be included, and so there are two categories: 1) Russia; 2) other states. When Russia is excluded from the calculation, the clustering results can be classified into two categories: one is the United States, and the other includes the remaining 15 states. The classification of the geo-potential results establishes three categories: the first is Russia, the second is the United States and Norway and the third is the other 15 states (see Table 3).

Table 3. The result of clustering based on the geo-potential index score

Classification Basis	Classification results
Geo-potential	Category 1	Russia
	Category 2	The United States, Norway
	Category 3	Other states
The comprehensive score of hard power, soft power and interdependence (rule out distance)	Category 1	The United States
	Category 2	Russia, China
	Category 3	Other states
Hard power	Category 1	The United States
	Category 2	Russia, China
	Category 3	Other states
Soft power	Category 1	Russia, China, Thailand, Vietnam
	Category 2	Poland
	Category 3	Japan
	Category 4	The Netherlands, the United States, Switzerland, Canada, France, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Germany, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Finland
Interdependence	Category 1	Russia, the United States, Japan, China
	Category 2	The Netherlands, Vietnam
	Category 3	Thailand, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Germany, Norway, South Korea, Finland, Canada, the United Kingdom, France

In the cluster analysis based on comprehensive power, the result is consistent with the cluster analysis based on hard power alone, and there are three categories: the first is the United States, the second is Russia and China and the third is the other 15 states. As a global power, America is a world leader in geo-economy, geostrategy and geo-technology, although its channel using capability needs to be improved. More specifically, its cargo volume carried by channel and average annual channel usage count are different to China and Russia, and this is why it ranks third in hard power. In contrast, Russia and China have advantages in the operation and use of the Northern Sea Route, and these include abundant icebreaker resources, high frequency use of the waterway and large amounts of cargo. Russia, in particular, has used the waterway 41 times in 2020, which accounts for half of its total number of use by all states. This confirms Russia’s frequent use of the Arctic Passage.

In the cluster analysis based on soft power, there are four categories which demonstrate that the first includes Russia, China, Thailand, Vietnam; the second is Poland; the third is Japan; the fourth include the Netherlands, the United States, Switzerland, Canada, France, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Germany, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, and Finland. From a soft power score perspective, there are no big differences between the 18 states; however, in terms of sub-index, states in the first category fall into the final four geopolitical places. The interdependence score establishes three categories: the first includes the Netherlands and Vietnam, the second includes China, Japan, the United States and Russia; and the third includes the other 12 states.

4.2 Similarity-based geospatial analysis

The clustering results show that Russia is an important actor in the Northern Sea Route. When Russia is excluded from the calculation, the U.S appears. The cluster analysis result is consistent with the current situation in the Arctic region, but the Asian states and European states involved in the calculation analysis cannot simply be classified as two powerful groups. As a result, an analysis of similarity is addressed to Russia and the U.S, the two reference states. Use the tool of similarity search in ArcGIS, take Russia and the U.S States as the respective match features and choose geo-potential as the attribute value that can be used to undertake similarity analysis. And then refer to the results in Table 4.

Table 4. The results of similarity analysis

Geo-potential (Russia)			Geo-potential (USA)
Similarity Rank	Country	SSVD	Similarity Rank	Country	SSVD
1	Norway	27.169	1	China	6.135
2	China	34.510	2	Finland	6.311
3	Finland	34.838	3	Norway	6.672
4	Sweden	35.191	4	Sweden	6.888
5	South Korea	35.340	5	South Korea	7.007
6	Japan	35.497	6	Japan	7.712
7	Canada	35.693	7	Denmark	8.256
8	Denmark	35.698	8	Germany	8.266
9	Germany	35.708	9	Canada	8.296
10	Poland	35.722	10	Poland	8.367
11	Netherlands	35.724	11	Netherlands	8.371
12	United Kingdom	35.726	12	United Kingdom	8.377
13	Iceland	35.734	13	Iceland	8.396
14	France	35.746	14	France	8.426
15	Vietnam	35.750	15	Vietnam	8.435
16	Thailand	35.758	16	Thailand	8.454

Note: SSVD (Sum Squared Value Differences).

The similarity analysis result shows a similar ranking of the scores for geopolitical interest groups represented by Russia and the U.S. When combined with other variables from the geo-potential model, it shows the ranking of similarity is highly consistent with the ranking of distance between each state in the Northern Sea Route. This is because geo-potential measures the actors’ potential to benefit from the Northern Sea Route, and this is why geographical distance is an important factor. Closer proximity to the Northern Sea Route means it is more convenient to use the Northern Sea Route, and this means that the economic and political benefits created by the Northern Sea Route’s opening can spread more quickly to nearby surrounding areas. But there are exceptions. For instance, China ranks eighth for distance from the Northern Sea Route, but its similarity score elevates it to second and first place when the match feature respectively takes Russia and the U.S into account. This is mainly because most of China’s power indicators resemble those of the U.S and Russia. China’s status as a powerful developing state means that it also occupies an important position in the international pattern. In taking comprehensive factors into account we see that, while the distance is not dominant, China still has a high similarity analysis score.

5. Discussion and analysis of impact feature provenance

The analysis results for geo-potential and geospatial pattern suggest the geopolitical interests of the Arctic Passage can be divided between Russia and the U.S, who each account for a specific interest group. The two countries have very different positions on the Northern Sea Route. Russia, with its geographical advantages, would like to incorporate the Route as its internal water, implement exclusive jurisdiction and deny the right of innocent and transit passage to the vessels of other states. With a view to achieving these aims, it has promulgated a series of decrees and implemented a navigation permission system. The U.S, meanwhile, maintains that the Arctic Passage is a strait used for international navigation, and argues that the vessels of other states should enjoy rights of innocent and transit passage (Yang, 2019).

5.1 Analysis of the geopolitical attributes of the Northern Sea Route

Analysis of the similarity search results suggest that the SSVD between each state and Russia falls within 27–36; and, in the case of the U.S, within 6–9. There is a big gap between the two states. The main reason for this is that Russia has an absolute geographical advantage in the Northern Sea Route, and its exploitation of the Northern Sea Route far exceeds that of other states. In addition, its jurisdictional propositions also distinguish it from other states to a certain degree. The SSVD between each state and the U.S is small, and this is because there are no big differences in their channel utilization, and their jurisdiction propositions in some respects resemble the U.S positions on free navigation and the containment of neutrality.

Norway is the state with the most similar Similarity Rank value to Russia, and its geo-potential is also quite similar. In addition to the similarity of the distance advantage, this is also related to the fact that the key industries of the two countries are similar, as they are both the world’s major natural gas and oil exporters. The signing of a treaty (Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean) in 2010 suggests that they have begun to cooperate on the Arctic strategy. China is the second state that is similar to Russia. With regard to the perspective of geopolitical environment factors, the gap between their indicators is small, and their scores of hard power, soft power and interdependence are relatively similar. Their hard power scores respectively place them in first and second place. Finland is the third state that is similar to Russia. Their relationship is economic, and is particularly strong in the area of foreign trade. Finland is an important export market for Russia and is also, after Norway and the U.S, closest (geographically) to the Northern Sea Route.

China is the state with the Similarity Rank value that is closest to the U.S. With regard to geopolitical environment factors, they have the closest geo-economic level, and have maintained regular exchanges in the research and control of the Arctic region. Finland is the second state that is similar to the U.S: the two have a similar number of icebreakers, and their quality of port infrastructure and enrollment rate in higher institutions are similar. In addition, they also have close import and export trade relations. Norway is the third state that is similar to the U.S. They have similar soft power scores. They both belong to NATO and are allies, and this means there is a certain degree of mutual political trust. Sweden is the fourth state that is similar to the U.S. They have similar geopolitical and geo-cultural indicators, their soft power level is almost the same and they both have distance advantages.

The ranking of Japan and South Korea does not change in the similarity search with Russia and the U.S, and they are respectively in fifth and sixth place. There are no big changes in the ranking of states that follow them either. This is because, in the similarity analysis, these states do not pay much attention to the exploitation of the Northern Sea Route, which means their ranking is consistent with their geo-potential ranking to some extent.

5.2 The geospatial pattern and the navigation proposition of the Northern Sea Route

Taking the quantitative analysis and spatial pattern analysis of the geo-potential model into account, it will be noted that Russia’s power in exploiting the Northern Sea Route is far greater than other states. As a surround Arctic state with the longest coastline on the Arctic Ocean, Russia claims that the Arctic Passage as its internal water, and regards the construction of the Northern Sea Route as a crucial part of its Arctic strategy. Russia also depends on the Northern Sea Route for transportation and trade activities related to Arctic resource exploitation (Aalto, 2016; Staun, 2017).

The U.S has certain geo-potential advantages that relate to the Northern Sea Route. As the second key actor in the Arctic region, it has a dual identity, and is both an Arctic state and a hegemonic state in the Arctic region. It also insists on free navigation. It believes that the Arctic Passage is an international waterway, that all states have the right of transit passage and that all vessels have a right of innocent passage through the strait. It claims both ends connect the high seas for international navigation, and asserts this right cannot be hindered. It also claims that Russia is undermining the peace in the Arctic region. However, although the U.S is dissatisfied by Russia and Canada’s statement about incorporating the Arctic Passage as their domestic waterway, it is, vis-à-vis Russia, in a weak position in both the Arctic region and the Arctic Passage. It will accordingly begin by asserting that the Arctic Passage is an international resource, and that all vessels have a free navigation right. It will then seek to carry out international exchanges and cooperation on behalf of the interests of all mankind. Or it will contact Denmark, Norway and other Arctic states and take advantage of its membership of the Arctic Council. This will enable it to gain access to the coastal ports of the Arctic Ocean, suppress Russian expansion in the Arctic region and exploit the resources of the Arctic Passage (Xiao, 2012; Wang, 2018).

Norway’s use of the Northern Sea Route is strengthened by its geographic location. In the similarity analysis, Norway is the most similar to Russia. However, as the only NATO member whose land is connected to Russia (Williams, 2012), Norway regards the U.S as its most important ally, and treats close cooperation with the U.S and NATO as the cornerstone of its foreign and security policies. The clustering analysis suggests Norway and the United Sates are in the same category. Although Norway has clear geographical environment advantages in the Arctic Passage, its alliance with the U.S means that it will need to balance the relationship between Russia and the U.S in order to influence the future status of the Northern Sea Route. Denmark and Iceland are also allies of the U.S. Although they will not attempt to dominate the geo-potential of the Arctic Passage, they will, in seeking to establish their navigation right in the Arctic Passage, concur with the U.S and declare that the Arctic Passage is an international strait, by implications, all vessels must have the right to transit and enjoy innocent passage.

China has certain advantages in exploiting the geo-potential of the Northern Sea Route, and this is mainly due to its hard power. The specific advantages include capital foundation, technical support, human and material resources. Its cooperation with Russia in the infrastructure; construction of the Northern Sea Route, its demand and utilization of the Northern Sea Route in cooperation on the use of oil and gas resources, and the growth of its bilateral economic and trade cooperation with Russia mean that, for the foreseeable future, the two states will continue to closely cooperate on the exploitation and construction of the Northern Sea Route (Bennett, 2016). But China’s participation in the Northern Sea Route will be based on the basic principles of respect, cooperation, win-win and sustainability, and its jurisdiction over the Northern Sea Route will also be used to build a community and shared future for mankind (Alexeeva & Lasserre, 2012; Bennett, 2018).

Finland and Sweden both have good geo-potential, despite the fact that they do not own coastal ports on the Arctic Ocean and are not allies of the U.S. Their national power is relatively weak, so they may cooperate with Russia to advocate the distribution of benefits in the eight surrounding Arctic states, or may insist on free navigation through the Arctic Passage (Li & Sun, 2011). Their attitude toward the Arctic Passage will be decided by their diplomatic relations with the U.S and Russia.

Japan and South Korea occupy the upper places of geo-potential, and are both allies of the U.S. They can benefit from the economic potential of the Arctic Passage. They may be forced by the U.S to join the camp of ‘the right of free navigation’, as this will enable them to obtain rights and interests from the Arctic Passage that will help their own development (Tonami, 2016; Xiao, 2012).

Other non-Arctic states, such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Vietnam and Thailand, do not have geo-advantages that will enable them to benefit from other opportunities. In the first instance, they can obtain benefits from geo-economic interests brought by the channel opening. However, in the second, although they are constrained by non-Arctic state identity, they may try to serve the interests of all mankind. They will insist on the idea that the Arctic Passage represents the interests of all mankind, and will uphold the right of free navigation in the Arctic Passage. Meanwhile, further discussions will address changes in geopolitics, geo-economics, geostrategy and foreign affairs within different states.

6. Conclusion

This paper draws on the demands and comprehensive power of each state for the exploitation of the Arctic Passage, and selects 18 stakeholder states in Eurasia by referring to geo-economics, geostrategy, geo-technology, geo-culture, geo-politics, laws and regulations and channel utilization. It constructs a geopolitical environment index evaluation system of the Arctic Passage and makes a quantitative analysis of each state’s geo-potential and comprehensive power in the exploitation of the Northern Sea Route. It undertakes spatial clustering and similarity analysis, and discusses the geo-spatial pattern of the Northern Sea Route by referring to each state’s geopolitical environment factors and navigation propositions.

It asserts that a state’s potential in exploiting the Arctic Passage is determined by a number of factors. Russia has the strongest geo-potential, and this is due to its superior geographical location, strong economic and military power and mature navigation conditions. Norway is in second place, and China and the U.S follow behind. Geographical distance is a key factor in determining geo-potential. When national power is the same, and the state is closer to the Arctic Passage, it will be able to exploit the waterway to a greater extent. The natural advantage of closer distance cannot be changed and so various factors (including enhancing political, economic, military and technological power, increasing the number of icebreakers, promoting the construction of navigation infrastructure and enhancing the capability of channel operation) can help to improve the state’s ability to exploit the Northern Sea Route. Analysis suggests two camps formed in the Arctic region, in the form of the geopolitical interest groups represented by Russia and the U.S. This reflects the strong power of the U.S and Russia in the Arctic region. This pattern is influenced by their different Arctic strategies and approaches in the Arctic Passage. Russia claims to manage the Northern Sea Route as its internal water, and in seeking to achieve its goal in the construction of the Arctic Passage, has sought closer contact with resource states like Norway and infrastructure states like China. The U.S, as a world power, asserts that the Arctic Passage should be regarded as an international channel, and insists all states should have the right to transit and passage. Its Arctic governance pays more attention to national security and global interest, actively unites the Arctic stakeholders of Asian and European states and attaches particular importance to exchange and cooperation with other states.

This paper combines the methods of quantitative evaluation and spatial pattern analysis, and it provides a comprehensive and quantitative multi-factor evaluation model that can be applied to an analysis of the geopolitical environment factors of the Northern Sea Route. It helps to clarify discussion of the geopolitical environment pattern analysis of the Arctic Passage, and will contribute new methods that can be applied to the research of the strategic value of the Arctic Passage and associated geopolitical interests.

Acknowledgements

This research was funded by the National Key Research and Development Project (NO. 2016YFC1402701) and National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 41876229). We would like to show our sincere gratitude to EditSprings, who helped us to polish the language. We also thank the World Bank, WGI and the Northern Sea Route Information Office for the open source data.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data availability statement

The authors confirm that the data supporting the findings of this study are available within the article and its supplementary materials.

Supplementary material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/27658511.2024.2305983

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China [2016YFC1402701].