2,628
Views
0
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Original Articles

Reversal of nuclear-conventional entanglement in outer space

&
Pages 64-91 | Received 27 Feb 2023, Accepted 15 Aug 2023, Published online: 15 Sep 2023

Bibliography

  • Acton, James and Thomas MacDonald, ‘Nuclear Command-And-Control Satellites Should Be off Limits’, Defense One, 10 Dec. 2021.
  • Acton, James M., Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2013), 1–149.
  • Acton, James M., (ed.), Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2017).
  • Acton, James M., ’Escalation Through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-And-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War’, International Security 43/1 (Aug. 2018). 10.1162/isec_a_00320.
  • AFD-130821-034, Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures (U.S. Air Force Space Command 2013).
  • Agardy, Frederic (Interview), ‘The Aerospace Corporation’, (May 2023).
  • ’Air Force FY18 RdT&E Budget Justification, Vol II’, (2017).
  • ’Air Force FY19 RdT&E Budget Justification, Vol II’, (2018).
  • ’Air Force FY20 RdT&E Budget Justification, Vol II’, (2019).
  • Bacevich, A. J., The Pentomic Era: The US Army Between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, DC: National Defense UP 1986).
  • Bateman, Aaron, ’Mutually Assured Surveillance at Risk: Anti-Satellite Weapons and Cold War Arms Control’, Journal of Strategic Studies 45/1 (Jan. 2022), 119–42. 10.1080/01402390.2021.2019022.
  • Blair, Dennis and Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear’, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb. 2019.
  • Burbey, Douglas W., Mindy Gabbert, and Kathryn Bailey, ‘Middle-Tier Acquisition Authority Features Flexible Prototype and Fielding Options,’ Army AL&T Magazine, 12 Sept. 2019.
  • Burch, Ron, ‘The Case for Disaggregation of U.S. MILSATCOM’, IEEE MILCOM 2011 Military Communications Conference, Nov. 2011.
  • Carpenter, Daniel, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928 (Princeton UP 2002).
  • Carter, Donald A, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History 2015).
  • Christensen, Thomas J., ’The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Missile Force Modernization and Its Implications for the United States’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (Aug. 2012), 447–87. 10.1080/01402390.2012.714710.
  • Colby, Elbridge, From Sanctuary to Battlefield: A Framework for U.S. Defense and Deterrence Strategy for Space (Center for a New American Security Jan. 2016).
  • Cunningham, Fiona S. and M. Taylor Fravel ’Dangerous Confidence: Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation’, International Security 44/2 ( Fall 2019), 61–109. 10.1162/isec_a_00359.
  • Dickey, Robin, ’The Rise and Fall of Space Sanctuary in U.S. Policy’, Aerospace (1 Sept. 2020).
  • Dinerman, T., ‘Space Warfare: We Must Defend Our Big, Exquisite Satellites’, National Review, 1 May 2018.
  • DOD Inspector General Report No. DODIG-2020-109. ‘Special Report: Lessons Learned for Department of Defense Acquisition Officials During Acquisition Reform’, 31 July 2020
  • DOD Inspector General Report No. DODIG-2021-131, ‘Audit of Department of Defense Middle Tier of Acquisition Rapid Prototyping and Rapid Fielding Programs’, 28 Sept. 2021.
  • Erwin, S., ‘Pentagon Undecided on Future Path for Space Systems’, National Defense Magazine, 22 Apr. 2014.
  • Erwin, S., ‘U.S. to Ramp Up Spending on Classified Communications Satellites’, SpaceNews, 1 May 2022.
  • Fast Space: Leveraging Ultra Low-Cost Space Access for 21st Century Challenges (Air University 13 Jan. 2017).
  • Futter, Andrew and Benjamin Zala, ’Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons and the Onset of a Third Nuclear Age’, European Journal of International Security 6/3 (Aug. 2021), 257–77. 10.1017/eis.2021.2.
  • GAO-14-328T, Space Acquisitions: Acquisition Management Continues to Improve but Challenges Persist for Current and Future Programs (Government Accountability Office Mar. 2014).
  • GAO-19-439, Leadership Attention Needed to Effectively Implement Changes to Acquisition Oversight (Government Accountability Office 2018).
  • GAO-21-222. Weapon Systems Annual Assessment: Updated Program Oversight Approach Needed (Government Accountability Office June 2021).
  • GAO-21-520T, Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges and Opportunities with Acquiring Space Systems in a Changing Environment (Government Accountability Office May 2021).
  • GAO/NSIAD-99-2, Military Satellite Communications: Concerns with Milstar’s Support for Strategic and Tactical Forces (Government Accountability Office Nov. 1998).
  • Garrett, James M., ’Nuclear Weapons for the Battlefield: Deterrent or Fantasy?’, Journal of Strategic Studies 10/2 (1987), 168–88. 10.1080/01402398708437295.
  • Gomez, Eric, Nuclear Weapons: What We Should Know (Cato Unbound Sept. 2020).
  • Hampshire, Edward, ’Strategic and Budgetary Necessity, or Decision-Making ‘Along the Grain’? The Royal Navy and the 1981 Defence Review’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/7 (2016), 956–78. 10.1080/01402390.2016.1220365.
  • Harrison, Todd, The Future of Milsatcom (The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 24 July 2013).
  • Harrison, Todd, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Makena Young, Defense Against the Dark Arts in Space: Protecting Space Systems from Counterspace Weapons (Center for Strategic & International Studies Feb. 2021).
  • HASC No. 114-110, ‘House Armed Services Committee Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services; Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Hearing on Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request for National Security Space’, 15 Mar. 2016.
  • Hitchens, T., ’2021 Budget Will Fully Fund Next-Gen OPIR, Says Roper’, Breaking Defense 24 (Feb. 2020).
  • Hoehn, John R., Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) Modernization (Congressional Research Service, 8 Dec. 2020).
  • Institute for Defense Analysis Paper P-2857, ‘Estimating the Costs of Nuclear -Radiation-Hardened Military Satellites’, Nov. 1994.
  • Johnson, Kaitlyn, Thomas G. Roberts, and Brian Weeden, ’Mitigating Noncooperative RPOs in Geosynchonous Orbit’, Aether: A Journal of Strategic Airpower and Spacepower 1/4 ( Winter 2022).
  • Kaiser, Karl, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Josef Schulze, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A Response to an American Proposal for Renouncing the First Use of Nuclear Weapons’, Foreign Affairs, ( Summer 1982).
  • Lal, Bhayva, Global Trends in Small Satellites (IDA July 2017).
  • Linville, Dax and Robert A. Bettinger, ’An Argument Against Satellite Resiliency: Simplicity in the Face of Modern Satellite Design’, Air & Space Power Journal ( Spring 2020).
  • Logan, David C., ’Are They Reading Schelling in Beijing? The Dimensions, Drivers, and Risks of Nuclear-Conventional Entanglement in China’, Journal of Strategic Studies 46/1 (Nov. 2020), 5–55. 10.1080/01402390.2020.1844671.
  • MacDonald, Bruce W and Cameo Lance, ‘Disentangling Conventional and Nuclear Assets’, Milsat Magazine, July 2020.
  • Mehta, A., ‘Policy Shift: DoD is Pushing Major Program Management Back to the Military’, Defense News, 11 Dec. 2017.
  • Nichols, Tom, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland, Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO (Strategic Studies Institute 2012).
  • Nordin, Paul, ‘Other Hostile Environments’, in Wiley J. Larson and James R. Wertz, (eds.), Space Mission Design and Analysis 2nd, (Microcosm Inc. and Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992).
  • Panda, A., ‘China’s Dual-Capable Missiles: A Dangerous Feature, Not a Bug’, The Diplomat, 13 May 2020.
  • Pawlikowski, Ellen, Doug Loverro, and Tom Cristler, ’Space: Disruptive Challenges, New Opportunities and New Strategies’, Strategic Studies Quarterly ( Spring 2012).
  • Posen, Barry, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP 1991).
  • Reesman, Rebecca and James R. Wilson, The Physics of Space War: How Orbital Dynamics Constrain Space-To-Space Engagements (Center for Space Policy and Strategy, The Aerospace Corporation Oct. 2020).
  • Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures (Air Force Space Command 2013).
  • Riqiang, Wu, ’Assessing China-U.S. Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation’, International Security 46/3 ( Winter 2021/2022).
  • Risen, T., ‘Disaggregation,’ Aerospace America, Apr. 2017.
  • Rovner, Joshua, ’Two Kinds of Catastrophe: Nuclear Escalation and Protracted War in Asia’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/5 (2017), 696–730. 10.1080/01402390.2017.1293532.
  • Sagan, Scott, The Limits of Safety (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP 1993).
  • Soper, Gordon K. (testimony), ’Group Vice President, Defense Group, Inc’, in Hearing, House Small Business Committee, Subcommittee on Government Programs and Oversight (1 June 1999).
  • Stares, Paul, ’Space and US National Security’, Journal of Strategic Studies 6/4 (1983), 31–48. 10.1080/01402398308437166.
  • Strout, N., ‘What Will the Space Development Agency Really Do?’, C4ISRnet, 24 July 2019.
  • Talmadge, Caitlin ’Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States’, International Security 41/4 ( Spring 2017), 50–92. 10.1162/ISEC_a_00274.
  • Talmadge, Caitlin, ‘Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control’, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec. 2018.
  • Tannenwald, Nina and James M. Acton, Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age: Emerging Risks and Declining Norms in the Age of Technological Innovation and Changing Nuclear Doctrines (Cambridge, Mass: American Academy of Arts and Sciences 2018).
  • Taverney, T., ‘Resilient, Disaggregated, and Mixed Constellations’, The Space Review, 29 Aug. 2011.
  • Thompson, Loren, ‘Satellite Disaggregation: The Space Community’s Newest Way of Wasting Money’, Lexington Institute, 8 Feb. 2013.
  • Townsend, Brad, ’Strategic Choice and the Orbital Security Dilemma’, Strategic Studies Quarterly ( Spring 2020).
  • Tran, Mimi and Peggy Hillebrandt, ‘Time to Get to Milestone B: Protected Anti-Jam Tactical SATCOM (PATS) Case Study’, Aerospace report ATR-2018-00333, (2018).
  • U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, ‘The Future of DoD SATCOM: Delivering Fighting SATCOM’, Milsat Magazine, (Apr. 2019).
  • U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space (Mar. 2022).
  • U.S. Department of Defense Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite (AEHF).
  • U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (Feb. 2018).
  • U.S. Department of the Air Force, ‘Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 23 Budget Estimates – Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation, Space Force’, Apr. 2022.
  • U.S. Space Force Space Operations Command, Fact Sheet – Milstar Satellite Communications Systems (Milstar) (Aug. 2021).
  • Vedda, James A. and Peter L. Hays, Major Policy Issues in Evolving Global Space Operations (The Aerospace Corporation and Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies Feb. 2018).
  • Wagner, Katherine, ‘Optimization of Disaggregated Space Systems Using the Disaggregated Integral Systems Concept Optimization Technology Methodology’, unpublished dissertation, June 2020.
  • Weeden, Brian and Victoria Samson, ed., Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment (Secure World Foundation Apr. 2023).
  • Wilson, James Q., Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (Basic Books 1989).
  • Yost, David S., ’The History of NATO Theater Nuclear Force Policy: Key Findings from the Sandia Conference’, Journal of Strategic Studies 15/2 (June 1992), 228–61. 10.1080/01402399208437482.
  • Zhao, Tong and Li Bin, ’The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement: A Chinese Perspective’, in in James M. Acton (ed.), Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2017).